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THE  UNIVERSITY   LIB'^ARY 

UNIVERSITY   OF   CALIFORNIA.   SAN   DIEGO 

LA  JOLLA,  CALIFORNIA 


itimli'; 


<JN]VLH',llr  Ol    (,AI  IKJHNIA,  SAN  UlEf^O 


/) 


3  1822  00308  1395 


.  X 


presented  to  the 
UNIVFRSIT^'  LIRRAHY 

r\T\TR^ITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
SAN  DIFGO 

by 

Dr.    D.    Frankville 


The 
European  War 


August  1914  — March  1915 


By 

Anthony  Arnoux,  Ph.  D.,   LL.  B. 


VOLUME  I 


RITTER  &  COMPANY 

BOSTON,  MASS. 

1917 


FIFTH  EDITION 


COPYRIGHT    1917 
ANTHONY  ARNOUX 


INDEX. 

I.     History  of  Europe  from  1871  to  the  War. 
II.     The  Outbreak  of  the  War. 

III.  The  Campaign  in  the  West.    The  Invasion  of 

Belgium. 

IV.  The  Campaign  in  the  West.    Tjie  Invasion  of 

France. 

V.     The  Campaign  in  the  West.    The  Battle  of  the 

Marne. 
VI.     The  Campaign  in  the  West.    The  Battle  of  the 
Aisne. 

VII.     The  Campaign  in  the  West.     The    Siege    of 
Antwerp.     The   Battles   of   Ypres. 

VIII.  The  Campaign  in  the  West.     From  Noyon  to 
the  Vosges. 

IX.  The  Campaign  in  the  East.    East  Prussia. 

X.  The  Campaign  in  the  East.     Poland. 

XL  The  Campaign  in  the  East.     Galicia. 

XII.  The  Turco-Russian  Campaign. 

XIII.  The  Serbian  Campaign. 

XIV.  Kiao-Chou  and  South  Africa  Campaign. 
XV.  The  Naval  War.     North  Sea.     . 

XVI.  The  Naval  War.     High  Seas. 

XVII.  The    Naval    War.      The    Mediterranean    and 

Black  Sea. 
Appendix. 


CHAPTER  I. 

HISTORY   OF  EUROPE   FROM   1871    TO 
THE  WAR 


In  the  early  part  of  1871,  a  result  largely  of  the 
Franco-Prussian  war,  the  German  empire  came  into 
being,  as  the  creation  of  Bismark,  under  the  leadership 
of  the  Prussian  king. 

The  treaty  of  1871,  which  terminated  this  war,  took 
from  France  the  two  provinces  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, and  united  them  to  the  German  empire.  This, 
as  regards  the  larger  portion  of  the  territory  and  as 
regards  the  language  and  the  characteristics  of  the 
majority  of  the  people  inhabiting  these  countries,  was 
a  reversion  to  their  original  political  affiliations,  as 
the  bulk  of  these  territories  had  been  taken  away 
from  Germany,  partly  by  force  and  partly  by  fraud,  by 
Louis  XIV  of  France.  The  city  and  fortress  of  Metz 
and  its  surrounding  district,  how-ever,  were  French- 
speaking  and  had  never  been  German,  either  politi- 
cally or  by  affiliation,  hence  Bismark  at  the  time  of 
the  annexation  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  Germany 
opposed  the  inclusion  of  Metz  in  the  territory  an- 
nexed, but  the  military  leaders  in  Germany  at  the 
time  viewed  the  continued  possession  of  the  fortress 
by  France  as  a  danger  to  the  future  tranquillity  of  the 
German  empire,  and  Bismark,  therefore,  against  his 
judgment,  acquiesced  in  its  being  included  in  the  ter- 
ritory to  be  taken. 

Viewed  from  the  political  standpoint,  the  future 
course  of  European  history  proved  the  soundness  of 
Bismark's  contention.  By  language,  by  religion  and 
by  national  feeling.  Metz  belonged  to  France,  but, 
more  important  than  the  fact  that  Metz  became  Ger- 
man, was  the  fact  that  the  possession  of  this  French- 
speaking,  French-feeling  people  by  Germany,  gave  life 
in  France  to  continuous  agitation  for  its  return  to  the 

9 


History  of  Europe— 1871   to  the  War 

motherland  by  the  only  means  possible,  re-conquest. 

Though,  possibly,  in  the  course  of  time,  France 
might  have  acquiesced  in  the  taking  from  it  of  the 
German-speaking  parts  of  Al>ace- Lorraine,  the  con- 
tinued spectacle  of  the  French-speaking  inhabitants 
of  the  territory  of  Metz  at  their  very  doors,  excited 
and  irritated  them  a>  no  other  conceivable  cause  could 
have  done,  and  made  thetn  most  eager  for  it3  re-io- 
corporation  into  the  territory  of  I'rancc.  and  this  de- 
sire, as  regard>  the  lesser  portion  of  the  conquered 
territory,  speedily  included  the  whole  of  the  conquered 
territory'. 

For  many  years  m  France,  up  to  the  outbreak  of 
this  war  of  1914,  the  rallying  call  of  every  political 
adventurer,  whether  it  was  a  P.oulanger  or  a  Paul 
Delourredc.  and  one  which  found  an  immediate  re- 
sponse in  the  hearts  of  French  people,  was  the  re- 
taking from  the  hated  German^  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine. 

Therefore,  for  forty  years,  in  every  possible  way. 
the  flame  of  the  resentment,  which,  unfortunately,  ex- 
isted in  a  portion  of  the  inhabitants  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, against  Germany  was  fanned  by  the  French,  by 
inflammatory  speeches,  by  caricatures,  in  literature, 
in  poetry  and  by  everv  conceivable  means,  legitimate 
or  illegitimate,  which  one  people  can  take  to  incite 
another  to  open  or  sullen  rebellion.  The  works  of 
liie  caricaturist.  Hansi,  which  have  attained  world- 
wide reputation  (caricatures  so  gross  that  they  verge 
on  positi^  c  indecency),  were  circulated  extensively 
through* »ut  Franco  in  the  last  three  or  four  years  pre- 
ceding tlu'  war.  and  greatly  aided  in  increasing  French 
resentment  against  Germany. 

Another  fact  ari«iing  from  the  war  of  1870.  wliich 
was  not  without  influence  in  the  pre>^ent  condition  of 
affairs,  and  which  fact  really  constitutes  the  com- 
mencement of  the  antagonism  between  Kngland  and 
Germany,  was  that,  during  the  Franco-Pru^-sian  war. 
England's  .sympathies  ran  vcrv  stronglv  with  France, 
and  this  vympathv  was  not  confined  to  mrrr  verbal 
expressir^n.  but  more  substantial  proofs  were  given. 
Many  British  fought  on  the  .«;ide  of  France  in  a  qiiarrel 
in  whirh  their  nation  had  no  cause  for  interference. 
and  firitish  manuf.Trturers  sccretlv  supplied  munitions 
of  war  to  th«-  I'rmrh.  a  fact  which  was  ascertained  by 

10 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

the  German  Government  and  forthwith  given  as  much 
publicity  as  possible. 

Moreover,  a  portion  of  the  British  press,  which  is 
almost  untrammelled  in  its  license,  not  liberty,  and 
almost  as  vehement  and  vituperative  in  its  forms  of 
expression  as  the  American  press,  had  espoused  the 
French  cause  with  undue  enthusiasm  and  had  vented 
its  partisanship  in  almost  daily  diatribes  and  fulmina- 
tions  against  Germany  for  its  alleged  harshness  in 
conducting  the  war,  for  its  demand  for  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  for  its  demand  for  the  indemnity,  and  in 
general  vituperation  against  the  German  people  and 
German  army.  Necessarily  the  German  newspapers, 
the  only  organ  for  expression  of  opinion  which  was 
at  the  disposal  of  the  German  people  when  these  ut- 
terances of  the  British  press  came  to  their  notice, 
retaliated  in  kind  and  a  war  of  invective  ensued  which 
lasted  for  several  years  and  created  the  seed  of  mutual 
mistrust  and  dislike. 

At  this  point  it  is  well  to  note  that  sufficient  atten- 
tion has  not  been  paid  by  historians  to  the  role  which 
is  played  by  the  modern  press,  in  creating  animosities 
between  peoples.  Self-restraint  at  times  of  excite- 
ment appears  to  be  unknown  and  in  espousing  the 
cause  of  one  side  or  the  other  the  press  knowingly 
prints  the  grossest  falsehoods,  if  calculated  to  injure 
in  the  eyes  of  the  public  to  which  it  addresses  itself, 
the  cause  which  it  dislikes — nothing  too  noble,  noth- 
ing too  holy  for  these  anonymous  and  ignorant  scrib- 
blers to  defame. 

Here  it  may  be  said  that  probably  never  in  the 
history  of  the  world  has  any  press  so  generally  and 
so  grossly  misconducted  itself,  so  disregarded  the 
rules  of  elementary  decency,  fairness  and  justice  as 
has  the  press  of  the  United  States  in  the  present  war. 
Nor  has  it  hesitated  wilfully  to  misrepresent  the  rules 
of  international  law  and  to  distort  historical  facts  in 
order  to  delude  the  public. 

This  feeling  of  mutual  distrust  and  lack  of  con- 
fidence between  the  peoples  of  Great  Britain  and  of 
Germany  was  increased  a  little  later  by  the  conduct 
of  the  British  press  and  people  in  the  crisis  of  1875. 

At  this  time,  France  having  paid  off  the  indem.nity 
exacted  by  the  Peace  of  1871,  ranged  herself  in  oppo- 
sition to  Germany  on  a  question  of  policy,  and  war 

11 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

nearly  resulted,  in  fact,  war  would  have  resulted,  had  it 
not  been  for  the  expressed  purpose  ol  Great  Britain  to 
intervene  therein. 

Shortly  after  this  came  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in 
1878.  By  this  Conj^jress  the  iiuiependence  of  Scrvia 
and  Bulgaria,  which,  though  practically  existing  be- 
fore, had  been  unrecognized  by  the  powers,  was  fixed 
and  defined,  the  status  of  Rumania  settled,  while 
Bosnia  and  Herzogovina  were  turned  over  to  Austria 
for  administration,  with  powers  so  great  that  the 
turning  ovei  amounted  practically  to  annexation  to 
the  dual  monarchy.  Unfortunately,  the  Congress  of 
Berlin  did  not  proceed  along  broad  and  permanent 
lines. 

The  Turko-Russo  war  had  just  been  concluded  and 
had  left  behind  it  several  sources  of  bitterness.  Dur- 
ing this  war,  at  the  last  moment,  England  had  inter- 
fered and  prevented  Russia  from  obtaining  what  had 
been  the  main  object  of  her  policy  for  generati<Mis — 
the  possession  of  Constantinople.  Russia's  disappoint- 
ment on  this  occasion  was  extreme,  and  she  came  to 
the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  a  hostile  mood  towards  most 
of  the  powers,  particularly  towards  England,  which 
condition  of  affairs  prevented  the  Congress  from  es- 
tablishing the  bases  of  a  lasting  situation  iti  the 
Balkans. 

After  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  l-'rance  for  a  tinv 
turned  her  attention  to  the  gathering  together  of  a 
colonial  empire  (though,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  she  had 
begun  to  m?ke  some  moves  in  this  direction  almost 
immediately  after  the  war"),  and  embarked  in  con- 
quests far  from  her  home  shores  in  Asia,  .^frica.  Mad- 
ap^scar  and  elsewhere,  and.  finally  in  liUK  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  had  succeeded  in  gathering  to- 
gether the  largest  colonial  empire  possessed  by  any 
power  in  the  world,  with  the  exception  of  Great 
Britain. 

The  French,  who  are  not  in  any  sense  of  the  wonl 
a  commercial  people,  thus  found  a  sphere  of  activity 
which  was  in  harmony  with  their  national  character 
True  it  is  that  these  colonics  in  no  wise  conduced 
to  their  national  prosperity,  and  that  after  once  having 
made  them  colonics  their  administration  was  so  ex- 
ceedingly complicated  by  red  tape  and  bureaucratic 
officials  tha;  the  colonies  remained  without  colonists, 

1? 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

contributing  little  to  the  good  of  the  world  or  the 
mother  country.  While  the  French  have  a  great  gift 
for  conciliating  and  winning  the  confidence  of  un- 
civilized peoples,  they  have  not  the  English  power  of 
making  a  colony  prosper  and  of  becoming  a  source  of 
strength  and  profit  to  the  mother  country. 

After  a  time  this  new  toy  failed  to  occupy  the  minds 
or  the  desire  for  glory  of  the  French,  and  their  eyes 
were  again  turned  toward  their  northern  neigh- 
bor, and  from  this  time,  about  1890,  we  may  note  a 
rise  in  the  flood  of  French  hatred  toward  Germany, 
which  had  during  the  colony  adventure  been  some- 
what abated. 

In  the  time  which  had  elapsed  since  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  the  relations  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
had  not  grown  better,  in  fact,  they  had  grown  worse. 
The  growing  commercial  expansion  of  Germany  which 
had  resulted  in  her  beginning  to  oust  Great  Britain 
from  many  of  the  markets  of  the  world,  which  that 
country  had  regarded  for  centuries  as  almost  her  pri- 
vate property,  had  aroused  in  Great  Britain  a  sense  of 
decided  uneasiness. 

Immediately  after  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  Germany 
formed  a  defensive  alliance  with  Austria,  which  was 
intended  to  check  Russia's  aggressive  methods.  In 
speaking  of  this.  Lord  Salisbury  said :  "To  all  those 
who  care  for  the  peace  of  Europe  and  take  an  interest 
in  the  independence  of  nations,  I  would  exclaim  *A 
crowning  mercy  has  been  vouchsafed  to  the  world.' " 

Although  it  may  not  be  apparent  at  the  moment  to 
Great  Britain  that  her  greatest  statesman  of  the  last 
hundred  years  spoke  the  truth  in  these  words,  it  is 
well  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  that  before  even 
a  few  years  from  the  present  time  shall  have  passed, 
she  will  recognize  that  his  vision  of  the  future  was 
keener  and  truer  than  that  of  the  pygmies  who  today 
control  her  government,  and  who  have  made  her  take 
up  arms  in  aid  of  the  great  menace  to  the  future  peace, 
prosperity  and  happiness  of  the  entire  world — Russia. 

Four  years  after,  this  league  was  strengthened  by 
the  adherence  of  Italy  thereto.  This  adherence  was 
the  result  of  the  occupation  of  Tunis,  by  France,  which 
country  Italy  had  for  a  long  time  intended  herself  to 
annex,  and  her  intense  annoyance  at  being  forestalled 
finally  resulted   in   her   entering  into   the  alliance  of 

13 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

those  op>pt)S€<l  lo  I'Vancc.  'riu»>  tlif  .siiiuc  ci>nilici  gave 
France  cause  for  anxiety  as  to  her  position  in  North 
Africa,  and  f trrfii:t!Kiu<l  (u-nnaiiy  un  the  continent  of 
ICuropc. 

Ahout  this  time,  to  be  precise,  in  the  year  1882, 
lireat  liritani  inter\eneil  in  Kgypt  against  Arabi 
I'asha.  with  the  result  that  ^iie  put  an  end  to  the  more 
*»r  leas  cordial  relations  which  had,  prior  to  that  time, 
existctl  between  her  gi»vcrntnent  and  that  of  Turkey. 
as  'Turkey  regarded  this  intcr\entiun  as  an  interfer- 
ence with  her  sn^•erei^n  ri«»hts  u\er  Egypt.  The 
situation  thus  created  was  taken  advantage  of  by 
(lermany.  which  at  that  time  showed  great  interest  in 
and  thereafter  aided  Turkey  in  many  ways,  particu- 
larly during  her  first  war  with  Cjrecce.  and  in  the  Bal- 
kan wars.  C'lcrtnany  thu.«>  succeeded  in  convincing  her 
that  she  was  Turkey  ;.  only  friend  among  the  powers 
of   Europe. 

In  1H9H.  at  the  time  . >t  the  visit  <>i  the  Kaiser  to  the 
ll«)l\  l..iM<l.  the  I'.agdad  Kailway  scheme  first  took  defi- 
nite shaj)e.  and  on  the  occasion  of  his  visit  to  the  Sul- 
tan, the  Emperor  not  only  obtained  concessions  for  the 
Christian  pilgrims  to  Jerusalem  from  that  monarch,  but 
he  also  obtained  from  the  Sultan  a  \  crbal  consent  to 
the  construction  of  the  Bagdad  Kailway.  the  I'ortc  fi- 
nally in  lIMiV  issuing  a  firman  authorizing  that  enterprise. 

The  Bagdad  kailway  then  took  shape,  and  in  1903 
tlie  German  Bagdad  Syndicate  secured  a  concession  to 
extend  its  line  to  Koweit  on  the  Persian  (iulf.  It  was 
evident  that  this  would  form  a  short  route  of  ct)nnec- 
tion  between  Europe  and  India,  and  particularly  if,  as 
was  contemplated,  it  was  connected  with  the  European 
lines  by  a  tunnel  under  the  Bosphorus,  since  there 
would  be  then  throujih  connection  from  Ostend  or 
Antwerp  to  the  Persian  T.ulf.  with  very  serious  results 
to  British   shipping   ititerestN. 

To  the  Turks  it  appeared  that  this  new  line  would 
double  the  military  strength  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
and  that,  furthertnnre.  the  prosperity  f»f  Mesopotamia 
and  Asia  Minor  would  revive,  stimulatetl  as  it  would 
be  by  innnigration  from  luirope  into  these  rich  coun- 
tries. Consequently,  England  l>e^an  to  scrutinize  the 
Bai^d.id  scheme  very  closely,  and  finally  assumed  ati 
attitude  J)f  (>pp<»sition,  veiled  to  a  degree  in  that 
Itritafn  t^nlv  opposed  the  original  scheme  as  far  as  it 

11 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

concerned  the  Persian  Gulf,  alleging  that  this  would 
enable  Germany  and  Turkey  to  send  troops  quickly  to 
the  confines  of  Persia  and  thus  to  India. 

Years  had  elapsed  during  these  negotiations,  during 
all  of  which  the  Teutonic  ascendency  in  Constantino- 
ple had  grown  stronger.  Therefore,  all  the  more  rea- 
son had  the  English  for  opposing  this  German  scheme 
of  pacific  i)enetration  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  where  the 
♦British  had  long  enjoyed  an  extremely  valuable  trade, 
so  in  lull  Sir  Edward  Grey  demanded  that  if  the  rail- 
way were  built  to  the  Gulf,  it  should  be  purely  a  com- 
mercial undertaking.  This  was  brought  about  not 
only  by  Germany's  ascendency  in  Turkey,  but  by  the 
fact  that  when  the  Czar  visited  the  Kaiser  at  Potsdam 
in  November,  1909,  they  conferred  together  on  the 
subject  of  this  railway,  and  Russia  agreed  not  to  op- 
pose the  scheme,  but  even  to  link  up  that  railway  with 
her  Persian  lines,  Germany,  in  return,  recognizing  thai 
Russia  had  special  political  and  strategic  interests  in 
North  Persia.  Germany  further  secured  permission 
from  the  Sultan  to  complete  and  improve  the  branch 
line  from  Damascus  south,  past  the  east  of  the  Dead 
Sea  and  the  Sinaitic  Peninsula  to  Mecca.  This  was 
represented  as  a  semi-philanthropic  enterprise,  intend- 
ed to  lessen  the  hardships  of  the  pilgrims  proceeding 
to  Mecca,  but  from  the  British  viewpoint  was  intended 
to  menace  Egypt,  and  besides  that  it  came  within 
striking  distance  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

The  subsequent  history  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  need 
not  here  be  told  in  extenso.  Suffice  it  to  sav  that  Eng- 
land's opposition  to  its  construction  resulted  in  a  com- 
promise, and  that  France  was  recognized  as  having  an 
interest  in  the  results  of  such  compromise,  although  she 
had  no  real  interest  whatever  in  the  country  affected, 
it  never  having  been  considered  within  the  sphere  of 
her  influence. 

This  compromise  was  a  diplomatic  and  commercial 
defeat  for  Germany,  and  did  not  tend  to  improve  her 
relations  with  Great  Britain, 

Russia  and  Germany  in  1884  drew  a  little  closer  to- 
gether than  they  had  been  in  the  years  immediately 
following  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  and  in  that  year  signed  a 
new  treaty  which  in  fact  revived  the  "Three  Emperor" 
league  of  187'^,  and  immediately  afterwards  Russia  an- 

'15 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

nexed  Merv  to\vards  the  Indian  border,  thereby  bring- 
injj  about  considerable  uneasiness  in  Great  Britain. 

For  some  years,  in  tact  since  1876,  Germany  had 
been  castinj^  rather  interested  glances  on  the  situa- 
tion in  South  Africa.  In  that  year  the  Boer  Re- 
public^ sent  a  delegation  to  Berlin  for  the  purpose  of 
recjuesting  Germany  to  protect  them  against  what 
they  even  then  foresaw  as  prol)ahlc — their  annexation 
to  Cape  Colony,  tlie  I'ocis  claitniiig  even  at  that  early 
period  that  such  was  undoubtedly  the  design  of  Cireat 
Britain.  From  this  interest  in  African  affairs  during 
the  next  few  years  s]>rang  several  sources  of  bitterness 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  the  Delagoa 
hay  incident  being  the  most  important.  Space  will 
not  ]icrinit  entering  into  details  (^f  the  various  nego- 
tiations and  intrigues  of  the  next  few  years,  but  as  a 
result.  Germany  expanded  considerably  in  Africa  and 
gained  the  Cameroons  in  18^5.  German  Fast  .Africa 
iHH«i-lS!»(i  and  German  New  Guinea  1884-1885. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  this  colonial  expansion 
(»f  Germany  occurred  at  a  time  when  her  fleet  was 
comparatively  insignificant,  and  that  in  the  very  early 
stages  of  this  expansion,  two  British  governments,  that 
of  Mr.  ("iladstone  and  that  of  Lord  Salisbury,  looked 
I'oon  that  expansion  as  an  indication  of  commendable 
development.  Mr.  Gladstone  indeed  went  so  far  as  to  say 
"if  Germany  is  to  become  a  colonizing  |K»wer,  all  I  can  say 
is  'God  speed  her'  and  hail  her  in  entering  upon  that  cause, 
in  her  associating  herself  with  us  in  carrying  the  light  of 
civilization  to  the  places  that  depend  upon  it,  to  the  more 
backward  and  less  civilized  regions  of  the  world." 

But  it  is  apparent  that  Great  Britain  quickly  changed 
her  opinion  as  soon  as  the  British  merchants  found 
that  the  tremendous  commercial  and  manufacturing 
expansion  of  (iermany,  accompanied  with  the  thor- 
•  lUijhne'^s  and  foresi^'htedness  with  which  its  manufac- 
turers and  merchants  attacked  the  prol)lem  of  the  dis- 
tribution I't  their  products,  was  as  a  result,  menacing 
P.ritish  commercial  supremacy  everywhere.  From  the 
year  1888  to  the  present  time  this  feeling  of  antago- 
nism has  constantly  grown  stronger  and  more  vindent 
.imong  the  British  commercial  classes,  which  in  turn 
have  influenced  the  policy  of  the  British  government. 

From  1890  onward.  France  and  Russia. — Russia  hav- 
ing severed  her  treaty  relation  with  Germany.— had  en- 
tered into  some  sort  d  alliance.    I'xactly  how   far  this 

16 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

alliance  went  at  that  time  we  do  not  know,  but  we  do 
know  that  it  was  directed  against  Germany.  As  has 
been  pointed  out,  the  French  hatred  of  Germany  had  been 
revived  in  1890  and  had  entered  upon  a  fresh  and  stronger 
life,  France  claims,  and  always  has  claimed,  that  this 
alliance  was  defensive,  but  the  difference  between  a  de- 
fensive and  an  offensive  alliance  is  really  only  a  question 
of  a  favorable  opportunity  presenting  itself.  In  1895  this 
alliance  was  publicly  announced  by  the  French  and  Rus- 
sian fleet  appearing  together  at  the  opening  of  the  Kiel 
Canal,  and  in  1904,  shortly  after  the  death  of  Queen  Vic- 
toria, was  tacitly  adhered  to  by  Great  Britain. 

The  alliance  between  Russia  and  France  was  entered 
into  from  different  motives  by  the  interested  parties. 
The  motive  of  France  was  to  secure  protection  and  aid 
against  Germany,  protection  against  possible  aggresion  on 
the  part  of  Germany,  aid  in  the  great  design  of  the 
recovery  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and  the  humiliation  of 
Germany  to  the  same  extent  that  Germany  had  humili- 
ated her  in  '71.  These  objects  have  been  sometimes  dor- 
mant and  sometimes  conscious,  but  ever-present  under- 
lying motives  of  all  French  action  in  the  political  sphere 
in  the  last  forty  years. 

The  Russian  motive  was  a  financial  one.  France  is 
one  of  the  richest  countries  in  the  world,  not  in  re- 
sources but  in  liquid  assets.  Russia  had  and  has  enor- 
mous undeveloped  resources  and  a  great  governmental 
need  for  money.  In  the  mind  of  Russia,  France  was  a 
gold  mine  to  be  exploited,  and  during  the  years  that  fol- 
lowed, most  nobly  was  this  gold  mine  exploited.  The 
French,  as  has  been  said,  are  not  a  commercial  people, 
and,  led  away  by  the  possibilities  of  achieving  the  poet- 
ical object  of  revenge  on  the  hated  Teuton,  were  for  a 
long  time  available  on  anv  and  every  occasion  for  ad- 
vances of  greater  or  smaller  magnitude. 

Not  only  were  these  French  investments  made  in  gov- 
ernmental securities  of  Russia,  but  the  French  embarked 
on  many  private  enterprises  for  the  development  of  Rus- 
sian resources,  considering  that  the  development  of  such 
resources  would  give  Russia  additional  funds,  which 
eventually  could  be  used  for  the  great  purpose.  After 
many  years,  however,  as  the  great  purpose  appeared  no 
nearer  attainment,  and  as  Russia's  demands  for  money 
were  insatiable,  there  was  a  momentary  slackening  in  the 
readiness  of  France  to  open  her  purse,  so  that  the  last 
few  loans  made  to  Russia  were  not  made  with  the  same 

17 


Histon-  of  Europe— 1871  to  the  War 

enthusiasm  as  those  before,  and  had  the  condition  at- 
tached that  these  advances  should  be  spent  in  their  en- 
tirety in  increasing^  the  Russian  army,  in  providing  strate- 
gic railroads,  and  increasing  Russia's  preparation  for  war. 

The  last  loan  in  1912  had  particularly  stringent  con- 
ditiotis  annexed.  Then  it  was  that  Russia  raised  iier 
army  to  a  peace  strength  of  l,250,00u,  and  began 
building  a  complete  s>!fstem  of  strategic  railroads 
along  the  German  borders.  These  were  not  finished 
when   the   storm   broke. 

There  is.  perhaps,  no  person  more  responsible  for 
the  understanding  between  France,  Russia  and  Eng- 
land than  Kdward  \'II.  Queen  Victoria  was  one  of  the 
ablest  diplomats  of  her  time,  and  Edward  V'll.  who,  to 
a  large  degree,  inherited  her  talent,  shortly  after  his 
accession  started  on  a  series  of  journeys  to  the  chiefs 
of  state  of  many  of  the  European  countries,  which  had 
as  their  object  the  improvement  of  England's  relations 
with  such  countries. 

At  this  time  the  relations  of  England  with  France 
were  particularly  bad.  The  old  historic  hatred  still 
existed  amoni;  the  intellectuals,  and  the  hatred  of  the 
mob  had  been  stimulated  by  recent  events  in  tiic  Boer 
War,  the  sympathies  of  France  running  almost  unani- 
mously with  the  Boers  in  the  conflict. 

The  writer  speaks  from  personal  knowledge  on  this 
point,  having  lived  in  France  continuously  from  the 
latter  part  of  1900  to  the  end  of  190«;  and  from  per- 
sonal observation  knows  that,  in  the  years  after  the 
Boer  war,  it  was  inadvisable  for  an  English  woman 
to  walk  the  streets  of  Paris  unescorted. 

The  Kint,^  ably  assisted  by  the  heads  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  day  in  Orcat  l^ritain,  very  .<;kilfully  played 
on  the  French  hatred  of  Germany  during  his  first  visit, 
which  visit  was  duly  returned  by  the  French  President. 
Little  by  little  the  relations  grew  better,  and  finally,  in 
1904,  an  agreement  in  regard  to  several  matters  in  dis- 
pute between  the  countries,  particularly  in  relation  to 
Egypt,  was  reached,  and  hatred  very  soon  changed  al- 
most to  love.  France  perceived  the  overwhelming  ad- 
vantage it  would  be  to  her.  already  allied  with  Russia, 
to  have  the  greatest  sea  power  in  the  world  on  more 
fricndlv  terms  with  her,  when  the  moment  came  for 
striking  at  the  ever  haterl  "Allemagne.'* 

Other  journe^'<»  produced  equally  happy  results,  and 

18 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

the  effect  was  to  group  all  of  the  elements  in  Euro- 
pean politics  opposed  to  Germany  together  and  to 
constitute  forces  outside  of  Europe  which  would  op- 
pose German  expansion  either  territorially  or  commer- 
cially by  all  possible  means. 

During  the  ten  years  from  1890  to  1900,  this  com- 
mercial and  industrial  expansion  went  on  with  ever 
increasing  rapidity,  while  during  this  time  several 
causes  for  friction  arose  between  Germany  and  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  embarked  on  the  crowning  sin 
of  her  career,  to  British  eyes,  the  creation  of  a  great 
navy. 

Up  to  the  launching  of  the  Dreadnought  by  Great 
Britain,  Germany's  efforts  at  creating  a  navy  able  to 
cope  with  hers  were  not  remarkably  successful,  owing 
to  the  great  advance  in  constructed  ships  Great  Britain 
possessed. 

But  the  success  of  this  dreadnought  type  of  battle- 
ship, which  practically  sent  all  ships  constructed  be- 
fore it  to  the  junk  heap,  was  Germany's  opportunity 
which  she  improved,  starting  in  on  a  well  reasoned 
plan  of  construction  that  in  a  very  few  years  raised 
her  navy  to  the  second  strongest  in  the  world,  and 
bade  fair  in  a  few  years  more  to  create  a  fleet  fully  as 
strong  as  that  of  Great  Britain.  This  latter  power  did 
not  view  this  proceeding  on  Germany's  part  with 
equanimity.  She  has  herself  for  many  years  added  to  her 
fleet  on  the  principle  of  keeping  always  equal  in  strength 
to  the  two  strongest  fleets  which  could  be  opposed  to  it. 

Germany's  program  of  construction  obliged  Great 
Britain  to  strain  every  financial  nerve  to  maintain  the 
established  proportion.  So  g^eat  was  this  strain  that 
on  one  occasion  she  proposed  to  Germany  that  the 
construction  of  warships  in  the  future  be  limited.  She 
was  willing  to  pledge  herself  to  only  build  five  ships 
to  each  three  built  by  Germany.  Somehow  or  other 
the  merits  of  this  proposition  did  not  appear  clear  to 
Germany,  so  the  race  in  construction  continued  and 
the  British  middle  classes,  who  largely  had  to  pay  the 
cost  of  the  British  construction,  and  whom  Germany 
was  also  injuring  by  taking  their  customers  from  them 
in  the  world's  markets  in  fair  and  open  competition,  did 
not  have  their  love  for  Germany  increased. 

After  the  introduction  of  the  construction  of  battle- 
ships of  the  dreadnought  and  super-dreadnought  type, 
it  was  at  once  apparent  to  the  German  naval  authorities 

19 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

that  unless  the  Kiel  Canal  was  widened  and  deepened, 
so  that  ships  of  this  size  and  draft  of  water  were  able 
to  use  this  channel,  the  two  great  naval  ports  of  Kiel 
ami  \\  illichnshavon  would  be  completely  isolated  from 
each  otlicr  and,  besides  that,  the  ships  in  the  Baltic 
would  have  great  difficulty  in  passing  luio  the  North 
Sea,  if  opposed.  Consequently  the  deepening  and 
widening  of  the  Kiel  Canal  was  determined  upon  and 
the  date  for  the  completion  of  tiiis  work  was  fixed  for 
1915.  But  after  the  work  was  started,  it  was  concluded 
to  hurry  it  through  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  it  con- 
sequently wa>  finished  in  the  spring  of  1911,  most  op- 
portunely, as  subsequent  events  have  shown,  for  the 
safety  of  the  German  empire. 

The  Jameson  raid,  however,  was  to  occasion  the  first 
open  break  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  The 
exigencies  of  space  preclude  a  lengthy  discussion,  but 
suffice  it  to  say  that  the  action  of  Germany,  or  of  the 
German  Kaiser,  in  his  famous  telegram  to  Kruger,  in- 
creased the  resentment  in  Great  Britain,  which,  fed  by 
the  ever  increasing  commercial  rivalry  of  C.crmany  and 
Germany's  sin  in  creating  a  navy,  has  grown  stronger 
and  strtinger  since  that  date  until  the  present  time. 

One  or  two  incidents  during  the  following  ten  years 
added  considerable  fuel  to  the  flame.  The  principal  one 
of  these  incidents  was  Morocco.  Morocco  was  an  in- 
dependent nation  whose  sultan,  e.xtremely  careless  in 
money  matters  and  extravagant  to  boot,  had  gradually 
allowed  himself  to  fall  under  the  financial  control  of 
Franco,  which  was  casting  covetous  eyes  on  his  do- 
mains, and  had  a  well  matured  plan  f<.«r  annexing  them 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

(Germany  had  built  herself  a  large  and  profitable 
trade  in  Morocco,  her  commercial  travelers,  with  their 
characteristic  energy  and  their  preparedness  to  cope 
with  ktcal  conditions,  h.'uing  secured  an  outlet  of  con- 
siderable importance  there.  By  an  annexatif)n  and  the 
infliction  on  the  country  of  a  high  protective  tariff  as 
regards  the  products  of  foreign  countries,  her  own  pro- 
ducts after  annexation  naturally  entering  free,  France 
would  have  been  al)le  to  cause  the  loss  of  nearly  all  of 
this  trade  to  Germany.  In  addition  to  this,  Germany 
needed  and  required  cf>aling  stations  for  her  fleet,  and 
Morocco  already  had  entered  into  negotiations  with 
Germany  looking  toward  the  concession  of  an  ap- 
propriate site  on  her  coast  for  such  purpose. 

90 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

The  defeat  of  this  not  unnatural  desire  on  the  part  of 
of  a  naval  F>ower  added  additional  piqu'ancy  to  the  plan  of 
annexation  in  French  eyes,  and,  of  course,  was  not  ill- 
viewed  by  Great  Britain,  since  between  Germany  and  the 
German  colonies  in  Africa,  Germany  possessed  no  port 
at  which  her  warships  could  coal,  though  England  pos- 
sessed several.  The  results  of  this  embroilment  were  the 
calling  of  the  Algeciras  Conference,  January  andj  March, 
1906;  the  sacrifice  by  France  of  her  foreign  minister, 
Delcassc,  and  the  voting  by  France,  in  1905  of  $300,000,- 
000  to  make  good  the  defects  of  her  army  organization, 
including  a  large  sum  for  strategic  railroads.  Germany 
failed  at  the  Algeciras  convention,  and  a  compromise 
resulted,  which  amounted  to  a  diplomatic  defeat  for  her. 

During  the  years  that  have  elapsed  since  Russia  was 
last  referred  to,  Russia  had  fought  a  war  with  Japan, 
and  suffered  an  ignominious  defeat  by  an  adversary 
much  weaker  in  wealth,  men  and  resources. 

In  1909,  France  and  Germany  came  to  an  agreement 
regarding  Morocco,  which  was  signed  at  Berlin  on  the 
19th  of  February,  1909.  By  this  France  recognized  the 
independence  of  Morocco,  which  was  the  essence  of  the 
German  contention.  On  the  other  hand.  Germany  agreed 
that  the  French  should  be  charged  with  the  maintenance 
of  order  in  the  interior.  This  France  undertook,  and,  by 
way  of  making  her  maintenance  of  order  conduce  to 
her  plans,  proceeded  by  drastic  policies,  interfered  in 
the  domestic  politics  of  Morocco  through  "Agents  Provo- 
cateurs," caused  a  storm  and  then  took  severe  measures 
to  appease  the  storm  she  had  thus  raised.  This  ultimately 
led  to  the  Agadir  incident. 

Germany,  seeing  her  commercial  interest  threatened 
by  this  scheme  of  maintenance  of  interior  order  by  the 
French  and  its  results,  which  amounted  practically  to 
annexation,  protested,  and,  when  nothing  came  of  this 
protest,  sent  the  warship  Panther  to  iVgadir  in  July, 
1911,  in  order  'to  help  and  protect  German  subjects 
and  clients  in  these  regions."  Even  an  English  author 
of  authority,  Dr.  Rose,  acknowledges  that  much  could 
be  said  in  favor  of  some  such  step,  for  as  matters  then 
stood,  German  interests  were  certain  to  sutfer  unless 
she  made  a  stand  against  French  expansion  in  Morocco. 

But  this,  however,  was  not  the  view  taken  by  the 
British  government,  because  the  British  ministry  pro- 
tested against  the  action  of  Germany  and  made  it  clear 
that  the  presence  of  the  Panther  at  Agadir  was  regarded 

21 


History  of  Europe — 1871   to  the  War 

as  an  unfrioiully  act,  and  as  a  result  the  whole  affair 
trended  dangerously  near  war.  This  war,  however, 
was  averted,  temporarily  at  least,  by  the  restraining 
influence  of  the  German  emperor  upon  the  ani^er  of 
the  German  people.  Eventually  the  Morocco  (juestion 
was  settled  by  concession  by  France  of  territory  in 
French  Congo  to  Germany,  in  return  for  which  Ger- 
many gave  France  a  free  hand  in  Morocco,  which  has 
been  followed  by  a  French  protectorate. 

The  whole  affair  embittered  the  relations  of  France 
and  Germany  to  an  even  greater  degree  than  they 
were  previously. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  spot   that   has  been   named   the 
storm  center  of  Europe, — Turkey,  the  so-called  Balkan 
States,  and  South  Austria, — a  situation  was  developing 
which  was  rapidly  becoming  the  most  complex  in  mod- 
ern history,  if  not  in  the  history  of  the  world.  The  small 
states  created  by  the  congress  of  Berlin, — Serbia,  Bul- 
garia and  Rumania. — had  had  a  troubled  existence.  In 
the  case  of  Rumania  and  Bulgaria,  the  tumultuousness 
of  their  existence  has  been  more  a  result  of  circum- 
stances and  environment  than  of  their  own  will.  But 
this  has  not  been  true  in  the  case  of  Serbia  which  has, 
since  the  days  of  its  recognition  as  a  semi-independent 
principality  under  Turkish  suzerainty  a  hundred  years 
ago,   distinguished    itself   by   its   utter   incapability   to 
maintain  and  conduct  a  civilized  government,  by  its 
aggressiveness  towards  its  neighbors,  by  its  ignorance, 
governmental  and  popular,  by  its  recognition   of  as- 
sassination as  a  legitimate  and  commonplace  adjunct  of 
political   action.  There   is  probably  no   people  on   the 
face  of  the  earth  which  ranks  lower  in  education  of  any 
kind,  in  public  and  private  morality,  than  the  Serbians, 
and  as  one  result  this  small  country  has  for  many  years 
been  a  sotirce  of  trouble  to  all  its  neighbors. 

Tt'^  oHginal  cause  of  contention  with  Austria  arose 
manv  years  ago  and  sprang  from  Austria's  trcattnent 
of  Serbian  pigs.  These  animals  Serbia  raised  in  quan- 
tities. She  was  unable  to  export  them  into  Turkey, 
because  pork  is  not  used  by  the  Turk^  Bulgaria  pos- 
sessed her  own  supply,  and  consequently  the  only  out- 
let for  Serbia's  «;iirplns  pigs  was  Xustria.  l)ut  the  bar- 
rier f<i  a  treatv  existrd  between  the  two  countrie*^.  and 
as  Hungary  raised  sufficient  pigs  to  supply  the  re- 
quirements of  the  Austrian  people,  this  barrier  was 
not.   in    spite   of    Serbia's     manv    appeals,     removed. 

22 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

Americans   cannot   assuredly    blame   Austria   or   any 
other  country  for  having  a  protective  tariff. 

The  Serbian  hatred  of  Austria  began  with  this  eco- 
nomic cause.  Her  political  dissatisfaction  arose  from 
the  situation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  As  has  been 
before  stated,  these  tv^^o  provinces,  which  had  originally 
formed  a  part  of  the  empire  of  Turkey,  and  had  never 
been  politically  united  to  Serbia,  were  separated  from 
the  Turkish  empire  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  though 
Turkey  retained  her  sovereignty  over  them  and  by  the 
Congress  were  turned  over  to  Austria  for  administra- 
tion. These  provinces  lie  between  Serbia  and  the 
Adriatic  on  the  west,  and  though  there  were  railways 
by  which  Serbia  could  transport  her  inconsiderable  ex- 
portations,  she  was  possessed  with  the  idea  that  of 
right  these  provinces  should  belong  to  her,  though  title 
she  had  none  of  any  character. 

This  feeling  was  further  intensified  by  the  fact  that 
a  portion  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  provinces  were 
Serbians  by  race,  although  they  never  had  been  politi- 
cal subjects  of  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia,  and  as  a  result, 
from  the  year  1879  onward,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
years  in  which  a  better  feeling  prevailed,  under  Kings 
Milan  and  Alexander,  there  has  been  friction  between 
Austria  and  Serbia  on  this  subject  as  well  as  on  others. 
On  this  particular  subject  the  friction  was  greatly  in- 
creased from  the  year  1903,  when  King  Alexander  was 
assassinated  and  Peter  Karageorgevitch,  a  tool  of  Russia, 
was  elected  to  the  Serbian  throne,  whereby  Serbia  and  the 
Serbian  government  became  a  mere  outpost  for  Russia, 
and  was  instigated  by  Russia  to  provoke  and  harass  in 
every  possible  way  her  neighbor,  Austria.  Serbian  in  form, 
but  Russian  in  fact,  this  aggression  became  virulent  at  and 
after  the  annexation  in  1909  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

During  the  years  1879-1909  that  Austria  had  held 
these  as  administrator,  she  had  expended  large  sums  of 
money  upon  the  provinces  from  the  funds  of  the  empire ; 
she  had  built  roads,  railroads,  telegraphs,  telephones 
and  all  the  other  material  constructions  of  an  advanced 
civilization,  and  had  instituted  a  complete  system  of  pri- 
mary and  secondary  education.  She  had  introduced  full 
and  complete  religious  liberty,  and  had  done  everything 
feasible  for  the  improvement  of  the  people,  morally, 
mentally  and  physically,  and  the  annexation  was  simply 
the  formal  announcement  of  what  was  an  actual  fact. 

In  1912  the  Christian  states  of  the   Balkans,   forced 

23 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

thereto  by  various  acts  of  Turkey,  formed  a  league 
against  her,  and  attacking  her,  nearly  drove  her  from 
Europe  in  the  course  of  a  month.  Unfortunately  they 
quarrelled  among  themselves  in  regard  to  the  division 
of  the  booty,  and  here  again  the  original  cause  of 
the  quarrel  was  the  covetousness  of  Serbia.  The 
upshot  was  that  a  second  war  broke  out  between  the 
victor>  of  the  fir>t  war,  which  wa>  furtiier  complicated 
by  the  entrance  therein  of  Rumania,  which  attacked 
Bulgaria  unexpectedly,  the  parties  to  this  combat  being 
originally  Bulgaria  on  one  side  and  Serbia  and  Greece 
on  the  other.  After  considerable  time  this  war  was  set- 
tled by  the  Congress  of  Powers  held  in  London  in  1913. 

During  the  course  of  the  two  wars.  Serbia  had 
struck  to  the  westward  and  had  forced  her  way  through 
Albania,  capturing  Avalona  on  the  Adriatic  coast.  The 
Albanians,  who  (ictcsted  the  Serbians  as  much  as  any 
other  of  their  neighbors,  protested  most  vehemently  to 
the  powers  against  this  possession  and  annexation  of 
their  countrv  by  a  bitterly  despised  fc»e.  with  the  result 
that  Serbia  was  ordered  and  forced  by  the  Powers  to 
evacuate  Albania,  her  dream  of  getting  to  the  Adriatic 
through  Albania  being  thus  shattered. 

This  brief  resume  of  the  history  of  Europe  for  the 
pa>t  forty-five  years  will  perhaps  help  to  some  under- 
standing of  the  causes  and  influences  which  led  up  to  the 
crisis  of  August,  1914.  A  glance  still  remains  to  be  given 
to  the  exact  political  conditions  in  the  various  countries 
now  at  war  at  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

In  Germany,  in  the  middle  of  June.  1914,  apparently 
political  conditions  were  quiet.  There  was.  it  is  true, 
the  habitual  uneasy  feeling  as  to  the  intentions  of  her 
eastern  neighbor.  Ru^^sia.  Nothing  extraordinary  ap- 
peared on  the  surface  and  there  was  apparently  no 
cloud  in  the  political  sky.  The  same  may  be  said  of  Aus- 
tria. The  rclation.s  of  the  component  states  of  the  dual 
monarchy  had  never  been  better  than  they  were  in  the 
middle  I't  June,  1914.  and  general  contentment  among 
the  peoples  comprising  the  empire  appeared  to  be 
greater  than  it  had  been  for  many  years. 

Tn  France,  except  for  the  ^^candal  excited  by  the  Cail- 
laux  trial,  and  the  glimpses  that  were  given  of  the  cor- 
ruption of  many  of  the  leading  French  politicians, 
nothing  extraordinary  wa*^  to  be  noticed.  There  too, 
everything  wa«*  apparently  calm. 

24 


.  History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

In  England,  there  was  a  very  different  condition  of 
affairs.  In  June,  last,  Great  Britain  was  apparently  on 
the  brink  of  a  civil  war,  arising  from  the  Irish  question, 
which  crisis  the  government  had  shown  itself  prac- 
tically unable  to  handle,  as  it  had  shown  itself  thereto- 
fore unable  to  deal  with  the  extravagances  of  the  so- 
called  Suffragettes. 

This  is,  perhaps,  because  the  present  English  govern- 
ment is  a  government  existing  only  as  a  result  of  the 
union  of  three  political  parties,  the  Liberals,  the  Labor 
and  the  Irish,  any  one  of  which  by  itself  is  in  the  mi- 
nority. Consequently,  like  all  governments  which  have 
not  behind  them  a  united  party  and  which  have  to 
please  three  masters  instead  of  one,  it  was  and  is  feeble 
and  vacillating,  and  particularly  was  this  true  last  June, 
because  the  members  of  this  government  knew  that  its 
fall  was  a  question  of  but  a  very  short  time. 

In  Russia  the  situation  was  reasonably  good.  Internal 
troubles  of  the  empire  had  lessened  in  the  last  few  years 
to  a  considerable  degree,  and  the  country  and  its  people 
were  much  quieter.  The  army,  in  accordance  with  the 
requirements  of  France,  had  been  recently  largely  in- 
creased and  the  work  necessary  for  the  strategic  de- 
fence of  the  Russian  empire  on  the  German  border  was 
in  a  process  of  completion.  A  strong  war  party  had 
risen  in  the  empire  under  the  lead  of  Grand  Duke  Nico- 
las Nicolaievitch,  which  desired,  at  the  earliest  possible 
opportunity,  a  war,  in  order  to  wipe  away  the  ?tain 
which  the  Japanese  defeat  had  put  on  the  Russian  es- 
cutcheon, and  if  possible,  to  carry  out  the  cardinal  arti- 
cle of  Russia's  political  creed :  the  advance  southward 
to  a  warm  water  port. 

Besides  this,  the  Russian  intrigue  in  the  Balkans  had 
advanced  to  such  a  point  that  the  responsible  heads  of 
the  Russian  government  knew  that  in  a  very  short 
time,  the  situation  would  become  so  menacing  and  so 
dangerous  as  to  force  some  definite  solution  of  the 
Balkan  problem,  which  solution  Russia  intended  to  see 
was  favorable  to  Russian  policies  and  Russian  inter- 
ests. The  Balkans  had  not  by  any  means  assumed  a 
normal  condition  after  the  second  Balkan  war,  and  the 
legacy  of  hatred  which  that  engendered  was  still  aa 
acute  as  on  the  day  that  Bulgaria  w^as  lacerated  by 
Serbia,  the  wretched,  and  Rumania,  the  cunning. 

Greece  was  watching  with  voracious  eyes  her  chance 

25 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

to  obtain  some  title  to  the  remaining  Turkish  islands 
which  she  had  already  occupied. 

Serbia  was  faithfully  fulfillinj^  her  mission  as  Rus- 
sia's trouble  maker. 

Italy's  relation  with  the  Triple  Alliance,  while  nomi- 
nally the  same  as  in  the  earlier  years  of  her  being  a 
partner,  have  not  been  in  fact  anything  like  as  cordial 
for  the  paiit  few  years,  for  the  reason  that  her  relations 
with  Austria  and  Germany  had  not  worked  to  her  ad- 
vantage in  the  Mediterranean,  the  field  which  she  had 
chosen  as  the  sphere  of  her  influence.  It  became  evi- 
dent to  her  that  with  French  and  English  opposition, 
she  could  not  proceed  to  fulfill  what  she  euphemistical- 
ly tenucd  her  legitimate  aspirations  on  the  North  Afri- 
can coast,  and  that  Germany  and  Au.stria  were  not  in 
a  position  to  help  her  by  force  to  achieve  these  aspira- 
tions, in  the  face  of  French  and  luiglish  opposition.  Con- 
sequently, she  drew  closer  to  England,  with  whom,  for 
that  matter,  she  had  been  always  more  or  less  on  friend- 
ly terms,  and  through  England's  influence,  she  drew 
closer  to  France.  The  result  was  that  neither  France 
nor  England  opposed  her  in  her  aspirations  to  annex 
Tripoli.  Since  that  time  she  has  felt  perhaps  even  more 
friendly  towards  France  and  England  than  .'^he  has  to 
Germany,  and  her  old  hatred  of  Austria  has  to  a  larg^ 
extent  been  revived. 

The  Kaiser,  who  is  intellectually  not  only  the  strong- 
est monarch  of  our  time  in  Europe  but  the  strongest 
since  Napoleon,  has  been  the  bone  of  di.spute  for  many 
year-.  It  is  not,  however,  my  purpose  here  to  defend 
him  from  his  enemies,  as  \x){h  he  and  his  country  are 
able  to  defend  themselves.  I  shall  merely  point  out 
that,  hated  as  he  is  by  a  large  number,  he  is  loved  and 
admired  by  an  even  larger  number,  and  that  no  man 
since  the  days  of  Napoleon  has  ever  had  <o  large  a  fol- 
lowing absolutely  devoted  to  him. 

I  will  further  point  out  that  on  several  occasions  he 
has.  against  the  wishes  of  his  government  and  of  his 
people,  preserved  alone  the  peace  of  Europe,  as  was 
abundantlv  trstifird  to  on  the  occasion  of  the  twenty- 
fifty  anniversary  of  his  accession,  by  many  men  of  high 
standinj,'  in  the  pf»litical  world  of  Europe,  who  were 
competvit  to  -peak  of  the  difficulties  which  surrounded 
him  ;  this  was  barely  a  year  ago. 

In  England,  from  the  moment  of  his  accession,  the 

26 


History  of  Europe — 1871  to  the  War 

Kaiser  has  been  the  butt  of  caricature  and  criticism, 
some  from  ignorance  and  some  from  malice.  His  dis- 
missal of  Bismark  in  the  very  early  years  of  his  reign 
and  the  famous  cartoon  which  Punch  published  upon 
that  occasion,  "Dropping  the  Pilot,"  was  the  start  of 
the  prejudice  against  him  in  the  minds  of  the  English 
and  Americans  more  than  probably  any  other  cause, 
and  the  flame  thus  started  has  not  lacked  fuel. 

The  Kaiser  has  been  systematically  represented  to 
both  the  English  and  American  people  as  the  personi- 
fied opposition  to  those  ideals  which  they  hold  most 
dear,  which  is  untrue.  He  has  moreover  been  repre- 
sented as  being,  even  in  Germany,  the  oppressor  of  his 
people.  In  the  refutation  of  this  one  need  only  call  at- 
tention to  the  most  extraordinary  unanimity  with 
which  he  has  been  supported  ever  since  he  came  to  the 
throne  and  in  the  present  crisis  by  the  German  people 
as  a  whole,  which  far  exceeds  the  unanimity  with  which 
Abraham  Lincoln  was  supported  by  the  American  peo- 
ple in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  or  George  Washington 
in  the  Revolution,  or  with  which  the  British  govern- 
ment of  today  is  supported  by  the  British  people.  No 
doubt,  being  human,  the  Emperor  has  his  faults,  but  he 
possibly  has  his  virtues  as  well. 


27 


CHAPTER  II. 
THE    OUTBREAK    OF    THE    WAR 

On  June  28.  1914,  at  Sarajevo,  Bosnia,  a  boy  under 
twenty,  Gavrilo  Prinzip,  shot  and  killed  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand  d'Este,  the  heir  presumptive  to  the 
throne  of  Austro- Hungary  and  his  consort,  the  Prin- 
cess of  Hohensburg.  The  reason  for  this  killing  waa 
because  the  murderer,  Prinzip,  who  had  for  the  four 
years  preceding  the  murder,  according  to  his  own 
statements,  been  a  student  of  a  college  in  Belgrade, 
had  there  finally  become  convinced  that  all  the  south- 
ern Slav  districts  of  Austro-Hungary,  including  Bos- 
nia and  Herzegovina,  must  be  taken  away  from  that 
monarchy  by  force  if  necessary,  and  that  to  do  this  was 
the  mission  of  Serbia.  By  a  peculiar  irony  of  fate,  it  so 
happened  that  the  Archduke  was  a  partisan  of  the  plan 
which  had  been  proposed  among  the  Austrian  politi- 
cians that  the  dual  monarchy  of  Austro-Hungary 
should  be  changed  to  a  triple  monarchy,  the  third  part- 
ner being  the  Slavs  of  the  empire,  organized  into  a 
kingdom  of  their  own  like  that  of  Hungary. 

As  a  re.^ult  of  this  murder  .\ustria  addressed  this 
note  to  Serbia  on  July  23rd,  1914. 

"On  the  31st  of  March.  1909,  the  Serbian  minister 
in  Vienna,  on  the  instructions  of  the  Serbian  govern- 
ment, made  the  followinq:  declaration  to  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government :" 

"Serbia  recognize^  that  the  fait  accompli  regarding 
Bosnia  has  not  affected  her  rights,  and  consequently 
she  will  conform  to  the  decision  that  the  Powers  may 
take  in  conformity  with  article  25  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin.  In  deference  to  the  advice  of  the  Great  Pow- 
ers. Serbia  undertakes  to  renounce  from  now  onwards 
the  attitude  of  protest  and  opposition  which  she  has 
adopted  with  regard  to  the  annexation  since  last  aut- 
umn. She  undertakes,  moreover,  to  modify  the  direc- 
tion of  her  policy  with  reqrard  to  Austria-Hungary  and 
to  live  in  future  on  good  neighborly  terms  with  the 
latter." 

"The  history  of  recent  years,  and  in  particular  the 
painful  events  of  the  28th  of  June  last,  have  shown  the 
existence  of  a  subversive  movement  with  the  object  of 
detaching^  a  part  of  the  territories  of  Austria-Htmgary 

2fi 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

from  the  monarchy.  The  movement,  which  had  its 
birth  under  the  eye  of  the  Serbian  Government,  has 
gone  so  far  as  to  make  itself  manifest  on  both  sides 
the  Serbian  frontier  in  the  shape  of  acts  of  terrorism 
and  a  series  of  outrages  and  murders." 

"Far  from  carrying  out  the  formal  undertakings  con- 
tained in  the  declaration  of  the  31st  of  March,  1909, 
the  Royal  Serbian  Government  has  done  nothing  to 
repress  these  movements.  It  has  permitted  the  criminal 
machinations  of  various  societies  and  associations  di- 
rected against  the  monarchy,  and  has  tolerated  unre- 
strained language  on  the  part  of  the  press,  the  glori- 
fication of  the  perpetrators  of  outrages,  and  the  parti- 
cipation of  officers  and  functionaries  in  subversive  agi- 
tation. It  has  permitted  an  unwholesome  propaganda 
in  public  instruction.  In  short,  it  has  permitted  all 
manifestations  of  a  nature  to  incite  the  Serbian  popu- 
lation to  hatred  of  the  monarchy  and  contempt  of  its 
institutions." 

"This  culpable  tolerance  of  the  Royal  Serbian  Govern- 
ment had  not  ceased  at  the  moment  when  the  events 
of  the  28th  of  June  last  proved  its  fatal  consequences 
to  the  whole  world." 

"In  order  to  give  a  formal  character  to  this  under- 
taking, the  Royal  Serbian  Government  shall  publish 
on  -the  front  page  of  its  "Official  Journal"  of  the  26th 
June   (13th  July)   the  following  declaration:" 

"The  Royal  Government  of  Serbia  condemns  the 
propaganda  directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  i.  e., 
the  general  tendency  of  which  the  final  aim  is  to  de- 
tach from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  territories 
belonging  to  it,  and  it  sincerely  deplores  the  fatal  con- 
sequences of  these  criminal  proceedings. 

"The  Royal  Government  regrets  that  Serbian  offi- 
cers and  functionaries  participated  in  the  above-men- 
tioned propaganda  and  this  compromised  the  good 
neighborly  relations  to  which  the  Royal  Government 
was  solemnly  pleded  by  its  declaration  of  31st  of 
March,   1909. 

"The  Royal  Government,  which  disapproves  and  re- 
pudiates all  idea  of  interfering  or  attempting  to  inter- 
fere with  the  destinies  of  the  inhabitants  of  any  part 
whatsoever  of  Austria-Hungary,  considers  it  its  duty  to 
warn  officers  and  functionaries  and  the  whole  popu- 

29 


The   Outbreak    of   the   War 

lation  of  the  kingdom,  that  henceforward  it  will  pro- 
ceed with  the  utino5t  rigour  ai^ainst  persons  wiio  may 
be  Ruiity  t>i  >uch  machinations,  whicii  it  will  use  all 
its  efforts  ic>  anticipate  and  suppress.  " 

'Thi>  declaration  shall  simultaneously  be  communi- 
cated to  the  Koyal  army  as  an  order  of  the  day  by  his 
Majesty  the  Kinj^  and  shall  be  published  in  the   Offi- 
cial KuUetin'  of  the  Army." 
"The  koyal  Serbian  Ciovcrnnicnt  further  undertakes:" 

1.  "To  suppress  any  publication  which  incites  to 
hatred  and  contempt  of  the  Austro- Hungarian  Mon- 
archy and  tile  general  tendency  of  which  is  directed 
again>t   hi   territorial   integrity;" 

2.  "To  dissolve  immediately  the  society  styled  Na- 
rodna  Odbrana,  to  confiscate  all  its  means  of  propa- 
ganda, and  to  proceed  in  the  same  manner  against 
other  societies  and  their  branches  in  Serbia  wliich  en- 
gage in  propaganda  against  the  Austro- Hungarian 
Monarchy.  The  Royal  Government  shall  take  the 
necessary  measures  to  prevent  the  societies  dissolved 
from  continuing  their  activity  under  another  name  and 
form ;" 

.').  "To  eliminate  without  delay  from  public  instruc- 
tion in  Serbia,  both  as  regards  the  teaching  body  and 
also  as  regards  the  methods  of  instruction,  everything 
that  serves  or  might  serve,  to  foment  the  propaganda 
against  Austria-Hungary;" 

I.  "To  remove  from  the  military  service,  and  from 
the  administration  in  general,  all  officers  and  fnnction- 
a'fics  giiilty  of  propaganda  against  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  whose  names  and  deeds  the  Austro- 
Hnngarian  Government  reserves  to  itself  the  right  of 
communicating  to  the   Koyal   Government ;" 

5.  "To  accept  the  collaboration  in  Serbia  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Austro-IIungarian  Government  in 
the  suppression  of  the  subversive  movement  directed 
against   the   territorial   integrity   of  the   Monarchy; 

6.  "To  take  judicial  proceedings  against  accessories 
to  the  plot  of  the  28th  of  June  who  are  on  Serbian  terri- 
tory. Delegates  of  the  Aiistro-Himgarian  Government 
will  take  part  in  the  investigation  relating  thereto; 

7.  "Tr)  proceed  without  delay  to  the  arrest  of  Major 
Voja  Tankosic  and  of  the  individual  named  Milan 
Ciganovic.  a  Serbian  state  employe,  who  have  been 
compromised  by  tlie  results  of  the  magisterial  enquiry 
at  Sarajevo; 

ao 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

8.  "To  prevent  by  effective  measures  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  Serbian  authorities  in  the  illicit  traffic  in 
arms  and  explosives  across  the  frontier,  to  dismiss  and 
punish  severely  the  officials  of  the  frontier  service  at 
Shatbatz  and  Loznitza  guilty  of  having  assisted  the 
perpetrators  of  the  Sarajevo  crime  by  facilitating  their 
passage  across  the  frontier ; 

9.  "To  furnish  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
with  explanations  regarding  the  unjustifiable  utter- 
ances of  high  Serbian  officials,  both  in  Serbia  and 
abroad,  who,  notwithstanding  their  official  position, 
did  not  hesitate  after  the  crime  of  the  28th  June  to 
express  themselves  in  interviews  in  terms  of  hostility 
to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government;  and  finally," 

10.  "To  notify  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment without  delay  of  the  execution  of  the  measures 
comprised  under  the  preceding  heads. 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  expects  the 
reply  of  the  Royal  Government  at  the  latest  by  6 
o'clock  on  Saturday  evening,  the  25th  July." 

The  reply  of  the  Serbian  government  to  this  note 
was  as  follows : 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  have  received  the 
communication  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment of  the  10th,  instant,  and  are  convinced  that  their 
reply  will  remove  any  misunderstanding-  which  may 
threaten  to  impair  the  good  neighborly  relations  be- 
tween the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the  King- 
dom of  Servia. 

"Falling  in,  therefore,  with  the  desire  of  the  Impe- 
rial and  Royal  Government,  they  are  prepared  to  hand 
over  for  trial  any  Serbian  subject,  without  regard  to 
his  situation  or  rank,  of  whose  complicity  in  the  crime 
of  Sarajevo  proofs  are  forthcoming,  and  more  espe- 
cially they  undertake  to  cause  to  be  published  on  the 
first  page  of  the  'Journal  Officiel,'  on  the  date  of  the 
13th  (26)  July,  the  following  declaration: 

"The  Royal  Government  of  Serbia  condemn  all 
propaganda  which  may  be  directed  against  Austria- 
Hungary,  that  is  to  say,  all  such  tendencies  as  aim  at 
ultimately  detaching  from  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  territories  which  form  part  thereof,  and 
they  sincerelv  deplore  the  baneful  consequences  of 
these  criminal  movements.  The  Royal  Government 
regret  that,  according  to  the  communication  from 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  certain  Serbian 

31 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

officers  and  ufficials  should  have  lakcn  part  in  the 
above- im-ntiunetl  propaganda,  and  llms  conipronused 
the  good  ncit:hb«,)urly  relations  to  wliich  the  Royal  Serbian 
Government  was  solemnly  engaged  by  the  declaration 
of  the  31st  March,  lyuy,  which  declaration  disapproves 
and  repudiates  all  idea  or  attempt  at  interference  with 
the  destiny  of  the  inhabitants  «)f  any  part  whatsoever, 
of  Austria-Hungary,  and  they  consider  it  their  duty 
to  formally  warn  the  officers,  officials,  and  entire  popu- 
lation of  the  kingdom  that  henceforth  they  will  take 
the  most  rigourous  steps  against  all  such  persons  as 
are  guilty  of  such  acts,  to  prevent  and  to  repress  which 
they  will  use  their  utmost  endeavor." 

"This  declaration  will  be  brought  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  Royal  Army  in  an  order  of  the  day,  in  the  name 
of  His  Majesty  the  King,  by  His  Royal  Highness  the 
Crown  Prince  Alcxan<ler.  and  will  l)e  published  in  the 
next  official  army  bulletin. 

"The  Royal  Government  further  undertake: — 

"1.  To  introduce  at  the  first  regular  convocation  of 
the  Skuptchina  a  provision  into  the  press  law  provid- 
ing for  the  most  severe  punishment  of  incitement  to 
hatred  vr  contempt  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy, and  for  taking  action  against  any  publication  the 
general  tendency  of  which  is  directed  against  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  Austria-Hungary.  The  Government 
engage  at  the  approaching  revision  of  the  Constitution 
to  cause  an  amendment  to  be  introduced  into  article 
22  of  the  Constitution  of  such  a  nature  that  such  pub- 
lication may  be  confiscated,  a  proceeding  at  present 
impossible  under  the  categorical  terms  of  article  22 
of  the  Constitution. 

"2.  The  Government  possess  no  proof,  nor  does  the 
note  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  furnish 
them  with  any  that  the  'Xarcnlna  Odbrana'  and  other 
similar  societies  have  committed  up  to  the  present  any 
criminal  act  of  this  nature  through  the  proceedings  of 
any  of  their  members.  Nevertheless,  the  Royal  Gov- 
ernment will  accept  the  demand  of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government,  and  will  dissolve  the  'Narodna  Od- 
brana' Society  and  every  other  society  which  may  be 
directing  its  efforts  against  Au.stria- Hungary. 

"3.  The  Royal  Serbian  Government  undertake  to  re- 
move without  delay  from  their  public  educational  es- 
tablishments   in  Servia  all    that    serves  or  could    serve 

89 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

to  foment  propaganda  against  Auhtria-lJungary, 
whenever  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  fur- 
nish them  with  facts  and  proofs  of  this  propaganda. 

"4.  The  Royal  Government  also  agree  to  remove 
from  military  service  all  such  persons  as  the  judicial 
enquiry  may  have  proved  to  be  guilty  of  acts  directed 
against  the  integrity  of  the  territory  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  they  expect  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  to  communicate  to  them  at  a 
later  date  the  names  and  the  acts  of  these  officers  and 
officials  for  the  purposes  of  proceedings  which  are  to 
be  taken  against  them. 

"5.  The  Royal  Government  must  confess  that  they 
do  not  clearly  grasp  the  meaning  or  the  scope  of  the 
demand  made  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
that  Serbia  shall  undertake  to  accept  the  collaboration 
of  the  organs  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
upon  their  territory,  but  they  declare  that  they  will 
admit  such  collaboration  as  agrees  with  the  principle 
of  international  law,  with  criminal  procedure,  and  with 
good  neighbourly  relations. 

"6.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment consider  it  their  duty  to  open  an  enquiry  against 
all  such  persons  as  are,  or  eventually  may  be,  impli- 
cated in  the  plot  of  the  15th  June,  and  who  happen  to 
be  within  the  territory  of  the  kingdom.  As  regards 
the  participation  in  this  enquiry  of  Austro-Hungarian 
agents  or  authorities  appointed  for  this  purpose  by  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment cannot  accept  such  an  arrangement,  as  it  would 
be  a  violation  of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  law  of 
criminal  procedure;  nevertheless,  in  concrete  cases 
communications  as  to  the  results  of  the  investigation 
in  question  might  be  given  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
agents. 

"7.  The  Royal  Government  proceeded,  on  the  very 
evening  of  the  delivery  of  the  note,  to  arrest  Command- 
ant Voja  Tankosic.  As  regards  Milan  Ciganovic,  who 
is  a  subject  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and 
who  up  to  the  15th  June  was  employed  (on  probation) 
bv  the  directorate  of  railways,  it  has  not  yet  been  pos- 
sible to  arrest  him. 

******** 

"8.  The  Serbian  Government  will  reinforce  and  ex- 
tend the  measures  which  have  been  taken  for  prevent- 
ing the  illicit  traffic  in  arms  and  explosives  across  the 
frontier.  It  goes  without  saying  that  they  will  imme- 

33 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

diateiy  order  an  enquirj-  and  will  severely  punish  the 
frontier  officials  on  the  Shabatz-Loznitza  line  who 
have  failed  in  their  duty  and  allowed  the  authors  of 
the  crime  of  Sarajevo  to  pass. 

"9.  The  Royal  Government  will  gladly  give  ex- 
planations of  the  remarks  made  by  their  officials, 
whether  in  Serbia  or  al)road,  in  interviews  after  the 
crime  and  which  according  to  the  statement  of  the 
lin{>erial  and  Royal  Government  were  hostile  towards 
the  Monarchy,  as  soon  as  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Gov- 
ernment have  communicated  to  them  the  passages  in 
question  in  these  remarks,  and  as  soon  as  they  have 
shown  that  the  remarks  were  actually  made  by  the 
said  officials,  althoutjh  the  Royal  (lovernmcnt  will 
itself  take  steps  to  collect  evidence  and  proofs. 

"10.  The  Royal  Government  will  inform  the  Impe- 
rial and  Royal  Government  of  the  execution  of  the 
measures  comprised  under  the  above  heads,  in  so  far 
as  this  has  not  already  been  done  by  the  present  note. 
as  soon  as  each  measure  has  been  ordered  and  carried 
out. 

"If  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  are  not  sat- 
isfied with  this  reply,  the  Serbian  Government,  con- 
sidering that  it  is  not  to  the  common  interest  to  pre- 
cipitate the  solution  of  this  question,  are  ready,  as  al- 
ways, to  accept  a  pacific  understanding,  either  by  re- 
ferring this  question  to  the  decision  of  the  Interna- 
tional Tribunal  of  The  Hague,  or  to  the  Great  Powers 
which  took  part  in  the  drawing  up  of  the  declaration 
made  bv  the  Serbian  Government  on  the  IRth  f^lst) 
March.  1909." 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  ultimatum  of  the  Aus- 
trian Government  brought  charges  of  the  most  serious 
character  against  the  Serbian  Government  itself;  in 
relation,  not  only  to  the  crime  at  Sarajevo,  but  also 
to  its  having  both  dircctlv  and  indirectly,  and  with 
guilty  knowledge,  approved  and  supported  Serbian 
societies  which  had  as  their  object  the  overthrow  of 
the  Austrian  Government  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
and  the  breakif>g  up.  if  possible,  of  the  Austria-Hun- 
garian monarchy. 

Great  stress  has  been  laid  bv  the  pscudo  moralists 
on  the  dutv  of  larcre  state';  to  avoid  coercing  small 
states,  since  the  bctrinnincr  '^f  this  war.  If  this  proposi- 
tion is  trtie.  that  large  states  are  hotmd  bv  a  moral 
ohlifration  not  to  rorrre  small  states,  it  is  also  true  that 
small  ^ates  anp  equally  bound  to  so  conduct  themselves 

B4 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

in  their  relations  to  large  states  at.  not  to  merit  a  legit- 
imate chastisement.  Otherwise,  the  obligation  would  be 
unilateral. 

In  the  case  of  Serbia  and  Austria,  the  ground  for 
Serbia's  agitation,  both  governmental  and  private,  against 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  was  the  fact  that 
Serbians,  by  race,  inhabit  the  territory  of  the  Austria- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  who  have,  however,  never  be^n 
subjects  of   Serbia. 

The  territory  which  the  Austria-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy annexed  in  1909  belonged  legally  to  Turkey,  and 
neither  the  whole  nor  any  part  of  it  had  ever  belonged 
to  Serbia.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  since  1878,  by  the 
decision  of  the  Powers  of  Europe  at  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  this  territory  had,  to  all  intents  and  purposes, 
formed  part  of  the  Austrian-Hungarian  Monarchy. 
With  equal  justice  could  the  Republic  of  Haiti  argue 
that  because  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  State 
of  Mississippi  are  negroes,  and  it  is  a  negro  Republic, 
that  the  State  of  Mississippi  should  belong  to  it.  How 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States  would  view  an  or- 
ganized conspiracy,  governmental  and  private,  on  the 
l>arL  of  the  Haitians  to  bring  this  result  about,  can 
easily  be  imagined. 

The  Narodna  Odbrana  itself,  mentioned  specifically 
by  name  in  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  was  a  secret  soci- 
ety whose  headquarters  were  in  Belgrade,  Serbia.  Its 
objects,  according  to  its  own  prospectus,  were  the  use 
of  every  possible  open  and  secret  means  to  cause  a  dis- 
ruption of  the  Austria-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  it  ad- 
vocated the  separation  from  that  monarchy  of  certain 
provinces,  viz. :  Bosnia.  Herzegovina,  Croatia.  Slavonia, 
and  some  of  the  southern  counties  of  Hungary. 

This  society  also  maintained  an  active  propaganda  for 
war  against  Austria-Hungary. 

Gen.  Bozo  Jankovic  was  the  president  of  this  society, 
and  accepted  the  presidency  when  he  was  upon  the  active 
list  of  the  Serbian  army. 

These  facts  are  matters  of  common  knowledge.  In 
order  to  connect  the  actions  of  Gavrilo  Prinzip  with 
those  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  and,  through  it,  with 
the  Serbian  government,  it  will  be  necessary  to  examine 
briefly  the  testimony  at  the  trial  of  Prinzip,  the  principal 
conspirator,   and   of  the  other  witnesses. 

A  word  about  Austrian  criminal  procedure.  A  crim- 
inal trial  in  Austria  takes  place  in  pubHc,  and  the  law 
expressly  provides  that  every  adult  person  not  bearing 

35 


The    Outbreak    of   the    War 

arms  who  desires  shall  be  admitted  to  the  sessions  of 
the  court.  The  defendants  are  represented  by  attor- 
neys, and  if  they  have  none,  the  court  appoints  attor- 
neys to  represent  them.  The  judg^inent  of  tlie  court 
must  he  based  solely  on  evidence  presented  in  open 
court  at  the  time  <>l  the  trial.  The  defendants  arc  al- 
lowed the  fullest  liberty  at  the  trial,  in  briii^inj;  out 
every  bit  of  eyidence  which  they,  or  their  c-unvrl,  may 
consider  will  strengthen  their  defense. 

The  trial  itself  proceeds  very  much  ak>nj;  the  lines 
of  a  trial  in  England.  Prior  to  the  trial,  however,  the 
procedure  differs  considerably  from  that  of  England 
or  .America,  but  follows  the  procedure  obtaining  in 
nearly  every  European  country,  except  England.  The 
Grand  Jury  does  n(H  exist.  I>ut.  in  its  place,  is  what  is 
known  as  the  examining  judge,  before  whom  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  Cnnvn  (the  District  Attorney  in 
our  practice),  produces  such  witnesses  as  he  deems 
serviceable  in  establishing  the  charges.  The  judge  ex- 
amines these  witnesses,  and  also  examines  the  de- 
fendants in  rebuttal  of  the  charges,  these  defendants 
being  aided,  if  they   so  choose,  by  c<»unsel. 

This  special  judge,  or  examining  judge,  then  deter- 
mines whether  or  not  the  evidence  is  sufficient  to  war- 
rant him  in  sending  the  defendants  beft^re  the  court 
for  trial. 

This  examining  judge  is  never  a  member  of  the 
court  before   which   the  case  is  heard  at  trial. 

In  the  Sarajevo  case  the  defendants  were  arraigned 
before  the  examining  magistrate,  and  the  evidence  ad- 
duced before  him  was  sufficient  in  his  judgment  to 
send  them  before  the  court  for  trial  for  the  murder  of 
the  Archduke. 

The  trial  itself  took  place  before  three  judges;  two 
judges  and  a  presifling  judge.  These  were  assisted 
by  two  assistant  judges  who,  in  case  of  disability, 
would  have  taken  the  places  (^f  any  one  of  the  regular 
members  of  the  court.  The  evidence  adduced  before 
the  examining  magistrate  was  all  known  to  the  defend- 
ants and  their  counsel  before  the  trial  itself.  This  is 
even  more  favorable  for  the  defendants  than  the 
.American  procedure,  since  in  most  cases  the  evidence 
which  is  presented  U)  the  .American  Grand  Jury  which 
indicts  the  defendant,  and  whose  proceedings  are  en- 
tirely ex  parte,  is  rarely  known  to  the  defendants  or 
their  counsel  prior  to  the  actual  trial. 

36 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

On  the  trial  itself  the  following  admissions  were  made 
by  the  defendants  against  their  interest: 

Nedjelko  Cabrinovic,  who  threw  the  bombs  at  the 
Archduke,  admitted  that  the  secretary  of  the  Narodna 
(Jdbrana,  a  Major  in  the  Royal  Serbian  Army,  one 
Milan  Vasic,  had  supplied  him  with  money  and  instruc- 
tions in  Belgrade;  that  he  was  employed  by  Zivojiu 
Barcic,  a  member  of  the  executive  staff  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana  and  the  head  and  director  of  the  Serbian  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office;  that  his  society  taught  that 
it  was  the  duty  of  every  member  to  find  means  that  the 
southern  Slav  districts  of  Austria-Hungary  should  be 
detached  from  the  Monarchy  by  force,  and  be  united 
with  Serbia. 

,  iSti  the  spring  of  1914,  on  hearing  of  the  impending 
arrival  of  the  Archduke  in  Sarajevo,  he  discussed  with 
Prinzip  and  Joko  Bajic  what  action  should  be  taken. 
The  last  named  was  a  member  of  the  Xarodna  Od- 
brana. The  result  of  this  consultation  was  that  they 
entered  into  communication  with  Milan  Ciganovic,  an 
official  of  the  Serbian  State  Railroads,  one  of  the  leaders 
of  the  Narodna  Odbrana.  He  took  them  to  Major 
Tankosic,  who  was  assistant  chief  of  the  Serbian  Gen- 
eral Staff.  This  officer  supplied  Prinzip  and  himself 
with  six  bombs  and  four  Browning  pistols,  and  also 
gave  them  sufficient  cyanide  of  potassium  to  enable  them 
to  commit  suicide  in  case  of  necessity. 

In  April.  1914,  Zivojin  Barcic,  formerly  the  employer 
of  the  witness,  introduced  him  to  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Serbia,  with  whom  he  had  a  long  conversation.  This 
conversation  was  after  the  projected  visit  of  the  Arch- 
duke to  Sarajevo  was  known,  and  took  place  late  in 
the  evening.  The  defendant  refused  to  state  the  sub- 
ject of  the  conversation.  These  two  officials  of  the 
Serbian  Government,  Ciganovic  and  Major  Tankosic, 
then  sent  them  to  a  Major  Povic  in  Sabac,  who  sup- 
plied them  with  false  passports,  etc..  and,  in  his  turn, 
sent  them  on  to  a  Serbian  Captain.  Joco  Provanic,  in 
Noslica. 

The  defendant,  Gavrilo  Prinzip,  the  actual  mur- 
derer, admitted  knowing  Major  Tankosic  and  Cigano- 
vic; admitted  having  received  money,  poison,  bombs 
and  pistols  from  Major  Tankosic ;  and  letters  to  the 
officials  of  the  Xarodna  Odbrana  at  various  points  on 
the  road  from  Belgrade  to  Sarajevo ;  and  having  writ- 
ten  Danilo   Hie   in   May,    1914,   from    Belgrade,   asking 

37 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

him  for  his  aid  m  the  murder  plot  which  was  being 
hatched  against  the  Archduke. 

Trit'ko  Grabcz  was  annilier  of  llie  principal  defend- 
ants. He  corroborated  the  admissions  of  Prinzip  and 
Cabrinovic  concerning  the  transactions  in  Belgrade 
with  Major  Tankosic  and  Ciganovic.  and  the  receipt  of 
the  bombs,  pistols,  money  and  letters  from  them.  He 
further  stated  that  the  bombs  handed  to  them  in  Bel- 
grade, by  Major  Tankosic,  were  exactly  like  those 
which  were  manufactured  in  the  Royal  Serbian  Arsenal 
at  Kragukejwac.  Danilo  Ilic,  another  defendant,  cor- 
roborated this  testimony. 

Vaso  Cubrilovic,  of  Sarajevo,  another  defendant, 
was  introduced  by  a  friend  named  Gykuic  to  the  de- 
fendant, Danilo  Hie,  and  was  by  him  informed  that 
everything  had  been  arranged  in  Belgrade  for  the 
murder  ni  the  Crown  Prince,  that  weapons  would  be 
supplied. 

One  Popovic,  another  defendant,  stated  that  he  had 
been  asked  by  Cabrinovic  to  join  the  conspiracy 
against  the  Crown  Prince,  did  so.  was  given  a  bomb  by 
Ilic,  and  posted  to  thri>w  the  same  at  the  Crown 
Prince,  hut  did  not  have  the  courage  to  throw  it. 

Valiko  Cubrilovic,  another  defendant,  testified  that 
he  had  met  Boso  Milanovic.  a  president  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana,  at  Sabac,  and  that  he  had  made  a  secret 
propaj.^anda  for  that  society  in  Bosnia,  admitted  that 
the  chairmen  of  all  Serbian  societies  in  the  towns  of 
Bosnia  wore  members  of  the  executive  staff  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana,  and  that  he  knew  that  a  strong 
revolutionary  committee  stood  behind  Prinzip  and  his 
confederates.  He  admitted  knowledge  of  the  Serbian 
origin  of  the  bombs. 

Jovanovic.  another  defendant,  admitted  being  a 
special  agent  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana.  that  he  talked 
over  the  murder  of  the  Prince  with  the  other  de- 
fendants, and  had  concealed  the  weapons  in  his  house 
at  Tuzla,  later  taking  them  to  Doboj. 

Milan  Kranjcevic,  another  defendant,  admitted  that 
it  was  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  among  .nil  his 
friends  that  the  Narodna  Odbrana  had  supplie«l  the 
homb<i  for  the  murder  of  the  Crown  Prince,  and  that 
it  had  previous  knowledge  of  the  whole  plot;  further 
admitted  that  the  object  of  the  wholr  prop.ngnnda  of 
the  \ar*^.dna  Odbrana  was  to  establish  a  great  Slav 
empire  under  the  leadership  f)f  the  Karagyorgyevics. 

38 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

Two  witnesses,  not  defendants,  who  had  ^een  at 
prior  times  members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  testified 
that  this  Narodna  Odbrana  received  subsidies  from  the 
Serbian  Government  and  was  allowed  the  privilege  of 
using  arms,  etc..  taken  from  the  State  Arsenals  of 
Serbia.  The  defendant,  Cabrinovic,  corroborated  these 
statements. 

Drajutin  Stojanovic,  an  official  of  the  Serbian  State 
Railroads,  testified  that  after  the  Balkan  war  all  arms, 
bombs  and  other  weapons  in  the  hands  of  any  one  in 
Serbia  were  collected  by  the  Serbian  Government  and 
placed  in  state  arsenals;  that  this  measure  had  been 
most  thoroughly  carried  out,  so  that,  at  the  time  of  the 
murder,  it  would  have  been  impossible  (the  sale  or  the 
possession  of  weapons  of  any  character  being  forbid- 
den), to  have  obtained  arms  or  bombs  from  any  source 
but  the  Serbian  Government  or  the  Narodna  Odbrana, 
its  agent. 

Certain  pamphlets  published  in  Belgrade,  the  capital 
of  Serbia,  by  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  were  submitted  in 
evidence,  which  contained  among  other  things,  exhorta- 
tions to  the  Serbian  population  to  incite  revolutions 
in  Austria-Hungary ;  that  being  the  only  way  to  destroy 
the  Monarchy ;  and,  further,  Serbian  youths  were  asked 
to  follow  the  example  of  Bodjanzerajic  who  attempted 
to  murder  the  Governor  of  Bosnia,  General  Baresania. 

It  was  further  proved  that  the  Crown  Prince  Alex- 
andria of  Serbia,  on  the  occasion  of  the  visit  of  the 
delegates  of  the  Austrian  Southern  Slav  Universities 
to  Belgrade,  in  1912,  received  two  students,  named 
Vladmir  Balizic  and  Luja  Rusic,  in  secret  audience, 
supplied  them  with  money,  and  that  soon  thereafter  Luki 
Jekic  attempted  the  murder  of  Barescale,  the  Governor 
of  Croatia,  and  that  at  the  time  of  the  trial  of  the  said 
Luki  Jekic  a  Serbian  professor  from  the  University  of 
Belgrade  came  to  Zagrac  and  brought  greetings  of  the 
Crown  Prince  Alexandria  of  Serbia  to  all  the  defend- 
ants. The  witness,  Henry  Shulz,  a  defendant  in  that 
trial,  was  a  recipient  of  these  greetings  from  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Serbia.  '!'.    ' 

Two  witnesses,  Theo.  Popovic  and  Trazimir  Kovozic, 
testified  that  they  knew  that  the  Narodna  Odbrana  had 
suppHed  68,000  crowns  to  aid  in  the  defense  of  Luki 
Jekic. 

The  result  of  this  trial  was  that  all  of  the  defendants 

39 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

who  participated  iii  the  actual  killinj;.  who  were  over 
the  ape  <>f  twenty  vears,  were  sentenced  to  death,  and 
this  sentence  was  carried  out.  I'rin/ip  himself  and  two 
others  were  sentenced  to  20  years'  imprisonment.  The 
rea>on  wliy  these  were  not  sentenced  to  death  was  be- 
cause the  law  of  Austria  forbids  the  sentencing  to 
death  of  anv  murderer  who  has  not  reacheci  the  aj^e  of 
20  years  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  tlic  murder. 
From  the  admissions  of  the  dcfendant>  alone,  at  the 
trial.  I  think,  as  a  lawyer,  that  any  court  would  have 
been  justified  in  drawinij  the  following  conclusions: 

1st — That  i'rinzip  and  his  fellow  conspirator^  were 
supplied  with  weapons  and  money  by  persons  who 
were  members  of  the  Narodna  ( )dbrana,  and  also  offi- 
cials of  the  Serbian  Government ; 

2nd — That  the  weapons  so  sui)plicd  were  taken  from 
the  Serbian  Royal  militar>  arsenals,  and  that  the  Ser- 
bian Government  permitted  this  Narodna  Olbrana 
Society  to  take  weapons  therefrom ; 

.3rd — That  thi>^  said  society,  the  Xarodna  Odbrana, 
was  a  society  whith  had  for  its  object  the  taking  by 
force,  or  by  intrigue,  of  territory  from  another  govern- 
ment, with  which  government  Serbia  was  at  peace,  and 
that  these  objects  were  known  to  the  Serbian  Gov- 
ernment : 

4th — That  the  Serbian  Government,  knowing  these 
objects,  aided  the  said  society,  the  Narodna  Odbrana, 
with  money,  arms,  and  generally  by  every  means  in  its 
power  which  might  contribute  to  the  accomplishment 
of  the  flesigns  of  the  said  society,  and  that,  in  fact,  the 
said  socictv  was  a  mere  cloak  to  enable  the  Serbian 
Government,  in  case  of  need,  to  avoid  responsibility. 
Considering  these  facts,  the  tone  of  the  ultimatum  of 
the  Austrian  Government  to  the  Serbian  Government 
does  not  seem  strange. 

As  tf»  the  other  clauses  in  the  ultimatum  of  .\u>tria. 
Serbia,  in  its  reply,  admits  the  truth  and  justice  of  the 
majorit>. 

Under  these  circumstances  and  in  view  of  the  his- 
tory of  Serbia's  relations  with  Austria-Hungary,  it  be- 
cornes  at  once  rcadilv  apparent  that  the  Serbian  reply 
to  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was  merely  an  attempt  to 
gain  time,  in  order  for  the  Government  of  Serbia  to 
make  "^uch  arrangements  with  Russia  as  would  enable 
her  to  escape  the  consequences  of  her  beini:,  as  a  gov- 
ernment, an  accessory  to  the  crime  of  murder      In  view 

40 


The   Outbreak   of   the    War 

of  all  these  facts,  Sir  Edward  Grey's  statement  that  he 
had  never  seen  one  State  address  to  another  independ- 
ent State  a  document  of  so  formidable  a  character,  be- 
comes at  once  estimable  at  its  true  value,  particularly 
when  it  is  considered  how  the  point  of  view  of  England 
has  greatly  changed  in  a  very  short  time,  as  regards 
Serbia.  In  1909,  Sir  Fairfax  Cartwright,  the  British 
Ambassador  to  Vienna,  said:  "Make  war  and  deal 
quickly  with  Serbia  before  anybody  can  stop  you.  The 
end  of  Serbia  will  be  a  blessing  for  all  Europe."  These 
remarks  were  publicly  made  in  Vienna  to  an  Austrian 
personage,  and  have  never  been  denied. 

Sir  E.  de  Bunsen,  occupying  precisely  the  same  posi- 
tion, said,  only  a  comparatively  few  days  before  Eng- 
land took  up  arms  on  behalf  of  Serbia:  "Be  convinced 
that  the  whole  English  nation  condemns  the  criminals 
of  Sarajevo.  We  are  tired  of  being  thrown  again  into 
disquietude  by  this  little  country,  and  there  is  no  Eng- 
lishman who  does  not  wish  heartily  that  Serbia  should 
receive  a  sound  and  lasting  lesson." 

Apparently  this  British  Ambassador  to  Vienna  was 
mistaken.  There  was  one  Englishman  who  did  not 
wish  that  Serbia  should  receive  the  fit  punishment  for 
her  crimes,  and  he  was  a  powerful  Englishman,  no  less 
than  Great  Britain's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  the  tool  in  this  whole  proceeding  of 
Sazonoff. 

The  two  clauses  which  were  particularly  objected  to, 
in  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  were  the  fifth, 
which  required  Serbia  to  accept  the  collaboration  of 
representatives  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
in  the  -suppression  of  the  various  revolutionary  move- 
ments in  Serbia  directed  against  Austria ;  and  the 
sixth,  requiring  the  Serbian  Government  to  take  judi- 
cial proceedings  against  accessories  to  the  plot  of  the 
28th  of  June  in  Serbian  territory,  and  to  allow  dele- 
gates of  the  Austrian  Government  to  take  part  in  the 
investigation  relating  thereto. 

As  regards  the  sixth,  the  matter  is  not  without 
precedent,  and.  curiously  enough,  it  is  a  precedent 
created  by  Austria  at  the  request  of  Serbia. 

One  of  the  numerous  political  assassinations  which 
disgrace  Serbian  history  took  place  on  June  10.  1868, 
when  Prince  Michael  of  Brenovic.  of  Serbia,  was  mur- 
dered in  the  Royal  Park  of  Topsidir  in  Belgrade.  Ser- 
bia traced  the  murder  to  Serbians  residing  in  south- 

41 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

ern  Hungary.  An  investigation  was  started  by  the 
Government  of  Hungary,  and  in  the  course  of  this  in- 
vestigation Serbia  asked  the  Government  of  Hungary 
that  some  of  her  government  officials  should  be  al- 
lowed to  participate  in  such  investigation,  which 
Hungary  permitted.  This  participation  by  Serbia  in 
this  Hungary  investigation  was  on  all  fours  with  the 
participation  that  Austria  asked  in  the  sixth  clause  of 
her  ultimatum,  and  as  she  had  already  granted  the 
same  thing  to  Serbia,  it  seems  peculiar,  unless  Serbia 
had  very,  very  good  reasons  of  an  unavowable  char- 
acter, that  she  should  refuse  to  grant  Austria  what 
Austria  had  granted  her. 

The  clamor  in  regard  to  the  sixth  clause  of  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum  arises  from  a  misunder'^tanding  of  its 
purport.  There  was  no  request  to  participate  in  any  trial 
which  might  result  from  an  investigation.  There  was  a 
request  to  participate  in  the  investigation  itself  before 
the  Juge  (I'lnstniction  or  examining  magistrate,  whose 
functions  have  been  pointed  out  in  the  summary  of  the 
Sarajevo  trial,  and  unless  Austria  had  participated 
there  and  had  had  some  direction  of  the  matters  which 
should  be  investigated,  does  any  human  being  pretend 
to  say,  knowing  the  history  of  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment, the  characteristics  and  moral  character  of  the 
Serbian  people,  and  the  utter  subserviencv  of  the  Ser- 
bian judges,  that  such  investigation  would  liave  been 
more  than  a  farce?  The  word  used  in  the  ultimatum 
was- "recherche,"  which  has  a  definite  and  positive 
meaning  known  to  every  jurist-consult  in  the  world. 
In  the  Serbian  Government's  reply,  the  term  "enquete 
judicairc"  is  used,  which  also  has  a  definite  and  posi- 
tive meaning,  and  is  not  the  same  thing,  or  anything 
like  the  same  thing,  as  "recherche."  This  the  Serbian 
Government  well  knew,  and  its  use  of  the  former  term 
in  its  reply  when  Austria  u.scd  the  latter  in  its  ultima- 
tum was  simply  to  confuse  the  issue  and  endeavor  to 
represent  .Austria  as  demanding  the  right  that  her 
judges  shf)uld  sit  with  the  Serbian  judge's,  which  was 
false.  With  the  facts  •sustaining  Au<stria's  contention, 
proved  at  the  preliminary  examination,  the  Serbian 
judge's  thereafter  could  not  rscapc  applying  the  law, 
but  had  this  examination  been  left  in  the  hands  of  sub- 
servient Serbian  magistrates  entirely,  nothintr  wotild 
have  iK'en  oa<;ipr  for  them  than  to  so  guide  anrl  direct 
the  investigation  as  to  make  the  result  what  is  known 
in  America  as  a  "white  wash  " 

42 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

Precedents  for  such  intervention  are  numerous  in 
continental  jurisprudence  and  have  been  invariably 
granted.  We  Americans  must  not  suppose  that  our 
own  system  of  procedure  is  the  only  one  in  the  world, 
or  is  necessarily  the  best. 

With  these  explanations,  the  case  of  Austria  against 
Serbia,  and  the  justness  and  moderateness  of  her  de- 
mands, can  safely  be  left  to  the  judgment  of  fair- 
minded  people. 

From  the  time  of  the  sending  of  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum events  moved  rapidly.  The  reply  of  Serbia 
was  deemed  insufficient  by  Austria,  and  war  was  de- 
clared on  the  28th  day  of  July.  On  the  25th  day  of 
July,  Russia  took  her  first  affirmative  action,  when 
her  Ambassador  at  Vienna  was  instructed  to  request 
an  extension  of  the  time  allowed  Serbia.  On  the  same 
day  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  saw  the 
Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  who  intimated 
to  him  his  intention  of  endeavoring  to  force  Austria 
to  retreat  from  the  stand  which  she  had  taken ;  claim- 
ing that  Austria's  action  was,  in  reality,  directed 
against  Russia,  and  that  she  aimed  at  overthrowing 
the  present  status  quo  in  the  Balkans  and  establish- 
ing her  own  hegemony  there;  and  who  further  stated 
that  if  Great  Britain  took  her  stand  firmly  with  France 
and  Russia  there  would  be  no  war. 

At  this  same  interview  the  Russian  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  stated  that  Russia  would  not  allow 
Austria  to  crush  Serbia  and  become  the  predominat- 
ing occupying  power  in  the  Balkans.  (English  White 
Paper  No.  17.)  The  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs in  this  made  a  declaration  of  war  in  fact,  if  not 
in  form.  Evidently  at  this  time  Great  Britain  con- 
templated a  possible  participation  with  Russia  and 
France  in  any  war  that  might  come,  since  this  British 
Ambassador  took  npon  himself  to  say  to  the  Russian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  that  "England  could  play 
the  roll  of  mediator  at  Berlin  and  Vienna  to  better 
purpose  as  a  friend,  who,  if  her  counsels  of  modera- 
tion were  disregarded,  might  one  dav  be  converted 
into  an  ally,  than  if  she  were  to  declare  herself  Russia's 
ally  at  once "  This  is  very  strong  language  for  an 
ambassador  to  use  in  reference  to  a  possible  action  by 
his  government  and  would  never  have  been  used  had 
there  not  been  an  already  existing  understanding. 

At  this  time  the  Emperor  of  Germany  was  absent 
from  Berlin  on  a  cruise  in  Scandinavian  waters;  on 

43 


The    Outbreak    of   the    War 

the  y6th  he  returned.  During  this  time  the  i^crbian 
Government  was  occupied  in  appeahng  tfi  every 
known  power  td  save  it,  but,  except  in  the  ca.sc  of 
Russia,  witli  comparatively  little  result,  the  Kcncral 
dispositit»n  among  the  pDwers  seeming  to  be  (as  a 
reading  of  the  correspondence  will  show)  that  Serbia's 
past  history  and  present  pcrfurnianccs  did  not  entitle 
her  to  much  sympathy  or  any  protection. 

Mefore  this  date  an  important  but  little  noticed  tele- 
gram had  passed  between  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Rome  and  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  This 
dispatch,  dated  the  '^iJrd  day  of  July  (the  very  day  on 
which  the  ultimatum  was  ^ent  from  Austria  to  Serbia), 
states  that  such  .\mbassadnr  knew  that  the  Italian 
Government  had.  at  that  time,  been  made  cognizant 
of  the  note:  to  use  \u^  own  lantruai^^e  "which  will  he 
addressed  to  Serbia." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  has  since  made  the  statement  that 
Italy  wa^  left  in  ignorance  of  the  contents  of  this  com- 
munication. How  he  can  make  tlii«  statement  seems 
puzzling,  in  view  i>f  the  fact  that  he  did  know,  from 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  on  the  very  day  the 
ultimatum  was  delivered  that  the  Italian  Govenitnent 
was  cognizant  of  its  contents.  (No.  .'is.  Kngli>h  W  bite 
Paper.)  This  is  not.  however,  the  only  thing  concern- 
ing which  an  explanation  mav  be  demanded  by  history 
from  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

The  next  day,  the  '^8th.  many  exchanges  of  tele- 
grams between  the  various  Ministers  of  Forcig-n  Af- 
fairs and  the  .Xmbas.sadors  took  place.  There  are 
none  which  call  for  much  comment  except  the  one 
(No.  }.'i)  frc^m  the  {British  .\mbassador  at  Berlin  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  wherein  the  .\nibassadf>r  stated  that 
the  German  Secretary-  of  State  informed  him  that  if 
Russia  mobilized  against  Gennany.  the  latter  would 
have  to  follow  suit ;  and.  on  his  demanding  what  was 
meant  hv  the  expression  "mobilized  against  Germany." 
was  informed  that  it  meant  a  mobilization  by  Ru^^sia 
in  the  north,  anil  tbnt  the  Russian  system  of  tnobilizn- 
tion  was  sn  complirated  that  it  might  be  difficult  ex- 
actly tn  hxate  her  mobilization,  and  that  Germany 
would,  therefore,  ha^ '■  ♦■■  bo  ^crv  r.ireftd  n.>«  ♦<>  be 
taken  bv  surprise. 

That  Russia  atui  1  i.uu-e  liad  been  for  mam  yrars  in 
an  offensive  and  <lcfensive  alliance  directed  against 
Cermanv  is  the  in«;tifiration  for  Germany's  not  do<;in'ng 
fri  }<r  fnWfn  Kv   <Mrtiri'-c    vvliirb  wa<  inulotibt (>(11\    tbr  in- 

•11 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

tention,  could  such  intention  be  carried  into  effect. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  know  the  conditions  upon  which 
Germany  would  not  take  the  definite  action  (jf  mobiliza- 
tion. Knowing  this,  it  would  seem  that,  had  his  desire 
been  for  peace,  he  would  have  brought  the  full  weight 
of  his  influence  upon  Russia  to  induce  Russia  to  com- 
ply with  this  requirement  on  the  part  of  Germany, 
which  was  lUKiucstionably  both  reasonable  and  necessary. 

Whether  he  did  this  or  not,  the  dispatches  exchanged 
in  the  next  four  or  five  days  show  more  conclusively 
than  any  argument  would.  From  this  maze  of  dis- 
patches we  extract  that  the  only  serious  proposal  made 
by  Sir  Edward  was  to  call  a  conference  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  England,  France,  Germany  and  Italy  to 
examine  the  possibility  of  a  way  out  of  the  situation. 

In  the  case  that  this  proposal  had  been  accepted, 
what  justice  could  Austria  have  expected  from  such  a 
conference?  France,  absofutely  hostile  to  all  Teutonic 
pretensions  of  any  character;  England,  who  had  shown 
her  hand  against  Germany  at  Algeciras,  in  the  Persian 
Gulf,  in  the  matter  of  the  Bagdad  Railroad:  one  of 
these  powers  formally  (France),  and  another  inform- 
ally (England),  allied  wnth  Russia,  Austria's  real  op- 
ponent in  the  dispute :  Italy  a  doubtful  factor,  and  one 
susceptible,  owing  to  her  interests  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, to  coercion  by  England  and  France,  which  co- 
ercion would  undoubtedly  have  been  exerted  in  case  of 
necessity.  This  proposition  was  simply  to  put  Austria's 
case  before  a  tribunal  which  was  already  packed,  so  as 
to  inevitably  secure  a  decision  adverse  to  her,  by  a 
vote  of  three  to  one.  Naturally,  Austria  could  not  ac- 
quiesce in  any  such  arrangement. 

On  the  27th  (No.  56),  the  Russian  Ambassador  in 
Vienna  informed  the  Austrian  Under-Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  if  actual  war  broke  out 
with  Serbia  it  would  be  impossible  to  localize  it,  for 
Russia  was  not  prepared  to  give  way  again  as  she  had 
done  on  previous  occasions. 

On  the  28th  the  British  Ambassador  to  Vienna  saw 
the  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  Ambas- 
sador begged  the  Foreign  Minister  to  believe  that  if,  in 
the  course  of  the  present  grave  crisis,  ''our  point  of 
view  should  sometimes  differ  from  his,  this  would  arise 
not  from  want  of  sympathy  with  many  just  complaints 
which  Austria-Hungary  had  against  Serbia,  but  from 
the  fact  that,,  whereas,  Austria-Hungary  put  first  her 

45 


The    Outbreak    of   the    War 

quarrel  with  Scrbiri,  you  (Sir  Edward)   were  anxious 
in  the  first  instance  tor  the  peace  of  Europe." 

This  phrase  "peace  of  Europe"  strikes  the  keynote 
of  Sir  Edward  Grey  s  entire  pretence  in  all  subsequent 
nej?otiation>.  which  Sir  Edward  Cirey  adopted  merely 
ft)r  the  purpose  of  s.^tisiying  that  portinii  i  ,f  Eni,'lish 
public  opinion,  which  would  have  balked  at  g"inj.(  to 
war  to  sustain  the  right  of  one  country  to  furtlicr  a 
conspiracy  to  murder  the  officials  of  another  country 
and  to  prevent  the  guilty  country  from  receiving  the 
punishment  which  was  its  due. 

On  the  '-ihth,  the  Imperial  Government  of  Russia 
announced  the  mobilization  in  the  military  conscrip- 
tions of  ( )dessa.  Kieff.  Moscow  and  Kazan  (No.  70 
White  Paper),  and  thus  took  the  decisive  action,  since 
Moscow  is  one  of  the  northern  circumscriptions,  which 
Germany,  on  the  t27th  (in  No.  43  already  quoted),  had 
said  would  be  followed  by  her  own  moi)ili/.ation.  Mr. 
Sazonoff  knew  of  this  intention  of  (Germany,  which 
had  been  announced  twenty-four  hours  before,  since  it 
was  communicated  tu  him  at  once  by  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
on  his  learning  it  from  the  British  Ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin, and  this  mobilization  was,  therefore,  with  malice 
aforethought,  particularly  as  there  was  no  military  or 
other  reason  for  mobilizing  the  Moscow  circumscrip- 
tion. Southern  Russia  could  have  supplied  all  the 
troops  which  would  l)c  necessary  for  an  attack  upon 
Austria,  had  it  not  been  Russia's  intention,  from  the 
beginning,  to  make  a  good  job  of  it  and  attack  Ger- 
many, too.  The  year  before  she  had  raised  her  peao* 
army  to  1,250,000  men,  500,000  more,  in  round  num- 
bers, than  the  German  army.    Why? 

Information  of  such  mobilization  was  comnuinicated 
by  the  Russian  Ambassador  to  Germany.  After  order- 
ing mobilization.  Russia  set  up  the  plea  (No.  78)  that 
a  week  or  more  would  in  any  case  elap«;e  before  the 
mobilization  was  completed,  which  would  give  time  to 
work  out  the  situation. 

By  this  time  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  made  up  his  mind 
to  acquiesce  in  the  somewhat  novel  political  doctrine 
that  a  conspiracy  to  murder  the  high  officials  of  one 
country  may  be  initiated  and  carried  forward  by  an- 
other country  without  the  second  country  l)cing  con- 
sidered guilty  of  any  wrong  doing,  and  had  announced 
this  decision  on  the  27th  m  the  House  of  Commons, 

46 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

for  which,  on  the  2l»th  (No.  S'6)   he  was  duly  thanked 
by  the  Prime  Minister  of  Serbia. 

On  the  29th  the  relations  of  France  and  of  England 
to  each  other  commenced  to  be  defined,  and  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  in  Dispatch  No.  87,  proceeds  to  define  the  British 
attitude  in  the  whole  controversy,  which  is  of  so  great 
importance  that  I  quote  it  verbatim  here : 

"SIR  EDWARD  GREY  TO  SIR  F.  BERTIE. 

"Foreign  Office,  Julv  29,  1914. 
"Sir, 

"After  telling  M.  Cambon  today  how  grave  the 
situation  seemed  to  be,  I  told  him  that  I  meant  to  tell 
the  German  Ambassador  today  that  he  must  not  be 
misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations  into 
any  sense  of  false  security  that  we  should  stand  aside 
if  all  the  efforts  to  preserve  the  peace,  which  we  were 
now  making  in  common  with  Germany,  failed.  But  I 
went  on  to  say  to  M.  Cambon  that  I  thought  it  neces- 
sary to  tell  him  also  that  public  opinion  here  ap- 
proached the  present  difficulty  from  a  quite  different 
point  of  view  from  that  taken  during  the  difficulty  as 
to  Morocco  a  few  years  ago.  In  the  case  of  Morocco 
the  dispute  was  one  in  which  France  was  primarily 
interested,  and  in  which  it  appeared  that  Germany,  in 
an  attempt  to  crush  France,  was  fastening  a  quarrel 
on  France  on  a  question  that  was  the  subject  of  a  special 
agreement  between  France  and  us.  In  the  present  case 
the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Serbia  was  not  one  in 
which  we  felt  called  to  take  a  hand.  Even  if  the  ques- 
tion became  one  between  Austria  and  Russia  we  should 
not  feel  called  upon  to  take  a  hand  in  it.  It  would  then 
be  a  question  of  the  supremacy  of  Teuton  or  Slav — 
a  struggle  for  supremacy  in  the  Balkans;  and  our  idea 
had  always  been  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  a  war  over 
a  Balkan  question.  If  Germany  became  involved  and 
France  became  involved,  we  had  not  made  up  our  minds 
what  we  should  do;  it  was  a  case  that  we  should  have 
to  consider.  France  would  then  have  been  drawn  inta 
a  quarrel  which  was  not  hers,  but  in  which,  owing  to 
her  alliance,  her  honour  and  interest  oblige  her  to  en- 
gage. We  were  free  from  engagements,  and  we  should 
have  to  decide  what  British  interests  required  us  to  do. 
I  thought  it  necessary  to  say  that,  because,  as  he  knew, 
we  were  taking  all  precautions  with  regard  to  our  fleet, 
and   I  was  about  to  warn   Prince   Lichnowskv  not  to 

47 


The    Outbreak    of    the    War 

count  on  our  siamiing  ii>nW,  hut  it  would  not  be  fair 
that  1  >lu.uld  let  M.  Camhun  he  misled  into  supposing 
that  this  meant  that  we  had  decided  what  to  do  in  a 
contingency  that  1  still  hoped  miglit  not  arise. 

"M.  Cainbon  said  that  I  had  explained  the  situation 
ver)-  clearlv.  He  understood  it  to  l>e  that  in  a  IJalkan 
quarrel,  and  in  a  struggle  for  supremacy  between  Teu- 
ton and  Slav,  we  should  not  feel  called  to  intervene: 
should  (.ther  issues  be  raised,  and  (icrmany  and  France 
become  involved,  so  that  the  question  became  one  of 
the  hegemony  of  Europe,  we  should  then  decide  what  it 
was  necessary  for  us  to  do.  lie  seemed  quite  prepared 
for  this  announcement,  and  made  no  criticism  upon  it. 
•Fie  said  French  opinion  was  calm,  but  decided.  He 
anticipated  a  demand  from  Germany  that  France  vyould 
be  neutral  while  Germany  attacked  F^ussia.  This  as- 
surance France,  of  course,  could  not  give ;  she  was 
bound  to  help  Russia  if  Russia  was  attacked." 

Then,  carrying  out  the  intention  expressed  in  Dis- 
patch No.  87.  Sir  Edward  Grey  further  defined  his  po- 
sition in  Dispatch  No.  S9  as  follows: 

SIR  EDWARD  GREY  TO  SIR  E.  GOSCHEN." 
"Foreign  Office.  July  29,  1911. 

"Sir, 
"After  speaking  to  the  German  Ambassador  this 
afternoon  about  the  European  situation.  I  said  that  I 
wished  to  say  to  him.  in  a  quite  private  and  friendly 
way,  something  that  was  on  my  mind.  The  situation 
was  verv  gra\e.  W'hilc  it  was  restricted  to  the  issues 
at  present  actually  in\'olved  we  had  no  thought  if  in- 
terfering in  it.  But  if  Germany  became  involved  in  it, 
and  then  France,  the  issue  might  be  so  great  that  it 
would  involve  all  European  interests;  and  T  did  not 
wish  him  to  be  misled  bv  the  friendlv  tone  of  our  con- 
versation— which  I  hoped  would  continue — into  think- 
ing that  we  should  stand  aside. 

"Tie  said  that  he  quite  understood  this,  but  he  asked 
whether  I  meant  that  we  should,  iinder  certain  cir- 
rnm'Jtances.  intervene? 

"I  replied  that  I  did  not  wish  to  say  that,  or  to  use 
anything  that  was  like  a  threat  or  an  attempt  to  apply 
pressure  bv  sa\  ing  that,  if  things  became  worse,  we 
should  intervene.  There  would  be  no  question  of  our 
intervening  if  Germany  was  nnt  involved,  or  even  if 

4fi 


The   Outbreak   of  the   War 

France  was  not  involved.  But  we  knew  very  well  that, 
if  the  issue  did  become  such  that  we  thought  British 
interests  required  us  to  intervene,  we  must  intervene  at 
once,  and  the  decision  would  have  to  be  very  rapid,  just 
as  the  decisions  of  other  Powers  had  to  be.  I  hoped 
that  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations  would  con- 
tinue as  at  present,  and  that  I  should  be  able  to  keep 
as  closely  in  touch  with  the  German  Government  in 
working  for  peace.  But  if  we  failed  in  our  efforts  to 
keep  the  peace,  and  if  the  issue  spread  so  that  it  in- 
volved practically  every  European  interest,  I  did  not  wish 
to  be  open  to  any  reproach  from  him  that  the  friendly 
tone  of  all  our  conversations  had  mislead  him  or  his 
Government  into  supposing  that  we  should  not  take  ac- 
tion, and  to  the  reproach  that,  if  they  had  not  been  so 
misled,  the  course  of  things  might  have  been  different. 

"The  German  Ambassador  took  no  exception  to  what 
I  had  said ;  indeed,  he  told  me  that  it  accorded  with  what 
he  had  already  given  in  Berlin  as  his  view  of  the  situa- 
tion." 

On  the  30th  France  defined  her  position  in  No.  99: 

"SIR  F.  BERTIE  TO  SIR  EDWARD  GREY. 

(Received  July  30.) 
(Telegraphic)  "Paris,  July  30,  1914. 

"President  of  the  Republic  tells  me  that  the  Russian 
Government  have  been  informed  by  the  German  Gov- 
ernment that  unless  Russia  stopped  her  mobilization 
Germany  would  mobilize.  But  a  further  report,  since 
received  from  St.  Petersburg,  states  that  the  German 
communication  had  been  modified,  and  was  now  a  re- 
quest to  be  informed  on  what  conditions  Russia  would 
consent  to  demobilization.  The  answer  given  is  that  she 
agrees  to  do  so  on  condition  that  Austria-Hungary  gives 
an  assurance  that  she  will  respect  the  sovereigntv  of 
Serbia  and  submit  certain  of  the  demands  of  the  Aus- 
trian note,  which  Serbia  has  not  accepted,  to  an  inter- 
national discussion. 

"President  thinks  that  these  conditions  will  not  be 
accepted  by  Austria.  He  is  convinced  that  peace  be- 
tween the  Powers  is  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain.  If 
His  Majesty's  Government  announced  that  England 
would  come  to  the  aid  of  France  in  the  event  of  a  con- 
flict between  France  and  Germany  as  a  result  of  the 
present  differences  between  Austria  and   Serbia,  there 

49 


The    Outbreak    of    the    War 

would  Ik-  Mo  war.  lor  (.iermajiy  \vi»ul<l  at  once  modify 
her  attitude. 

"I  explained  to  him  how  difficult  it  would  be  for 
His  Majesty's  Government  to  make  such  an  announce- 
ment. Init  he  said  that  he  must  maintain  that  it  would 
be  in  the  interests  of  peace.  France,  he  said,  is  pacific. 
She  does  not  desire  war.  and  all  that  she  has  done  at 
present  is  to  make  preparations  for  mobilization  so  as 
not  to  be  taken  unawares.  The  IVench  Government 
will  keep  His  Majesty's  (f«nernnunt  iiifortned  of  every 
thinq-  that  may  he  done  in  that  way.  'Phev  have  reliable 
information  tJiat  the  German  troops  arc  concentrated 
round  Thionville  and  Metz  ready  for  war.  If  there 
were  a  gfencral  war  on  the  Continent  it  would  inevita- 
bly draw  Encflaiid  into  it  for  the  protection  of  her  vital 
interests.  A  declaration  now  of  her  intention  to  sup- 
port France,  whose  desire  it  is  that  peace  should  be 
maintained,  would  almost  certainly  prevent  Germany 
from  j^oinp  to  war." 

Notice  how  Sazonoff.  Cambon  from  the  bcijinning, 
and  Poincare  in  this,  harp  on  England's  declaring  her- 
self with  them. 

England  folhjws  it  on  the  .same  day  witli   N'«».   101  : 

"SIR  EDW  ARD  GREY  TO  SIR  E.  GOSCIIEN. 
(Telegraphic).  "Foreign  Office.  July  30,  1914. 

""Sour  telegram  of  29th  July. 

"His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  lor  a  moment 
entertain  the  Chancellor's  proposal  that  they  should 
bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 

"What  lie  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by 
while  French  colonies  are  taken  and  hVance  is  beaten 
so  long  as  Germany  docs  not  take  French  territory  as 
distinct  from  the  colonies. 

"From  the  material  {)oint  of  view  such  a  proposal  is 
unacceptable,  for  France,  without  further  territory  in 
Europe  bcim,'  taken  from  her.  could  be  so  crushed  as  to 
lose  her  position  as  a  Great  Power,  aiid  become  sub- 
ordinate to  German  policy. 

"Altogether,  apart  from  that,  n  would  he  .i  disgrace 
for  us  to  make  this  bargain  with  Germany  at  the  ex- 
pense of  h'rance.  a  disgrace  from  which  the  gocnl  name 
r»f  this  country  would  never  recover. 

"The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain 
away  whatever  obligation  or  interest  we  have  as  re- 

50 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

gards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.    We  could  not  enter- 
tain that  bargain  either. 

"Havinj^^  said  so  much,  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine 
whether  the  prospect  of  a  future  general  neutrality 
agreement  between  England  and  Germany  offered  posi- 
tive advantages  sufficient  to  compensate  us  for  tying 
our  hands  now.  We  must  preserve  our  full  freedom  to 
act  as  circumstances  may  seem  to  us  to  require  in  any 
such  unfavorable  and  regrettable  development  of  the 
present  crisis  as  the  Chancellor  contemplates. 

"You  should  speak  to  the  Chancellor  in  the  above 
sense,  and  add  most  earnestly  that  the  one  way  of  main- 
taining the  good  relations  between  England  and  Ger- 
many is  that  they  should  continue  to  work  together  to 
preserve  the  peace  of  Europe ;  if  we  succeed  in  this  ob- 
ject, the  mutual  relations  of  Germany  and  England  will, 
I  believe,  be  ipso  facto  improved  and  strengthened. 
For  that  object  His  Majesty's  Government  will  work 
in  that  way  with  all  sincerity  and  good-will. 

"And  I  will  say  this :  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be 
preserved,  and  the  present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own 
endeavour  will  be  to  promote  some  arrangement  to 
which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be 
assured  that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be 
pursued  against  her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia, 
and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately.  I  have  desired  this 
and  worked  for  it,  as  far  as  I  could,  through  the  last 
Balkan  crises,  and,  Germany  having  a  corresponding 
object,  our  relations  sensibly  improved.  The  idea  has 
hitherto  been  too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  defi- 
nite proposals,  but  if  this  present  crisis,  so  much  more 
acute  than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through  for  gen- 
erations, be  safely  passed,  I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief 
and  reaction  which  will  follow  may  make  possible 
some  more  definite  rapprochement  between  the  Powers 
than  has  been  possible  hitherto." 

The  last  part  of  this  dispatch  was  written  with  one 
eye  on  the  nonconformist  conscience  of  England. 

All  of  this  time,  it  must  be  noticed,  there  is  no  ques- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  in  any  shape,  form  or  man- 
ner, and  that  England  is  willing  to  go  to  war  without 
regard  to  this,  unless  Germany  accepts  certain  condi- 
tions, the  acceptance  of  which  conditions,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  France  and  Russia  were  both  ready  to 
attack   Germany,   by   Germany,   would    have    simply 

51 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

amounted  to  suicide  on  Germany's  part.  By  what  right 
England,  if  not  allied  to  these  powers  (in  spite  of  the 
denials  of  Sir  Kdward  drey)  should  seek  to  circum- 
scribe Germany's  military  and  naval  action  against 
France,  secm*^  impossible  to  understand;  and  the  only 
conclusion  that  can  be  reached  from  a  close  examina- 
tion of  these  dispatches  is  that  the  nej^otiations  by  Sir 
Edward  Grey  with  Germany  were  from  the  beginning 
poisoned  by  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

On  the  'U^X,  Russia  mobilized  completely,  although 
Germany  had  not  at  this  time  mobilized.  (X(^.  11'^) 

On  the  same  day  (No.  112)  Germany  decided  to  take 
the  first  step  towards  mobilization,  "Kriegsgcfahr." 
For  obvious  reasons,  the  British  Government  has  chosen 
to  print  the  German  dispatch  before  the  Russian 
(No.  113).  The  text  of  the  German  dispatch,  however, 
shows  that  the  action  of  Germany  was  taken  subse- 
quent to  the  action  of  the  Russian  mobilization. 

Ab<nit  this  time  Sir  Edward  Grey  found  another 
moral  issue;  and,  having  found  it.  addressed  duplicate 
dispatches  to  the  French  and  (^lerman  G<j\  ernments 
(No.  114): 

"SIR  EDWARD  GREY  TO  SIR  F.  BERTIE  AND 

SIR  E.  GOSCHEN. 
(Telegraphic).  "Foreign  Office,  July  ;U,  1914. 

"I  still  trust  that  situation  is  not  irretrievable,  but 
in  view  of  prospect  of  mobilization  in  Germany  it  be- 
comes essential  to  His  Majesty's  Government,  in  view 
of  existing  treaties,  to  ask  whether  French  (German) 
Government  is  prepared  to  engage  to  respect  neutrality 
of  Belgium  so  long  as  no  other  Power  violates  it. 

"A  similar  request  is  l)eing  addressed  to  German 
(French)  Government.  It  is  important  to  have  an 
carlv  answer." 

This  brint:->  tis  U>  the  c^cneral  subject  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium. 

But  before  taking  up  this  intricate  and  involved  sub- 
ject, it  is  perhajis  advisable  to  dispose  of  the  dis- 
|)atches  container!  in  the  White  Paper,  as  far  as  space 
permits,  and  to  show  how  Sir  Edward  Grey  deceived 
the  British  public  and  misled  the  i^ritish  .Vmbassador 
at  St.  Pcterslnirg,  his  own  subordinate. 

It  is  now  known  that  on  July  30th  Sir  Edward  Grev 
was  about  to  resign,  because  the  majority  of  the  Cabi- 
net refused  to  go  to  war  with  Germany  on  account  of 

58 


The    Outbreak    of    the    War 

Serbia  and  preferred  to  throw  over  Great  Britain's 
naval  and  other  engagements  with  France,  which,  on 
July  30th,  Cambon  urged  Great  Britain  to  execute 
without  delay.     (White  Paper  105,  and  its  enclosures.) 

The  British  Cabinet  being,  in  a  sense,  all  at  sea,  per- 
suaded Sir  Edward  Grey  to  withdraw  his  resignation 
and  to  stay  on,  and  on  the  31st  of  July  he  agreed  to  re- 
main until  Germany's  position  as  regards  Belgium  was 
determined.  Early  on  August  1st  the  British  Cabinet 
met  and  drew  up  a  memorandum  concerning  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  to 
submit  to  Lichnowsky.  White  Paper  123  gives  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  account  of  his  interview  with  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador,  and  shows  that  at  about  1 :30  P.  M. 
of  August  1st  the  German  Ambassador  asked  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  the  question  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a 
promise  not  to  violate  Belgium's  neutrality,  Great 
Britain  would  remain  neutral.  Sir  Edward  Grey  was 
further  pressed  as  to  whether  he  could  not  formulate 
conditions  in  which  Great  Britain  would  remain  neu- 
tral, and  the  Ambassador  even  suggested  that  the  in- 
tegrity of  France  and  her  colonies  might  be  guaran- 
teed. To  this  offer,  which  we  now  know  was  made 
with  authority  by  the  German  Ambassador,  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  said  that  he  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely 
any  promise  to  remain  neutral  on  any  terms,  and  could 
only  say  that  "we  must  keep  our  hands  free."  This 
dispatch  is  so  extremely  important  that  T  quote  it  in 
full : 

(No.  123)   "SIR  EDWARD  GREY  TO  SIR  E." 
GOSCHEN. 

"London,  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

"Sir:  I  told  the  German  Ambassador  today  that  the 
reply  of  the  (German  Government  with  regard  to  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  was  a  matter  of  very  great  re- 
gard, because  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  affected  feelint: 
in  this  country.  If  Germany  could  see  her  way  to  give 
the  same  assurance  as  that  which  had  been  giv- 
en to  France,  it  would  materially  contribute  to  relieve 
anxiety  and  division  here.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there 
were  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one 
combatant,  while  the  other  respected  it.  it  would  be 
extremely  difficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in  this 
country.  I  said  that  we  had  been  discussing  this  ques- 
tion at  a  Cabinet  meeting,  and  as  I  was  authorized  to 
tell  him  this  T  gave  him  a  memorandum  of  it. 

53 


The    Outbreak    of    the    War 

"He  (kskiti  oit-  uluthtr,  tj  Girmany  jt,'a;  t-  a  promise 
not  to  liohttt-  lii'li^iitni  ii,utrality,  we  :iiouUi  t'n^'Oj^t*  to 
rrMidiii  ncutrai. 

"\  replied  that  1  cuuM  not  say  that:  our  hands  were 
still  I'rcc,  and  wc  were  considcrinj;  what  our  attitude 
should  be  All  1  could  say  was  that  our  attitude 
would  be  determined  largely  by  public  opinion  here. 
I  did  not  think  that  we  could  give  a  promise  of  neu- 
trality on  that  condition  alone. 

■■'nit'  Atnbossiuior  pressed  lue  as  to  zchether  J  could 
not  /oniudote  londttioiis  on  ichich  riv  would  remain 
nfutral.  He  d  en  stated  that  the  integrity  of  France 
and  her  colonies  mi^ht  be  guaranteed. 

"I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any 
promise  to  remain  ncutrai  on  similar  terms,  and  I 
could  only  say  that  we  must  keep  our  hands  free." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  gave  no  information  to  his  col- 
lea^mes  of  these  offers  of  Lichnowsky  on  August  1st, 
and  when  the  Cabinet  met  the  next  morning,  .Aug^^st 
2nd.  he  concealed  them  from  the  entire  Cabinet  as  he 
did  from  the  House  of  Commons  on  August  3rd.  But 
for  this  concealment  of  Sir  Edward  Grey.  Belgium 
would  not  have  been  turned  into  a  shambles,  and  Rus- 
sia would  undoubtedly  have  accepted  Austria's  ac- 
quiescence in  tlie  terms  that  Sazonoff  hi^uself  dictated 
to  Pnurtales  at  2  V.  M.  on  July  3(»th,  whicli  are  men- 
tioned in  Dispatch  97  from  Sir  G.  Buchannan  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey. 

The  conversation  between  the  German  Ambassador 
and  Sir  Edward  Grey,  which  is  referred  to  in  Dispatch 
123.  was  not  known  f(»r  weeks  after  it  occurred.  When 
Parliament  met  on  August  27th.  Sir  Edward  Grey  was 
asked  in.  the  House  whether  he  had  submitted  Lich- 
nowsky's  proposals  to  the  Cabinet,  and  why  these  pro- 
posals difl  not  fully  meet  the  desires  of  the  British 
Cabinet.  Sir  Edward  Grey  admitted,  in  his  answer  to 
this  interrogation,  that  be  bad  disclosed  this  dispatch 
to  no  one  at  the  time  and  for  several  days  thereafter, 
claiming  that  Lichnowsky  was  speaking  for  himself 
only  and  had  not  been  authorized  by  Berlin  to  propose 
such  terms. 

In  making  this  last  statement.  Sir  Edward  Grey  did 
not  explain  win  he  did  not  in  this  interview  raise  the 
questirjn  with  Lichnowsky  as  to  his  specific  authority, 
which  would  have  been  the  natural  thing  to  do,  since 
Tjrhnowskv    made    the    very    propositions   which    tho 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

British  Cabinet  had  stated  that  they  would  insist 
upon ;  nor  why  he  immediately  wired  them  to  Goschen, 
the  Ambassador  of  England  to  Berlin,  to  prevent  the 
latter 's  getting  into  cross  purposes  with  the  British 
Foreign  Office  in  the  matter. 

The  fact  is,  and  cannot  be  doubted,  that  at  the  time, 
August  1st,  1914,  Lichnowsky  made  these  proposals  ro 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  Sir  Edward  Grey  knew  that  they 
were  authoritative  and  would  bind  the  German  Gov- 
ernment. 

Ambassadors,  in  such  grave  situations  as  were  then 
existing,  do  not  make  unauthorized  propositions.  Fur- 
thermore, the  German  correspondence  shows  that 
Lichnowsky  was  authorized  to  make  this  offer.  It  is 
an  English  scholar  of  standing,  Dr.  Connybeare  of  Ox- 
ford, who  characterizes  Sir  Edward  Grey's  answer  to 
the  interpellation  in  Parliament  on  x\ugust  27th  as  a 
mode]  of  hard  lying;  and  goes  even  further,  in  a  lately 
published  letter: 

"One  thing  we  must  insist  upon  for  her,"  (Great 
Britain)  "is  that  that  sinister  liar,  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
who  forever  has  peace  on  his  lips  and  war  in  his  heart, 
should  go.  We  cannot  trust  him  and  his  accomplice, 
Sazonoff,  to  make  peace  for  England." 

Sazonoff  himself  has  lied  and  lied  constantly 
throughout  all  the  negotiations  betw^een  the  Powers 
which  preceded  the  declaration  of  war.  No.  133  in  the 
English  White  Papers  shows  that  at  the  time  Russia 
ordered  her  mobilization,  Austria  had  signified  her 
willingness  to  discuss  the  substance  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Serbia,  that  Sazonoff  had  expressed  his 
satisfaction  thereat  and  had  said  it  was  desirable  that 
the  discussion  should  take  place  in  Tvondon  with  the 
participation   of  the   Great    Powers. 

Russia  intended  w-ar  from  the  very  beginning  of  the 
conflict.  She  had  raised  her  army  from  twelve  hun- 
dred and  fifty  .thousand  men  in  peace  only  a  short  time 
before,  which  necessitated  a  counter  increase  on  Ger- 
many's part.  She  had  assembled  forces  of  everv  kind 
that  she  was  capable  of  assembling  early  in  the  Spring 
of  1914,  and  she  intended,  and  had  intended,  for  a  long 
time,  to  launch  her  legions  on  the  march  to  Constan- 
tinople in  that  fateful  year. 

France,  that  "peaceful  democracy,"  which  for  forty 
years  has  been  biding  her  time  and  w-aiting  her  mo- 
ment, like  a  revengeful  woman,  and  which  now  is  pos- 
ing as  having  been  desirous  of  peace,  had  an  oppor- 

55 


The    Outbreak    ot    the    >X^ar 

lunit)  iL>  in-iiro  peace,  ii  >hc  had  really  wished  it.  had 
she  rephcd,  when  sIjc  was  asked  hy  Germany  what  her 
intentions  were  in  the  crisis,  that  >lie  did  n»n  propose 
to  supp<-)rt  Russia  in  attempting  the  justify,  by  the  force 
of  arms,  murder,  as  a  means  of  political  action.  But 
France,  who  needed  a  strait-jacket  to  keep  her  out  of 
a  cjuarrel  wliich  wa^  not  hers,  in  the  whole  business, 
was  willing  to  support  anything  and  everything,  pro- 
vided she  gratified  that  insane  obsession  of  hers,  which 
sprang  from  iier  offen<led  conceit,  towards  Germany 
for  having  taken  from  her,  in  1870.  territory,  the  larger 
portion  of  which  she  herself,  in  the  reign  of  Louis 
XI\'.  had  taken  from  (lermanv  !)y  force  of  arms,  and 
held  by  that  title. 

The  subject,  in  all  its  bearings,  is  too  long  and  too 
intricate  to  be  here  discussed  at  greater  length. 

There  is  a  most  excellent  work  by  M.  V.  Price  en- 
titled. "The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,"  which 
gives  all  the  diplomatic  disi)atches  and  co-relates  them 
to  one  anotiicr  and  with  contemporaneous  evidence,  in 
so  far  as  this  is  ascertainable.  Any  fair-minded  man 
of  reasonable  intelligence,  who  will  read  this  book 
carefully,  will  inevitably  be  driven  to  the  conclusion 
that  Sir  Edward  Grey  is  the  person  upon  whom  the 
responsibility  for  the  expansion  of  the  war  from  more 
than  a  local  quarrel  between  Austria  and  Russia  will 
be  placed  by  history;  and  that  to  accomplish  the  end 
which  lie  had  in  view  from  the  very  beginning.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grev  did  not  disdain  to  deceive  both  his  col- 
leagues of  the  Cabinet,  the  Houses  of  Parliament,  and 
the  people  of  England. 

Some  day  perhaps  Morley  will  speak  and  then  the 
dots  will  be  placed  on  the  i's  of  this  whole  affair. 

During  the  I'Vench  Revolution,  the  territory'  now 
known  as  P.elgium  had  become  a  part  of  the  Republic 
of  France.  It  embr.accd  with  great  enthusiasm  the  most 
violent  of  the  political  doctrines  taught  by  the  French 
Revolution.  Subsequent  to  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  it  was 
united  with  Holland,  but  in  18.'10  revolted,  and  a  Eu- 
ropean scandal  had  ensued,  in  some  sense,  which  neces- 
sitated the  intervention  of  the  great  Powers.  Accord- 
ingly, on  the  lAth  of  November.  IS.'Jl,  a  treaty  was  en- 
tered into  luiwecn  Great  I»ritain.  Austria,  France.  Prus- 
sia anfl  Rus'^ia.  on  \\\c  one  part,  and  P.elgium  on  the 
other,  relative  to  the  separation  of  Belgium  from  Hol- 
land. This  treaty  affected  the  present  war  only  in  its 
7(h  ,iiif|  '.?r.t!i  articles.    .Xrticle  7  is  "Belgium,  within  the 


The   Outbreak    of   the    War 

limits  specified  in  Articles  1,  2  and  4,  shall  form  an  inde- 
pendent and  perpetually  neutral  state.  It  shall  be 
bound  to  observe  such  neutrality  towards  all  other 
states." 

Article  25  is  "The  courts  of  Great  Britain,  Austria, 
France,  i'russia  and  Russia  guarantee  to  His  Majesty, 
the  King  of  the  Belgains,  the  execution  of  all  of  the 
preceding  Articles." 

These  articles  are  quoted  at  length  from  "Map  of 
Europe,  by  Treaty,"  by  Edward  liurstlet,  Librarian 
and  Keeper  of  the  Papers,  Foreign  Office,  London, 
1875.  There  have  been  so  many  versions  of  the  articles 
of  this  treaty  affecting  the  neutralization  of  Belgium 
quoted  in  the  daily  press,  and  elsewhere,  in  an  al- 
tered form,  that  it  is  deemed  advisable  to  give  a 
version  of  the  text  from  a  work  of  authority.  This 
treaty  was  entered  into  between  the  Powers  and  Bel- 
gium, but  Holland,  however,  refused  to  accept  the 
treaty,  and  war  took  place  between  Belgium  and  Hol- 
land, with  the  result  that  the  going  into  full  effect  of 
the  treaty  was  postponed  until  1839,  when  another 
treaty  (which  was  preceded  by  a  treaty  of  separation 
between  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  and  a  treaty  be- 
tween the  Powers  on  the  one  part,  and  the  Netherlands 
on  the  other,  had  been  entered  into,  both  being  signed 
on  the  same  day),  between  the  Powers  on  the  one  part, 
and  Belgium  on  the  other,  was  entered  into  at  London 
on  the  19th  of  April,  1839.  By  its  Second  Article  the 
treaty  of  the  15th  of  November,  1831,  between  their 
Majesties  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  etc.,  and  His  Majesty,  the  King  of 
of  the  Belgians,  is  declared  not  to  be  obligatory  upon 
the  high  contracting  parties.  And  by  the  First  Article 
Her  Majesty,  etc.,  declared  that  "the  Articles  hereunto 
annexed,  and  forming  the  tenor  of  the  treaty,  conclud- 
ed this  dav  between  His  Majesty,  the  King  of  the  Bel- 
gians, and  His  Majesty,  the  King  of  the  Netherlands, 
the  Crown  Duke  of  Luxemburg,  are  considered  as  hav- 
ing the  same  force  and  validity  as  if  they  were  textu- 
ally  inserted  in  the  present  Act.  and  that  they  are  thus 
placed  under  the  guarantee  of  their  said  Majesties." 

The  Seventh  Article  of  the  treaty,  referred  to  in  the 
First  Article  of  the  treaty  between  Great  Britain,  etc., 
and  Belgium,  of  the  19th  of  April,  1839,  is  "Belgium, 
within  the  limits  specified  in  Articles  1.  2  and  4.  shall 
form  an  independent  and  perpetuallv  neutral  State.  It 

67 


The   Outbreak    of   the   War 

shall  he  bound  to  ubservc  >uch  neutrality  towards  all 
other  States." 

Thus  was  Belj^um  neutralized.  This  neutralization 
continued  down  to  the  year  1870  intact ;  though,  in  the 
year  181<».  at  a  moment  when  war  apparently  threat- 
ened. France  notified  liclj^um  that  unless  .she  defended 
her  neutralization,  she  (France),  would  violate  it.  no 
overt  act  was  committed. 

In  l.'sTt*  the  Franct»-l'russian  \\  ar  broke  out,  and  Mi 
Gladstone,  who,  for  many  reasons,  did  not  consider  that 
the  Treaty  of  183U  was  at  the  time  binding  upon  the 
parties  thereto,  caused  another  treaty  to  be  entered 
into  between  Great  Britain  and  the  North  German  Con- 
federation, by  His  Majesty,  the  King  of  Prussia; 
wherein  and  whereby  the  North  German  Confederation 
agreed  to  respect  the  neutralization  of  Belgium  as  long 
as  the  same  was  respected  by  I'Vaiice  ;  and  tlie  Oueen 
of  England,  on  her  part,  obligated  herself  "in  the  event 
that  the  armies  of  France  should  violate  that  neutral- 
ity through  the  hostilities  between  the  North  German 
Confederation  and  France,  she  will  be  prepared  to  co- 
operate with  His  Prussian  Majesty  for  the  defense  of 
the  same  in  such  manner  as  may  be  mutually  agreed 
upon;  emj)loying  for  that  purpose  her  na\al  and  mili- 
tary forces  to  insure  its  observations  and  to  maintain, 
in  conjunction  with  His  Prussian  Majesty,  then  and 
:hereaftcr.  the  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium. ' 

-Nrticle  3  of  this  treaty  runs  as  follows:  "This  treaty 
shall  be  binding  on  tlie  high  cf)ntracting  parties  during 
the  continuation  of  the  present  war  between  the  North 
German  Confederation  and  France,  and  for  twelve 
montlis  after  the  ratification  of  anv  treaty  of  peace  con- 
cluded between  tho'^e  parties,  and  on  the  expiratifMi  of 
that  time,  the  independence  and  neutrality  of  I'clgium 
will,  so  far  as  the  high  contracting  parties  are  respect- 
ively concerned,  continue  to  rest  as  heretofore  in  Ar- 
ticle I.  of  the  Ouintuple  Trcatv  nf  the  l!>th  of  April. 

A  precisely  similar  treaty  was  on  the  1 1th  of  .August 
entered  into  with  France.  The  Treaty  of  Peace  was 
made  on  the  IRth  of  ^fay.  1871.  and  the  ratifications 
were  exchanged  on  the  20th  of  May  following.  These 
two  treaties  of  IhTO.  relative  to  Belgium.  fluTcfor*-.  ex- 
pired, bv  the  limitatiftns  contained  in  their  Third  Arti- 
cle. f)n  the  20th  of  May.  1872. 

The  treaties  above  cited  contain  the  basis  on  which 

58 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

it  is  sought  to  hold  the  present  German  Empire  as  re- 
sponsible for  violating  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

The  first  question  wiiich  suggests  itself  tu  tiie  reader 
of  those  treaties  is  the  following:  How  is  the  German 
Empire,  which  was  not  in  existence  as  a  sovereign  state 
in  the  years  1831,  1839  or  1870,  bound  by  these  treaties? 

The  Treaty  of  1831  was  signed  by  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia, as  was  the  treaty  of  1839.  The  Treaty  of  1870 
was  signed  by  the  King  of  Prussia  for  the  North  Ger- 
man Confederation.  The  German  Empire  and  Prussia 
are  entirely  separate  political  units ;  as  separate  as  are 
the  United  States  and  the  State  of  New  York;  and  the 
Kingdom  of  Prussia  bears  much  the  same  relation  to 
the  Empire  of  Germany  as  the  State  of  New  York  does 
to  the  United  States  of  America. 

The  North  German  Confederation  was  organized  as 
a  result  of  the  War  of  1866  with  Austria,  and  was  com- 
posed of  the  German  states  north  of  the  Main,  and  did 
not  include  Wurtemburg,  Bavaria  and  the  other  states 
of  the  south ;  and  as  these  separate  sovereignties  were 
not  members  of  the  North  German  Confederation  \  at 
the  time  of  tlie  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  1870,  it  ^s 
extremely  difficult  to  see  by  what  process  of  reasoning 
these  South  German  states  were  affected  by  a  treaty  of 
the  North  German  Confederation. 

The  Empire  of  Germany  united  the  North  and  South 
German  States  in  one  political  federation,  very  similar 
in  its  constitution  to  the  United  States,  under  the  head- 
ship of  the  King  of  Prussia,  as  Emperor  of  Germany. 
But  the  Kingship  of  Prussia  did  not  fuse  into  the 
Empireship  of  Germany ;  the  two  offices  are  as  distinct 
as  those  of  the  Governor  of  New  York  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States.  The  mere  fact  that  the  two 
offices  happen  to  be  held  by  the  same  individual  does 
not  confuse  their  functions  and  prerogatives.  Nor 
does  the  sovereigntv  of  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia  merge, 
except  so  far  as  provided  by  the  act  constituting  the 
Empire,  into  the  sovereignty  of  the  German  Empire. 
This  lack  of  fusion  in  many  important  attributes  of 
sovereignty  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  to  this  dav  Sax- 
ony. Bavaria  and  Wurtemburg  maintain  diplomatic  rep- 
resentatives abroad,  and  receive  those  of  foreign  coun- 
tries. Great  Britain  had  diplomatic  representatives  in 
several  of  the  separate  States  in  the  Empire  at  the  mo- 
ment of  the  outbreak  of  the  war ;  thus  recognizing  that 

59 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

the  sovcreitj^ntN   <>t   ihcsi-  siato  was  i\ot   fused  in  those 
of  the  ICnijiirt-. 

The  whole  iK»litical  scheme  of  the  German  Empire 
is  a  fetltratioii  and  not  a  union.  If  any  new  state  was 
admitted  intt*  tins  federation.  subse(|uent  to  the  nego- 
tiation of  a  treaty  by  the  Geriiian  Empire,  in  pursuance 
of  the  treaty-making  powers  confcrretl  vipon  it  by  the 
constituti(»n,  there  is  no  doubt  that  such  entering  state 
would  be  bound  by  such  treaty ;  but  that  is  a  totally  dif- 
ferent case  from  the  (icrman  I'.inpire  Winj;  Ixnuid  by 
treaties  negotiated  prior  to  its  creation  by  one  (  Prus- 
sia), or  by  more  than  one,  (North  German  Confeder- 
ation) of  the  separate  sovereign  States  which  after- 
wards became  federated,  unless  subsequent  to  the  fed- 
eration such  treaties  were  assumed  by  the  German  Em- 
pire in  the  manner,  and  accor«linp  to  the  forms,  pre- 
scribed by  its  constitution.  There  has  never  lieen  any 
pretence  that  any  treaty  which  had  been  duly  entered 
into  by.  say,  Bavaria,  prior  t(»  its  joining  the  German 
Empire  as  one  of  the  federated  states  has  an^  binding 
force  upon  the  German  Empire,  nor  has  such  a  conten- 
tion been  advanced  in  relation  to  any  treaty  made  by 
any  of  the  federated  sovereiijn  states,  except  Prussia, 
which  the  pseudo-sentimentalists  contend  bound  the 
German  Empire  in  1831  and  IbM.  thirty  odd  years  be- 
fore the  German  Empire  came  into  existence,  by  its 
signature  to  the  treaties  guaranteeing  the  neutralizatii^i 
of  Belgium. 

In  the  history  of  the  L  iiiled  Slale>  there  i.>  an  in- 
cident which  proves  both  the  folly  and  the  absurdity  of 
this  contention.  What  is  now  tlie  state  of  Texas  was 
once  the  republic  of  Texas  and  had  entered  into  treaty- 
relations,  as  such  republic,  with  various  countries  of  the 
world.  SubstHjuent  to  tiie  entrance  into  tiiese  treat}' 
relations,  the  rei)ublic  of  Texas  divested  itself  of  a  por- 
tion of  its  sovereignty  by  accepting  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  and  entered  the  rni<»n  as  a  state. 
There  never  has  been,  and  never  will  be.  any  contention 
that  the  treaties  which  Texas  had  entered  into  with 
foreign  countries  iMnmd  the  United  States,  on  Texas  be- 
coming one  of  the  states  composing  the  Union. 

.Another  thing:  neither  the  Treaties  of  IRMl  nor  of 
1830  contained  anv  time  limitation.  Cotmcqucntly. 
they  were  revocal>le  by  any  one  of  the  guarantors  at 
will :  and.  l)eing  so  revocable,  the  oidy  qiie.stion  which 
could  arise  in  connection  with  their  being  revoked  was 

60 


The   Outbreak   of   the   War 

the  character  of  notice  which  any  of  the  sovereign 
states,  composing  the  guarantors,  should  give  to  the 
guaranteed  state  or  to  its  co-guarantors. 

International  law  is  not  precise  on  this  point,  but  it 
may  be  said  that  a  declaration  of  war  is  one  form  of 
notice. 

Russia,  one  of  those  nations  which  is  now  posing 
as  being  moved  in  this  war  by  altruistic  regard  for  the 
rights  of  small  nations  (although  her  history  would  not 
lead  anyone  to  suspect  that  heretofore  she  had  been 
troubled  with  any  such  scruples),  has,  on  several  occa- 
sions, put  forward  the  doctrine  of  rebus  sic  stantibus 
which  is  recognized  by  the  great  writers  on  internation- 
al law  as  being  a  tacit  condition  in  every  treaty,  and 
which  means  that  a  total  change  of  circumstances  is  a 
cause  in  itself  of  the  termination  of  any  treaty  obliga- 
tion. This  doctrine  was  accepted  by  the  Powers  as  an 
excuse  for  Russia's  repudiation  of  the  clauses  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris  neutralizing  the  Black  Sea  and  also  of 
her  engagements  as  to  Batum  contained  in  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin.  In  neither  of  these  cases  has  the  change 
of  circumstances  been  so  total  as  is  the  case  in  both 
Germany  and  Belgium,  since  the  making  of  the  Treaties 
of  1831  and  1839.  At  the  time  of  the  signing  of  the 
Treaties  of  1831  and  1839,  Belgium  was  a  small  and  in- 
significant country,  both  in  point  of  area  and  popula- 
tion, with  little  foreign  commerce,  with  no  army  worthy 
of  the  name,  and  with  none  of  those  attributes  of 
strength  which  are  a  part  of  sovereignty. 

In  1914  the  situation  had  decidedly  changed;  Bel- 
gium had  become,  in  proportion  to  her  area,  one  of  the 
most  populous  countries  of  the  world,  enjoying  a  large 
and  lucrative  foreic^n  commerce ;  was  a  manufacturing 
country  of  great  importance ;  had  raised  and  maintained 
an  army  which,  in  proportion  to  her  population,  re- 
quired the  military  services  of  a  very  considerable  per- 
centage thereof ;  had  thoroughly  fortified  her  chief 
strategic  points  and  had  acquired  colonies.  In  short, 
had  taken  on  all  the  attributes  of  any  other  of  the  mod- 
ern states.  There  was  no  longer  any  need  for  her  re- 
maining in  the  emasculated  position  of  a  neutral  state ; 
and  it  is  an  axiom  of  law  that  when  a  reason  for  a  thing 
fails,  the  thing  fails. 

The  writer  expresses  no  personal  opinion  as  to  wheth- 
er or  not  this  change  was  so  great  in  itself  as  to  con- 
stitute a  case  for  the  fitting  application  of  the  doctrine 

61 


The    Outbreak    of   the    War 

which  Russia  had  already  applieil.  as  shown  in  less 
■strong  cases,  hut  merely  points  out  that  this  doctrine  is 
recognized  in.  and  has  the  sanction  of.  the  law  of  na- 
tions. 

Another  pt>int  de>crves  attention,  in  view  of  the  re- 
lations of  France,  IJel^iuni  and  Germany.  Uy  the  lan- 
guage of  the  7th  Article  of  the  orij^inal  Treaty  of  IBiH. 
which  was  a^ain  used  in  tlu-  Treaty  ul  IHIV.t,  Iklgium 
was  bound  to  observe  perpetual  neutrality  tv)\vard>  all 
other  states,  and  this  necessarily  assumes  that  she 
would  maintain  an  attitude  of  strict  impartiality  as  be- 
tween all  other  states;  and  it  follows  necessarily  that  if 
she  departed  from  this  attitude  of  strict  impartiality, 
the  state  to  whcise  tii>a(lvantage  she  so  dLjjartcd  cmiltl 
not  be  longer  bound  by  any  engagement  that  it  had 
contracted  toward  Belgium. 

In  other  words,  iielirium's  maintenance  of  an  attitude 
of  strict  itupartiality  was  a  condition  precedent  to  any 
of  ihe  guaranteeing  states  maintaining  a  like  attitude. 

r.elgium  fortified  the  towns  commanding  the  main 
routes  from  Germany  into  France,  and  also  fortified 
Antwerp  in  comparatively  recent  years.  I'eculiarly 
enough,  the  first  set  of  fortifications  commanding  the 
routes  from  Germany  into  I'Vance  also  commanded  the 
German  frontier.  She  erected  no  like  fortifications 
commanding  the  French  frontier,  which  she  permitted 
to  lie  open. 

The  explanation  of  r)elgium  ff>r  the  construction  of 
these  fortresses  was  that  they  were  purely  for  the  pur- 
poses of  defense.  We  will  accept  this  explanation  as 
fact,  and  will  not  comment  on  the  peculiarity  that, 
geographically,  their  positions  seem  to  indicate  that 
defense  was  necessary  only  ag.iinst  Germany. 

In  190.'),  France  made  a  special  appropriation  of  three 
hundred  million  dollars  for  the  strengthening  of  her 
fortific.itions  and  the  putting  of  her  army  into  a  I)ette!" 
condition  as  regards  artillery  and  other  equipiuent. 
.'\  considerable  portion  of  this  money  was  spent  on  im- 
proving the  condition  of  the  fortresses  which  com- 
manded the  Belgian  border,  and  which,  in  a  strategic 
sense,  dove-tailed  the  Uelgiati  fortresses  towards  Gtcr- 
many  and  completed  the  defensive  scheme  of  these 
Belgian  fortificatir)ns  against  an  invasion  coming  from 
Germany. 

In  ISOfi  Germany  did  a  thing  which  now  appears,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  pseudo-sentimentalists,  to  have, been  a 

6t 


The   Outbreak    of   the   War 

heinous  crime.  She  built  strategic  railways  along-  the 
Belgian  frontier,  and  by  this  means  made  it  possible  to 
comciilraU'  ircjops  in  large  numbers  at  strategic  points 
on  that    I'rontier. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  this  acti(jn  was  only  taken  af- 
ter France  had  strengthened  her  fortresses  on  the  Bel- 
gian border,  and  Belgium  had  greatly  strengthened  her 
fortresses  which  commanded  the  road  to  Germany.  In 
the  cases  of  both  France  and  Belgium,  these  fortresses 
were  for  the  purpose  of  defense  only,  according  to  tiiese 
two  nations,  but  they  nevertheless  did  make  a  chain  of 
strong  i)laoes  which  could  have  been  used  with  great 
advantage  in  an  invasion  of  Germany  from  France 
through  Belgium.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  con- 
struction of  strategic  railways  by  Germany  may  also  be 
conceived  to  be  for  defensive  purposes  ;  but  the  pseudo- 
sentimentalists  will  have  none  of  this,  these  railways 
were  for  offensive  purposes,  and  for  no  other. 

This  digression  from  the  main  subject,  that  is  to  say, 
the  consideration  as  to  whether  or  not  Belgium  per- 
formed her  obligations  under  the  Treaties  of  1831  and 
1839,  is  necessary  to  understand  the  full  scope  of  what 
follows. 

In  the  year  1906,  without  advising  Germany  of  such 
consultation,  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General's  Staff, 
Major-General  DuCarne,  entered  into  a  series  of  con- 
versations with  the  military  attache  of  the  British 
Legation.  Col.  Barnardiston.  in  Brussels.  The  original 
report  of  General  DuCarne  discloses  that  as  early  ag 
January,  1906,  consultations  took  place  between  the 
Belgian  Government  and  the  British  Government  over 
steps  to  be  taken  by  them  against  Germany.  The  other 
details  will  be  found  in  the  conversation  itself,  which 
will  be  found  in  the  Appendix. 

In  the  year  1912,  Col.  Bridges,  who  had  succeed.ed 
Col.  Barnardiston,  and  General  Jungbluch,  then  chief 
of  the  Belgian  General's  Staff,  continued  these  conver- 
sations; and  in  1911  Baron  Greindl,  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister in  Berlin,  in  a  communication  to  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  shows  his  knowledge  of  the  ex- 
istence of  these  plans  and  makes  a  protest  against  them 
as  being,  in  a  large  sense,  a  violation  of  Belgium's 
duties  towards  Germany  under  the  Treaties  of  1831 
and  1839. 

The  writer  makes  no  comment  on  these  documents 
— they   speak  for   themselves   sufficiently    strongly — 

63 


The   Outbreak   of   the    War 

merely  pointing  out  that,  whatever  the  British  Govern- 
ment may  >ay  as  re^^ards  the  lack  of  importance  of 
these  conversations  and  the  lack  of  authority  of  her 
representatives,  nations  do  not  reveal  their  military 
secrets  to  each  other  except  where  there  is  a  clear  un- 
derstanding between  them  as  to  the  willingfncss  of  both 
parties  to  enj^a^e  in  joint  action. 

I'urther,  was  not  Belgium  in  honor  bound  to  advise 
Germany  of  these  conversations  and  their  substance 
under  her  treaty  obligation  of  neutrality? 

To  sum  up.  it  seems  hardly  probable  that  in  law  the 
Empire  of  Germany  was  bound  by  the  Treaties  of 
18;31  or  18:^9,  which  were  entered  into  by  only  one  of 
the  component  states  of  the  present  German  Empire, 
whicli  Empire  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of  the  making 
of  the  treaties. 

Second: — That,  even  if  the  present  German  Empire 
"tNCre  bound  by  such  treaties,  the  action  of  Belgium,  in 
« nt».riii;.r  into  ilkj.jal  niililary  relaliuns  with  Cireat  Hrit- 
nin.  as  evidenced  by  the  docunicnts  hereinbefore  re- 
ferred to,  absolved  the  German  Empire  from  further 
obligations  under  such  treaties. 

Third : — That,  furthermore,  the  doctrine  of  the  ter- 
mination of  a  treaty  obligation  by  total  change  of  cir- 
cumstances was  applicable  in  the  present  case. 

Fourth  : — That,  in  any  event,  the  exigencies  of  the 
military  situation  on  the  first  day  of  August.  101  1.  con- 
stituted, and  still  continue  to  constitute,  under  the  law 
of  nations,  a  sufficient  justification  for  the  German  in- 
v;t''  •;      f   lii'l^'iuni. 

No  nation  is  expected  to  pre>^eiit  its  throat  to  the 
knii'i  ;  .mv!  any  Nt.itcsinan.  of  .-in\-  nation,  who,  in  ,in 
occasion  of  overwhelming  necessity  for  his  own  nation, 
wo'dd  deoin  >nch  necessity  sulvirdinatc  to  a  treaty 
right  of  any  other  nation,  would  be  false  to  his  duty 
to  his  own  nation:  self  preservation  being  the  first  law 
of  national  existence,  as  it  is  of  individual  existence. 

The  Siii)reine  Court  of  thi>  I'nited  States,  for  on.- 
aiithorifv.  ha<<  alrcadv  s.iid :  "It  i>;  not  to  he  presuinefl 
that  the  legislative  department  of  the  Government  will 
likely  pass  laws  which  are  in  conflict  with  the  treaties 
of  tho  country,  but  that  cirrninst.Tnccs  may  arise  which 
would  not  only  justify  the  Government  in  disregarding 
their  stipulations,  but  demand,  in  the  interests  of  the 
cr)uiitrv.  that  it  ^^honbl  do  so  Th<Te  r.Tti  he  tin  ques- 
tion that  imexpertcfl  events  may  call  for  a  change  in 
the  policv  of  a  country." 

64 


-  CHAPTER  111. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST 

INVASION  OF  BELGIUM. 

During  the  night  of  August  1st  the  Adolph  bridge, 
a  fine  viaduct  which  spans  one  of  the  great  gorges  at 
Luxemburg,  was  seized  by  the  Germans.  The  Grand 
Duchess,  Marie  Adelaide,  placed  her  motor  car  across 
the  bridge  while  Mr.  Eyschen,  a  member  of  the  Cabi- 
net, attempted  to  hand  to  the  officer,  commanding  the 
German  advance  guard,  a  copy  of  the  treaty  of  1867. 
General  V'andvck,  the  commandant  of  Luxemburg, 
was  also  present. 

While  these  events  had  been  taking  place  on  the 
bridge,  the  Luxemburg  government  received  a  tele- 
gram from  the  Imperial  Chancellor  stating  that  the 
acts  against  the  Grand  Duchy  had  been  taken  in  no 
hostile  sense,  but  were  only  such  measures  as  were 
necessary  to  secure  the  safety  of  German  troops  by 
protecting  Luxemburg  and  its  railways  against  an  at- 
tack by  the  French.  Luxemburg  thus  being  peacefully 
seized,  no  time  was  lost  in  strengthening  the  German 
position  bv  the  usual  military  measures,  and  the  in- 
vading forces  settled  down  to  wait  until  that  portion 
of  the  German  army  which  had  been  detailed  for 
making  the  movement  through  Belgium,  hereinafter 
described,  had  advanced  to  that  point  in  their  cam- 
paign at  which  the  co-operation  of  the  army  in  Lux- 
emburg would  be '  necessary  in  the  general  forward 
movement  into  France. 

A  German  army,  departing  from  the  base  of  Aix-la- 
Chapelle,  proceeded  by  rail  to  Herbesthal,  and  cross- 
ing the  Belgian  frontier,  occupied  Limberg,  the  first 
Belgian  town  on  the  road  to  Liege.  This  occupation 
took  place  without  military  opposition  and  the  army 
pressed  forward  to  Verviers.  Before  the  infantry 
reached  this  place  a  small  Belgian  force  had  been 
driven  out  of  it  by  German  cavalry  advance  guard. 
The  inhabitants  here  offered  no  resistance  and  conse- 
quently the  occupation  was  orderly.     On  the  same  day 

65 


The  Campaign  in  the  West 

Dlher  German  lroop>  also  entered  Hclj^juin  at  Uale- 
leim,  Francoiichainp  and  Sta\clot.  n<i  opposition  be- 
n^  otiered  anywhere. 

A  portion  of  the  German  troops  then  turned  south- 
ward down  the  valley  of  the  Meuse.  advancinj^  to- 
wards Liege  by  Herve  and  found  the  bridge  of  the 
Meuse  and  the  Trois  Font  tunnels  blown  up.  The 
ittempt  to  sei/.e  the  bridges  across  the  Meuse  by  Vur- 
.)rise  was  therefore  a  failure,  and  the  effort  to  replace 
them  by  temporary  i)ontoon  bridges,  the  Belgians  at 
first  successfully  resisted,  but  this  resistance  was  soon 
overcome  and  the  Germans  advanced  to  Liege. 

.'\t  the  same  time  that  this  southward  movement 
was  taken  another  (icrman  force  advanced  northwest- 
wardly from  the  German  frontier  towards  Vise,  a 
small  town  just  outside  the  Dutch  frontier  and  oc- 
cupying a  strategic  position  of  importance  on  the 
flank  of  any  force  advancing  from  the  east  towards 
Liege.  This  advance  was  delayed  on  the  road  lie- 
cause  the  bridges  had  been  blown  up  and  others  had 
to  be  built  under  a  heavy  fire  from  concealed  Belgian 
troops.  This  delay  caused  the  capture  of  \*ise,  which 
should  have  been  made  prior  to  the  assault  u]m)U 
Liege,  to  be  postponed  until  .Tftcr  the  general  assault 
upon  Iviege  had  been  l>egun 

After  fierce  fighting,  ho\^c^^i.  m  which  the  civilian 
population  took  part,  the  Germans  entered  \ise  and. 
in  spite  of  the  reports  originally  published  in  the  Eng- 
lisii  Press,  as  the  London  Times  afterwards  admitted, 
they  did  not  massacre  the  inhabitants  of  this  place. 
Some  few  civilians,  caught,  with  arms  in  their  hands, 
were  shot  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  war.  but  this 
was  all.  until  after  the  retirement  of  the  Belgian  forces 
when,  the  inhabitants  l)eing  assembled  in  the  centre 
of  the  town,  the  commander  of  the  German  troops 
made  them  an  address,  explaining  that  "Germany  was 
not  at  war  with  Belgium,  but  that  the  inhabitants  of 
the  occupie<l  towns  nuist  submit  to  German  military  law 
and  that  any  atlemjjt  upon  the  tr«K>ps  would  immediate- 
ly l)e  punished   with  death." 

As  this  officer  was  finishing  these  words,  a  pistol 
shot  rang  out  from  the  crowd  and  he  fell.  shot.  Sum- 
mary procediire  was  adopted.  Those  present  in  the 
vicinity  from  whence  the  sh(»t  came  were  seized  and 
immerliately  executed,  a^  would  hnve  hapfx-ncfl  with 
nnv   armv   in    this   world. 


Invasion  of  Belgium 

Liege,  to  the  southward  in  the  valley  of  the  Meuse, 
has  been  jirominent  in  the  history  of  this  portion  of 
Europe  for  himdreds  of  years.  The  name  first  appears 
in  720  when  it  was  made  the  seat  of  a  bishopric,  the 
bishop  also  having  temi)oral  power  and  under  this 
govermnent  of  its  prince-bishop,  llie  city  remained 
until  Vi\)2,  when  it  was  occupied  by  a  French  contin- 
gent commanded  by  Lafayette,  This  government 
then  fell  and  Liege  became  a  part  of  the  French  Re- 
public.       »■  ♦ 

In  modern  times  Liege  had  become  the  centre  oi 
the  coal  mining  industry  of  Eastern  Belgium,  and  one 
of  the  most  important  industrial  towns  in  Europe,  fam- 
ous particularly  for  the  manufacture  of  arms  and  wea- 
pons of  all  kinds  in  the  LSO  factories  located  in  the  city 
devoted  to  this  purpose,  besides  which  the  zinc  foun- 
dries and  engine  factories  and  the  cycle  works  of  Liege 
were  all  world  famous.  Situated  at  the  juncture  of  the 
Ourth  and  Meuse  rivers,  the  town  itself  is  pleasant  and 
well  laid  out  and  its  surroundings  beautiful. 

A  garrison  of  about  32, .500  held  the  modern  fortifi- 
cations of  the  city,  which  were  deemed  untakable,  un- 
der the  command  of  General  Leman,  one  of  the  ablest 
of  Belgian  commanders.  In  the  preceding  years  at  the 
suggestion  and  with  the  aid  of  France,  these  forts  had 
been  fully  equipped  with  all  necessary  supplies  and  were 
in  condition  for  a  long  siege,  which  it  was  expected 
they  would  be  able  to  sustain,  being  among  the  best  prod- 
ucts of  one  of  the  most  distinguished  constructors  of 
modern  fortifications.  Practically  all  these  forts  were  of 
the  disappearing  turret  type  and  hence  furnished  little 
or  no  target  to  attacking  forces. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  August,  a  remarkabh 
warm  day,  the  bombardment  began.  Masses  of  Ger- 
man cavalry  which  had  preceded  the  advance  of  the 
artillery  and  covered  it,  skirmished  along  a  wide  front 
from  Forts  Emborg,  Chandfontaine  and  Evegne  on 
the  eastern  front  to  well  below  the  city  on  the  south. 
This  movement  of  artillery  protected  by  the  cavalry, 
as  before  stated,  continued  until  the  8th,  the  town 
being  completely  occupied  on  the  7th  when  the  Belgian 
garrison  in  the  town  retired. 

Here  again,  unfortunately,  a  number  of  the  civilian 
population  participated  in  the  fighting  and  fired  upon 
the  German  troops  from  ambush.  When  discovered, 
these  were   summarily  tried   and   immediatelv  executed. 

67 


The  Campaign  in  the  West 

in  accordance  with  the  code  of  war.  The  fact  that 
non-combatant  Belgians  took  part  in  the  defence  of 
Liege  as  well  as  at  Vise  has  been  repeatedly  admitted 
by  the  British  chroniclers  of  the  war  and  a  supporting 
statement  to  this  effect  appears  on  the  332nd  page  of 
the  history  of  the  war  publi>hed  by  the  London  Times. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  Germans  were  well 
within  those  rules  which  have  governed  war-making 
since  almost  the  beginning  of  history  as  regards  a  civil 
population  participating  in  hostilities. 

The  artillery  brought  up  by  the  Germans  proved 
inadequate  to  the  taking  of  the  forts,  and  operations 
did  not  progress  rapidly  until  the  arrival  of  heavy 
artillery.  The  German  troops  were  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Von  Emmich.  who  had  with  him  at 
first  a  portion  only  of  the  Seventh  Army  Corps.  These 
troops  were  afterwards  re-enforced  by  the  Reserves  of 
the  7th  Corps  and  finally  by  the  10th  and  5Hh  Corps, 
but  the  greater  portion  of  the  last  mentioned  Army 
Corps  did  not  reach  the  scene  until  after  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  forts. 

Contemporary  accounts  narrating  attacks  upon  the 
fort  by  the  Germans  in  massed  formation  with  a  con- 
sequent loss  of  25.000  men  were  pure  fiction,  intended 
for  tl\e  delectation  of  the  British  and  French  public. 

During  the  three  or  four  days'  wait,  while  tiic  heavy 
artillery  was  being  brought  up.  skirmishes  took  place 
between  the  troops  in  the  forts  and  the  German  troops, 
which,  as  stated,  on  August  7th.  had  practically  occu- 
pied the  town  with  varying  results,  but  finally  on  the 
9th  of  the  month,  the  heavy  artillery  got  up  and  was 
placed  in  position.  A  few  shots  from  those  monster 
pieces  reduced  all  the  forts  except  the  four  on  the 
northwest  side  rtf  the  town,  the  second  line  of  defense. 
Tlii*;  »:econd  line  of  defense  was  able  to  hold  out  until 
the  21st  of  August. 

The  big  qun-^  used  on  this  occasion  were  a  novelty. 
The  so-called  42  centimeter,  (16.i  inches,)  required 
fi>r  the  h.iiiling  <tt  eaiji  gun  l.'J  traction  engines  of  the 
broad  wheel,  steam  roller  type.  Each  gun  was  in  four 
pieces,  each  piece  being  drawn  bv  three  engines,  the 
extra  engine  being  a  road  tester,  and  a  helper  on 
gra<Ies.  Accr»rding  to  the  testimony  of  eye  witnesses, 
nothing  s«>  terrible  has  ever  been  seen  in  war  as  the 
effect  of  the  great  shells  fired  from  these  guns  on  the 
Fjegc  forts.  The  steel  turrets  which  had  been  sup- 
posedly capable  of  resisting  anv  modern  artillerv  were 

68 


Invasion  of  Belgium 

broken  through  as  though  they  were  porcelain,  and 
men  were  not  simply  killed  or  wounded,  they  were 
blackened,  burned  and  smashed.  Not  only  here,  but 
in  the  subsequent  sieges,  these  guns  proved  that  there 
is  no  known  system  of  defensive  fortification  which  is 
able  to  resist  their  projectiles.  Earth  works  seem  to 
have  a  far  greater  resistance  than  the  elaborate  forti- 
fication of  steel,  concrete  and  stone. 

The  check  to  the  German  forces,  of  which  so  much 
was  made  in  the  press  at  the  time  of  the  siege  of 
Liege,  amounted  therefore  to  four  days.  On  the  fifth 
day,  that  is  to  say,  on  August  11th,  all  the  important 
|)]:ioes  in  tlic  town  itself  were  in  the  German  hands 
and  the  German  army  proceeded  southward  down  the 
valley  of  the  Meuse.  Huy  was  soon  taken,  offering 
comparatively  little  opposition,  and  the  army  soon 
found  itself  before  the  extensive  and  costly  fortifica- 
tions of  Namur,  which  represented  the  crowning  work 
of  the  military  genius,  Brialmont,  in  the  science  of 
fortification. 

Namur  served  as  no  better  than  a  trap  for  its  un- 
fortunate defenders.  Strongly  fortified  as  it  was  by 
a  garrison  of  Belgians  adequate  to  its  defence  and 
ably  directed,  who  were  aided  by  a  large  number  of 
French  troops  which  had  advanced  from  the  impor- 
tant French  garrison  town  of  Givet  located  a  little  to 
the  south,  forty-eight  hours  sufficed  to  terminate  the 
resistance  here  and  to  force  its  French  defenders  to 
fall  backward  to  their  base  at  Givet,  while  such  of  the 
Heigian  defenders  as  were  left,  retreated  precipitously 
to  the  west.  A  part  of  the  victorious  German  troops, 
now  mustering  three  full  armv  active  corps  and  one  of 
the  reserve,  were  hard  on  the  heels  of  the  retreating 
French  and.  proceeding  by  forced  marches,  reached 
Givet  almost  as  soon  as  they,  while  another  part 
marched  westward  towards  Charleroi. 

At  Givet  one  of  the  bloodiest  fights  of  the  war  took 
place,  and  the  French,  comprising  about  70,000  were 
hurled  back  and  out  of  Givet  with  enormous  losses. 
The  army  of  General  von  Emmich  had  reached  its 
appointed  position  for  the  general  invasion  of  France, 
and  here  for  the  time  being  we  will  leave  it. 

While  these  events  were  happening  in  the  valley  of 
the  Meuse,  another  German  army,  also  leaving  the  base 
of  Aix-la-Chappelle,  marched  westward  in  the  general 
direction  of  Brussels,    proceeding  along  the  general 

69 


The  Campaii^n  in  the  West 

line  of  Tongjes.  St.  Troiul.  TirlenuMit  and  Louvain. 
The  march  of  its  main  body  was  paralleled  by  a  por- 
tion of  the  forces  which  had  been  at  Licpc.  and  ad- 
vanced northward  from  Tongres  to  llazlett.  and  then  > 
fnniol  \\r>itwar«l.  procecdinir  throuc:ii  Hiest  and 
Aerschot  to  Rrusscls.  The  P.elqian'^,  who  had  a  field 
army  of  about  ?on.OOO  men.  opposed  as  str<in^  a  re- 
sistance as  they  were  able  and  severe  fightinij  took 
place  at  many  points  on  the  march,  and.  .oti-ii.l.rincf 
its  strenjj[th,  this  Relf^ian  army  did  well. 

Tonijres  was  seized  by  about  7,(»00  ficnuaii  cav;iiry 
on  AuRiist  I'th  and  the  supporting;  infantry  marched 
into  that  place  on  the  lOth.  That  day  the  cavalry 
which  had  moved  before  alonp  different  roads,  joined 
issue  with  the  Belfiian  troops  at  St.  Trond,  Tirlemont 
and  other  places  further  west.  This  was  not.  how- 
ever, an  attack  in  force,  but  a  feelinj;  out  of  the  enemy. 

Hazlett,  on  the  northern  line,  was  attacked  the  next 
dav  by  a  German  cavalry  division  supported  by  one 
battalion  of  infantry  apainst  which  was  opposed  a 
Relijian  force  of  one  cavalry/ division  and  a  brig^ade 
of  infantry.  A  sustained  fipht  took  pkue.  the  town 
being  won  and  lost  three  times.  The  Beljijians 
thouijht  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Germans  to 
proceed  in  force  along  this  line.  Hazlett  to  Dicst.  with 
the  intention  of  turning  the  flank  of  their  position 
which  ran  in  a  general  .sense  from  Diest  through  Tirle- 
mont south  to  Gcmbloux.  and  resisted  very  strenu- 
ously the  movement  in  this  direction. 

Several  days  passed  in  cavalry  skirmishes  anil 
finally  on  the  Kth  dav  of  August.  Germany  commenced 
its  serious  forward  movement  with  strong  infantry 
columns.  The  French  bv  this  time  had  taken  con- 
tact with  the  Belgian  army,  having  entered  Belgium 
on  the  Mth  day  of  .\ugust  by  Charleroi.  and  ad- 
vanced northward  therefrom  in  the  direction  of 
Wavrc.  The  first  German  movement  was  to  throw  a 
strong  cf)lumn  of  infantry  supported  by  artillery 
southward  t»n  St.  Trond.  to  the  south  and  on  Wavre, 
and  to  occupy  the  same,  breaking  the  Belgian  line 
under  Jodoigne  and  interposing  it^^clf  between  the  end 
of  the  Belgian  line  and  the  advancing  French.  At 
the  samr  time,  a  general  .idvanee  to«>k  place  on  the 
north  and  south  lines  which  formed  the  remainder  of 
the  Belgian  front.  Diest  at  the  north,  Tirlemont  in 
its  centre,  and  Hongacrde  were  almost  simultaneously 
attacked  tiv  large  forces  and.  while  at  points  a  very 


Invasion  of  Belgium 

vigorous  defence  was  ]>m  up,  ii  l)ecanie  evident  that 
llie  Ijclj^dans  would  not  withstand  the  attack  of  the  Ger- 
man artillery  and  tiic  German  infantry. 

Hence,  the  Belgian  Army  could  not  remain  in  its  po- 
sition ;  heavy  losses  had  already  weakened  it.  particular- 
ly its  cavalry,  to  such  an  extent  that  total  destruction 
stared  it  in  the  face.  Accordingly,  on  the  night  of  Au- 
gust ITth,  leaving  two  brigades  of  troops  to  protect  its 
rear,  the  entire  Belgian  army  began  to  retreat  in  the 
direction  of  Antwerp. 

Before  this  retreat  began,  the  Belgian  general  staff 
had  debated  at  some  length  which  direction  this  re- 
treat should  take,  wdiethcr  it  should  fall  back  to  the 
westward  and,  concentrating  at  Louvain,  attempt  to 
defend  that  town  in  the  hope  of  saving  Brussels,  or 
whether  it  should  fall  back  completely  to  Brussels  and 
make  its  stand  in  front  of  the  Belgian  capital.  Space 
forbids  more  than  the  recording  of  the  decision  ar- 
rived at,  which  was  that  it  would  be  impolitic  for 
many  reasons  to  attempt  to  defend  either  Louvain  or 
Brussels  and  that  the  retreat  should,  therefore,  be  o 
the  northwest  in  the  hope  of  being  able  to  bring  the 
Belgian  army  under  the  defence  of  the  guns  of  the 
fortress  of  Antwerp,  which  was  considered  then  one 
of  the  strongest  of  Europe  and  which  supposedly 
would  afford  an  untakable  base,  from  which  the  fu- 
ture operations  of  the  Belgian  army  could  be  con- 
ducted. 

This  retreat  was  conducted  in  fairly  good  order,  the 
two  brigades  which  were  left  behind  succeeding  in 
holding  back  the  German  forces  for  a  sufficient  length 
of  time  to  enable  the  retreating  troops  to  draw  off  in 
reasonably  good  order  and  to  attain  their  projected 
base  without  losses  of  moment.  What  was  left  of 
these  two  brigades  subsequently  managed  to  gain  the 
base  also. 

At  Brussels  during  these  important  days,  there  was 
more  or  less  panic.  At  first  there  was  talk  of  defend- 
ing the  city.  The  civil  guard  which  had  formed  a 
bone  of  contention  between  the  Germans  and  the 
Belgians  from  the  first,  as  to  its  being  recognized  as 
a  regular  military  force,  dug  intrenchments  and  built 
barricades.  On  the  morning  of  the  i8th  after  receiv- 
ing the  news  of  the  retreat  of  the  Belgian  army  from 
the  battle  line  previously  occupied,  the  government 
transferred  the  capital  from  Brussels  to  Antwerp. 
Rumors  of  a  British  advance,  of  a  French  advance,  and 

71 


The  Campaign  in  the  ^  est 

of  plans  of  tiie  Allies,  whereby  Brussels  \va>  to  be  the 
bait  to  draw  on  the  Gernaans,  who  were  ti«  be  inter- 
cepted and  crushed  by  the  Allies  before  rtacliiiig  that 
city,  circulated  through  the  town  in  a  hundred  vary- 
ing ft)rins.  and  gave  courage  to  the  people,  but  with 
the  departure  of  the  government  and  with  the  influx 
from  the  east  of  thousands  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
country  of  all  classes  who  had  deserted  their  homes 
iK-tt  re  the  approaching  ricriuan  forces,  these  false 
hope-i  iK'gaii  to  fade  and  the  seriousness  of  the  situ- 
ation began  to  be  recognized. 

The  more  sober  and  the  more  intelligent  of  the 
population  perceived  the  futility  of  attempting  to  de- 
fend the  city  particularly  with  tiie  civil  guards,  whose 
value  in  a  military  sense  was  more  than  doubtful.  After 
much  consultation,  it  was  determined  that  the  city 
should  be  surrendered  without  defence,  and  on  the 
I9th  the  burgomaster  of  Brussels  posted  a  proclamation 
throughout  the  city,  stating  that  the  occupation  of  the 
town  by  the  (iermans  was  imminent,  and  exhorted  the 
population  to  remain  calm  and  to  avoid  panic. 

On  the  next  day  the  burgomaster,  Mr.  Max,  went 
forward  in  a  motor  car,  accompanied  bv  hi?  sheriffs, 
in  his  scarf  of  office,  and  met  the  advancing  German 
army.  Its  commander  received  him  formally  and 
asked  him  whether  his  powers  were  sufficient  to  au- 
thorize him  to  surrender  the  city  unconditionally,  as 
otherwise  it  would  be  taken  by  force.  The  burgo- 
master made  such  surrender  and  was  then  told  that 
he  would  be  held  personally  responsible  for  the  good 
conduct  of  the  citizens  of  the  town.  Arrangements 
were  then  made  for  the  German  troops  to  enter  and 
occupy  the  citv  on  the  same  day,  which  was  duly 
done.  The  German  Commander,  General  Sixtus  von 
.\rnim,  issued  a  proclamation  which  was  placarded 
in  I'russels  in  which,  after  mentioning  that  German 
troops  would  pass  through  the  town  for  some  days 
and  f'-r  whom  lodLring.  foofl  an(l  sujiplics  must  he  pro- 
vided, went  on  to  guarantee  the  preservation  of  the 
city  and  the  safety  of  its  people  in  the  event  that  the 
population  promptly  furnished  the  supplies  requisi- 
tioned and  committed  no  act  of  aggression  atr^inst  the 
troops.  At  the  same  time  he  warned  the  inhabitants 
that  in  the  event  of  any  act  of  aggression  of  any  kind 
taking  place,  the  *.cvercst  measures  would  be  resorted 
to. 

Tb.-it  ni'trrnf..  .11  -.f  fv«r>  o'clock  the  formal  cntr>*  was 

72 


Invasion  of  Belgium 

made  by  about  40,000  troops  before  a  large  gathering 
of  the  inhabitants  of  Brussels.  This  was  the  first  time 
that  an  opportunity  had  been  afforded  to  inspect  the 
German  troops  in  war  equipment,  and  great  was  the 
surprise  of  the  onlookers  to  find  that  the  familiar  Ger- 
man uniform  had  completely  disappeared,  and  that 
the  entire  army  was  dressed  in  a  greenish  gray.  Not 
only  were  the  men  so  dressed,  but  the  wagons,  both  of 
the  commissary  and  the  train,  the  guns,  in  short  all  of 
the  equipment,  was  painted  a  like  color.  The  troops 
quicklv  took  possession  of  the  strategic  points  of  the 
city  in  an  orderly  manner  and  all  fear  of  violence  or 
of  intimidation  was  quickly  removed.  The  burgo- 
master was  continued  in  charge  of  much  of  the  rou- 
tine work  and  local  administration,  though  the  Ger- 
mans appointed  a  civil  governor  of  their  own  to  take 
supreme  charge  of  the  affairs  of  the  city.  An  indem- 
nity of  $40,000,000,  as  a  war  levy,  was  imposed  upon 
the  town,  payment  of  which  for  the  time  being  was 
impossible  on  account  of  the  funds  of  the  banks  and 
of  the  city  itself  having  been  transferred  to  Antwerp. 

The  entry  into  Brussels  finished  the  first  phase  of 
the  war  in  Belgium,  that  is,  that  phase  of  the  war  In 
which  the  Germans  were  engaged  solely  with  Belgiaa 
troops.  Henceforth  the  fighting  was  not  only  with  the 
Belgians,  but  Avith   the  French  and  English. 

One  feature  of  the  war  in  Belgium  which  deserves 
remark,  was  the  extraordinary  use  which  the  Belgians 
made  of  motor  cars  in  defending  their  territory. 
Numbers  of  these  cars  on  which  a  light  gun  had  been 
mounted  and  protected  by  hastily  devised  armor,  were 
sent  flying  up  and  down  the  roads  in  front  of  the 
advancing  Germans,  opposing  their  progress.  This 
novel  weapon  of  defense  proved  in  many  cases  extra- 
ordinarily effective.  In  the  sequel  this  idea  was 
adopted  by  all  the  armies  and  carried  to  a  much  higher 
degree  of  perfection  in  its  offensive  power,  than  were 
these  first  armored  motor  cars,  but  the  credit  of  the 
idea  of  this  use  of  motors  seems  to  belong  fairly  to  the 
Belgians. 

During  this  defense  the  world  was  startled  and 
shocked  by  continued  stories  of  the  perpetration  of 
atrocities  of  all  kinds  and  nature  by  the  advancing 
armies.  The  lack  of  familiarity  with  war  and  the 
passion  which  so  many  people  have  for  believing  the 
extraordinarily  horrible,  caused  these  tales  to  be  given 
wide  credence,  but  later  it  was  found  that  the  vast  ma- 

73 


The  Campaii^ii   in  the  West 

jority  were  purr  invcuiii>n>  df  ilic  vaj^aiies  t»i  a  dis- 
eased imai;inaii«.)n.  A  specimen  ot  these  extrai>rdinary 
stores  was  the  one  put  in  circulation  in  Scotland  by  a 
>ciunp  {jirl  concerniiijf  the  mutilation  of  her  sister  by 
German  soldiery,  which  was  circulated  tiimuj^hout 
the  world,  and  which  proved  sub.seijueiitly  to  be  an 
iiu]>n<len!  tahriration.  the  nuitilated  sister  never  hav- 
ing been  in  Hcli^'ium.  aiul  beinp:  at  the  time  of  the 
allcijed  nuitilatinn  at  Huddersfield.  peacefully  engaged 
in  the  arduous  duties  of  her  profession  as  a  nurse,  at 
a  sick  bed.  The  British  courts  subsccjuently  convicted 
this  snrl  ^^^  fortrer>'.  she  having  pnxluced  letters  pur- 
porting to  be  written  by  her  sister  and  a  companion 
and  *^old  them  to  the  press;  l)Ut  the  denial  uf  the  story 
was  never  given  one-hundredth  <>f  the  ])rominencc 
which  the  original  fabrication  had. 

Unquestionably  in  every  army  there  are  some  brutes 
who  misconduct  themselves,  but  the  discipline  of  the 
German  army,  which  is  the  most  severe  of  any  army 
in  the  world,  undoubtedly  reduced  the  crimes  of  such 
brutes  as  it  possessed  to  a  minimum.  That  there  were 
men  and  women  summarily  shot  in  considerable  num- 
bers for  breaches  of  the  laws  of  war.  such  as  -^hooting 
froi7i  houses  upon  passing  troops  or  isolated  soldiers, 
of  setting  fire  to  houses  in  which  troops  were  sleep- 
ing; or  as  at  Liege,  for  instance,  siiooting  on  a  sentry, 
and  after  he  had  fallen,  a  woman,  forgetful  of  her  sex, 
coming  out  of  the  house  from  which  the  sht)t  had  l)een 
tircfl  and  gouging  out  the  eyes  of  the  fallen  man  with 
a  pair  of  scissors,  and  other  affairs  e(|ually  repugnant, 
both  to  the  laws  of  iuimanitv  and  of  the  laws  of  war, 
is'  undoubtedly  true.  These  things  have  happened 
in  <verv  war  in  the  history  of  the  world.  They  ha|)pcned 
in  our  Civil  War;  they  happened  in  our  war  with 
Spain :  they  happened  in  the  march  to  Pekin ;  they 
have  happened  in  the  Philippines,  even  so  recently  aS 
the  ^.eiznre  of  \cra  Cruz  they  ha))pene(l  also;  and 
when  the  time  comes,  if  it  ever  does  come,  that  the 
allied  troops  enter  Germany,  they  will  happen  there 
also. 

There  have  been  comparisons  drawn  between  the 
defences  of  the  Tyrol  against  Xapoleon  bv  Andreas 
Jlofer  and  his  cf>mrades.  and  the  defence  of  non- 
combatant  H«-Igians  of  the  P«elgian  territory  against 
the  German  forces,  but  the  cases  are  not  analogous. 
.Andrea«»  Hofcr  and  his  men  took  the  field  and  fought 
iprnlv.  and  were,  in  some  degree  at  least,  distinctively 

7\ 


Invasion  of  Belgium 

uniforined.  They  did  not  shoot  from  the  house  tops 
of  occupied  towns  or,  from  other  like  places  of  con- 
cealment, fire  on  unsuspecting  troops.  Their  war 
was  conducted  as  war,  and  not  as  a  f(jrm  of  assassi- 
nation. Yet  Napoleon  did  not  concede  to  Hofer  and 
his  comrades  the  ri.L;hts  of  war,  but  shot  them  when 
he  captured  them,  but  they  were  men  enough  to  suf- 
fer the  consequences  of  the  acts,  which  they  knew  the 
enemy  regarded  as  illegal,  with  courage,  without  ap- 
pealing to  the  whole  world  to  save  them  from  the  con- 
sequences of  their  acts. 

Complaint  has  also  been  made  of  the  indemnities 
which  were  levied  by  the  Germans  on  certain  of  the 
Belgian  cities,  and  the  popular  but  mistaken  idea 
seems  to  be  that  the  moneys  secured  by  these  indem- 
nities were  applied  to  their  own  purposes  by  the  Ger- 
mans. This  is,  however,  not  true  in  anything  like  its 
entirety.  As  we  have  seen  in  the  case  of  Brussels,  the 
funds  of  the  city  had  been  sent  away  to  Antwerp, 
where  they  were  no  longer  available  for  any  purpose. 
Now  it  requires  money  to  run  a  city  and  to  pay  the 
salaries  of  the  employes  of  that  city,  as  well  as  other 
expenses  of  administration,  and  a  large  portion  of  this 
fund  raised  by  these  indemnities  has  been  and  is  being 
applied  to  the  expenses  of  the  municipality  and  towns. 

Special  stress  has  been  laid  by  the  enemies  of  the 
Germans  on  the  happenings  in  the  towns  of  Dinant, 
Malines,  Tirlemont,  and  on  the  report  of  the  commis- 
sion appointed  by  the  Belgian  government  to  inves- 
tigate a  report  on  the  alleged  outrages  perpetrated  by 
the  German  troops  during  this  invasion  of  Belgium. 
There  is  before  the  writer  the  report  of  this  commis- 
sion, which  was  supposed  to  be  composed  of  eminent 
legal  and  scientific  experts.  There  is  not  one  case  from 
one  cover  to  the  other  whicli  is  supported  by  evidence 
of  sufficient  weight  to  justify  a  police  magistrate  in 
holding  the  defendant  to  bail  in  a  simple  case  of  as- 
sault and  battery,  though  the  commission  started  with 
the  object  of  examining  the  facts  and  the  witnesses  to 
support  these  facts  from  a  judicial  viewpoint. 

As  to  the  happenings  at  these  towns,  although 
space  will  not  admit  of  a  minute  discussion  of  each 
case,  it  can  be  stated  with  confidence  in  nearly  every 
case  that  the  punishment  which  fell  upon  the  towns 
was  provoked.  Louvain.  a  university  town  with  a 
.  number  of  students  in  it.  and  a  population  like  that 
of  any  university  town,  peculiarly  sensitive  to  its  own 

7.5 


The  Campaign  in  the  West 

merits,  was  occupied  by  the  German  troops.  From 
the  first  moment  of  occupation,  friction  and  trouble 
characterized  the  relations  between  tlie  troops  and  the 
people.  Finally  after  repeated  isolated  attacks  by 
snipers,  concealed  in  the  houses,  a  jj^cncral  attack, 
which  appears  to  have  been  the  result  of  a  prear- 
ranged understanding,  was  made  upon  the  German 
troops  as  they  were  gping  about  their  duties,  many  of 
them  were  killed,  and  street  fighting  between  the 
troops  and  civilians  became  general. 

Durin-^  this  fighting  fire  broke  out  and  very  seri- 
ously damaged  the  town,  burning  several  costly,  in- 
teresting and  historic  buildings  with  their  contents. 
Through  the  effort^^  of  the  troops,  the  most  famous 
building,  the  town  hall,  was  saved.  As  a  result  of 
these  overt  acts  by  the  populace,  many  of  them  were 
seized  and  shot. 

The  Belgians  claimed  that  the  affair  was  caused  l>y 
a  body  of  German  soldiers  being  driven  out  of  Malines 
bv  the-  Uelgians  and  falling  back  ujx>n  Louvain.  The 
German  troops  in  Louvain,  who.  as  a  result  of  their 
looting  the  cellars  of  a  people  with  a  fine  taste  in  good 
wine,  were  fthis  is  the  allegation,  wine  not  brandy), 
intoxicated,  and  mistaking  their  returning  comrades 
for  Belgian  troops,  fired  upon  them.  Hut  to  anyone 
who  knows  the  strict  discipline  which  prevails  in  the 
German  army,  the  story  is  as  absurd  as  it  is  mali- 
cious, and  furthermore,  as  a  fact,  no  German  troops  re- 
treated from  Malines  to  Louvain  during  the  whole  time 
of  the  fighting  in  Belgium. 

The  stories  of  Louvain  and  of  Malines  and  of  the 
other  places  are  merely  a  part  of  the  organized  cam- 
paign of  slander  against  the  German  troops. 

The  bulk  of  the  German  troop^^  which  entered  Brus- 
sels remaineri  there  hut  a  few  days,  as  the  compaign 
in  the  south  required  their  presence  there.  Con- 
sequently, after  the  city  was  fully  (|uieted,  the 
army  moved  to  the  south  towards  Charleroi  and 
Mons.  leaving  only  a  garrison  of  sufficient  strength  to 
in'iure  the  tranduillity  nf  the  town,  and  thereafter  for 
ten  days  other  troops  in  large  numbers,  cnming  from 
the  eastward  poured  throuj^'li  I'ru'^scls  and  marched  to 
the  south  to  reinforce  the  army  which  had  originally 
taken  Brussels,  and  then  proceeded  southward.  Dur- 
ing this  time  also,  other  troops  from  the  German  ba.sc 
moved  southward  through  the  valley  of  the  Meuse  to 
Liege,  and  thus  turning  to  the  westward  proceeded  to 

76 


Invasion  of  Belgium 

take  contact  with  those  troops  which  went  south  from 
Brussels.  The  German  line  of  battle,  when  this  move- 
ment was  conii)lete(l,  extended  northward  from  Givet, 
up  the  valley  of  the  Meuse  to  Namur,  thence  west- 
ward to  Charleroi  and  Mons,  and  thence  to  Tournai, 
the  line  from  Mons  to  Tournai,  however,  at  this  time 
not  being'  particularly  strong". 

While  these  things  were  happening  in  Belgium,  the 
German  force  which  had  entered  Luxemburg  in  the 
earlier  days  of  war,  had  strengthened  its  position 
there  and  thrown  out  columns  to  the  westward  running 
through  Neufchatcau,  which  had  taken  contact  with 
Von  Emniich's  arniv  at  Givet,  so  that  this  army  too 
had  reached  its  appointed  position  for  the  advance  on 
France.  Further  east,  the  army  advancing  from  Metz 
had  taken  contact  with  the  army  to  the  westward  at 
Luxemburg,  and  stretched  out  to  the  southeast 
through  Luneville  and  Bacarrat  at  St.  Die. 

In  the  east,  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  the  French  had 
made  a  counter  thrust  in  the  hopes  of  relieving  the 
pressure  on  Belgium,  and  to  concentrate  the  German 
attention  in  this  quarter  as  much  as  possible  during 
the  time  that  was  necessary  for  the  full  mobilization 
of  the  French  army,  and  to  give  time  to  the  British 
arrr^y,  which  was  preparing  in  England,  to  get  up. 
From  the  first  week  in  August,  it  was  apparent  that 
the  length  of  time  required  for  the  British  army  to 
begin  to  move,  would  delay  the  French  action  in  con- 
nection with  it,  and  therefore  the  French  general-in- 
chief  ordered  the  French  troops  to  occupy  Muelhausen 
in  Alsace,  to  cut  the  bridges  of  the  Rhine  at  Humingue 
and  below,  and  to  protect  the  attack  of  the  French 
troops  operating  further  to  the  west  in  Lorraine. 

This  operation  began  by  the  French  troops  carry- 
ing Muelhausen  and  throwing  the  Germans  towards 
Strasburg.  This  success,  however,  was  only  moment- 
ary, as  the  Germans  returning  in  force,  re-occupied 
Muelhausen  and  drove  the  French  troops  before 
them  in  disorder  and  heavily  punished,  back  to 
the  French  fortress  of  Belfort.  This  French  move- 
ment, though  undertaken  according  to  the  French  re- 
ports, with  the  purpose  above  mentioned,  was  also 
probably  undertaken  to  satisfy  the  Paris  populace,  the 
real  governing  force  in  France,  in  its  desire  for  "la 
revanche."  and  in  order  to  give  the  population  a  theme 
for  oratory  in  the  partial  deliverance  of  the  sacred  soil 
of  Alsace  from  the  foot  of  the  Teuton. 

77 


CHAPTER  1\ 
illK   C  AMPAKJN    IN   THE   WEST 

INVASION  OF  FRANCE. 

On  tlic  '-Unh  ui  August  the  (icrnian  concentration 
in  South  lielgium  and  Luxenil>urj^  was  finished,  and 
their  troops  were  ready  to  advance.  These  troops 
comprised  >evcn  to  ei};ht  army  corp^,  280.0f»fl  to 
.■Jl*U.<»»iU  men,  with  four  cavalry  divisions  and  appro- 
priate artillery  and  train,  and  stretched  on  a  long  line 
from  Mons  in  lielgium,  tu  the  eastern  border  of  Lux- 
emburg with  the  largest  forces  between  Mons  and  the 
valley  c>f  the  Meuse. 

From  the  authoritative  and  detailed  summary  of  the 
German  forces  in  the  official  report  of  the  I'Vcnch 
General  Staff,  it  will  be  seen  how  exaggerated  were 
the  contemporary  claims  of  their  enemies,  particularly 
of  the  British,  that  the  German  army  attacking  them 
in  the  west  comprised  from  700,000  to  1.000,0(»0 -com- 
batants and  outnumbered  them  in  a  proportion  at  that 
time  said  t(^  be  fri>m  T)  to  '.]  to  2  to  1.  .\s  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  French,  P>rrtish  and  Belgian  forces  on  this 
western  line  outnumbered  the  .  Germans,  and  von 
Kluck  fought  his  way  nearly  to  Paris  against  superior 
forces  of  the  enemy. 

This  as>ertion  is  proved  !>>  the  official  reports  on 
this  portion  of  the  campaign,  issued  by  the  French 
General  Staff,  which  stated  on  the  21st  qjt  August  that 
their  operations  in  this  region  began  with  ten  army 
corps,  two  tfj  three  army  corps  more  tlian  the  Ger- 
mans possessed,  with<^)ut  including  the  forces  of  the 
English,  which  by  this  time  had  come  up  and  taken 
their  positions  in  the  battle  line  near  Charleroi  and 
Mons.  and  the  Belgians  who  were  further  to  the  west 
but  in  comparatively  small  numbers.  The  account 
that  will  be  adopted  a^^  a  foundation  (qt  the  narration 
of  the  retreat  nearly  to  Paris  of  the  forces  of  the 
Allies,  will  be  that  of  the  French  General  Staff,  as  this 
certainly  cannot  be  accused  of  uuflue  prejudice  in 
f.T\<.r  rif  tile  Grimans 

78 


Invasion   of  France 

The  serious  figlitinj^  conimeiu-ed  with  an  iinijortant 
battle,  Charleroi  beinj^the  centre,  the  Hne  running  east 
and  west  therefrom.  Charleroi,  a  city  of  some  30,000 
inhabitants,  the  centre  of  the  South  Belgium  iron  in- 
dustry, was  first  entered  on  August.  21st  by  a  few 
German  hussars  who  were  thrown  back.  The  same 
day  the  German  artillery  opened  on  Charleroi  and 
Thuin.  This  was  Friday.  On  Saturday  the  Germans 
assaulted  Charleroi  and  the  bridges  above  and  below 
it  at  Thuin  and  Chatelet,  but  were  stoutly  resisted.  On 
Sunday  there  was  a  desperate  struggle  in  Charleroi 
itself,  and  on  Monday  after  a  terrific  hand-to-hand 
fight,  the  Turcos  were  driven  out  of  the  town  by  the 
Prussian  guard.  The  Sambre  from  Xamur  to  Mau- 
beuge  had  been  seized  by  the  Germans.  The  British 
army  completed  its  concentration  on  Friday  the  21st, 
and  on  the  22nd,  it  took  up  a  position  extending  from 
the  fortress  of  Conde  to  the  north  of  Valenciennes, 
through  Mons  to  Binche  on  the  east.  There  were  two 
corps,  the  1st  and  2nd.  and  two  cavalry  brigades,  one 
of  which  was  at  Binche.  During  the  22nd  and  9;5rd 
the  cavalry  and  airmen  reconnoitered  the  ground  in 
front  of  them  and  reported  that  the  Germans  were  in 
comparatively  small  force. 

On  the  23rd,  Sunday,  towards  three  in  the  afternoon, 
a  strong  force  of  Germans  attacked  the  British  along 
the  line  of  the  Conde-Mons  Canal,  forcing  the  .second 
corps  to  retreat  to  Bray  and  the  cavalry  to  evacuate 
Binche,  which  the  Germans  promptlv  occupied.  The 
British  were  to  a  certain  extent  surprised,  and  the  pow- 
erful German  artillery  played  havoc  among  them,  with 
the  result  that  that  night  the  British  forces  were  com- 
pelled to  fall  back  to  a  position  which  had  previously 
been  reconnoitered,  resting  on  the  left  on  the  fortress 
of  Maubeuge  and  extending  on  the  right  to  Janlein 
southeast  of  Valenciennes.  The  English  had  opposed  to 
them  the  4th  and  0th  German  army  corps,  while  the 
2nd  was  executing  a  turning  movement  on  the  left 
from  the  direction  of  Tournai,  but  they  never  took 
contact  with  this  corps.  Consequently  they  fought  at 
about  equal  numbers. 

Over  to  the  east  the  Germans  had  taken  possession 
of  the  entire  northern  bank  of  the  Sambre,  and  had 
forced  the  passage  of  the  same.  The  French  offensive 
had  therefore  failed  and  this  reverse  was  serious,  the 
reasons  for  which  are  complex.  There  were  in  this 
movemcnt'inflividual  and  collective  failures,  imprudences 

79 


The  Campaign   in   the  ^X■est 

committed  under  the  lire  «>i  the  enemy,  divisions  ill 
engaged,  rash  deployments  and  precipitate  retreats, 
premature  waste  of  men  and  finally  the  inadequacy  of 
certain  of  the  French  troops  and  their  leaders,  both  as 
regards  the  use  o£  infantry  and  artillery.  In  conse- 
quence of  these  lapses  the  Germans,  turning  to  ac- 
count the  difficulties  of  their  enemies  were  able  to  se- 
cure the  maximum  profit  which  the  superiority  of  their 
subaltern  complements  gave  them. 

In  spite  of  this  defeat  the  French  manoeuvre  still 
had  a  chance  for  success  if  their  left  and  the  English 
army  secured  a  decisive  result.  This  was  not  the  case. 
On  August  '^3rd.  as  stated,  the  Germans  crossed  the 
Sambre  and  the  French  left  wing  fell  back  to  the  line 
of  Beaumont-Givet.  and  on  the  same  day  the  British 
army  fell  back  after  a  severe  German  attack  upon  it 
from  the  position  which  it  had  taken  up  on  the  22nd. 
On  the  2r)th  and  26th  the  Britisii  army  was  harrj 
pressed  and  its  retreat  became  hurried.  It  had  lo.-t 
severely  during  the  previous  fighting  and  had  received 
onlv  one  brigade  of  infantrv  in  reinforcement,  which 
had  been  stationed  on  the  21th  a  little  south  of  Quar- 
oble  to  support  its  left  flank.  The  Ith  division  under 
General  Snow  was  at  Le  Cateau,  but  unavailable. 

The  I'rcnch  claim  that  this  British  retreat  rendered 
their  defense  of  the  frontier  on  the  spot  extremely 
perilous  and  in  the  report  of  the  general  staff  state 
that  after  the  24th  the  English  never  kept  their  hold 
until  after  crossing  the  Marnc  and  that  their  rapid 
retreat,  coinciding  with  the  defeat  inflicted  upon  the 
French  themselves  in  I^elgian  Luxeml)urg  helped  tj 
accelerate  the  action  of  the  enemy's  right  wing. 
Hence  the  French  were  confronted  with  the  problem 
whether  to  defend  the  frontier  under  the  conditions 
above  stated  or  to  execute  a  strategic  retreat,  which 
was  delivering  to  the  enemy  a  part  of  the  national  soil, 
but  which  would  permit  them  to  resume  the  defense  rt 
the  time  of  their  own  choosing. 

General  Joffre  determined  on  the  second  alternative. 
The  British  lay  the  blame  for  their  being  forced  to 
retreat  on  the  fact  that  General  Soudet  who  had 
promised  to  support  their  left  with  his  cavalry  corps, 
did  not  do  so  owing  to  his  horses  being  too  tired  to 
move  and  that  the  French  retreated  on  their  right.  On 
the  extreme  wc^t  <,i  the  lino  during  this  time  the  Ger- 
mans harl  occupied  Lille  and  routed  the  French 
at  Bethunc  and  captured  Cambrai.  while  west  of  Cam- 

80 


'  Invasion   of  France 

brai  tlicy  had  inflicted  another  severe  defeat  on  the 
French  at  Bapaume  and  tlireatened  Arras.  A  force  of 
French  troops  under  General  d'^Vmade  hurriedly  en- 
tered Arras  and  defended  it.  From  this  position  oi 
the  Britisii  and  German  troops,  it  will  be  seen  that  on 
the  2Jth  the  British  left  wing  was  in  serious  danger 
of  envelopment. 

The  next  day,  the  25th,  a  general  retirement  began 
of  the  British  to  the  road  joining  Cambrai  and  Le 
Cateau.  This  retreat  was  fairly  skilfully  conducted, 
severe  fighting  took  place  at  Marolies  and  at  Landre- 
cies.  With  varying  fortunes  the  retreat  continued  on 
the  26th,  27th  and  28th,  when  the  British  line  halted 
on  the  line  Noyon-Charmange-La  Fere.  During  all 
this  time  the  British  claim  to  have  been  opposed  by 
enormously  superior  forces,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
there  were  only  three  German  army  corps  to  two 
British  Army  Corps  and  General  Snow's  division, 
which  on  the  last  two  days  had  the  help  of  General 
d'Aniade  with  two  French  reserve  divisions,  who  were 
attacking  the  right  wing  of  these  three  German  corps, 
from  Arras. 

When  General  Joffre  made  this  strategic  retreat  he 
was  perhaps  somewhat  influenced  by  the  events  that 
were  happening  along  the  river  Meuse.  The  German 
forces  which  had  descended  the  valley  of  the  Meuse 
from  Namur,  passing  through  Dinant  and  capturing 
Giyet,  keeping  to  the  left  bank  all  this  way,  succeeded 
near  Givet  in  crossing  the  river,  and  the  possession  of 
the  triangle  of  country  from  the  environs  of  Mamur 
to  La  Mare  and  from  La  Mare  to  Givet,  enabled  them 
to  turn  the  French  defences  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse.  The  wooded  country  between  Givet  and 
Mezieres  permitted  the  French  to  oppose  a  desperate 
resistance  to  the  invaders  at  points,  and  this  \vas  pa--- 
ticularly  true  at  Charleville  which  the  Germans 
reached  on  the  25th  day  of  August  and  where  both 
sides  distinguished  themselves  by  desperate  gallantry, 
but  at  length  resulted  in  a  French  defeat.  Again  at 
Signav  and  IWblange  the  fighting  was  fierce  but  the 
French  were  obliged  to  retreat  abandoning  this  place 
and  Mezieres. 

On  August  27th  the  main  body  of  the  French  in  the 
centre  gained  some  slight  success,  and  on  the  28th  this 
slight  success  continued.  General  Joffre  had  three 
conditions  which  had  to  be  fulfilled  in  his  effort  to  pre- 
pare the  offensive  before  that  offensive  could  be  taken. 

81 


The  Campaign   in   the  West 

First,  the  retreat  had  to  be  carried  oui  in  order  under 
a  succession  of  counter  attacks  which  would  keep  the 
enemy  busy.  Second,  the  extreme  point  of  this  re- 
treat must  be  fixed  in  such  a  way  that  the  different 
armies  should  reach  it  sinmltaneously  and  should  at 
the  moment  of  reaching  it  be  ready  to  resume  the  of- 
fensive all  together.  Third,  if  circumstances  permit- 
ted of  a  resumption  of  the  offensive  before  tliis  point 
should  be  reached,  such  circumstances  must  be  utilizeil 
by  the  whole  of  the  French  forces  and  the  British 
forces. 

This  local  success  of  the  '-iTth  and  ViHth  fulfilled  tlic 
first  principle  of  the  retreat  and  thanks  to  them  the 
main  body  was  able  to  fall  back  on  the  l>uzancy-Le 
Chcsne-Bouellemont  line.  While  this  movement  was 
going  on,  further  to  the  right  another  force  obtained 
local  success  at  Othain  and  another  at  Spincourt.  A^ 
a  result  again  of  these  local  successes  the  scattered 
units  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse  were  able  to  unite 
and  cross  the  Meuse  and  join  in  the  acti(m  of  the 
French  centre.  This  manoeuvre  reunited  the  French 
armies  and  ma<lc  them  available  for  the  offensive. 

On  August  2()th  a  new  army  composed  of  two  army 
corps,  five  reserve  divisions  and  a  Moorish  brigade. 
was  constituted.  This  army  was  ordered  to  assemble 
in  the  region  of  Amiens  between  August  27th  and 
September  1st.  and  take  the  offensive  against  the  Ger- 
mans by  uniting  its  action  with  that  of  the  British 
army  which  it  was  expected  at  that  time  would  be  ">m 
the  line  Ilam-Rray-Sur-Somme.  but  the  hope  of  tak- 
ing the  offetisivc  under  this  disposition  of  the  allied 
troops  was  rendered  vain  ])y  the  rapidity  of  the  march 
of  the  Germans'  right  wing,  which  continued  pound 
ing  on  the  Allies'  left  anrl  driving  back  the  British  be- 
fore  it. 

On  August  27th  the  retreating  British  army  got  into 
cxtrcmelv  serious  trouble  at  St.  Quentin  and  had  it 
not  been  fr)r  the  promnf  action  of  General  Joffre.  who 
momentarily  sacrificed  his  manoeuvre  and  disengaged 
them  by  an  attack,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the 
hulk  of  their  armv  would  have  been  cither  captured 
or  destroyed.  The  next  dav  the  British  abandonr'l 
the  line  Rovon-T,a  Fere  anrl  retreated  to  take  up 
a  position  on  the  line  Compiegne-Soissons  along  the 
River  ,\isne  This  falling  bark  of  the  British  im- 
covered  on  the  31st  of  August  the  French  left  flank, 
and  the  general  line  of  battle  thus  modified  contained 


Invasion  of  France 

waves  which  had  to  be  redressed  before  the  French 
could  pass  to  the  offensive.  The  projected  mobiliza- 
tion of  an  army  in  Amiens  was  also  defeated  by  the 
rapidity  which  von  Kluck's  army  had  manoeuvred,  as 
that  army  had  seized  Amiens  before  the  new  army 
which  the  French  were  endeavoring  to  create  had  a 
chance  to  assemble. 

The  result  of  this  occupation  and  the  exposure  of 
the  left  flank  of  the  French  line  of  battle  by  the  Brit- 
ish resulted,  first,  in  a  further  retreat  by  the  British ; 
secondly,  in  a  postponement  by  Gen.  Joffre  of  the 
offensive  and  the  continuance  of  retreat,  since  a  defeat 
under  the  conditions  in  which  he  found  himself  would 
have  cut  off  the  French  field  armies  from  Paris  and 
from  the  British,  and  at  the  same  time  from  the  new 
army  which  was  to  assemble  at  Amiens  and  was  actually 
assembling  further  south. 

To  understand  this,  a  glance  on  the  positions  of  the 
German  troops  on  September  2nd  is  necessary.  The 
German  cavalry  northwest  of  Paris  had  crossed  the 
Oise  and  had  occupied  Chateau  Therry.  The  first  army, 
under  Gen.  von  Kluck,  which  now  comprised  four  army 
corps  and  a  reserve  corps,  had  passed  Campeigne ;  the 
second  army,  under  Gen.  von  Buelow,  three  army  corps, 
two  reserve  corps,  was  around  Laon ;  the  third  army, 
under  Gen.  von  Hansen,  two  army  corps  and  a  reserve, 
had  crossed  the  Aisne  between  Chateau  Pordei  and 
Attieaux.  More  to  the  east  the  fourth,  fifth,  sixth 
and  seventh  German  armies,  twelve  army  corps,  four 
reserve  corps  and  several  Ersatz  formations  were 
stretched  between  Vouviers  and  Verdun  and  from  Ver- 
dun to  the  Vosges. 

It  will  therefore  be  seen  that  the  French  left,  if 
they  had  expected  battle  in  their  then  position,  would 
have  been  in  great  peril  through  the  British  forces  and 
the  new  French  army  operating  more  to  the  westward 
having  given  way.  Gen.  Joffre  decided  to  continue 
the  retreat  and  fixed  the  extreme  limit  therefor  as  the 
line  Bray-sur-Seine,  Nogent-sur  Seine,  Arcis-sur  Aube, 
Vitry-le  Francois  and  the  region  to  the  north  of  Bar- 
le-Duc.  If,  however,  there  was  a  possibility  of  initiating 
an  offensive  before  reaching  this  line,  that  would  per- 
mit the  co-operation  of  the  whole  of  the  French  forces, 
it  was  to  be  made. 

During  the  time  that  these  things  were  happening 
in  the   field,   several  important  things  were  happening 

83 


The  Campaign  in  the  >X'est 

in   Paris,  aiul   a   glance   ai   tlicin   i^  perhaps  necessary. 

On  the  *^*7lh  of  August,  General  Gallicni  was  ap- 
pointed Governor  of  I'aris  and  charged  with  the  duty 
of  organizing  the  newly  created  army  called  the  "Army 
of  the  defense  vi  I'aris." 

On  the  -."Jth  of  August,  in  consequence  of  certain 
internal  dissension,  the  French  cabinet  resigned.  It 
is  stated,  and  apparently  with  some  authority,  that  a 
portion  of  the  old  cabinet  desired  to  secure  peace  at 
any  price,  and  had  made  propositions  to  Germany 
lookinij  t<>  the  brinj^Mng  aliout  of  the  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities.  This  infi>rmatioii  coming  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  President  of  France  and  the  Premier  of  the  Admin- 
istration, it  was  deemed  wise  to  purge  and  reform  the 
cabinet,  for  which  purpose  the  cabinet  resij^ned. 
X'ivianiii.  the  premier  of  the  old  cabinet,  the  same  day 
reorganized  a  new  cabinet  eliminating  those  not  agree- 
ing with  the  policy  of  contiiniing  the  war.  and  adding 
in  their  places  other  statesmen  who  were  in  accord 
with  his  own  views  and  those  of  the  President.  On 
the  vMid  of  September  the  capital  of  France  was  tran.s- 
ferred  to  Bonleaux  from  Paris  and  the  I'resident  and 
the  ministry   left   f«'r  that   place. 

During  the  time  that  these  events  were  taking  place 
in  the  west,  the  situation  in  the  east  from  \'ouviers 
to  tile  Swiss  frontier  had  necessarily  ncn  received  at- 
tention. The  French  had  made,  early  in  .\ugust.  an 
attack  on  Neuf  Chateau  in  Luxemburg  but  had  been 
driven  back  therefrom  with  heavy  losses  by  the  Ger- 
mans, who  followed  them  up,  surrounded  the  fortress 
at  Longwv  and  proceeded  to  a  siege  thereof.  This  fort 
put  up  a  magnificent  resistaticc  under  its  comiviandant. 
the  brave  Colonel  Darche,  and  did  not  surrender  until 
,\ugnst  27th.  the  resistance  of  this  garrison  seriously 
retarding  the  advance  of  the  Orman  army,  based  on 
Trevr<.  under  the  command  of  the  Crown  Prince 
Finally.  hf)wever.  after  the  surrender  of  Longwv.  this 
arnn  advancerl  and  seized  a  large  portion  of  the  forest 
of  .\rgonne,  and  i?i  connection  with  the  armv  im- 
me<liatelv  to  the  east  threw  a  line  of  tro<ips  in  a  semi- 
circle around  the  fortress  of  Verdun,  completely  iso- 
latintr  it  from  the  north  and  east. 

Nothing  of  anv  great  importance  had  happened  dur- 
ing this  peri<»fl  further  to  the  east,  althotigh  there  ha  I 
been  hcavv  fitrhting.  but  without  bearing  on  the  gen- 
eral result.  The  only  movements  of  strategic  impor- 
tance in  the  eastern  pf>rtion  of  this  field  Ixing  thosr 
which  have  already  been  discassed. 

84 


CHAPTER  V. 
THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST 

THE    BATTLE   OF   THE    MARNE 


On  September  5th  it  appeared  that  the  situation 
which  General  Joffre  had  manoeuvred  for  and  for 
which  he  had  so  long  waited,  existed.  The  first  German 
army  movins^,  perhaps  slightly  too  rapidly  for  the 
rest  of  the  German  line  in  its  effort  to  envelope  the 
French  left,  had  crossed  the  river  Grand  Morin,  and 
reached  the  region  of  Chauffry  to  the  south  of  Rebais 
a:nd  of  Esternay,  its  object  being  to  cut  off  the  portion 
of  the  French  and  British  lines  opposing  it  from  Paris 
and  to  crush  them.  The  second  army  lay  on  the  line 
Champaubert-Etoges-Bergeres  and  Vertus.  The  third 
and  fourth  armies  between  them  reached  Chalons  sur 
Marne  and  Bussy  le  Repos.  The  fifth  Triancourt- 
Les  Islettes  and  Julvecourt.  The  sixth"  and  seventh 
armies  were  engaged  further  to- the  east. 

But  here  is  the  capital  difference  between  the  situa- 
tion of  September  5th  and  that  of  September  2nd,  the 
envelopment  of  the  French  left  was  no  longer  po'^;- 
sible  in  the  position  of  the  two  armies.  The  French 
left  had  been  obliged  to  take  up  a  position  on  the  line 
Sezanne-Villers-St.  Georges  and  Courchamps  aside, 
while  the  British  forces  were  gathered  between  the 
Seine  and  the  Marne  and  the  newlv  created  army 
which  was  to  have  mobilized  at  Amiens  and  which 
events  forced  to  mobilize  much  further  to  the  south, 
flanked  this  British  force,  and  both  were  closely  con- 
nected with  the  rest  of  the  French  forces.  General 
Joffre  seeing  this  situation  took  from  his  right  two 
new  armv  corps,  two  divisions  of  artillery  and  two 
divisions  of  cavalry  which  he  threw  into  his  left  wing 
to  reinforce  it.  On  the  evening  of  the  5th  he  sent  out 
a  general  order  to  all  the  commanders  of  his  army 
corps  orderinir  them  to  attack. 

"The  hour  has  come."  he  wrote,  "to  advance  at  all 

85 


The  Campaii^n   in   the   ^'est 

costs  and  to  die  where  you  stand  rather  than  to  give 
way." 

In  the  meantime,  General  von  Kluck  had  started  to 
move  eastwardly  from  Chantilly'  to  Meaux  and  Con- 
toniniieres  and  thi>  infkction  towards  the  left  exposed 
the  right  to  the  offensive  action  of  the  French  army  of 
Amiens,  the  British  and  the  army  of  the  garrison  of 
Paris  under  General  Galliiini.  as  well  as  to  the  offen- 
sive action  of  the  French  left  from  its  above  described 
position.  Von  Kluck's  reason  for  this  movement  was 
probablv  a  double  one.  The  situation  in  the  eastern 
campaign  had  necessitated  the  withdrawal  of  troops 
from  tiie  German  centre  for  use  in  the  campaign  in 
Eastern  Prussia  and  also  necessitated  a  closing  in  to- 
wards the  left,  which  movement,  when  completed, 
would  have  permitted  an  attack  in  force  on  the  French 
centre.  This  mo\ement  nf  the  first  German  army  to 
the  left  was  a  bold  and  most  perilous  operation  which 
required  General  von  Kluck  to  execute  a  flank  march 
in  front  c>f  vastly  superior  forces.  Had  this  been  sue 
cessfully  carried  out,  the  French  centre  in  all  proba- 
bility would  have  been  broken,  but,  as  will  be  seen, 
the  full  measure  of  success  did  not  attend  this 
manoeuvre. 

During  the  night  of  Sej^tembcr  5th  the  French  left 
army  reached  the  front  Penchaud-St.  Souflct  and  \'er. 
On  tile  (ith  and  7th  it  threw  itself  vigorously  upon 
von  Kluck's  right  towards  the  Ourcq.  On  the  Kth, 
the  next  day,  the  Germans  who  had  in  great  haste 
reinforced  von  Kluck's  right  by  bringing  the  second 
and  fourtli  Army  Corps  back  to  it,  obtained  some  suc- 
cess bv  attacks  of  extreme  violence  and  ocupied  Ret/, 
Thurv  and  Natuil.  but  in  spite  of  this  the  French 
troops  held  their  grounds  well.  During  the  day  of 
the  0th  the  fighting  was  very  violent  all  along  General 
von  Kluck's  front,  and  indecisive.  During  that  night 
the  French  left  was  reinforced  and  put  in  condition 
for  a  new  attack  on  the  next  dav.  On  the  10th.  how- 
ever, which  was  a  Thursday,  the  first  German  army 
beat  a  rather  hastv  retreat,  which  obliged  the  second 
armv  to  conform,  and  which  in  turn  drew  back  thw 
whole  German  line  running  to  the  eastward. 

The  French  left  had  wHl  sustained  its  three-fold 
role  of  supporting'  the  nrittsh  on  its  left  and  support- 
ing the  French  c«^ntre  on  its  right  which  for  three 
davs  «5tond  the  brunt  of  the  shock,  ancl  had  succeeded 
in  defeating  an«l  throwing  bnck  the  German  armv  in 

86 


The  Battle  of  the  Marne 

front  of  it.  it  is  true  that  this  army  was  reinforced 
by  a  large  portion  of  the  army  of  the  garrison  of 
Paris,  but  in  any  event,  full  credit  must  be  given  to 
the  French  left  as  unquestionably  any  glory  that  was 
gained  by  either  the  British  or  the  remainder  of  the 
French  army  at  this  point  of  the  Marne,  was  due  to 
its  heroic  action.  The  German  retreat  continued  all 
the  day  of  the  10th  and  on  the  11th,  nor  did  it  stop 
till  the  line  to  the  north  bank  of  the  River  Aisne  was 
reached.  The  River  Aisne  runs  roughly  parallel  to 
the  Marne  and  some  forty  miles  to  the  northward. 
This  distance  measures  on  its  front  the  extent  of  the 
retreat  of  the  German  right  wing  from  its  most  south- 
erely  position.  On  arrival  here  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  Aisne,  in  which  trenches  and  defensive  positions 
had  already  been  prepared  for  them,  the  German  right 
halted  and,  turning,  faced  the  enemy,  except  at  Sois- 
sons.  where  the  pursuing  French  left  wing  succeeded 
in  crossing  the  river. 

We  will  now  turn  our  attention  for  a  moment  to 
what  happened  in  the  German  centre  during  the  period 
in  which  the  combats  last  described  were  taking  place 
between  the  German  right  and  the  French  left  aided 
by  the  British. 

The  French  centre,  which  on  the  5th  of  September 
was  composed  of  a  new  army  created  on  the  29th  of 
August,  and  one  of  those  which  at  the  beginning  of 
the  campaign  had  been  engaged  in  Belgian  Luxem- 
burg, occupied,  on  September  5th,  a  line  running 
Sezanne-Mailly-Humbauville  Chateau  Beauchamp- 
Bignicourt-Blesmes-Marupt-Le  Montoy.  The  Ger- 
man army,  in  view  of  its  right  wing  having  been  ar- 
rested and  its  projected  enveloping  movement  de- 
feated, made  a  desperate  attempt  on  the  7th  and  10th 
of  September  to  pierce  the  French  centre  to  the  east 
of  Fere-Champeaux,  with  a  temporary  measure  of 
success  on  the  8th  and  9th.  forcing  the  French  to  re- 
treat a  not  inconsiderable  distance. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  9th,  however,  the  French 
commander  took  a  general  offensive  and  succeeded  in 
beating  back  the  Germans  on  his  left  towards  the 
marshes  of  St.  Gond,  and  in  the  evening  succeeded  in 
making  a  flank  attack  upon  the  German  forces,  and 
particularly  on  the  Guard  which  had  attacked  his  own 
right  army  corps.  The  Germans  were  taken  by  sur- 
prise by  this  bold  manoeuvre  and  fell  back  hastily. 
The  next  day  more  ground  was   gained  and  on  the 

87 


1  he  Campaign   in   the  W  est 

lltli,  liic  I'Tcnch  crossed  the  Manic  beiwcen  Tours- 
sur-Alanie  and  Sarry,  driving  the  liennans  in  front 
of  them,  and  on  the  T^lh  the  Germans  reached  a  posi- 
tion already  prepared  tor  them  north  tif  the  Camp- 
de  Chali>n.  where  ilie  retreat  .stopped,  and  tlie  Gernians 
to<.)k  up  the  piisitioii  which  they  have  since  main- 
tained. 

The  operations  on  the  ca.-^lcni  pen  tion  of  ihis  battle 
line  were  of  notliinj;  like  the  ^a^le  importance  or  in- 
terest as  those  in  the  west,  which  have  been  described, 
nor  did  the  Germanij  retreat  to  anylliiii^  like  the  same 
extent.  Heavy  fighting  took  place  at  intervals  on  the 
eastern  part  of  this  line,  but  aside  from  a  small  gain 
towards  the  Argonne  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  Ger- 
man forces  which  had  been  operating  between  Xancy 
and  the  \'osges,  the  results  were,  in  point  of  territory 
gained  by  the  French  comparati\  ely  small.  The  Ger- 
man retreat  was  nearly  always  in  good  order  and 
without  detracting  from  the  credit  undoubtedly  due 
to  the  French  troops  with  their  grand  defence  and 
their  splendid  courage,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  Germans  were  very  considerably  outniinibcrcd. 

This  statement  is,  of  course,  not  in  accordance  with 
the  early  reports  of  this  fighting  received  via  London 
which  represented  the  struggle  as  being  conducted 
on  very  unecpial  terms,  the  superiority  resting  enorm- 
ously in  numbers  with  the  Germans.  The  French 
official  report  by  the  general  staff  of  this  fighting  is- 
sued several  months  later,  when  facts  were  more  ac- 
curately known,  however,  makes  no  such  claim.  This 
report  estimates  the  aggregate  number  of  men  en- 
gaged on  both  sides  as  somewhere  in  the  vicinitv  of 
2.250,000,  of  whom  perhaps  000.000  or  050,000  were 
Germans.  For  one  moment  of  the  offensive  of  the 
French  left  wing  ni.:ainst  General  von  Kluck's  Gcrinan 
right  wing,  the  [British  played  a  highly  spcctacul.ir 
part  and  did  imdoubtcdly  contribute  to  the  victory, 
but  that  this  victory  is  entirely  or  even  largelv  at- 
tributable to  them.  is.  of  course,  an  exaggeration. 
The  P.ritish  army  here,  as  elsewhere,  in  s<^mc  degree 
at  least,  had  the  adxantage  of  a  greater  i>ubliritv  of 
its  effort>*  than  the  French  enjoyed.  The  real  credit 
for  thi»i  victory  is  to  he  given  the  French  troops  of  the 
line  of  the  left  wing  and  left  centre,  who  had  sufficient 
morale  to  take  the  offensive,  after  manv  davs  of  dis- 
couraging retreat,  at  the  word  of  command,  and  to 
«ii^tain  dtiring  the   first   three  dav;   of  the  battle   as 

88 


The  Battle  of  the  Marne 

saults  of  a  very  formidable  nature  and  to  repulse  them, 
and  to  gain  ground  in  spite  of  them. 

One  great  effect  of  this  victory,  and  perhaps  the 
greatest,  was  the  enforced  retirement  of  the  army  of 
the  Crown  Prince  in  the  east,  which  undoubtedly 
saved  Verdun.  One  of  its  important  defences.  Fort 
Tyron,  was  afterwards  found  to  have  been  on  the 
verge  of  surrender,  the  fort  itself  had  been  reduced  to 
a  heap  of  ruins ;  its  garrison  to  11  men  with  only  four 
guns  workable.  Forty-eight  hours  more  and  Fort 
'J'yron  would  probably  have  been  taken  with  the  result 
that  Verdun  would  have  been  cut  off. 

While  thes  events  were  going  on  on  the  ])attle  line, 
behind  the  battle  line  an  event  of  considerable  importance 
was  taking  place.  When  the  Germans  advanced  south- 
ward through  France  they  invested  the  French  fortress 
of  Maubeuge  and  left  its  capture  to  be  completed  at 
leisure.  A  few  days  were  necessary  to  bring  up  the 
famous  guns  which  had  done  such  extraordinary  work 
at  Liege  and  Namur,  and  after  their  arrival  and  instal- 
lation, a  couple  of  days  sufficed  to  end  the  resistance 
of  Maubeuge.  By  the  capture  of  this  fortress  the  Ger- 
mans made  prisoners  of  40,000  French  troops,  together 
with  a  large  quantity  of  artillery  and  munitions  of  war, 
and,  what  is  more  important  even,  secured  their  com- 
munications in  their  rear  from  any  danger  of  successful 
attack  from  this  point.  The  capture  of  this  stronghold 
also  freed  the  besieging  forces  and  enabled  them  to  march 
southward  to  join  their  hard  pressed  comrades. 

The  battle  of  the  Marne  lasted  realh-  seven  full  days. 
At  the  time  of  the  fighting  it  was  considered  to  have 
lasted  several  days  longer,  but  now  that  we  see  it  in 
perspective  and  draw  therefrom  a  just  sense  of  its  pro- 
portion to  precedent  and  subsequent  events,  we  perceive 
that  the  real  battle  finished  on  the  evening  of  the  12th 
of  September.     The  next  three  days  were  uneventful. 


89 


CHAPTER  VI. 
TIIK  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST 

THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    AISNE 


On  Tuesday,  the  15th  of  September,  the  prepared 
{Ktsitions  of  the  German  army  had  hciii  reached  and 
it  lay  in  a  line  across  France  beginnintr  at  Noyon  on 
the  west  and  running  thence  castwardly  through  Vic- 
sur-Aisnc,  north  of  Soissons.  the  Mount  of  Laon,  the 
heights  north  and  east  of  Rheims.  and  on  a  line  north 
of  Ville-sur-Tour-de-Varennes  and  thence  to  Le-Bois- 
de-Fourges  on  the  Meuse  north  of  Verdun.  As  a  re- 
sult of  the  fall  of  Maubeuge,  considerable  heavy  ar- 
tillery had  been  brought  to  the  enemy  as  well  as  fur- 
ther reinforcements. 

For  four  days  the  French  and  British  made  frontal 
attacks  upon  this  line  but  found  it  so  strong  that  it 
wa<^  impossible  for  them  to  make  headway  in  spite 
of  determined  sustained  attacks,  and  it  became  obvi- 
ous that  the  position  would  be  seriouslv  defended. 
On  the  Ifith,  Sir  John  French's  army  was  reinforced 
by  another  division,  that  is,  approximately  20.000  men. 
which  brought  the  English  force  up  to  about  its  origi- 
nal strength.  By  the  ISth  the  British  and  French  had 
reconnojtered  the  position  of  the  dermans  and  found 
that  it  had  been  long  prepared  and  was  of  extremely 
formidable  character.  The  German  forces  were  dis- 
posed just  behind  the  crest  of  the  ridges  or  followed  the 
edges  of  the  woods,  and  were  protected  against  a  di- 
rect attack  bv  barbed  wire  entanglements  and  rabbit 
fencing,  while  every  avenue  of  approach  was  covered 
by  cross  fire.  Indeed  this  pf)sitir>n  consisted  f^f  a  series 
of  natural  fortresses  of  hills.  wr>ods  and  quarries,  in 
some  places  backed  by  eight  or  nine  successive  lines 
of  trenches. 

An  artillery  duel  of  great  violence  had  taken  place 
for  several  davs  and  had  had  no  effect  on  the  general 
position  of  either  armv  or  the  whole  length  of  this 
line  Tlu-  allied  cr)nimandcrs.  appreciating  that  in  the 
sifn.Tti..Ti  fhf  fiMTif.d  attacks  would  be  worse  than  use- 

90 


The   Battle  of  the  Aisne 

less,  since  it  was  extremely  doubtful  whether  any  ad- 
vance could  be  made,  and  in  any  event  there  was  the 
certainty  of  enormous  loss  of  life,  after  consultation, 
determined  to  try  and  turn  the  German  right  wing. 
To  this  end,  General  deCastelnau,  supported  by  the 
bulk  of  the  British  trocjps,  worked.  Their  intention  was 
to  proceed  in  a  direct  northerly  line  from  a  point  a 
little  to  the  west  of  Noyon,  but  the  German  forces 
succeeded  in  deflecting  the  end  of  this  line  from  a 
northerly  course  and  forcing  it  west. 

The  first  point  occupied  by  the  French  in  the  ex- 
tension of  their  flank  was  Peronne,  and  thence  they 
endeavored  to  work  towards  St.  Quentin,  but  were 
forced  to  the  westward.  This  movement  continued 
for  some  time  and  heavy  fighting  took  place  daily. 
As  fast  as  the  French  advanced  to  the  north^  they 
were  deflected  and  forced  to  the  west  with  the  final 
result  that  a  fierce  battle  took  place  between  the  left 
wing  of  the  Allies  and  the  right  wing  of  the  Germans 
from  September  20th  to  October  10th,  along  the  line 
which  stretches  roughly  from  Compeigne,  where  the 
Oise  from  the  north  joins  the  Aisne  in  its  southward 
flow  from  the  wooded  hill  country  of  the  Argonne, 
to  the  sea.  This  line  was  about  120  miles  from  the 
north  of  Dunkirk  to  Compeigne.  The  plan  that  Gen- 
eral Joffre  adopted,  as  has  been  said,  was  to  work 
around  the  German  right  wing  north  of  Compeigne 
and,  by  moving  eastward,  to  compel  the  enemy  to 
evacuate  the  Somme,  the  Scheldt  and  the  Oise  and 
ultimately  the  Aisne,  the  Sambre,  the  Dendre  and  the 
Meuse. 

Compeigne  is  about  forty  miles  from  Paris  and  a 
similar  distance  from  Amiens.  From  the  Oise  at 
Compeigne  to  the  Somme  a  plain  extends  practically 
on  the  same  level  as  the  great  plain  which  is  bounded 
by  the  Scheldt  from  Cambrai  to  its  southern  mouth, 
and  by  the  Channel  from  that  mouth  to  the  low  hills 
wliich  run  from  the  south  of  Calais  around  the  west 
of  St.  Omer,  Bethune  and  Arras  to  the  south  of  Cam- 
brai. These  hills  or  heights,  which  between  Albert 
and  Peronne  approach  the  north  bank  of  the  Somme, 
divide  the  plain  of  this  river  from  that  of  the  Scheldt. 
Along  the  eastern  edge  of  the  plain  of  the  Somme 
flows  the  Oise  and  on  its  left  bank  between  Com- 
peigne and  La  Fere  to  its  mouth,  the  ground  rises  near 
Lassigny  and  Noyon.  The  Somme  rising  a  little  to 
the   north    of   St.    Quentin    flows   southwest   to    Ham 

91 


The  Campaign   in   the  West 

turn>  iiurtluvcst  to  Peroniie  and  thon  flows  westward 
to  Amiens,  and  a  few  miles  above  which  it  receives  the 
waters  of  the  Ancre.  The  sources  of  this  tributary  of 
the  Somnie  are  near  Bapaume,  the  town  on  the  high 
road  from  Amiens  to  Cambrai.  lietween  Amiens  and 
Rapaume  is  the  town  of  Albert.  High  roads  join 
Bapaiune  to  Arras  and  Cambrai  and  to  Peronnc  on 
the  Soinme  From  I'eronne  a  road  and  railroad  run 
soutliwest  to  Compeij^ne.  halfway  between  them  is 
Royc  and  to  the  east  the  railroad  between  Roye  and 
Compcipnc  and  Lassigny.  At  Compeij;nc  the  Oise 
and  the  Aisne  meet. 

By  Septcniber  1st  deCastclnau's  right  wing  had 
pushed  up  the  west  of  the  CJisc  to  the  neigliborhood 
of  Xoyon.  \'iolcnt  encounters  ensued  in  the  regions 
of  Lassigny.  From  Lassigny  the  French  moved  to- 
ward Roye,  wliilc  their  left  wing  seizetl  Pcronne. 
The  Germans,  alarmed  at  the  menace  to  their  com- 
munications through  St.  (Juentin,  which  was  some 
twenty  miles  from  F^eroiine,  prt)mptly  brought  up 
heavy  reinforcements  and  on  the  morning  of  the  2.5th 
the  I'Vench  near  Xoyon  began  to  be  pushed  back.  The 
French  hurried  up  fresh  troojjs  and  the  offensive  was 
resumed. 

During  the  last  week  of  September  (leneral  Joffre 
discovered  that  the  Gcrmatis  in  this  district  were  in 
such  force  that  they  were  able  to  meet  the  outflanking 
manoeuvre  by  a  counter  strike,  which  in  its  turn 
would  outflank  him.  To  prevent  this,  he  determined 
to  extend  hi^  left  northwest  to  .\rra<  Lens-I.illc.  and 
thus  threaten  again  the  enem\'s  flank  by  mnving 
through  .\rras  on  Cambrai  and  behitul  Cambrai  on 
Le  Catcau  and  from  Lens  on  \'alencienne>,  .ind  be- 
hind it  the  lost  fortress  of  Maubeugc.  If  the  French 
succeeded  in  occupying  the  area  in  the  j)arallelogram 
Cambrai A'alencicnncs-Maubeuge  and  I.e  Cateau.  the 
Germans  r>n  the  S«»mme.  the  Oise  and  the  Aisne.  would 
have  lost  control  over  the  tw<i  r.iilw.ixs  .-..inniunicat- 
ing  with  Liege,  their  base  of  supplier. 

.\'c)  doubt  this  plan  was  attempted  in  the  hope  of 
having  st)me  influence  on  the  siege  of  Antwerp,  which 
was  now  going  on  and  which  will  be  described  later. 
To  carry  f)Ut  this  new  plan  another  aniu  under  Gen- 
eral Maud'huy  was  assembled  northwest  of  flcCastel- 
nau's  army  which  h.id  been.  u|)  to  the  present  time,  en- 
deavoring to  outflank  the  German  right  and  was  from 
now  on  to  adopt  a  defensive  role  preventing  the  Ger- 

92 


The  Battle   of  the  Aisne 

mans  penetrating^  further  between  the  Soinme  and  the 
Oise  and  thus  cuttin};  the  communications  of  Maud- 
'huy's  army  which  ran  south  towards  Amiens. 

This  army  was  concentrated  around  Arras  and  Lens 
on  the  hei^^hts  between  the  plains  of  the  Somme  and 
the  Scheldt.  A  portion  of  the  cavalry  was  north  of 
Lens  in  touch  with  territorials  moved  south  from 
Dunkirk.  In  the  vast  plain  which  stretches  from  the 
Scheldt  between  Cambrai  and  Ghent  to  the  sea  be- 
tween Calais  and  Ostend  lies  the  city  of  Lille,  at  this 
time  occupied  by  French  territorials. 

The  first  move  of  this  army  was  to  drive  the  Ger- 
mans out  of  Arras  and  then  the  position  of  the  army 
was  as  follows :  The  right  rested  on  Ancre,  the  left 
extended  from  Arras  through  Lens  to  Lille,  the  centre 
was  in  Arras.  Looking  to  the  eastward  Arras  is  the 
apex  of  a  triangle  of  which  the  base  line  is  Lille-Cam- 
brai.  in  front  of  that  line  near  Cambrai-Lille  stood 
Douai.  The  Germans  were  in  force  between  Douai 
and  Cambrai  and  from  Cambrai  west  to  near  Bapaume. 
Lens  is  to  the  south  from  Arras  and  Lille.  Douai  was 
garrisoned  by  French  territorials.  Maud'huy's  plan 
seems  to  have  been  to  move  the  mass  of  his  army 
through  Arras  and  Douai  on  Valenciennes. 

The  German  plan  was  to  capture  Lille  and  advance 
from  Turcoing  down  both  banks  of  the  Lys  from 
Bethune  and  St.  Pol,  and  while  this  turning  movement 
was  in  progress  to  capture  Douai  and  Lens,  and  seizing 
the  heights  northwest  of  Arras,  cut  the  roads  between 
that  city  and  St.  Pol,  w^hen  it  would  be  possible  to  roll 
Maud'huy's  army  back  to  the  Somme. 

Fighting  began  on  the  30th  of  September  at  Vitry-en- 
Artois,  a  village  about  twelve  miles  up  the  Arras  and 
Douai  road.  Other  skirmishes  took  place  the  same 
day  at  several  places,  and  all  that  day  the  troops  of 
both  sides  w-ere  moving  into  position.  The  next  day, 
October  1st.  the  real  battle  began  and  opened  with  an 
artillery  duel  which  lasted  all  day  on  this  front.  Dur- 
ing the  day  the  Germans  attacked  Douai  from  Valen- 
ciennes and  Cambrai  and  capturing  the  place  drove 
out  the  French  territorials.  The  French  brought  up 
reinforcements  to  Arras  during  the  night  in  the  hope 
of  being  able  to  retake  the  place  the  next  day.  Octo- 
ber 2nd,  the  battle  continued  as  it  did  on  the  3rd.  On 
Monday,  the  4th,  the  Germans  pushed  the  centre  of 
the  French  left  wing  back  west  of  Lens  and  Maud'huy 

93 


The  Campaign  in   the  West 

was  obliged  to  abandon  Arras  and  fall  back  to  the  hills 
west  of  that  town. 

On  October  tJth,  the  Geiniaiis  bombarded  Arra>  and 
attempted  to  penetrate  the  town,  but  French  rein- 
forcenunts  arrivini;,  after  hand-to-hand  fightinj^  they 
were  dri\cn  out  of  the  town.  Away  to  the  northeast 
on  the  road  from  Arras  to  Lille,  the  battle  continued 
to  rape.  Douai  and  Lens  had,  as  we  know,  been  cap- 
tured by  the  Germans,  but  the  fightinj^  in  the  direc- 
tion of  St.  Pol  had  not  been  so  favorable  to  tliein.  On 
October  7th  the  (icrman  line  extended  irou\  Cambrai 
through  Douai  U>  the  cast  of  Lens.  Lille  had  been 
shelled  since  the  Ith  and  on  the  Gth  the  Germans  sur- 
rounded the  city  on  three  sides,  but  were  repulsed  by 
the  French  territorials,  who  put  up  a  really  splendid 
defense  of  the  city  for  troops  of  that  class. 

It  was  around  the  Uh  that  Maud'huy's  offensive  liad 
been  broui^'ht  to  a  standstill.  To  meet  this  situation 
General  Joffre  concentrated  still  another  army  be- 
tween Lens  and  Dunkirk  and  transferred  the  British 
expeditionary  forces  to  the  extreme  western  end  of  the 
line.  General  d'Urbal  took  command  of  this  army 
while  General  Foch  was  f^iven  supreme  command  of 
the  four  armies — deCastclnau's,  Maud'huy's.  Sir  John 
French's  and  d'Urbal's.  General  Foch  fixed  his  head- 
quarters at  DouUens.  north  of  Amiens,  and  half  way 
between  Arras  and  Abbeville.  By  the  8th  of  October 
these  forces  were  all  in  position.  It  is  worthy  of  note 
here  that  Sir  John  French,  the  British  field  marshal, 
and  his  force  were  strictly  subordinate  to  General 
Foch,  and  remained  so  while  the  operations  on  this 
extreme  west  of  the  line  were  beinp^  carried  out. 

On  October  5th,  before  the  .Mlies'  army  was  com- 
pletely ready,  the  Germans  blew  up  the  railroad  line 
which  connected  Lille  and  Cambrai  with  Hazcbrouck 
and  Calais.  The  plan  of  the  Allies  was  to  sweep  the 
Germans  back  through  Ypres  and  Lille  and  then  join 
hands  with  the  Belgians  and  Rawlinson's  corps  in  the 
north  and  drive  the  enemy  back  from  Brussels.  At 
this  time  Antwerp  was  on  the  point  of  falling  and  the 
Belgian  and  liritish  auxiliary  forces  were  retreating 
south  pursued  by  the  ficrmans.  The  French  rein- 
forced their  troops  largely  and  probably  were  in  su- 
perior force  to  the   British 

On  October  9th  the  position  of  the  Allies  was  as 
follows:  The  army  of  General  deCastelnau  stretched 
across   the  plain   of  the   Somme  from   the  region  of 

94 


The  Battle  of  the  Aisne 

Compeigne  to  the  heights  north  of  that  river,  the  left 
wing  rested  on  the  Ancre  west  of  Bapaume.  Upon 
the  hills  northward  between  Arras  and  the  plain  of  the 
Scheldt  as  far  as  Bethune  were  disposed  the  troops 
comprising  the  army  of  Maud'huy  and  held  Arras  at 
the  edge  of  the  plain.  The  army  of  General  d'Urbal 
held  both  sides  of  the  canal  of  Calais,  the  canalized 
Aa  and  the  portion  of  the  canal  St.  Omer-Lille,  which 
lies  between  St.  Omer  and  Bethune,  and  also  the  line 
of  the  canal  from  Wharton  which  runs  south  of  Dun- 
kirk through  Fumes  to  Nieuport. 

Leaving  these  forces  in  this  position  we  will  now 
turn  our  attention  to  what  happened  in  the  northwest 
of  Belgium  during  the  time  occupied  by  the  move- 
ment we  have  been  describing  here. 


95 


CHAPTER   s  11. 

TIIK  C'AMI'AIGN  IN  TUK  WEST 

THE  SIEGE  OF  ANTWERP 
THE  BATTLE   OF  YPRES 

Aiiiwirj)  was  iiUcndcd  to  be  the  great  stronghold  of 
Mcigium.  and  was  defended  by  three  rings  of  forts  in 
addition  to  the  defenses  of  its  natural  position,  being 
practically  encircled  by  the  Rivers  Scheldt,  Rupel  and 
Nethe.  The  first  line  of  outer  forts  was  very  inodern, 
only  having  been  completed  in  I'Jl.'J  and  armed  with 
modern  armament  of  very  high  power.  The  second 
ring  of  forts  had  been  constructed  by  Brialmont  in 
187U,  while  the  third  or  inner  ring  of  forts,  placed  at 
regular  intervals  of  *^'^0U  yards,  at  an  average  distance 
of  about  .3500  yards  from  the  enceinte  of  the  city  itself, 
were  old.  having  been  built  in  18G9  or  thereabouts. 

In  view  of  the  deflection  of  French  to  the  west,  fur- 
ther south,  it  became  necessary  for  the  Germans  to 
take  this  city,  and  towards  the  end  of  September  it 
became  evident  that  a  serious  movement  by  the  Ger- 
mans was  pending  in  this  direction.  There  had  been 
various  encounters  and  petty  skirmishes  between  the 
time  that  the  I'elgian  army  had  withdrawn  from  Brus- 
sels to  the  sliclter  of  the  forts  of  Antwerj),  but  these 
had  amounted  to  little.  The  only  important  event  that 
had  taken  place  was  that  (m  the  7th  of  September 
when  General  von  Hoehn  had  forced  the  Belgian 
troops  to  withdraw  from  Mclle  and  arranged  with  the 
city  of  Ghent  to  deliver  supplies  to  his  army.  The 
places  fixed  for  the  delivery  of  these  supplies  Indi- 
cated the  route  which  (.cneral  von  Hoehn's  troops 
were  to  follow  and  as  this  was  France,  the  Belg'ans 
determined  to  make  a  sortie  in  force  from  .\ntwcrn  on 
Tcrmond  and  Liere. 

The  Belgian  left  recaptured  .Most  and  i)ushed  its 
way  to  and  beyf)nd  Aersclmt,  while  the  right  re- 
occupied    Malincs   and    penetrated   to   Nosscghen    and 

96 


The  Siege  of  Antwerp 

Cortenberg  to  the  northeast  of  Brussels.  The  fight- 
ing during  this  sortie  was  probably  the  heaviest  of 
the  war  in  Belgium.  The  Belgians  themselves  lost 
very  heavily  and  it  was  said  that  the  Germans  also 
suffered  severely.  A  portion  of  General  von  Boehn's 
army  returned  to  help  in  this  fight  against  the  entire 
German  position  in  Belgium  and  it  was  presumably 
this  operaton  that  brought  about  the  immediate  at- 
tack upon  Antwerp.  The  Germans  did  not  first  pro- 
ceed, curiously  enough,  to  cut  communication  between 
Antwerp  and  the  coast  at  Ostend  and  Zeebrugge, 
which  would  have  cut  off  any  line  of  retreat  to  the 
south  by  the  garrison  or  any  means  by  whch  it  could 
receive  reinforcements.  The  reason  for  this  was  be- 
cause it  was  thought  Ostend  was  held  in  great  force 
by  the  British,  which  was  not  so. 

Consequently  the  advance  on  Antwerp  began  from 
the  direction  of  Brussels  and  the  fighting  opened  near 
Termonde  on  September  26th  and  27th.  The  Belgians 
were  driven  out  at  first,  but  returned  and  drove  out 
the  Germans,  while  a  similar  result  attended  the  fight- 
ing at  Lebbekke  on  the  27th.  Attempts  were  made  to 
cross  the  river  at  Schellebelle  on  the  west  and  Baes- 
rode  on  the  east,  but  these  attempts  were  probably 
schemes  intended  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  Bel- 
gian army  from  the  real  attack.  This  real  attack  was 
launched  from  the  south  and  on  the  27th  of  Septem- 
ber the  Germans  advanced  as  far  as  Malines  and  bom- 
barded the  town ;  its  inhabitants  fled  to  Antwerp.  On 
the  28th  the  Germans  had  advanced  beyond  Malines 
and  were  within  reach  of  the  southernmost  part  of 
Antwerp.  Forts  Waelhem  and  Wavre-St.  Catherine, 
were  immediately  attacked  on  the  28th  and  29th.  The 
German  attacking  force  was  about  70,000  men  and 
they  had  brought  with  them  28-centimeter  artillery. 

Wavre-St.  Catherine  was  the  first  fort  to  be  silenced 
on  the  29th  of  September.  It  had  been  badly  smashed 
to  begin  with  by  German  bombardment,  and  half  its 
guns  were  out  of  action  when  a  magazine  blew  up 
ruining  the  fort  completely.  It  was  abandoned,  and 
Forts  Waelhem  and  Fort  Lierre  then  bore  the  brunt 
of  the  attack.  In  the  rear  of  Waelhem  were  the  main 
water  works  of  Antwerp,  and  on  September  30th  these 
were  destroyed  and  the  great  reservoir  burst,  which 
flooded*  part  of  the  Belgian  trenches  and  cut  off  the 
city'.'^  water  supply.  Fort  Waelhem  fought  gallantly 
through  the  1st  of  October  and  was  then  abandoned. 

97 


The  Campaign  in  the  West 

On  the  same  date  Forts  Koiiiiigshoyckt  and  Lierre 
were  silenced.  The  boinbardnient  up  to  tliis  time  had 
Ix'cii    I'roin   a  distance  of   about    I'^.'^Ou  yards. 

VS  ith  the  fall  of  these  forts,  the  situation  of  Ant- 
werp became  practically  hopeless  and  on  the  «Jnd,  the 
nd^jan  government  started  to  remove  to  Ostend,  but 
changed  its  plan.^.  A  marine  brigade  and  two  naval 
brigades  together  with  some  heavy  naval  guns  luidii 
command  of  General  Paris,  were  thrown  into  the  city 
late  in  the  evening  of  Saturday,  (.)ctol>cr  3rd,  under  the 
direct  orders  of  the  British  First  IvOrd  of  the  Admir- 
alty, Winston  Churchill.  I'or  this  Mr.  Churchill  was 
afterwards  bitterly  criticised  because  a  large  propor- 
tion of  these  naval  brigades  consisted  of  very  young 
men  who  liad  recently  joined  and  were  so  untraineil 
that  the\  literally  did  not  know  how  to  use  a  rifle. 
Tlieir  equipment  was  also  sadly  inadequate.  These 
numbered  all  told  about  8,000  men.  It  is  possible, 
liowever,  that  this  was  only  a  part  of  the  force  intended 
to  be  sent  to  Antwerp  and  that  developments  elsewhere 
J »re vented  the  sending  of  the  remainder. 

On  the  3rd  of  rK-tober,  the  outer  forts  having  been 
silenced,  the  German  guns  were  brought  closer  to  the 
river  and  sought,  on  the  morning  of  October  4th.  to 
force  a  passage  at  Waelhem.  but  were  repulsed  by 
the  Belgians.  The  Cermans  then  turned  their  atten- 
tion to  a  point  further  ea.stward  l>etwcen  Duffel  an<l 
Lierre.  The  figlit  here  lasted  the  night  of  OctolK'r 
4th  and  the  day  and  night  of  October  Sth,  and  was 
quite  severe,  the  British  marines  aiding  the  Belgian 
defenders.  By  the  afternoon  of  October  5th  it  became 
evident  that  the  iWst  trenches  could  no  longer  be 
held  and  the  defending  forces  withdrew  several  hun- 
dred yards.  In  the  early  morning  of  (^ctolx*r  <)th  the 
Germans  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river.  On  the  /ith 
of  October  the  exodus  of  citizens  hr\d  begun  from 
the  town  and  from  this  time  forward  till  its  fall,  great 
numbers  of  fugitives  moved  out  of  the  citv  towards 
Ghent  and  to  the  southward  and  the  Dutch  frontier  on 
the  north. 

The  government  of  Belgium  left  on  the  7th  for 
Ostend,  and  the  oil  tank*;  of  the  city,  which  was  the 
oil  depot  for  Belg^iiun.  Holland  and  a  |xirtion  of 
France,  were  set  on  fire,  as  it  was  evident  that  the 
city  could  not  much  longer  be  defended.  On*  the  Hth 
a  notice  of  l>otnbardment  was  sent  by  the  German 
commander  to  Gen.    Degui.se.   the   Belgian   commander. 

U8 


The  Siege  of  Antwerp 

unless  the  city  was  immediately  surrendered.  This 
surrender  was  refused.  The  bombardment  was  not 
begun  until  a  few  minutes  before  midnight  of  the  7th. 
Durmg  the  7th  the  British  and  Belgian  troops  began 
to  withdraw,  accompanied  by  about  200,000  of  the 
population,  the  majority  going  northward  to  the 
Dutch  frontier  and  crossing.  The  bombardment  con- 
tinued the  Hth  and  on  Friday,  October  9th,  all  of  the 
troops  being  supposed  to  be  out  of  the  town,  the  bur- 
gomaster went  out  between  8  and  9  o'clock  to  meet 
the  German  commander,  and  surrender  the  city.  At 
noon  the  Germans  entered  the  city  through  the  gate 
of  Malines. 

General  Von  Boehn  has  been  rather  severely  criti- 
cised and  with  apparent  justice  both  for  not  having 
seized  the  railway  northward  and  westward  from  Ant- 
werp previously  to  the  time  he  actually  did  so,  which 
was  on  the  evening  of  October  9th,  when  the  Germans 
penetrated  as  far  as  the  railroad  line  at  Lookoren, 
and  for  his  tardiness  in  pursuing  the  retreating  troops 
to  the  southward,  Ghent  not  being  taken  until  the 
12th  nor  Bruges  until  the  15th.  The  effect  of  this  w^as 
to  permit  the  Allies  to  withdraw  unharassed  beyond 
Ostend  and  to  join  the  allied  line  of  battle  at  the  Yser. 
Had  they  arrived  there  twenty-four  hours  earlier,  the 
whole  of  the  Belgian  army  and  the  bulk  of  the  British 
naval  marines  would  have  been  made  prisoners.  As 
it  was,  the  German  attack  forced  about  2,000  of  the 
8,000  naval  force  into  Holland  and  captured  about  600 
or  700  at  Neuiken ;  some  20,000  Belgian  troops  also 
succeeded  in  crossing  the  Dutch  frontier. 

-•After  the  fall  of  Antwerp,  as  has  already  been 
stated,  the  Germans  turned  to  the  southward  and  ad- 
vancing slowly,  occupied  Ghent  on  the  12th  and 
Ostend  on  the  15th  of  October.  This  time  was 
utilized  by  the  Belgian  infantry  and  British  naval  bri- 
gade to  make  good  their  escape.  No  defense  of  mo- 
ment was  put  up  at  either  of  these  places,  and  from 
Ostend  a  portion  of  the  naval  brigades  went  to  Eng- 
land. The  Belgian  army  turned  southward  along  the 
coast  and  succeeded  in  effecting  a  junction  w^ith  the  ex- 
treme western  end  of  the  allied  line  south  of  Nieuport. 
From  Ostend  the  Belgian  government  moved  to 
Havre,  France,  it  having  made  an  arrangement  w^ith 
France  that  it  should  have  the  same  rights  at  Havre 
as  were  accorded  by  Italy  to  the  Pope  under  the  "Law 

99 


The  Campaii^n  in  the  West 

of  Guarantecii,  "  that  is  to  say,  practically  ex-tenito- 
riality.  Many  refugees  fled  from  Ostend  to  England, 
the  last  boat   leaving  on  October  14th. 

The  importance  of  taking  Antwerp.  Ostend  and  the 
Belgian  sea  coast  was  very  consideralde,  in  that  it 
gave  Germany  a  basis  for  submarine  and  air  craft  op- 
erations against  Great  Britain.  In  the  sequel  the  im- 
I)ortance  oi  this  will  be  more  fully  realized. 

While  thf  Belgian  army  was  retreating  to  the  banks 
of  the  Vser  and  the  British  Fourth  corps  was  attempt- 
ing to  protect  the  flank  of  this  retiring  division  by 
occupying  the  country  between  Bruges-^'pres,  Gen- 
eral I  of  ire  was  also  engaged  in  his  third  attemi)t  to 
turn  the  right  wing  oi  the  main  German  army.  The 
Germans  had  bombarded  Lille  on  the  10th  of  October, 
had  passed  westwardly.  between  it  and  the  Lys,  and 
were  in  the  vicinity  of  Merville  to  the  north  of  the  St. 
Omer-La  Basscc-lJlle  canal.  As  the  right  wing  of  the 
German  army  opi)osing  Maud'huy  extended  from  La 
Bassee,  Lille  ran  the  risk  of  being  completely  isolated 
and  its  garrison  captured. 

In  order  to  i)revent  this,  the  offensive  had  to  be  re- 
sumed immediately.  All  the  French  movements  had 
been  brought  to  a  standstill  after  Maud'huy 's  unsuc- 
cessful advance  through  Arras,  which  has  been  re- 
ferred to.  There  were  available  on  the  9th  for  this 
renewed  offensive,  General  d'Urbal's  army,  based  on 
Dunkirk,  the  British  7th  Infantry  Division,  and  the 
.3rd  Cavalry  Division  south  of  Bruges.  These  were 
all  fully  employed  and  the  only  hope  for  Lille  lay  in 
being  able  to  combine  the  2nd  and  3rd  corps  and  the 
cavalry  of  the  British  army  now  moving  from  the 
.•\isne  north,  with  a  movement  from  Dixmude  of  the 
British  force  there  and  French  marines  under  Rear 
.\dmiral  Ronarc'h,  together  with  a  division  of  French 
troops  under  General  Grossetti.  which  were  to  be 
thrown  into  Nieuport.  This  threw  the  bulk  of  the 
work  of  J^aving  Lille  itself  on  the  British  2nd  corps 
and  Maud'huy 's  army. 

Maud'huy's  army  was  to  make  a  frontal  attack  and 
the  British  to  pivot  from  the  French  po'.ition  to  the 
west  of  La  Bassee  and  to  attack  in  flank  the  German 
position  there.  This  movement  opened  with  cavalry 
combat.s  on  the  f»th.  Idth  and  11th  in  which  the  French 
and  British  gained  some  success,  and  cleared  the 
lountrv  of  the   German   horsemen      The  2nd    British 

100 


The  Siege  of  Antwerp 

corps  reached  the  Aire-Bethune-Canal  October  11th, 
crossed  the  canal  the  same  day,  its  left  wing  working 
in  a  northeasterly  direction.  On  the  12th  this  wing 
was  brought  in  the  direction  of  Merville  from  whence 
the  French  cavalry  had  driven  the  German  horsemen, 
as  already  noted.  The  intention  was  then  to  move 
tliese  corps  into  the  line  Laventi-Lorgis,  the  first  men- 
tioned place  being  a  little  to  the  southeast  of  Estaires, 
and  the  second  a  few  miles  to  the  north  of  La  Bassee. 
To  cut  this  manoeuvre  the  Germans  extended  their 
right.  The  whole  of  the  2nd  British  corps  advanced 
to  the  attack  but  made  little  headway,  owing  to  the 
obstacles  in  the  way  and  the  severe  resistance  which 
it  encountered. 

A  general  engagement  followed  but  the  English  did 
not  gain  ground.  The  French  cavalry  corps  joined  in 
the  battle  and  gained  some  ground  on  the  roads  to 
Estaires-Richebourg.  On  October  13th  the  corps 
pivoting  on  Givenchy  two  miles  due  west  of  La  Bas- 
see, wheeled  to  the  south  and  endeavored  to  get  astride 
the  La  Bassee-Lille  road  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Furnes.  Here  they  made  a  slight  advance  on  the 
14th  and  this  advance  was  continued  to  some  degree. 
On  the  15th  they  forced  the  Germans  off  the  La  Bassee- 
Estaires  road  and  took  up  the  line  Pont  de  Ham- 
Croix  Barbee.  On  the  16th  the  9th  Infantry  Brigade 
captured  the  village  of  Herlies  b}'  bayonet  charge,  but 
with  this  capture  the  British  offensive  movement  came 
to  an  end,  terminating  in  the  failure  of  its  object,  the 
driving  of  the  Germans  out  of  their  position  at  La 
Bassee  and  the  saving  of  Lille. 

We  will  now  see  what  happened  at  Lille  during  the 
time  of  this  movement. 

On  the  10th  of  October  a  German  cavalry  patrol 
rode  up  to  the  city  hall  and  asked  for  the  Mayor. 
While  they  were  parleying,  French  cavalrymen  ar- 
rived and  the  Germans  were  thrown  back.  A  bom- 
bardment with  the  heavy  artillery  was  begun  by  the 
Germans  at  5  o'clock.  This  started  a  panic,  the  pop- 
ulace taking  refuge  in  cellars.  Towards  7  o'clock  the 
bombardment  increased  in  violence,  though  the  later 
night  was  comparatively  calm.  On  October  11th  from 
8  o'clock  in  the  morning  until  dusk,  the  bombardment 
was  resumed  and  shells  fell  incessantly,  fire  broke  out 
in  several  places  and  the  people  streamed  out  of  the 
city. 

The  next  day.  the  18th,  from  6  o'clock  in  the  morn- 

101 


The  Campaii^n   in   the  West 

ing  till  dusk,  the  bombardment  continued  and  finally 
on  the  13th,  as  it  was  seen  that  tiiere  was  no  hope  of 
succor  from  the  I'rcnch.  wlmse  artillery  couUl  be 
heard  in  the  distance,  but  who  were  unable  lo  ^cl 
close  en<:)Ui;h  to  aiil  the  town,  tlie  city  surrendered. 
Ci-imparatively  little  daniaj^e  was  dune  by  the  bom- 
bardment, and  this  was  concentrated  mostly  around 
the  northern  railroad  station  and  the  Hue  de  la  Gare 
leading  to  it.  An  eye  witness  to  the  (jcrnian  entry, 
who  was  in  Lille  for  a  week  after  its  occupation  by 
the  Germans,  wrote  that  the  Germans  on  the  entry 
behaved  well.  They  were  apparently  under  strong 
and  admirable  discipline.  They  set  themselves  at 
once  to  put  ou{  the  fire ;  the  ordinary  police  were  left 
in  charge  of  the  town,  though  there  were  German 
soldiers  stationed  in  all  the  streets.  Civilians  with 
arms  in  their  possession  were  told  that  they  were 
liable  to  be  shot  at  once.  During  bombardment  few 
civilians  suffered,  the  principal  losses  being  among 
the  Algerian  troops  defending  the  town.  After  the 
occupation  the  Germans  brought  in  a  number  of  large 
guns,  dug  intrenchmcnts  and  erected  barbed  wire  de- 
fences around  the  town. 

With  the  falling  of  Lille,  however,  the  most  import- 
ant industrial  town  in  France  and  a  control  of  the  en- 
tire manufacturing  and  mining  district  of  northern 
France  fill  into  ihc  hands  of  the  Germans.  The  economic 
importance  of  this  will  be  shown  later. 

While  Lille  was  being  captured.  General  d'Urbal 
north  of  the  Lys,  was  winning  the  only  victory  of  any 
importance  that  the  French  won  in  this  series  of  ac- 
tion*;. The  Germans  here  were  less  numerous,  the  hulk« 
of  their  forces  in  this  terrain  having  been  sent  to  the 
eastward  to  the  ^^iege  of  Lille.  Consequently.  General 
d'l^rbal  was  inabled  to  make  headway.  From  the  Lys 
westward  to  the  ocean  the  country  is  very  flat,  while 
next  to  the  coast  is  a  district  composed  of  reclaimed 
marshes  drained  bv  canaN  and  dikes.  The  character 
of  this  country  is  agricultural  and  not  industrial.  Ry 
October  11  tb  the  whole  of  the  coa^t  and  the  rcclnitncd 
marsh  land  was  in  the  hatuh  of  the  .\llies  and  the 
German  line  extentled  from  Mont  dcs-Cats-Meteren 
and  thence  to  the  south  of  Estaircs  on  the  Lys. 

The  aim  of  the  GermaiT^  was  to  remain  on  the  de- 
fensive until  the  army  released  from  ,\ntwrrp  and 
other  reinforcements  could  join  them.  Thev  took 
cverv  advantage  of  the  ground,  roncealinc:  themselves 

102 


The  Siege  of  Antwerp 

in  the  trenciies,  woods  and  hills  and  below  bridges. 
Even  their  front  was  covered  by  barbed  wire  entangle- 
ments. The  line  they  had  to  defend  was  longer  than 
that  of  Etaires-La  Bassee,  however,  and  the  enemy 
considerably  outnumbered  them.  The  weather  and 
the  hostility  of  the  population  were  also  against  them. 

On  the  13th  of  October  the  British  advanced  in 
force  eastward  on  the  line  St.  Sylvester-Caestre-and 
Strazelle  station.  This  put  them  on  the  main  road 
between  Cassel  and  Bailleul,  and  threw  them  across 
the  one  railroad  from  Hazebrouck  to  Ypres,  while  at 
Strazelle  Station  itself  they  cut  the  railroad  from 
Hazebrouck  to  Armentieres  and  Lille.  From  this 
base  a  general  advance  was  made  on  the  German  po- 
sition and  by  nightfall  the  British  and  French  had 
made  considerable  advance  in  all  directions  and  cap- 
tured Meteren  and  Oultersteene.  and  engaged  in  force 
the  right  of  the  German  troops  at  Mont  des-Cats.  The 
result  of  these  operations  was  that  the  German  posi- 
tion became  untenable  and  they  fell  back.  As  a  con- 
sequence the  French  and  British  entered  Ypres  and 
held  it. 

The  next  day,  October  13,  a  movement  was  made 
by  the  Allies  towards  Neuve  Eglise,  which  position 
was  subsequently  consolidated.  Various  other  small 
advances  were  made  north  and  northeast  of  these  po- 
sitions during  the  next  two  or  three  days,  the  Ger- 
mans retreating  continuously,  but  slowly,  until  the 
16th  when  all  the  country  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Lys  and  some  six  or  seven  miles  below  Armentieres 
was  evacuated  and  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Allies. 

On  the  18th  and  19th  an  attack  was  made  on  Roul- 
ers  to  the  northeast  of  Ypres  and  the  Germans  re- 
treated temporarily,  but  the  Allies'  possession  did  not 
last  long,  for  the  Germans  returning  in  greater  forces 
drove  them  out.  On  October  19th  an  attempt  was 
made  to  drive  the  Germans  through  Menin  by  the 
British,  but  this  resulted  in  failure.  On  this  same  day 
a  German  advance  on  Roulers  forced  back  the  Brit- 
ish forces  in  this  vicinity. 

This  British  left  had  now  lost  most  of  the  ground 
acquired  in  the  prior  advance  and  events  were  taking 
place  over  to  the  eastward  which  made  a  further 
movement  along  this  line  of  doubtful  value.  Never- 
theless, as  a  diversion  the  1st  British  Corps  was 
thrown  forward  on  the  20th  from  Ypres  towards 
Thourout.  the  ultimate    object    being   the    capture  of 

103 


The  Campaign  in  the  ^X''esr 

Hiuj;c>.  ii  Is  worthy  <.»i  rcuKuk.  thai  uii  tlu>  ilatc.  the 
V0)!i  ui  <. October,  the  first  ili vision  ot  the  Indian  expe- 
<lition:iry  force,  which  Great  Britain  liail  summoned 
to  htr  aid.  thus  pitting  the  .Asiatic  against  the  Euro- 
pean for  the  first  time  on  a  European  battlefield,  was 
beginning  to  arrive  at  its  concentration  area.  Tliis 
movement  noahward.  however,  did  not  have  the  effect 
desired. 

The  battle  of  the  Vser  had  been  in  progress  noNV. 
for  days  while  the  battle  of  Vpres  was  about  to 
begin.  Under  this  title  "The  Battle  of  the  Ypres"  arc 
included  the  fighting  from  October  IGth  onward  be- 
tween the  sea  at  Kieuport  Baths  and  Dixmude.  which 
is  also  known  a>  the  battle  of  the  Vser.  and  the  strug- 
gle which  commenced  on  October  llith  from  Dixmude 
through  Vpres  and  Armentieres  on  the  Lys  and  thence 
to  La  Bassee.  The  battle  of  the  Yser  is  divided  into 
two  parts.  In  the  first  the  Belgian  and  I'rench  ma- 
rines under  Rear  Admiral  Ronarc'h  defended  the 
lower  course  of  the  Vser  and  the  canal  for  a  week 
from  October  IGth.  In  the  scc«>nd  halt  the  army  of 
General  d'Urbal  backed  the  forces  of  the  Belgians. 
This  battle  opened  by  the  British  attack  nn  Dixmude 
on  the  16th  of  October. 

General  Joffre  called  upon  the  Belgians  on  the  16th 
to  hold  tlic  line  of  the  Vser  and  its  bridge  heads  for 
forty-eight  hours,  promising  them  relief  at  the  end 
of  this  time.  From  the  sea  to  Dixmude.  as  the  crow 
flies,  is  .some  ten  miles;  from  Dixmude  to  Vpres  13 
miles;  from  Ypres  to  .A.rmentiercs  12  miles,  and  from 
the  Lys  at  .'\rmcntieres  to  Bcrhuscn  1.')  miles,  inaking 
a  total  of  50  miles,  but  the  actual  length  held  by  the 
allied  troops  from  October  IHth  was  perhaps  ten  miles 
more  in  that  line  following  the  north  bank  of  the  wind- 
ing bank  of  the  Vser  from  Xieuport  and  Dixmude, 
and  from  this  town  the  forest  of  Houthulst. 

From  Xieuport  and  Dixmude  the  line  was  held  by 
the  British,  aided  by  the  French  marines,  who  occu- 
pied Dixmude  and  the  neighborhood  with  outposts 
thrrtwn  well  out  in  front.  From  this  town  it  ran  past 
Zorelehe  to  Warneton  on  the  Lys.  This  portion  of 
the  line  was  held  by  French  marines,  the  Briti^h  un- 
der General  Rawlinson,  two  French  Territorial  Divi- 
sions and  a  part  of  the  French  cavalry.  From 
Warneton  to  Bcthune  the  line  wa.s  held  by  tw. .  British 
army  crj*^,  Conncau's  cavalry  cor[)s  and  tin  Britisli 
cavalry.     The  actual  position  of  the  Belgians  was  as 

104 


The  Siege  ot  Antwerp 

follows:  2nd  division  at  Nieuport;  to  its  right  the  1st 
division,  between  the  1st  division  holding  the  line  to 
Dixmudc  was  the  4th,  the  French  marines  were  in 
Uixnmde  and  the  oth  Belgian  Division  in  support.  The 
whole  force  was  about  55i,UOO  men. 

The  German  plan  involved  the  capture  of  Dixmude, 
the  crushing  of  the  Belgians  and  a  further  advance  to 
turn  the  Allies'  left.  Between  Dixmude  and  Nieuport 
ran  the  canalized  river  Yser,  which  is  built  up  to  from 
15  to  20  feet  above  the  level  of  the  land  through  which 
it  runs,  with  a  tow  path  on  each  side,  this  canalized 
river  forming,  properly  defended,  an  almost  untakable 
fortification.  Southwest  of  the  canal  about  two  miles  is 
the  embankment  of  the  railroad  which  connects  Dixmude 
with  Nieuport.  This  is  also  raised  a  considerable  dis- 
tance above  the  surrounding  countrv  and  forms  a  sec- 
ond line  of  defense  in  the  event  of  the  enemy  crossing 
the  \  ser.  The  countr\-  north  and  northeast  of  the  Yser 
is  flat  and  boggy,  so  is  the  country  between  the  Yser 
and  the  railroad.  Trenches  dug  in  this  land  are  al- 
most immediately  flooded  with  water.  The  land  at  high 
tide  is  below  sea  level  and  can  easil)^  be  flooded  by 
opening  the  sluices  of  the  protecting  dikes,  which  keep 
the  sea  out.  Any  advance  southward  from  a  short 
distance  west  of  Dixmude  would  be  exposed  to  the 
fire  from  the  guns  of  a  fleet  lying  off  the  shore. 

From  this  description  of  the  Yser,  it  will  be  seen 
how  valuable  and  how  important  the  preventing  of 
turning  movements  of  the  entire  French  left  wing  and 
the  British  across  this  canalized  river  was.  If  the 
advance  had  been  broken  through  at  any  point,  dis- 
aster in  its  worst  form  would  have  probably  over- 
whelmed the  entire  French  wing  from  Roye-Nieuporr, 
and  in  addition  to  this  the  channel  ports  of  Calais  and 
Dunkirk  would  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
The  loss  of  these  channel  ports  would  have  been  of  the 
greatest  importance  to  Great  Britain  as  she  could  have 
been  threatened  vitallv  therefrom. 

For  this  reason,  it  can  be  seen  what  importance  the 
Germans  attached  to  the  breaking  through  of  the  op- 
posing line  here,  but  at  the  same  time  from  the  de- 
scription of  the  country  to  the  east  of  Dixmude  here- 
tofore given,  it  will  be  seen  how  almost  physically 
impossible  it  was  going  to  be  to  overcome  the  obsta- 
cles of  not  only  the  opposing  troops,  but  of  the  floods 
which  thev  could  call  to  their  assistance  as  well  as  the 
bombardment   of   the  territory    from   the   sea   to   which 

105 


The  Campaii^n  in  the  West 

the  GcrInan^  wuuUl  have  had  no  chance  of  replying. 
This  German  effort  west  of  Dixinude,  which  cost 
rnanv  thtmsands  of  Hves,  is  open  to  the  severest  criti- 
cism and  tlie  :^allantry  with  which  the  effort  was  made 
d«x\s  iiui  redeem  the  lethtiical  mistake.  The  attacks  on 
Dixmude  and  the  attempt  to  pierce  the  opposing  lines 
ai  this  point  was  a  different  matter  entirely,  the  condi- 
tions not  heinp  at  all  similar.  The  efforts  of  the  Ger- 
mans on  the  16th  in  their  attacks  on  Dixmude  were 
confined  to  a  reconnaissance. 

Towards  sunset  of  the  Uith,  however,  the  German 
heavy  artillery  bcf^an  shclling^  from  near  Eessen  the 
French  and  British  dcfendinu^  Dixmude.  The  puns 
ceased  firing  and  an  infantry  attack  was  made  which 
was  repulsed,  but  fighting  continued  during  the  night 
and  towards  midniglu  a  charge  of  the  Germans  car- 
ried the  first  French  trenches,  but  at  dawn  the  French 
delivered  a  counter  attack  and  regained  the  lost 
trenches. 

The  day  of  the  17th  was  quiet.  At  11  o'clock  the 
German  artillery  ceased  firing.  During  this  day  the 
French  brought  up  further  artillery  and  now  the  Ad- 
miral commanding  the  defenses  had  seventy-two 
pieces  at  his  disposal.  The  18th  was  quiet  in  this 
•section.  This  f|uiet  resulted  from  a  counter  offensive 
which  had  been  taken  by  General  d'L'rbal  and  the 
British  on  his  right  on  the  17th,  which  attacked  Ger- 
man troops  coming  from  Roulers  towards  Dixmude 
and  cleared  the  forest  of  them  and  demonstrated  to- 
wards R<^)ulers.  General  d'lrbnl  was  striking  at  this 
town  and  the  next  day.  the  18th,  the  French  tnedital- 
ing  an  advance  on  Thourot.  asked  for  aid  from  Ad- 
miral Ronarc'h,  who  accordinglv  sent  a  force  to 
Eessen.  This  same  day  while  the  French  were  en- 
gaged in  this  attack  against  Thourot.  the  Germans  at- 
tacked the  Belgians'  advanced  positirm  from  I.om- 
bartzyde  to  Keyem  and  captured  at  sunset  Mankens- 
ver-Keyem.  Keyem  was  of  the  highest  importance 
since  from  it  the  Germans  could  march  on  Dixmude 
or  strike  at  Pervysc  and  break  the  Belgian  line.  It 
therefore  harl  to  be  retaken  at  all  costs  b\-  the  .Allies 
and  the  Belgian  4th  division  was  hurled  forward  that 
night,   drivini,^   the   Germans   from    the   \  illage 

On  the  IJMh  a  general  attack  was  made  bv  the  (tcr- 
mans  and.  to  help  the  attack  on  Dixmude.  columns 
from  Rruge^'-Ghent  were  directed  on  RotiIer«.  The 
town   was  captured   that   evening.        Rcerst.   between 

inn 


The  Siege  of  Antwerp 

Keyeni  and  Dixmude  was  captured  on  the  Thourot 
front  and  a  desperate  effort  was  made  to  take  Keyem. 

The  French  marines  and  the  Belgian  5th  Division 
were  ordered  to  advance  from  Dixmude  and  recover 
Beerst.  The  ground  in  front  of  this  village  is  quite 
flat,  intersected  by  dikes  overflowing  with  water,  the 
only  cf^ver  being  here  and  there  a  leafless  hedge.  The 
first  battalion  of  marines  was  almost  cut  to  pieces. 
The  second  battalion  was  more  fortunate  and  reached 
the  village  where  terrific  house-to-house  fighting  took 
place.  Another  battalion  was  hurriedly  thrown  in  and 
at  5  oclock  Beerst  was  taken,  but  owing  to  the  vic- 
tory at  Roulers  and  the  launching  of  a  column  from 
that  place  on  Dixmude,  it  had  to  be  abandoned  as 
soon  as  taken  and  Keyem  also  fell  into  German  hands. 
Between  Keyem  and  Nieuport  the  Germans  had  been 
cannonading  the  enemy,  and  at  Lombartzyde  were 
making  a  strong  effort  to  strike  through,  which  they 
would  probably  have  done  had  it  not  been  for  the 
bringing  up  by  the  British  on  the  sea  of  three  moni- 
tors, which,  being  of  light  draught,  could  approach 
close  to  the  shore  and  which  were  armed  with  6-inch 
guns.    The  use  of  these  forced  the  Germans  back. 

The  Germans,  however,  did  not  give  up  but  con- 
tinued the  attempt,  though  their  losses  were  frightful. 
This  continued  all  the  next  day  and  further  to  the 
west  the  Germans,  on  the  20th  captured  Schoor  and 
Mankensvere.  In  front  of  Dixmude,  in  the  mean- 
time, heavy  howitzers  had  been  brought  up  and  were 
raining  shells  on  the  town. 

The  next  day,  the  21st,  was  one  of  the  most  critical 
of  the  struggle.  General  Joffre  himself  took  command 
and  hurried  French  troops  to  reinforce  the  line.  The 
Ninth  French  Army  Corps  was  to  come  to  Ypres,  an- 
other reinforcement  was  to  arrive  immediately  after- 
wards, and  it  was  General  Joffre's  intention  with  these 
and  the  Belgian  and  British  troops  to  assume  the 
Dffensive  and  drive  the  Germans  eastward.  But  this 
:ould  not  be  done  until  the  24th. 

To  attempt  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  Dixmude  the 
French  centered  a  large  force  to  threaten  the  forest 
Houthulst  which  the  Germans  had  occupied,  but  this 
operation,  while  at  first  fairly  successful,  w^as  stopped 
in  the  afternoon.  From  this  time  the  battle  from 
Bethune  to  Nieuport  became  a  purely  defensive  one 
Dn  the  part  of  the  Allies  on  the  Yser. 

107 


The  Campaign  in  the  >X'est 

At  daybreak  the  '^Ist,  the  Germans  hurled  them- 
selves on  the  French  and  lUlgians  around  Dixniude. 
The  bunibardincnt  was  very  lieavy,  a--^  liigli  as  fifty 
shell>  a  minute  being  counted.  Eight  separate  at- 
tacks were  made  on  the  trendies  protecting  iJixniude. 
The  Germans  fought  with  splendid  courage,  but  were 
unal)le  to  reach  the  trenches  owing  to  the  btiff  defense 
oi  tile  l-'reMch  marines.  Towards  sunset  the  Tjernians 
crossed  the  Vser  south  of  Dixmude  and  took  St. 
Jacques  Cappele  wiiere  hand-to-hand  fighting  took 
place  and  they  were  repulsed.  Krom  Schoor  northwest, 
an  attack  had  been  launched  at  Schoorbakkc,  but  this 
was  also  repulsed. 

C>n  the  21st  the  bombardment  continued,  both  sides 
rushing  reinforcements  up,  and  fought  without  rest 
all  through  the  day.  The  Allies'  flotilla  continued 
steaming  up  and  down  the  coast  firing  at  the  German 
trenches  and  batteries  on  tlie  shore.  That  night  the 
Germans  got  across  the  canal  and  took  Terveate  while 
assaults  were  made  on  the  Belgian  second  division 
above  Nicuport  and  around  Lombartzyde.  On  the 
23rd  the  French  4ynd  Division  and  the  9th  Army 
Corps  reached  the  front  under  General  Grossetti. 

Meanwhile  south  of  Xieuport  the  Belgian  1st  and 
4th  Divisions  were  pushed  back  towards  the  railway 
embankment  between  Pervyse  and  Ramschappelle. 
This  same  day  the  British  flotilla  attacked  Ostend. 
with  no  particular  result.  C)n  the  night  of  the  23rd 
and  24th.  fourteen  assaults  were  made  on  Dixmude. 
but  all  were  beaten  off  and  the  town  which  was  now 
a  mass  of  ruins,  was  still  in  the  hands  of  the  .Allies. 
The  French  had  come  up  in  force  and  from  this  date 
the  Belgian  troop.>>  were  withdrawn  for  rest. 

While  visiting  the  Indian  troops  on  this  western  end 
of  the  Flanders  battle  line.  Lord  Roberts  was  stricken 
with  pneumonia,  which  resulted  fatally  on  the  14th  of 
November.  Tn  him  died  not  only  England's  greatest 
soldier,  but  her  most  gallant  in  the  wide  sense  of  the 
word,  a  great  tighter  in  acttial  combat  and  one  who 
detested  vilification  from  a  safe  distance,  the  favor- 
ite metho<l  of  fighting  <>i  the  small-minded.  In  his  de- 
parture he  carried  with  him  the  respect  of  his  enemies 
and  the  love  of  his  own  people,  the  noblest  tributes 
that  can  be  paid  a  soldier. 

At  dawn  on  Monday,  the  2t>th,  the  Gentians  made 
another  f^'cat  effort  to  hew  their  wav  along  the  coast, 

lOR 


The  Siege  of  Antwerp 

and  their  troops  advanced  along  the  Mankensvere  road, 
and  threw  pontoon  bridges  over  the  river  and  canal. 
The  infantry  got  across  and  made  a  determined  attempt 
to  carry  Nieuport  by  storm.  The  French  brigade  had 
to  call  on  the  Belgians,  who  had  just  left  the  trenches, 
for  help,  so  that  their  rest  was  not  of  great  length. 

The  Germans  were  not  able  to  take  Nieuport  and 
turned  to  the  south  towards  the  villages  of  Ramscappelle 
and  Pervyse,  and  here  in  front  of  Pervyse  occurred  one 
of  the  most  desperate  fights  of  the  campaign,  which  re- 
sulted in  a  draw,  but  the  Germans  could  not  hold  their 
ground  as  it  was  marsh  land,  and  impossible  for  troops 
to  remain  in  anv  time.  For  several  days  the  struggle 
continued  bitterly  all  along  this  line,  the  contending 
forces  alternatively  advancing  and  retreating  in  a  small 
space  of  territory  not  more  than  two  or  three  miles  wide, 
both  sides  fighting  with  all  the  energy  of  despair. 

On  the  night  of  October  26th.  th^  dikes  protecting  the 
lowland  country  from  the  incursion  of  the  sea,  and  from 
the  waters  of  the  Yser,  which,  as  it  will  be  remembered 
here,  is  canalized,  the  river  being  at  a  higher  level, 
as  a  result,  than  the  land,  were  cut  by  the  Belgians  and 
the  country  overflowed.  This  proved  a  serious  source  of 
embarrassment  for  the  Germans  and  prevented  their  ad- 
vance towards  the  goal  for  which  they  were  aiming,  the 
French  seaports  of  Dunkirk  and  Calais.  In  the  previous 
fighting,  the  losses  to  both  sides  were  tremendous  and 
what  remained  of  the  Belgian  army  was  for  the  second 
time  cut  to  pieces.  On  the  whole  neither  side  was  success- 
ful in  making  any  permanent  gain  of  any  movement. 

Bv  the  end  of  the  first  week  in  November,  both  sides 
were  exhausted  and  for  the  next  few  days  the  battle  lan- 
guished, but  towards  the  10th  of  November,  activity  be- 
gan again  to  some  degree  and  the  Germans  were  suc- 
cessful in  occupying  Dixmude.  Though  on  the  other 
end  of  the  line  under  consideration  at  Nieuport,  the  Allies 
made  some  slight  gain  and  by  the  16th  were  threatening 
Dixschoote,  this  advance  was  of  little  advantage.  The 
effect  of  opening  the  dikes  and  flooding  the  country  by 
the  Belgians,  which  has  been  mentioned  above,  was  to 
turn  all  of  West  Flanders  practically  into  a  lake.  About 
the  1st  of  November,  bad  weather  set  in.  which  added  to 
the  difficulties  of  the  contending  forces  in  this  flooded 
area  and  made  activities  still  further  languish,  until  fin- 
ally almost  unbroken  quiet  settled  on  this  scene,  and  this 
quiet  was  only  broken  by  occasional  skirmishes  and 
artillery    duels,    which   became  less  and   less  as   the 

109 


The  Campaign  in  the  West 

weather  grew  worse,  and  the  contest  settled  down 
into  a  lest  of  enthiraiKc,  with  occasional  flashes  of  ac- 
tivity by  both  sides,  none  uf  which  resulted  in  any 
tactical  bucccss. 

l-'ruiu  time  to  time  both  sides  announced  a  resump- 
tion of  the  offensive,  the  Allies  in  the  middle  of  De- 
ceml)cr,  making  the  most  conspicuous  effort  of  this 
character.  Thev  gathered  a  considerable  army  com- 
posed i'f  both  French  and  British,  and  made  a  deter- 
mined eflnrt  for  some  days,  but  tiiis  effort  was  fruit- 
less and  {gradually  dwindled  away  to  nothing.  The 
ultimate  result  was  thai,  except  with  interchanging 
insignificant  advances  at  various  points  along  the 
line,  the  po,sitif)ns  of  the  contendini^  armies  remaine<l 
the  same  as  ab<.>ve.  Then  came  the  truce  of  Christ- 
ina-', which  here,  as  elsewhere  along  ihf  western  bat- 
tle line,  paralyzed  all  effort  for  several  days,  and  there- 
after practically  all  through  the  months  of  January 
and  l*"ebruary,  much  the  same  qualities  characterized 
this  }K)rtion  oi  the  western  battle  line  as  had  settled 
down  on  the  rest.  The  country  was  in  no  condition 
ti»  tight  over,  and  the  conditions  l)eing  siuh  as  they 
were,  it  would  ha\  e  been  folly  on  the  i)art  of  the  com- 
manders to  call  on  their  men  for  any  great  or  extra- 
ordinary effort.  But  to  the  North  on  the  coast  during 
this  time,  however,  the  Germans  were  not  idle.  They 
established  an  important  submarine  base  at  Zee- 
bnigge.  bringing  submarines  and  materials  from  Ger- 
many and  from  this  base  launched  attacks  on  the  Eng- 
lish commerce  in  the  channel  and  around  the  coast. 
From  time  to  time  the  Allies  attacked  this  position 
both  from  the  sea  and  from  the  air,  but  on  the  whole 
accomplished  little  nr  nothing 


NO 


CHAPTER  Vlir. 
THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST 

FROM    NOYON   TO   THE   VOSGES. 

We  will  now  return  to  the  eastern  portion  of  the  line, 
from  Noyon  to  the  Vosges,  and  follow  the  course  of 
events  there  from  the  ISth  of  September  onward.  On  the 
19th  of  September  the  French  were  driven  out  of  the 
fort  of  Rriemont,  Nogent,  Abesse  and  Beru  on  the 
heights  to  the  north  of  Rheims,  where  the  Germans  es- 
tablislied  themselves,  and  on  the  2()th  began  to  bombard 
the  French  position  at  Rheims.  It  was  during  this  and 
the  succeedings  days  that  the  cathedral  at  Rheims  suf- 
fered owing,  the  German  say,  to  its  use  by  the  French 
for  observation  purposes  and  to  the  establishing  of  bat- 
teries near  it,  as  well  as  guns  on  its  roof  for  the  purpose 
of  bringing  down  aeroplanes.  It  is  difficult  to  say 
whether  this  was  true,  but  the  damage  to  the  cathedral 
was,  for  their  own  purpose,  greatly  exaggerated  by  tlie 
French,  and  in  the  carrying  out  of  this  exaggeration  cer- 
tain American  residents  of  Paris  figure, — one  an  archi 
tect. — who  were  supposed  to  be  neutral,  but  who  for  the 
purposes  of  their  own,  possibly  not  connected  with  the 
future  wearing  of  a  bit  of  red  ribbon,  were  more  intense 
in  their  outcries  than  the  French  themselves. 

The  cathedral  at  Rheims  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful 
and  most  interesting,  both  architecturally  and  historically 
of  the  French  cathedrals.  It  was  here  that  for  hundreds 
of  years  all  the  French  kings,  up  to  and  including  Charles 
X,  with  the  exception  of  Louis  XVIII,  were  anointed 
and  crowned,  and  where  the  consecrated  oil  which  was 
used  in  the  anointing,  which  the  legend  goes,  was 
brought  down  from  Heaven,  was  kept.  This  cathedral, 
too,  had  been  hallowed  by  the  presence  of  that  purest  of 
all  patriots,  Joan  of  Arc,  who  gave  all  and  asked  for 
nothing.  There  is  perhaps  no  nobler  figure  in  all  history 
than  that  of  the  nineteen-year-old  girl  who  was  after- 
Ill 


The  Campaign  in  rhc  West 

wards  burned  at  the  slake  at  Rouen  as  a  heretic  and 
blasplicnier,  and  there  is  certainly  n(Mie  who  ran  a  more 
marvelous  career. 

The  writer  lived  lOr  nearly  two  years  at  the  "(jolden 
Lion"  directly  oj)i)osite  tlie  main  portals  of  the  cathedral, 
and  knows  the  building  as  well  as  he  knows  any  build- 
ing in  the  world.  From  the  photographs  of  the  cathedral 
and  other  like  evidences,  from  letters  and  verbatim  state- 
ments made  to  him  by  two  or  three  competent  persons 
who  have  seen  the  cathedral  since  the  bombardment,  it 
would  seem  that  the  exaggeration  spoken  of  was  mali- 
cious and  in  the  nature  of  a  propaganda.  The  view  is 
l)orne  out  by  the  fact  that  since  this  l>ombardment.  the 
most  exposed  portions  of  the  cathedral  have  been  cov- 
ered to  a  very  considerable  height  with  sand  bags  to 
protect  the  carvings  anrl  ornaments  from  damage.  It 
would  seem  to  stand  to  rea.son  that,  had  the  cathedral 
been  so  damaged  as  was  then  stated  in  September  and 
October  of  1014.  and  reduced  to  a  condition  of  sucii 
utter  ruin  as  represented,  there  would  have  been  little 
left  to  so  protect,  and  no  object  in  so  doing.  That  the 
magnificent,  great  window  was  damaged,  but  not  ir- 
reparably, is  very  probablv  true,  but  the  towers  and  the 
nain  lx>dy  of  the  cathedral  are.  and  the  photogra]>hs 
prove  this  contention,  but  Httle  injured. 

Be  this  as  it  may.  however,  even  if  the  cathedral  was 
totally  destroyed,  it  falls  into  the  first  class  of  atrocities, 
if  one  can  use  this  word  in  relation  to  a  material  ob- 
ject, as  laid  down  by  the  London  Economist  in  its  article 
on  the  bombardment  of  the  luiglish  seacoast  towns,  which 
is  quoted  in  full  in  connection  with  the  rlesrription  of 
that  bombardment. 

( )n  the  21st  the  French  succeeded  in  ca|)turing  the 
heights  of  Lassigny.  west  of  Noyon  and  Mesnilles-Hur- 
lus-Massignes  in  their  centre.  The  result  of  this  change 
and  other  minor  changes  during  the  next  few  days 
brought  the  allied  positions  to  a  line  which  ran  from  the 
extreme  south  of  Alsace  through  St.  Die  in  the  X'osges, 
Luneville  on  the  Meurthe.  Pont-a-Mousson  on  the  Mo- 
selle. Consenvoyi  on  the  Meuse.  Monfaucon.  Oranrl  Pre. 
in  the  .Argontie,  Sowain-Fort-de-la  romprlje.  a  line  west 
and  south  <if  Berru-Rrimont  and  Craconne- Noyon.  The 
re.st  of  the  line  to  the  south  has  alrcadv  been  given  in 
the  accotmt  of  tho  western  battles. 

The  battle  from  \ovon  east  had  nowdegeneratedinto 
a  prolonged  stalemate.  The  bombarflment  of  Rlirims  con- 
tinued and  reached  its  climax  on  the  28th.     From  every 

118 


From  Noyon  to  the  Vosges 

part  of  the  line  came  the  same  style  of  attack  and  coun- 
ter attack,  without  any  change  in  the  positions  except 
that,  on  the  l^oth  of  September,  the  Germans,  by  a  bril- 
liant effort,  pushed  along  the  so-called  promontory  of 
Hattonchatel  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Moselle, 
south  of  Verdun,  and  reaching  down  to  St.  Mihiel 
where,  attacking  the  forts  Paroisses  and  Camp  des 
Remains  the  next  day  by  a  series  of  brilliant  charges, 
and  hard  fighting,  they  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Meuse, 
and  after  a  violent  contest  St.  Mihiel  and  the  two  forts 
mentioned  were  taken,  with  the  result  that  the  Ver- 
dun-Toul  fortress  barrier  was  broken. 

The  question  now  was,  whether  the  Germans  could 
drive  through  the  gap  they  had  broken  in  the  line  of 
this  barrier  fortress  and  invest  and  in  due  course,  cap- 
ture Verdun,  with  its  garrison,  to  the  north  St.  Mihiel, 
and  thus  remove  the  greatest  thorn  in  their  side.  Ver- 
dun is  tile  key  to  France  and  until  it  is  in  possession 
of  the  German  troops,  their  hold  upon  the  territory 
occupied  cannot  be  secure.  Paris  itself  is  nothing  like 
so  great  a  prize,  since,  besides  its  strategic  import- 
ance, the  possession  of  Verdun  would  open  up  new  and 
better  lines  of  communication  with  Germany  than  are 
now  in  German  possession. 

The  capture  of  St.  Mihiel  was  one  of  the  most  bril- 
liant feats  of  arms  during  the  war,  and  its  continued 
possession  in  the  face  of  the  almost  continual  attack 
which  had  been  made  upon  it  since  by  the  French  in 
large  force,  is  an  even  more  brilliant  feat  of  arms.  From 
now  on  the  combat  along  all  the  eastern  portion  of  this 
line  degenerated  into  an  absolute  impasse ;  one  day  re- 
sembling another  in  its  monotony.  Artillery  duels  took 
place  from  time  to  time  at  various  points  on  the  line, 
but  these  were  unsupported  by  infantr}'-  attacks,  and 
resulted  in  nothing,  although  taking  toll  of  human  Hves 
every  day.  This  condition  of  affairs  continued  until  the 
New  Year,  nothing  taking  place  w^hich  is  worth  detailing. 

The  one  bright  spot  in  all  this  dreary  winter  to  the 
men  in  the  cold,  damp  trenches,  was  the  informal  truce 
which  obtained  for  a  few  hours  Christmas  Day,  when 
the  enemies  left  their  trenches  and  mingled,  exchanging 
the  greetings  of  the  season  and  thus  exemplifying  most 
forcibly  the  old  proverb :  "One  touch  of  nature  makes 
all  the  world  akin."  These  few  hours  of  good  will 
among  the  men  cheered  the  dreary  life  in  the  trenches, 
under  circumstances  which  the  average  well-fed,  com- 

113 


The  Campaign  in  the  West 

fortably  housed  reader  cannot  begin  to  imagine.  Vet  it 
shows  the  adaptability  of  human  beings  to  conditions 
no  matter  how  hard,  and  how  these  men  managed  to 
secure  for  ihnuseKc^  by  the  exercise  of  tlieir  own  in- 
j;enuity  many  ameliorations  of  their  condition,  which 
would  l)e  believed  almost  impossible. 

It  may  be  mentioned  that  in  one  place  the  Uiilers  of  a 
ruined  factory  served  to  provide  hot  water  for  an  under- 
ground bathing  establishment,  which  the  men  set  up;  in 
another  place  a  deep  excavation  underground,  which  was 
made  by  the  men  outside  their  hours  of  duty,  was  fitted 
up  and  used  as  a  theatre,  on  the  stage  of  which  the  talent 
of  the  trenches  fouml  an  op|)ortunity  to  display  itself. 
Behind  the  British  lines  throughout  the  winter,  the  love 
of  sport  asserted  itself  and  where  the  opportunity  offeree!, 
as  a  relief  from  the  sterner  doings  on  the  front,  daih 
contests  in  football  between  regiments  and  battalions 
tcxjk  place.  Often  from  the  German  trenches  came 
the  sound  of  music  of  really  high  class,  the  national 
passion  for  music  finding  expression  even  under  these 
circumstances.  Several  newspapers,  if  the  word  may  be 
u<;ed  to  apply  to  one-sheeted  journals,  copies  of  whicli  lie 
before  me  as  I  write,  were  set,  printed  and  published  at 
various  points  along  the  line.  Their  contents  arc  mostly 
intended  to  be  comic,  and  present  the  incidents  of  this 
war  in  the  trenches  in  a  light  totally  different  from  that 
in  which  the  average  non-combatant  sees  it. 

I'amiliarity  breerls  contempt,  even  with  death,  and  the 
sudden  and  violent  ending  of  life  which,  uiuler  ordinary 
circumstances,  would  be  a  tremendous  shock,  in  the 
trenches  apj>ears  after  a  very  short  time,  as  one  of  the 
ordinary  incidents  of  the  day.  This  is  not  a  manifesta- 
tion of  carelessness,  nor  heartlcssncss.  but  a  striking  il- 
lustration of  how  custom  blunts  the  feeling,  atnl  how  the 
extraordinary  rapidly  l)ecomes  the  ordinary  among  hu- 
man beings. 

Most  interesting,  and  sometimes  pathetic,  an  the  mani- 
festations of  extraordinary  ijigenuity  in  ada])ting  things 
•which,  rreaterl  for  one  purpose  and  ajjparently  incapable 
of  serving  anv  other,  arc  nevertheless  turned  into  a  hun- 
dred other  uses.  These  are  too  numerous  to  enter  into. 
but  exist  in  tliOusand.s  of  instances. 

Thu«!.  daily  warfare  flragged  its  monotonous  length 
along  ii!ibrok»n  by  any  incident  deviating  from  the  com- 
monplace of  the  trenches. 

In  December  General  Joffre  announced,  or  perhaps,  1 

Hi 


From  Noyon  to  the  Vosges 

should  say,  was  said  to  have  announced,  that  the  gen- 
erals of  the  Allies  were  about  to  take  a  general  offensive, 
and  that  the  moment  had  arrived  when  the  invaders 
would  be  driven  out  of  France.  This  announcement, 
however,  not  being  followed  by  any  particular  advance  or 
even  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Allies,  presumably  it 
never  was  said  but  was  merely  the  idea  of  some  corre- 
spondent as  to  what  would  be  the  most  interesting  to  his 
readers  to  have  the  general  say. 

The  calm  remained  unbroken  until  the  14th  of  January, 
when,  after  three  days*  hard  fighting  across  the  Aisne 
from  Soissons,  the  French,  who  had  installed  themselves 
solidly  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river  and  sought  to  ex- 
tend their  lines  further,  were  in  the  course  of  an  offen- 
sive, not  only  driven  back  to  their  old  positions  but  driven 
completely  out  of  these,  and  south  of  the  river. 

All  told,  this  fight  lasted  some  eight  days  and  the  battle 
in  many  respects,  closely  resembled  that  of  Antietam,  the 
bloodiest  of  our  civil  war.  The  battle  opened  in  Napo- 
leonic fashion,  with  a  heavy  artillery  attack,  followed  by 
a  well  delivered  and  well  sustained  infantry  charge, 
which  hurled  the  Germans  well  back  from  their  first  posi- 
tions. The  French  entrenched  in  the  ground  won,  and 
then  in  their  turn  sustained  an  artillery  attack,  followed 
by  an  infantry  advance.  For  four  days  the  fighting  con- 
tinued, while  hand  to  hand  struggles  of  the  most  desper- 
ate character  raged.  On  the  fourth  day  the  Germans 
attacked  in  force  on  the  eastern  wing,  and  Von  Kluck's 
veterans  succeeded  in  driving  through  five  lines  of 
French  trenches  and  attacking  the  French  centre,  which 
they  broke,  driving  the  French  across  the  river  Aisne 
completely,  and  taking  the  seven  villages  on  the  north 
bank.  The  losses  were  enormous,  the  French  estimated 
to  be  about  12,000,  and  the  Germans'  a  little  less.  The 
battlefield  was  covered  until  the  end  of  January  with  the 
corpses  of  the  unburied  dead.  Some  of  the  victims, 
curiously  enough,  had  managed  to  get  a  package  of  ci- 
garettes from  their  pockets  for  the  last  smoke,  before  dy- 
ing. 

As  a  counter  to  this,  the  British  announced  the  capture 
of  La  Bassee,  and  for  a  few  hours  London  rejoiced,  but 
only  for  a  few  hours,  as  this  report  turned  out  to  be  the 
product  of  the  pure,  or  impure,  imagination  of  a  British 
reporter  in  Holland  several  hundred  miles  from  the  scene 
of  alleged  combat. 

During  this  month  there  was  heavy   fighting  in  the 

-     115 


The  Campaign  in  the  West 

vicinity  of  St.  Mihiel.  with  continual  skirmishing  and  ar- 
tillery duels  akxiR  the  whole  line,  but  otherwise  there 
was  nothing  of  the  slightest  moment  or  even  of  transient 
interest.  Late  in  January,  the  French  launched  an 
.)ffensive  in  Champagne,  which  operated  in  the  district 
immediately  tmrth  x'li  Le  Mesnil  and  Terthes.  Thi>. 
movenu-nt  was  nuuk-  in  f<>rcc  aiul  continued  for  nearly 
a  month.  Kven*-  effort  was  made  by  direct  frontal  at- 
tacks to  pierce  the  German  lines,  but  at  the  end  of  Feb- 
ruary, the  effort  was  abamloned.  A  net  gain  of  a  couple 
of  nules  over  a  nine-mile  front,  was  the  total  result,  and 
this  grounil  was  purchased  at  the  price  of  certainly  uK^re 
than  :}n.n(»o  killed  and  woiuided. 

The  rest  of  the  line  all  through  February  had  the  usual 
character  of  fighting,  skirmishing  and  artillery  duels, 
with  occasional  infantry  attacks.  The  weather,  which 
had  iK'Comc  worse  during  February  than  in  the  preceding 
months,  aided  in  bringing  about  a  general  cpiict  all  along 
the  line.  Such  storm  centres  as  there  wen-,  were  in  Av- 
gonne  and  the  di.slricl  around  St.  Mihiil.  but  the  gains 
and  losses  counter-balanced  each  other. 

The  result  of  the  German  campaign  >ums  up  as  fol- 
lows:  Materially,  the  Germans  held  on  March  1st  only 
about  *)  per  cent,  of  the  territory  within  the  geographi- 
cal limits  of  France,  but  in  this  small  territory  the  Ger- 
mans old  the  homes  of  one-tenth  of  the  pt)pulation  of 
France  and  nearly  one-half  of  industrial  France.  Pas- 
de-Calais.  Xord,  Aisne,  Ardennes.  Meuse  and  Meurthe- 
et-Moselle  arc  the  departments  of  France  of  which  the 
Germans  hold  all  or  the  larger  and  most  valuable  parts. 
In  these  arc  the  mines,  the  foundries  and  the  factories, 
the  dairies  and  farms,  which  produce  the  wealth  and  th^ 
strength  of  modern  France.  This  narrow  strip  held  in 
the  German  grip  produces  70  per  cent,  of  the  coal  mined 
in  France,  90  per  cent,  of  all  the  native-mined  iron  and 
ju>t  half  ui  the  republic's  output  of  manufacturing  ar- 
ticles. I'rancc  stands  fotirth  aiuon^  the  nations  of  the 
world  as  a  producer  of  iron  and  steel  and  this  industry 
is  centred  and  contained  in  northern  France  where  arc 
the  raw  materials.  In  the  departments  of  the  north  and 
part  of  Calais,  there  arc  a  hun«lred  thousand  miners  em- 
ployed, usually.  Practically  the  entire  supplv  of  fossil 
coal  is  mined  hero.  The  iron  mines  of  the  Meiirthc-ct- 
^foselle  alone  furnisherl  H\  |)cr  cent,  of  the  total  French 
output  of  ir«)n,  this  region  being  reckr^ncfl  (»nc  of  the 
richest  irf»n  producing  centres  of  the  world.  The  depart- 
ment of  the  Nord,  all  but  a  few  square  miles  of  its  coa.si 

116 


From  Noyon   to  the  Vosges 

lines,  is  in  the  possession  of  the  Germans  and  is  the  fit  ■^t 
department  of  both  agricultural  and  industrial  impor- 
tance in  France,  and  in  this  department  and  the  depart- 
ments of  Pas-de-Calais,  Meuse  and  Meurthe-et-Moselle 
are  the  great  metal  working  plants  and  the  most  im 
portant  machine  works  of  France. 

In  this  same  department  further  is  the  greater  part  of 
the  land's  textile  industry,  the  cotton,  woolen  and  linen 
weaving,  and  the  working  of  lace  and  embroidery,  the 
weaving  of  carpets  and  dyeing.  Flour  mills,  brick  kilns, 
distilleries,  glass  works,  potteries,  shoe  and  hat  factories, 
tobacco  factories  and  large  plants  for  the  production  of 
hardware,  enamelled  iron  hollow  ware  and  edged  tools 
are  sprinkled   through  this,  the  most  thickly   populated 
region  of  the  republic,  in  profusion.     Most  of  the  French 
cabinet  work  is  done  in  the  shops  in  the  territory  occupied 
by  the  Germans  and  most  of  the  French  sugar  is  pro- 
duced from  the  beet  fields  which  are  also  held.     The.-e 
departments  are  also  the  site  of  the  most  intensive  agri- 
culture   in    France,    if   not    in   the    world.      Everywhere 
throughout  the  region  where  there  are  no  mines  and  fac- 
tories, smiling  gardens  and  well  cultivated  farms  take 
their  place.     This  is  the  wheat  region  of  France  and  of 
the  sugar  beet,  besides  which  are  grown  cereals,  fruits, 
hops,  tobacco,  flax.     This  is  also  the  centre  of  the  cattle 
raising  industry  and  of  the  largest  and  best  known  dairies. 
Some  idea  of  the  comparative  richness  may  be  had 
from  the  fact  that,  while  the  average  per  acre  value  of 
all  France  for  the  land  is  about  $150,  that  of  these 
northern  departments  is  $235,  over  50  per  cent,  greater. 
The  moral  effect  of  the  occupation  of  this  territory  is 
also  great,  and  its  practical  effect  upon  the  revenue  of 
the   French   government   is   still   greater.     This   one- 
tenth  of  the  population  pays  about  one-quarter  of  all 
the  internal  revenue  of  France,  and  furnishes  in  ordi- 
nary times  to  the  French  army  over  one-tenth  of  its 
troops.    The  majority  of  the  classes  of  1915,  1916  and 
1917.  which  the  French  government  is  now  incorpo- 
rating into  the  army,  who  are  residents  of  this  section, 
the   government   will   be  unable   to  bring   under  the 
colors. 


117 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  campai(;n  in  the  east 

EAST     PRUSSIA. 

The  Hast  i'rus>iaii  l)order  and  the  border  of  Poland 
presented  equally  to  Germany  and  Russia  a  difficult 
and  interesting  problem  in  regard  to  tlieir  defence, 
owing  to  topographical  features.  East  Prussia,  the 
most  bleak  and  dreary  of  the  German  provinces,  is  a 
flat,  sandy  plain  which  slopes  from  the  Vistula  north 
and  north-eastward  to  the  sand  dunes  of  the  Baltic, 
and  as  it  nears  the  Baltic  sinks  below  the  level  of  that 
sea  but  rises  again  towards  the  coast.  The  immediate 
frontier  of  Russia  is  not  easy  of  defence  nor  is  it  until 
that  tangle  of  lakes,  woods  and  .^wamps  known  as 
Mazuria  is  reached,  at  some  little  distance  from  that 
frontier,  that  the  defendable  area,  so  to  speak,  properly 
begins. 

This  Mazuria  is  an  extremely  difficult  country  for 
military  operations  and  its  full  possession  is  a  g^reat 
asset  from  the  defensive  standpoint.  In  addition  to  its 
natural  defenses,  it  is  also  protected  by  a  rather  intri- 
cate series  of  block-houses  and  equipped  with  stra- 
tegic railroads  which  make  the  movement  of  troops 
through  it  and  behind  it.  further  to  the  west,  easy  for 
its  defenders,  and  gives  them  the  chance  to  move  large 
mas'^es  of  troops  rapidly  hither  and  thither  a>^  the 
necessities  of  the  moment  may  require. 

The  northern  part  of  the  Russian  front  bordering 
on  East  TVussia  is  a  wild  and  desolate  country  full  of 
forest-.  >mall  lakes,  marshes  and  bog<;.  and  in  the 
southern  half  is  the  great  forest  of  Xtign-^fiwo,  which 
nearly  fills  it.  The  town  of  Suwalki  stands  in  its 
midst.  Further  south  the  German  frontier  is  (defend- 
ed by  the  strong  fortress  of  Thorn  and  then  south  of 
that  come  another  succession  of  marshes  cut  by  the 
river  Wartha.  who-e  vallev  at  the  frontier  is  a  wide 
one.  Sriuth  of  the  river  marches  again  occur  and 
make  penetration  difficult  anywhere  to  the  Au'='trian 
frontier 

118 


East   Prussia 

The  means  of  communication  along  this  portion  of 
the  German  frontier  were  in  a  very  advanced  state,  the 
strategic  railroads  having  been  carried  to  a  great  de- 
gree of  development.  Russia's  strength  and  Russia's 
danger  was  the  so-called  Polish  salient.  A  reference 
to  the  map  will  show  that  this  salient  juts  out  into 
Germany  and  Austria  like  a  peninsula  projecting  into 
the  sea.  On  the  north  and  west  roughly,  it  is  bounded 
by  Prussian  and  on  the  south  by  Austrian  territory. 
This  salient  contains  the  most  important  industrial 
cities  of  Russia  in  addition  to  all  the  important  coal 
mines  of  western  Russia,  as  well  as  metallurgical 
establishments  of  importance.  It  is  not  anything  like 
as  well  equipped  in  railroads  as  the  Prussian  territory 
to  the  west,  but  Russia  had  recently  entered  into  the 
construction  of  an  elaborate  system  of  strategic  rail- 
roads, at  almost  the  positive  order  of  France,  that 
country  having  made  such  construction  a  condition  of 
the  later  loans  to  Russia.  Unfortunately,  however, 
for  Russia,  this  construction  had  proceeded  with  usual 
Russian  slowness  and  was  nothing  like  completed 
when  the  war  broke  out. 

The  Polish  country  from  Warsaw  to  the  frontier  is 
a  flat  plain  with  extensive  marshes  covering  quite  a 
portion  of  the  area.  North  of  the  Vistula,  Poland  is 
an  open  wooded  plain  which  extends  northward  to  the 
Narew,  above  which  are  marshes  of  great  extent.  It 
will  be  noticed  in  the  narrative  that  marshes  and  topo- 
graphical conditions  generally  have  a  very  important 
bearing  upon  this  portion  of  the  Eastern  campaign. 
Soutli  Poland,  watered  by  the  Pilitza,  is  higher  than 
the  northern  portion,  much  more  heavily  wooded  and 
may  be  described  as  a  flat  country  intersected  by  occa- 
sional deep  gullies,  or  gorges,  the  whole  making  a 
rather  difficult  country  to  campaign  over. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  Russian  army  was 
heralded  throughout  the  world,  by  reason  of  its  vast 
numbers,  as  the  factor  which  would  bring  about  a 
speedy  termination  of  the  conflict  and  which  in  a  com- 
paratively few'  weeks  would  be  marching  into  Berlin. 
The  English  press  nicknamed  it  the  "steam  roller"  and 
this  nickname  was  immediately  taken  up  by  the 
Americans. 

As  we  will  see  in  the  sequel,  the  giant  had  feet  of 
clay.  The  great  defects  in  the  organization  of  its  army 
and  the  character  of  the  troops  which  composed  it,  as 
well  as  in  their  equipment,  were  accentuated  by  the 


The  Campaign   in   the   East 

glaring  incompetency  of  its  commander-in-chief,  the 
Grand  Uukc  Xicolai  Xicolaivitch.  This  Grand  Duke, 
who  had  licld  a  >ubordinate  cununand  under  General 
Kuropalkjn  in  the  canipai^jn  against  Japan,  and  had 
not  di>tin^uislicd  liiniseli  therein,  liad,  on  his  return 
from  the  east,  both  by  reason  of  his  position  as  Grand 
Duke,  and  by  reason  of  his  inclinations,  made  himself 
the  head  of  the  Russian  n\ilitary  party.  For  some 
years,  after  the  crushinj^  defeat  that  Russia  experi- 
enced at  tlic  hands  i>f  the  Japanese,  this  party  was 
comparatively  feeble,  but  after  the  internal  troubles  of 
Russia  had  become  to  a  lar};e  degree  (luicted  and  liie 
nation  began  to  rise  from  the  depression  into  which  it 
had  been  thrown  by  the  Japanese  <lefcat,  its  power 
rapidly  strengthened  and.  as  the  throne  was  occupied 
by  an  amiable,  wcU-ineaning.  biu  weak  character,  ilie 
Grand  Duke  soon  gained  the  mastery,  not  only  in  a 
military  but  in  a  political  sense  and,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  when  the  war  broke  out  was  the  master  of 
Russia  more  than  the  Czar.  Of  limited  capacity,  but 
of  unbounded  conceit,  this  sinister  personage  unites  in 
his  character,  his  aims  and  his  ambitions  all  of  the 
worst  qualities  of  the  Russian  autocracy,  without  ])os- 
sessing  any  of  its  better.  .\  Peter  the  Great,  physi- 
cally, he  lacks  the  intellect  which  redeemed  that  brute 
from  his  own  brutalities  and  made  him  a  great  and 
constructive  leader  of  the  Russian  state. 

The  first  military  movement  made  by  Russia  after 
the  outbreak  of  tlic  war  was  t()  undertake,  gaily  and 
light-hcartedh ,  the  invasion  of  Eastern  Prussia  with 
some  600,000  men,  divided  into  two  armies,  that  of  the 
Narcw,  under  General  Samsonoff  and  that  of  the  Xie- 
men,  under  General  Rennenkampf.  General  Rennen- 
kampf  struck  directly  west  from  behind  the  river  Nie- 
men,  while  General  Samsonoff  advanced  from  the 
south  by  \'ialla  and  Lyck  to  beyond  the  Ma/urian 
lakes,  and  by  a  second  line  of  advance  through  Mlawa- 
Soldau.  On  the  6th  of  .\ugust  the  Ru'^sian  cavalry 
division  crossed  the  frontier  south  of  Eydtkuhnen,  and 
two  davs  later  a  small  force  of  Russian  infantry  was 
gkirnii'^hing  to  the  north  towards  Tilsit.  .\  larger  cav- 
alry- raid  took  place  on  the  lOth  and  in  the  opinion  of 
General  Reimenkampf,  who  saw  this  fighting,  an  easy 
victory  lay  before  the  Russians. 

The  general  advance  of  the  army  of  the  Nicmen  took 
place  on  the  16th  of  August,  and  on  the  17th  the  Rus- 
sian advance  engaged  the  German  First  Arniv  Corps, 

120 


East   Prussia 

which  fought  a  delaying  action  at  Stalluponcn,  which 
was  the  first  considerable  battle  in  this  campaign.  The 
contest  was  hard  fought  and  when  the  Germans  fell 
back  they  took  with  them  some  of  the  Russian  artil- 
lery and  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners.  The  Rus- 
sian defense,  considered  as  a  whole,  had  a  front  of 
approximately  thirty-five  miles ;  Pilkallen  on  the  north 
to  Goldap  on  the  south.  The  centre  followed  the  line 
of  road  and  railroads  from  Stalluponen  to  Gumbinnen. 
The  country  here  is  flat  and  without  natural  defenses. 
The  Germans  had  only  part  of  one  first  line  corps  with 
parts  of  two  reserve  corps,  and  were  outnumbered  by 
more  than  two  to  one. 

The  Russians  continued  to  advance  and  cleared  the 
town  of  Pilkallen  of  the  Germans,  who  held  it,  and 
who  fell  back  southwest  to  Gumbinnen,  in  front  of 
which  the  main  battle  was  fought  the  next  day,  Aug- 
ust 30th.  Gumbinnen  is  tw^enty-two  miles  from  the 
Russian  frontier.  General  Rennenkampf  made  a  front- 
al attack  on  the  enemy's  centre  and  after  a  stiff  fight 
of  fourteen  hours  the  German  centre  withdrew,  the 
wings  holding  out  a  little  longer,  but  eventually  the 
entire  German  forces  fell  back  to  Insterburg,  taking 
with  them  an  important  number  of  Russian  prisoners. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  these  were  delaying  ac- 
tions, and  that  in  each  case  the  retreat  w^as  foreseen 
and  was  part  of  the  strategy  of  the  campaign.  The  Ger- 
man cavalry  recaptured  Pilkallen  on  the  20th,  but  was 
driven  out  again  on  the  21st,  the  fighting  continuing 
throughout  that  day  in  Goldap.  The  Russians  pressed 
forward  to  Insterburg  and  by  the  24th  had  occupied 
it  in  force. 

From  this  point  Rennenkampf  s  advance  was  practi- 
cally unopposed,  and  his  final  position  was  running 
across  East  Prussia  in  a  northerly  and  easterh-^  line 
from  Tilsit  to  a  point  well  south  of  Konigsburg. 

The  Germans  had  now  drawn  General  Rennenkampf 
into  the  position  which  they  wished  him  to  occupy. 
Meanwhile  the  army  of  the  Narew  advanced  rapidly 
and  successfully  from  the  south.  This  armv  also  num- 
bered 250,000  to  300,000  men.  The  advance  was  made 
along  three  lines — northwest  by  the  Warsaw,  Mlawa 
and  Soldau  railroad ;  second,  to  Lyck  by  the  railroad 
from  Osowiec  and  thence  turning  south  of  the  lakes 
to  Johannesburg;  third,  to  Lyck  as  above  and  thence 
by  a  wider  detour  around  Lake  Spirding.  The  German 
resistance  here  was  intentionallv  weak.     A  delaying 

121 


The  Campaii^n   in   the  East 

action  was  fought  in  Soldau  by  a  brigade  of  landwehr 
who,  of  course,  were  forced  back  opposed  by  many 
times  their  own  strength.  Niedcnbur^  fell  next,  then 
.\!lcn>-tcin.  wliich  the  landwthr  defended  more  or  less 
feebly,  and  then  followed  the  hottest  engagement  of 
the  series  at  Frankcnau,  where  Samsonoff's  right  de- 
feated the  20th  German  corps  and  forced  it  back  to 
Osterode. 

On  the  "Mth  the  Russians  had  driven  the  enemy  out 
of  that  part  of  East  Prussia  which  lay  ea^t  and  west  of 
the  main  railway  line.  Kenncnkampf  now  turned  and 
faced  southwest  on  the  line  Fricdland-Gerdauen-Nor- 
denburg-Angerburg,  while  Samsonoff  occupied  the 
triangle  Soldau-Allcnstein-Frankcnau.  Together  these 
armies  totalled  about  600.000  men. 

The  moment  had  cotiic  for  the  Germans  to  strike, 
and  with  the  moment  had  come  the  man,  General  Paul 
von  Hindenburg,  who.  when  the  war  broke  out  was 
aged  ♦JT,  and  had  retired  from  the  army  a  short  time 
previously.  He  began  his  military  service  with  the 
Austrian  campaign,  and  also  fought  in  the  French 
war.  Thereafter  he  served  with  the  First  Army  Corps, 
at  Konigsburg,  and  through  this  •service  he  became 
interested  in  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  Mazu- 
rian  lakes  to  the  successful  defence  of  East  Prussia, 
of  which  province  he  was  a  native,  and  on  the  border 
of  which  lay  his  paternal  acres.  For  many  years  he 
studied  this  district  minutely,  and  it  is  said  pushed  his 
studies  to  such  an  extent  that  he  actually  knew  from 
personal  inspection  every  foot  of  the  ground  comprised 
in  this  region.  He  was  fortunate  in  having  associated 
with  him  a  brilliant  soldier  as  chief-of-staff.  General 
von   Ludendorff. 

Von  Hindenburg  confronted  a  difficult  strategic 
problem  when  he  took  command  of  the  German  forces 
in  East  Prussia  on  the  23rd  dhy  of  August.  He  had 
only  ven-  limited  forces  and  those  verv  largely  com- 
posed of  second  line  troops  with  which  to  defeat  two 
armies,  either  one  numerically  superior  to  hi<^  lorce, 
and  which  had  nearly  united,  so  that  «=pecd  was  one 
of  the  e'J'^entials  in  the  event  that  he  intended,  as  he 
dicl,  to  attack  them  separately  before  their  union.  He 
elected  first  of  all  to  deal  with  Samsonoff's  army,  and 
if  he  were  favored  by  fortune  in  this  attack,  to  strike 
Rennenkampf'J.  The  superb  railroad  system  of  Prus- 
•^ia  worked  night  and  day  getting  together  his  army 
for  him.     He  had  with  him  the  ?Oth  Corps,  and  some 

122 


East   Prussia 

landwehr.  From  Konigsburg  he  drew  the  First  Corps 
and  its  reserve  auxiliary.  The  garrison  of  Graudenz 
and  Thorn  also  sent  troops,  which  consisted  mainly  of 
landweher.  He  also  gathered  together  a  considerable 
number  of  heavy  guns.  With  this  force,  more  than  50 
per  cent,  of  which  were  landwehr  and  landsturm  for- 
mations, he  confronted  Samsonoff's  arm}-,  which  out- 
numbered his,  and  which  was  composed  entirely  of 
first  line  troops. 

The  Russians  had  been  lulled  to  sleep  by  their  easy 
advance,  as  the  Germans  had  intended  they  should.  As 
stated,  Samsonoff's  army  was  massed  within  the  tri- 
angle Soldau-Allenstein-Frankenau.  The  road  from 
Osterode  and  Soldau  and  the  two  railroads  which  come 
towards  Soldau  from  Eylau.  Graudenz  and  Thorn 
had  not  been  occupied.  Von  Hindenburg's  first  move 
was  to  make  himself  master  of  Soldau  junction  and  to 
seize  the  railroad,  which  was  done  just  three  days  after 
he  took  command.  This  line  could  have  been  easily 
defended,  there  being  marshes  in  front  and  a  good  road 
behind.  The  importance  of  this  loss  was  seen  almost 
at  once  by  Samsonoff  as  it  cut  him  off  from  his  main 
line,  both  of  retreat  and  for  supplies. 

On  the  27th  he  attempted  to  retake  Soldau  but  was 
unable,  for  topographical  reasons,  to  concentrate  his 
superiority  in  numbers  into  a  superiority  at  a  vital 
point,  and,  therefore,  the  only  result  he  accomplished 
was  to  dislocate  his  forces  to  defend  his  left,  as  a  result 
of  which  he  was  driven  backward  to  Niedenburg  with 
his  isolation  made  almost  complete. 

On  the  left  the  German  forces  were  active.  At  Ho- 
henstein  a  hot  fight  took  place,  the  Russians  in  super- 
ior numbers  endeavoring  to  break  von  Hindenburg's 
line  to  the  northwest.  The  fight  lasted  three  days,  the 
26th,  27th  and  28th,  the  Russians  having  opposed  to 
them  landwehr  troops  until  the  afternoon  of  the  3rd 
day,  when  the  first  line  troops  came  up  and  the  Rus- 
sians were  routed  by  bayonet  charges.  On  the  27th 
and  28th  von  Hindenburg  took  the  first  step  to  sur- 
round Samsonoff  by  turning  him  with  his  right  wing 
at  Niedenburg,  which  having  been  taken,  gave  his  left 
wing  an  enormous  extension.  The  Russians,  two 
days  before,  had  abandoned  Allenstein,  not  realizing 
that  it  was  the  key  to  their  position.  By  this  exten- 
sion of  the  left  wing  the  Germans  regained  the  use  of 
their  main  railway  as  far  as  Rothfliess  and  the  branch 
line  which  runs  to  Ortelsburg. 

123 


The  Campaign   in  the  East 

The  next  move  of  von  Hindenhur^  was  lo  transport 
by  every  possible  inean>  of  comejance — railroad,  mo- 
tors, bicycles,  and  e\cn  by  hcjrses — all  of  the  infatitry 
that  lie  couUI  possibly  niana^^c  to  so  transport  around 
the  Ku>>ian  rij^ht  to  the  rather  distant  town  of  Uisch- 
ofsbur;^'.  This  force  then  took  Wartenburi^;  from  the 
railroad  and  moved  to  l^assenhcim,  which  was  cap- 
tured after  the  stiffcst  fight  of  the  niovenient. 

l{y  the  evening  of  the  I'Oth  von  liindenburj^  was  in 
position.  The  (iernians  then  held  three  good  roads  all 
the  way  around  three  sides  of  the  Russian  position, 
their  hcav\  iiun>  were  in  place  on  these  roads,  and  that 
evcniiii;;  they  began  flinging  shells  at  will  upon  the 
Russian  troops  within  the  triangle  of  their  batteries. 
The  almost  incredible  had  been  done.  An  inferior 
force,  numerically,  had  surrounded  a  superior  force, 
and  held  it  in  the  marshes,  lakes  and  swamps,  guarding 
it  in  a  grip  from  which  there  was  no  escaping.  Von 
Hindenburg's  minute  knowledge  of  the  topography  of 
the  country  enabled  him  to  make  one  man  do  the  work 
of  three  by  utilizing  the  swamps  and  lakes  so  that  only 
the  causeways  between  them  were  obliged  to  be  held, 
while  the  Russians,  not  possessing  this  knowledge, 
were  drowned  as  often  as  they  were  shot,  and  lost  en- 
tire batteries  of  artillery  and  troops  of  cavalry  in  the 
mud  of  the  swamps. 

The  only  question  which  remained  for  them  was 
how  many  could  escape  from  this  trap  by  the  f>nly  pos- 
sible exit,  the  road  from  Ortclsburg  to  |oliamie<burg. 
By  the  '^Oth.  whole  regiments  were  laying  di>wn  their 
arms,  and  Samsonoff's  army  presented  the  appearance 
of  a  disorganized  mob. 

Samsonoff  made  an  effort  on  the  .ilst  to  try  and  or- 
ganize the  retreat  and  went  to  the  tirin:^  line  where  he 
was  killed  by  a  shell,  and  with  him  (General  TcstitcU 
his  chief  of  staff,  and  t)ther  officers.  Oencral  Martos, 
another  corps  commander,  was  captured  fleeing  in  his 
motor  car.  .Ml  t<»ld,  the  Russians  lost  about  JH).00() 
uiiwoun«li(l  prisoner-^  in  this  fij^ht ;  in  killed,  wounded 
and  drowned  men  they  lost  nearly  as  many  more. 
Only  one  and  one-half  ct)rps  escaped  on  the  (  )rtels- 
burg  road,  and  only  isolated  fragments  of  other  corps 
or  cavalry  divisions  are  said  to  have  broken  through 
to  the  Russian  frontier  or  north  to  Renncnkampf.  This 
was  as  complete  a  victory,  probably,  as  has  ever  been 
won  on  any  singK-  battlefield  and  the  peculiar  jiart  is, 

124 


East   Prussia 

that  it  was  won  by  an  army  numerically  inferior  to 
the  defeated  army. 

It  was  nuw  Rennenkampf's  turn.  Vun  llindenburg 
without  a  pause  for  rest  or  reorganization,  struck  up 
north,  passed  Nordenburg-Angerburg-Goldap  to  Gum- 
binnen-Eydtkuhnen  to  intercept  the  retreat  that  Ren- 
nenkampf  had  already  begun  on  hearing  from  the  fu- 
gitives who  had  reached  him,  of  Samsonoff's  annihila- 
tion. Rennenkampf,  however,  retreated  too  rapidly 
and  succeeded  in  avoiding  more  than  rear  guard  ac- 
tions. These,  however,  were  expensive  to  him  and 
cost  him  the  loss  of  some  30,000  prisoners,  with  about 
an  equal  amount  of  casualties,  besides  which,  his  re- 
treat was  so  hurried  that  he  abandoned  over  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  guns  and  enormous  quantities  of  muni- 
tions of  war. 

On  September  11th,  the  Russians  had  evacuated  In- 
sterburg  and  the  German  troops  crossed  the  Russian 
border  on  the  15th.  The  Russian  reserve  army  from 
Grodno,  of  three  corps,  which  had  advanced  to  cover 
Rennenkampf's  retreat  was  defeated  at  Lyck  with 
heavy  losses,  and  again  at  Augustowo.  Suwalki,  the 
capital  of  the  province  of  that  name,  was  occupied  by 
the  Germans  on  September  15th,  and  General  von 
Morgen  here  took  actual  conduct  of  operations  for  the 
Germans.  The  Russians,  a  few  days  later,  changed 
their  commanding  general  and  Ruszky  took  charge  of 
the  defence. 

The  Germans  had  only  four  corps  in  Russia,  and  it 
is  probable  here  that  they  made  a  tactical  mistake  in 
attempting,  with  so  weak  a  force,  to  attack  the  Niemen 
line  of  defence.  It  is  true  that  in  East  Prussia  they 
had  been  able  to  make  these  four  corps  do  the  work  of 
twelve,  but  there  they  had  the  advantage  of  a  perfect 
railroad  system,  which  they  lacked  in  Russia,  and 
there  they  also  had  the  use  of  roads  which  were  suited 
for  motor  traffic.  Such  roads  did  not  exist  in  the  low 
boggy,  forest-covered  country  into  which  they  had  to 
advance.  The  Germans  moved  along  the  one.  good 
road  which  traversed  the  swampy  valley  of  immense 
marshes  of  the  Bohr  towards  Grajawo-Bailystok.  The 
crossing  of  the  river  was  defended  by  the  little  town  of 
Osowiec,  which  ranks  as  a  fortress,  and  has  solid  con- 
crete forts  mounted  with  heavy  guns.  The  whole  place 
is  practically  impassable  and  can  be  attacked  only 
from  the  causeway  leading  to  it. 

The  Germans  began  to  bombard  on  September  27th 

125 


The  Campaign   in   the   East 

and  continued  fur  lour  days  and  niglUs  without  rest. 
The  bombardment  took  place  from  a  distance  of  five 
miles,  the  infantry  never  being  nearer  than  four  miles. 
The  difficulties  being  insurmountable,  tlie  siege  was 
ibatidnned  October  1st  and  the  German  forces  retreated 
to  German  soil,  which  abandonment  was  brought  about 
not  only  on  account  of  the  unexpected  difficulties  in 
the  siege  of  the  fortress,  but  also  because  the  larger 
operations  on  the  Xiemen  had  failed. 

A  fortnight  after,  the  Russians  advanced  westward 
over  the  same  route  that  the  Germans  had  taken  in 
their  retreat,  and  twu  weeks  later  were  attacking  the 
Germans  in  Lyck. 

Rennenkampf's  rear  guard  crossed  the  Xiemen  on 
September  v'.^rd,  and  the  Germans  were  then  in  pos- 
session of  all  the  chief  strategic  points  in  the  country 
between  that  river  and  tiieir  own  frontier.  Tiie  chief 
physical  feature  of  this  region  is  the  enormous  forest, 
thirty  miles  long  and  twenty  miles  wide,  on  whose 
western  edge  Augustowo  is  situated.  Chains  of  lakes 
stretch  on  either  side  of  the  road  from  Suwalki  to 
Seiny.  beginning  again  on  the  southeast  side  of  Seiny 
and  continuing  on  either  side  of  the  road  Surino  to 
the  Xiemen. 

The  German  plan  was  to  cross  the  Niemen.  and  to 
seize  the  railroad  at  or  about  Grodno.  Ruszky  wished 
not  only  to  throw  them  back  from  the  Xiemen.  but  to 
disorganize  their  communications  by  taking  the  little 
town  of  Augustowo,  vital,  because  it  controls  the  only 
good  roads  in  this  vicinity,  and  thus  force  them  back 
on  their  own  frontier.  The  Xiemen  in  itself  was  a  for- 
midable obstacle.  It  is  a  deep  river,  more  than  200 
yards  wide,  and  bridges  exist  only  at  Grodno  and  Oli- 
ta,  both  strr)ng  places,  besides  which  the  right  bank, 
which  the  Russians  held,  is  high,  the  left  bank,  where 
the  Germans  were,  is  low,  and.  what  is  more  impor- 
tant, very  swampy. 

The  Germans  made  two  attempts  to  cross  the  river 
at  the  same  time,  the  northerly  attempt  at  Druskcniki, 
twenty-five  miles  north  of  Grodno.  Three  attempts 
to  cross  here  were  made  on  September  ^Rth,  and 
though  bravely  made,  were  successfullv  repulsed.  The 
Germans,  towards  evening,  being  attacked  by  the  Co.«<- 
sacks.  who  had  managed  to  swim  tlic  river,  fell  back. 
Another  attempt  was  made  nearer  to  Grodno  at  So- 
potskinkie.  Here  the  Rii«^sian  infantry,  intrenched  on 
tlie  left  bank  and  supported   by   heavy  guns  on  the 

126 


East   Prussia 

heights  of  the  right  bank,  succeeded  in  repelling  the 
Germans.  Tiie  Germans  then  retreated  towards  Aug- 
ustowo  by  tile  few  roads  along  which  a  retreat  was 
possible,  and  were  followed  by  the  Russians,  who 
eventually  bombarded  Augustowo,  the  town  falling  to 
them  on  the  afternoon  of  October  1st. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  German  forces  at  Oso- 
wiec  returned.  The  Germans  fell  back  to  Suwalki  and 
were  also  defeated  there  and  at  Mariampol  further 
north,  on  October  3rd  and  4th  respectively.  They  then 
fell  back  to  the  frontier  with  the  Russians  following. 
From  this  time  forward  to  the  middle  of  November 
the  Germans  and  Russians  faced  each  other  in  lines  of 
trenches  that  followed  practically  the  line  of  the  fron- 
tier each  side,  dug  themselves  in  elaborately  and 
strengthened  their  positions  with  all  possible  defences, 
— wire  entanglements,  concealed  gun  pits,  etc.  Neither 
side  made  any  real  effort  to  advance. 

In  the  middle  of  November  the  German  defence 
weakened  and  the  Russians  again  reached  Lyck  and 
attacked  Stalluponen  in  the  north  for  the  second  time 
on  November  14th,  while  in  December  they  slowly 
penetrated  for  the  second  time  the  Mazurian  lake  re- 
gion. The  German  forces  were  all  recent  formations 
and  not  in  large  numbers,  and  as  long  as  the  Russians 
did  not  advance  beyond  Gumbinnen-Angerburg-Lotze 
and  Johannesburg,  the  Germans  did  not  seem  to  be 
troubled.  All  through  December  the  Russians  held 
this  area  with  only  local  skirmishes  now  and  then, 
only  sufficient  activity  being  shown  by  the  Germans, 
in  order  to  apparently  give  notice  of  their  presence 
from  time  to  time  to  the  enemy.  The  Russian  and  the 
English  press  again  began  to  talk  of  the  march  to 
Berlin.  The  New  Year  found  the  situation  still  un- 
qhanged. 

The  same  situation  continued  all  through  the  month 
of  January,  with  nothing  more  important  than  local 
skirmishes.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  winter  in 
this  quarter  of  the  world  is  extremely  severe,  and  that 
it  is  impossible  for  even  Russians  (who  are,  by  the 
way.  not  as  accustomed  to  living  in  the  open  air  in  the 
depths  of  winter  as  is  the  popular  impression),  to 
campaign  to  any  great  degree  in  the  open.  The  Rus- 
sians had  hoped  that  when  the  Mazurian  region  was 
completely  frozen  over,  they  would  be  able  to  ad- 
vance across  the  lakes  and  marshes  on  the  ice.  but 
during  the  month  of  January,  cold  as  it  was.  the  Ger- 

127 


1  he  Campaign   in   the   Hast 

man?  managed  lu  keep  ihe>e  lakes  open  by  the  use  of 
ice  breakers,  and  this  hupe  was  dashed. 

From  time  to  time  during  this  month  of  January, 
however,  there  were  confHcts  gjachially  increasing  in 
imjx)rtance,  iKtwecn  the  Cicnuans  and  the  Kussi:uis  in 
this  east  I'olish  ilistrict.  Tlie  i)riiicipal  one  took  place 
ou  tlic  '^Uih  of  January  at  Gunibinnen,  and  in  the  last 
days  of  the  month  another  attempt  was  made  by  the 
Russians  to  advance  in  force  towards  Konigsburg. 
This  had  a  measure  of  success  and  the  Russians  again 
gaincil  ground,  almost  reaching  their  favorite  jKJsition 
in  the  Slazurian  I^akes.  This  tendency  continued  for 
several  tlay>.  and  finally  it  became  apparent  that  a  for- 
mitlable  movement  was  being  launched  by  the  Russians 
with  the  object  of  again  invading  Kast  Prussia  in  force. 
As  has  been  saitl,  the  (.iernian  forces  here  were  neither 
great  in  numbers,  nor  was  their  (juality  at  all  good. 
Consequently,  on  February  1st  the  Russians  got  to  the 
north  of  I'ilkallen  and  Gumbinnen  and  were  driving 
these  German  forces  before  them.  On  February  2nd, 
the  Russians  advanced  after  severe  fighting  to  the  west 
of  I'ilkallen  and  from  thence  onward  the  drive  was  ac- 
centuated during  the  next  few  days.  The  Russian  bul- 
letins again  teemed  with  accounts  of  the  capture  of 
various  East  Prussian  towns.  By  the  9th  of  I'cbruary 
without  doubt  they  had  penetrated  into  ICast  Prusssia 
nearly  as  far  as  they  had  on  the  prior  occasion. 

The  fighting  took  place  largely  in  the  Mazurian  I^ke 
district  and  had  really  become  a  menace  to  this  section. 
The  usual  streams  of  refugees  poured  through  East 
Prussia  into  the  other  parts  of  Germany,  telling  stories 
of  the  most  outrageous  cruelties  committed  !)v  the  Cos- 
sacks and  other  troops  of  the  Russian  advance  forces. 
Further  to  the  north  the  right  wing  of  this  invading 
force  extenfled  past  Tilsit  almost  to  Memel,  Tilsit  itself 
having  fallen  momentarily  into  the  possession  f)f  the 
Russians. 

Towarfl  the  middle  of  the  month,  however,  this 
movement  came  to  an  untimely  end.  and  this  end  was 
due  to  the  same  general  to  which  the  victorv  of  Tan- 
nenhurg  in  Augu.st  was  due,  von  Hindenburg.  Quietly, 
as  is  this  general's  wont,  and  apparently  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  Russians,  he  assembled  three  armies, 
again  aided  by  the  magnificent  railroad  svstem  of  Ka.st 
Prussia,  some  of  which  troops  were  drawn  from  the 
polish    front     sotnc    broiight    on    from   the   garrison    of 

128 


East  Prussia 

Thorn  and  Berlin,  and  others  brought  back  from  Gali- 
cia  where  they  had  been  aiding  the  Austrians  in  their 
defence  of  the  Carpathians. 

The  first  army  was  assembled  towards  Rothfliess  and 
Bischofsburg,  then  running  southerly  towards  Ortels- 
burg,  with  its  base  at  Allenstein.  The  second  army  was 
.further  north,  running  roughly  from  Allenburg  along 
the  railroad  to  Angerburg,  while  the  third  army  ran 
between  Insterburg  and  Gumbinncn. 

The  Russians  thought  they  had  stolen  a  march  upon 
von  Hindenburg  and  he  indulged  them  in  this  notion 
by  apparently  acting  upon  the  line  of  offense  towards 
Warsaw,  and  then  suddenly  launched  the  three  armies, 
whose  position  has  been  described,  in  simultaneous  at- 
tacks upon  the  Russian  commander,  General  Baron 
Sievers. 

The  frontal  attack  was  made  by  the  troops  of  the 
second  army,  and  while  the  Russians  were  busy  repel- 
ling this,  two  other  attacks  were  made  upon  them,  one 
from  the  north  and  one  from  the  south  by  the  first  and 
third  army.  As  a  result  of  this  combined  attack,  the 
Russian  army  was  cut  to  pieces,  even  more  completely 
than  at  the  famous  battle  of  Tannenburg. 

In  point  of  numbers  the  forces  were  about  equal.  The 
battle  began  on  the  6th  day  of  February  and  fighting 
continued  for  nine  days.  The  main  battle,  however, 
was  over  on  the  10th  of  February,  was  mostly  fought  in 
a  driving  snowstorm,  and  it  is  to  be  attributed  to  the 
fact  that  this  snowstorm  was  driving  to  the  north  and 
into  the  eyes  of  the  German  flanking  army  advancing 
from  the  north,  impeding  their  progress  seriously,  that 
any  of  the  Russian  forces  escaped.  On  the  10th  the 
Germans  had  taken  over  90,000  prisoners  besides  inflict- 
ing casualties  which  are  supposed  to  exceed  that  num- 
ber, and  which  have  never  as  yet  been  accurately  stated. 
The  scattered  remnants  of  General  Baron  Siever's  army 
were  hurled  back  across  the  Prussian  border  and  pur- 
sued well  into  Russian  territory. 

The  retreat  has  been  described  by  eyewitnesses  as 
being  the  worst  rout  which  has  befallen  any  army  in 
recent  wars.  From  the  most  advanced  position  in 
East  Prussia  as  far  back  east  as  Suwalki  and  Augus- 
towo  in  Russian  territory,  abandoned  guns  and  auto- 
mobiles, wrecked  and  overturned  wagons,  sledges 
and  ammunition  caissons  encumbered  the  way;  and 
rifles,  blankets  and  other  equipment  lay  in  thousands 

129 


The  Campaign  in  the  East 

where  thrown  by  the  fleeing  troops.  At  the  street 
comers  in  the  towns  of  Suwalki  and  Augustowo  were 
great  heaps  of  abandoned  rifles  and  bayonets,  while 
large  bands  of  Russian  prisoners,  many  of  whom  sur- 
rendered without  firing  a  shot,  were  frequently  en- 
countered along  the  roadside.  Dead  horses  and  sol- 
diers who  had  fallen  and  frozen  where  they  lay  were 
everywhere  in  evidence,  and,  as  said  before,  this  was 
true  of  all  the  roads  leading  from  the  battlefield,  well 
into  Russian  territory.  After  February  10th,  the  en- 
gagement was  fought  wholly  in  Russian  territory. 

The  fleeing  Russians  who  had  escaped  the  slaughter 
in  East  Prussia  retreated  precipitately  by  the  roads 
leading  through  the  forest  of  Augustowo,  passed  that 
town,  which  fell  into  German  hands,  as  did  Suwalki, 
the  capital  of  the  government  of  the  same  name,  and 
continued  their  flight  to  the  east.  Ossowiec  and  Os- 
trolcnka  were  reached  by  the  Germans  in  their  victor- 
ious advance,  while  in  the  north  the  rush  of  the  Ger- 
man troops  brought  them  to  a  point  only  12  miles  dis- 
tant from  Grodno. 

This  pursuit,  between  February  10th  and  14th, 
netted  the  Germans  another  40,000  prisoners.  One 
Russian  corps,  which  had  taken  refuge  in  the  depths  of 
the  forest  of  Augustowo,  and  refused  to  surrender,  was 
cut  off  almost  to  the  last  man. 

The  total  casualties  in  this  retreat  will  never  be 
known.  The  number  of  prisoners  captured  by  the 
Germans  exceeds  that  of  any  battle  in  modern  history, 
even  that  of  Sedan.  Cannon  in  this  one  fight,  to  over 
300  in  number,  fell  into  German  hands,  besides  count- 
less numbers  of  machine  guns,  enormous  quantities 
of  munitions  of  war,  such  as  provisions,  ammunition, 
rifles,  etc. 

The  German  pursuers  made  good  their  positions  in 
Russia,  and  started  to  besiege  Ossowiec,  which  siege 
was  proceeding  at  the  time  this  record  closed.  Another 
force  advanced  to  the  eastward  through  Ostrolenka 
with  the  design  of  reaching  the  main  railroad  from 
Petrograd  and  Warsaw  and  cutting  it,  thus  preventing 
the  movement  of  any  further  supplies  of  munitions  of 
war  reaching  the  Russians  of  the  Warsaw  line. 

Another  force  in  the  extreme  north  proceeded  to 
make  thrusts  at  Grodno.  These  thrusts  did  not  yield 
great  results  and  were  finally  abandoned. 

At  the  time  this  record  closes.  March  1st,  the  move- 
ment towards  the  railroad  had  not  reached  fruition. 

1.30 


East  Prussia 

The  Russians,  who  had  re-formed  to  the  eastward, 
were  attempting  to  drive  the  German  advance  posts 
back.  In  this  they  had  not  been  successful,  but  had 
merely  added  to  their  previous  stupendous  losses. 

This  victory  added  fresh  laurels  to  the  crown  of  the 
victor  of  Tannenburg  and  Lodz,  and  once  more  proved 
that  strategy,  not  numbers,  is,  after  all,  the  main  factor 
in  modern  battles. 


181 


CHAPTER  X. 
THK  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  EAST 

POLAND. 

During  the  month  of  August,  while  the  events  here- 
inbefore narrated  were  taking  place  in  East  Prussia, 
and  the  Russians  had  stripped  Central  Poland,  to 
the  line  of  Warsaw  defences,  of  their  troops,  in  order 
to  aid  in  their  movement  in  East  Prussia,  the  Germans, 
perceiving  that  the  Russians  had  denuded  this  terri- 
tory of  troops  to  a  large  extent,  took  advantage  of 
this  weakness  and  pushed  forward  to  Koiii  from  'I  horn 
castwardly  through  Central  Poland.  In  the  midst  of 
other  and  more  interesting  events,  this  movement 
was  lost  sight  of.  but  by  successive  advances  towards 
the  end  of  September  it  finally  reached  Lodz,  having 
driven  the  opposing  Russians  for  l'-*n  miles  before  it. 
The  effect  of  this  showed  the  excellence  of  the  Ger- 
man strategy,  since  the  presence  of  this  column  in  this 
position  in  the  middle  of  September  paralyzed,  to  a 
very  large  degree,  the  efforts  of  the  Russian  armies 
in  the  south  of  Galicia,  and  eventually  forced  the  with- 
drawal of  Russian  troops  in  very  considerable  num- 
bers from  the  Galician  territory. 

On  arriving  at  Lodz,  about  the  .')th  of  September, 
this  column  made  no  further  effort  to  advance  for  a 
time,  and  occupied  itself  in  holding  the  territory  won. 

On  the  2r)th  of  September  General  vou  IHndenburg 
was  put  in  commancl  of  this  movement  and  given  the 
task  of  conquering  Poland,  and  fresh  German  troops 
were  added  to  enable  him  to  accomplish  his  ta>k.  One 
body  of  these  fresh  forces,  starting  from  Thorn,  ad- 
vanced along  the  left  bank  of  the  river  Vistula  and  the 
railway  to  \Vloclawek.  Another  started  from  Hreslau 
and  proceeded  via  Czestochowa  towards  Piotrkow  and 
Novo  Radomsk.  Another  advanced  from  the  direction 
of  Cracow  northeasterly  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Vis- 
tula towards  Kielce;this  advance  partly  took  the  Rus- 
sians by  surprise.  They  had  assumed  that  the  terror 
of  their  bulletins,  if  not  of  their  armies,  would  cause 
the    Germans    to    await    their    onslaught    behind    the 

132 


Poland 

strongly  entrenched  and  fortress-prptected  frontier  line 
from  Thorn  to  Czestochowa,  and  at  first  they  inter- 
posed no  formidable  obstacles  to  the  German  advance 
which  was  made  with  characteristic  rapidity,  and 
which,  by  the  8th  of  October,  had  taken  up  a  position 
extending  practically  from  Wyszogrod  to  Skierniewice; 
\ivhile  the  army  advancing  from  the  southeast  had 
nearly  attained  the  Russian  fortress  of  Ivangorod. 
So  that,  on  the  14th  of  October,  the  whole  of  that  por- 
tion of  Poland  bounded  on  the  north  and  east  by  the 
Vistula  river  was  either  in  German  possession  or  in 
German  control,  with  the  exception  of  a  small  area 
around  Warsaw  and  an  equally  small  area  around  Ivan- 
gorod. 

On  October  15th  the  advance  was  thrown  forward 
further,  and  the  Germans  penetrated  within  ten  miles 
of  Warsaw ;  on  the  16th  another  three  miles  were 
gained,  so  that  evening  the  German  forces  were  within 
seven  miles  of  the  capital  of  Poland. 

The  actual  forces  engaged  in  the  immediate  attack 
on  Warsaw  did  not  exceed  four  army  corps,  of  whom 
comparatively  few  were  first  line  troops. 

On  this  date,  the  16th  of  October,  the  City  of  War- 
saw was  in  panic  and  the  population  streamed  out  of 
the  city  in  all  directions  to  the  eastward.  The  officials, 
the  State  Bank  and  the  other  financial  institutions 
fled;  while  the  British  Colony  distinguished  itself,  ac- 
cording to  the  Warsaw  papers,  by  the  rapidity  with 
which  they  executed  their  retreat. 

As  has  been  said,  the  Russians  were  surprised,  and 
the  city  at  this  time  was  defended  by  only  two  army 
corps.  It  is  true  that  hurry  orders  had  been  sent  to 
the  Russian  military  bases,  Brest-Litovsk,  Bialystok 
and  Grodno,  to  hurry  forward  reinforcements. 

On  Sunday,  October  17th,  the  Germans  were  at  the 
edge  of  the  town,  with  their  projectiles  exploding 
within  the  town  limits.  That  afternoon  the  Russian 
defending  forces  were  at  the  last  gasp ;  cut  to  pieces 
and  discouraged,  they  had  retreated  from  their  de- 
fenses, and  there  was  a  period  at  this  time,  of  a  few 
hours,  when  the  Germans  could  have  entered  Warsaw, 
to  all  intents  and  purposes,  unopposed.  The  Germans, 
however,  did  not  know  these  facts.  It  seems  to  be  the 
only  time  in  the  campaign  either  East  or  West  that 
the  German  commanders  were  not  kept  in  thorough 
touch  with  the  enemy's  movement  by  their  air-craft, 
or  other  means  of  obtaining  intelligence;  and,  conse- 

133 


The  Campaign   in   the    East 

quently,  they  not  only  did  not  avail  themselves  of  the 
situation,  but  actually  at  this  critical  moment  ceased 
their  attack,  which,  had  they  known  it,  could  then  have 
been  driven  home  with  little  or  no  opposition. 

After  the  Russian  troops  streamed  back  into  the 
town  during  the  few  hours  that  the  German  attack 
was  suspended,  they  were,  to  a  degree,  reorganized 
and  sent  back  to  the  lines  of  defense,  so  that  when  the 
Germans  resumed  the  attack  the  road  was  no  longer 
open.  The  defending  Russians  managed  to  hold  that 
night,  and  the  next  morning  some  reinforcements 
reached  them  and  brought  the  news  that  further  and 
much  greater  reinforcements  were  actually  on  the 
way  and  would  arrive  as  soon  as  steam  could  bring 
them  there.  This  was  the  18th.  That  evening  a  divi- 
sion of  the  Siberian  troops,  hurriedly  taken  from  the 
forces  in  Galicia,  reached  the  town,  and  all  that  night 
and  all  the  next  day,  and  for  several  days  thereafter, 
the  Russians  poured  in  regiment  after  regiment  from 
the  northeast  and  south,  until  they  had  nearly  a  million 
men  assembled  at  this  critical  point. 

Some  criticism  has  been  directed  at  General  von 
Hindenhurg,  in  the  first  place,  for  having  made  a  front- 
al attack  on  Warsaw  with  such  a  comparatively  weak 
force,  and  also  for  not  having  pushed  that  attack  home 
at  the  critical  moment.  The  first  criticism  may  have 
some  elements  of  justice,  but  the  second  criticism  is  de- 
void of  foundation,  because  General  von  Hindenburg, 
in  not  pushing  the  attack  home,  only  exercised  a  salu- 
tary caution,  since  he  had  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
the  Russian  commanders  would  have  left  Warsaw  so 
comparatively  undefended,  and  all  tlic  circumstances, 
as  they  presented  themselves  at  the  time,  indicated  a 
trap  laid  by  the  Russians. 

On  the  20th  of  October  the  Russian  army  advanced 
from  Warsaw  and  in  its  turn  took  the  defensive,  and 
on  the  21st  the  Germans,  after  severe  fighting  at 
Blonie,  were  obliged  to  fall  back,  owing  to  their  left 
having  been  turned  by  another  Russian  force  which  ad- 
vanced down  the  Vistula  and  occupied  Sochaczcw.  The 
Germans'  magnificent  defense  at  Blonie  gave  the  Si- 
berians. Russia's  crack  troops,  reason  to  remember 
them  :  though  they  themselves  suffered  quite  severely. 

Tvangnrod,  during  the  time  these  events  were  hap- 
pening at  Warsaw,  was  also  being  attacked  by  the 
German's.  This  fortress,  of  the  fir'^t  class,  is  on  the 
ri\rr  \'i';tn1,T    nbotit  slxtv  miles  below  Wnr'^aw.     On 

134 


Poland 

the  16th  of  October  the  German  attacking  forces, 
which  were  also  comparatively  weak,  began  to  bom- 
bard the  fortress  with  heavy  guns,  and  the  next  two  or 
three  days  were  occupied  in  attempts  to  cross  the 
river  and  to  get  closer  to  the  fortress ;  but  in  this  they 
were  not  successful.  The  main  attack  on  the  fortress 
was  directed  from  a  little  village,  Kozienice,  a  couple 
of  miles  from  the  Vistula,  standing  on  the  ridge  which 
separates  the  plain  from  the  gully  in  which  the  Vistula 
runs. 

The  Polish  rivers,  like  the  rivers  in  the  Middle  West 
of  the  United  States,  have  gouged  out  for  themselves 
a  bed  which  lies  at  a  considerable  distance  below  the 
level  of  the  surrounding  country,  so  that  to  reach  them 
it  is  necessary  to  descend  considerably.  This  gully, 
or  valley,  varies  in  width  as  do  the  gullies  and  beds 
of  our  Western  rivers,  but  is  usually  much  wider  than 
the  actual  stream  of  the  river;  this  wideness  being 
brought  about  by  the  gouging  of  the  river  in  time  of 
flood,  when  it  rises  and  outspreads  its  usual  banks. 
Anyone  who  has  seen  the  Red  River  or  any  other  of 
the  larger  streams  in  the  southwest,  can  form  an  exact 
idea  of  the  Polish  rivers. 

This  bank  on  which  the  village  of  Kozienice  stands 
had  been,  to  a  degree,  fortified  by  the  Germans,  but 
the  nature  of  the  grounds  were  such  that  these  for- 
tifications cannot  be  said  to  be  extremely  formid- 
able. On  the  night  of  the  20th  the  Russian  troops 
managed  to  cross  the  river  well  below  the  village,  and, 
struggling  through  the  heavy  ground  on  the  river  bot- 
tom, attained  the  height  on  the  right  of  the  German 
position.  This  once  accomplished,  the  Russians 
brought  up  more  troops  until  they  were  in  such  force 
that  the  right  of  the  German  position  was  driven  in, 
which  had  the  effect  of  forcing  the  entire  German  line 
to  abandon  its  position  on  the  ridge  and  to  retreat  into 
the  woods  on  the  East.  These  woods  extended  East 
and  West  for  perhaps  ten  miles,  and  into  these  woods 
the  Russians  poured.  The  woods  were  so  thick  that 
artillery  could  not  be  handled  therein  and  the  fighting 
was  almost  entirely  with  the  bayonet  and  rifle.  The 
Russians  poured  in  division  after  division,  until  they 
outnumbered  the  Germans  over  three  to  one.  For 
nine  days  the  conflict  in  this  comparatively  small  for- 
est continued,  and  it  was  not  until  the  evening  of  the 
9th  day  that  the  Russian  forces  succeeded  in  clearing 
the  woods  of  the  enemy.     How  fierce  this  battle  was 

135 


The  Campaign   in   the   East 

may  be  reali/cd  when  it  is  stated  that  the  Russians, 
after  the  fi^lit,  buried  16.000  of  tlicir  own  dead,  and 
their  total  loss  was  probably  not  less  than  tiO.OOO  to 
62,000.  The  German  loss  was  about  v»r).0O(>:  The  effect 
of  the  driving  out  of  the  Germans  from  the  wood  was 
to  cause  them  to  fall  back  on  Radom.  which  town  the 
Russians  occupied  on  October  28th.  Kive  days  more 
broujjht  them  to  Kielce,  where,  on  Xovember  3rd,  a 
battle  which,  in  any  other  war.  would  have  l)een  con- 
sidered a  very  serious  one,  took  place,  and  which  was 
contested  with  bitterness.  The  fipht  lasted  all  through 
the  night  of  the  .'3rd  and  4th  of  Xovemi)er.  and  was  de- 
cided adversely  to  the  Gcrman-.\ustrian  force  by  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  Xovcmber  1th.  The  losses 
on  both  sides  here  were  very  heavy,  the  Russian  Cos- 
sacks, in  particular,  suffering  most  severely.  About 
two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  November  4th,  the 
Teutonic  .Mlies  began  to  retreat;  which  retreat  was 
continued  until  the  Polisli  borders  near  Cracow  and 
Czestochowa  were  reached. 

In  front  of  Warsaw,  as  has  been  said,  on  October 
21st,  the  Germans  began  to  fall  back.  On  the  22nd  the 
fighting  was  on  tiic  Bzura  and  near  Lowicz ;  and  by 
the  28th.  the  Germans  having  been  obliged  to  give 
ground  in  the  invasion  itself,  the  Russians  occupied 
Lodz.  The  German  retreat  continued ;  the  lines  of  re- 
treat being  along  the  line  of  Lowicz  towards  Thorn  in 
the  northwest  and  towards  the  Warta  River  a  little  to 
the  southwest.  And  on  the  0th  of  November  the  Ger- 
man forces  had  retreated  beyond  the  Warta  River, 
basing  themselves  on  Kalisch  and  Czestochowa.  How- 
ever, one  of  the  main  objects  of  the  original  German 
advance  had  been  achieved :  the  Russian  pressure  on 
Galicia,  to  the  south,  had  been  forced  to  relax  to  a  verj 


to  a  verv 
;ult    well 


considerable  degree.  This  had  been  a  rest 
worth  achieving,  since  the  Russians  had  been  obliged 
to  withdraw  forces  therefrom,  which  might  have,  and 
probably  would  have,  insured  the  speedy  conquest  of 
the  whole  |)rovincc. 

On  November  Hth.  the  Germans  took  up  a  defensive 
position  along  the  Warta  River,  but  the  capture  of 
Kolri.  on  the  left  bank,  by  the  Russians,  forcing  them 
to  fall  back  again,  this  retreat  carried  them  I»ack 
to  the  strongly  entrenched  j)ositions  which  had  been 
prepared  fluring  the  si.x  weeks  preceding,  for  the 
special  purpose  of  furnishing  a  defensive  line  to  bar 
any   Russian   invasion  of   Silesia      As  has  been   said, 

136 


Poland 

this  Russian  line  stretched  along  the  line  of  Kalisch 
and  Czestochowa,  along  the  Warta  River.  The  Rus- 
sians then  ceased  operations  for  several  days,  while 
waiting  to  concentrate  their  full  strength  in  men  and 
artillery  before  joining  battle  on  this  new  front  where 
the  Germans  had  chosen  the  battlefield  and  had  every 
advantage  of  study  and  preparation  of  the  territory. 

The  Germans  on  this  line  also  had  the  advantage  of 
easy  communication  with  the  rear  from  their  position 
and  consequent  improvement  in  the  supply  of  food  and 
of  artillery  projectiles. 

After  concentrating  their  army,  however,  the  Rus- 
sians arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  this  position  was 
too  strong  for  a  frontal  attack  and  began  drawing  off 
to  the  southeastward  towards  Galicia.  The  Germans, 
seeing  this,  took  advantage  of  the  Russian  indecision, 
and,  leaving  enough  men  on  this  line  to  hold  the  Rus- 
sians (and  only  enough),  transported  with  as  much 
rapidity  as  possible  all  of  the  remaining  men  north- 
wards to  Thorn,  to  which  center  they  also  drew  men 
from  East  Prussia  and  from  their  reserves;  thus  or- 
ganizing a  new  army.  Further  strength  was  gained 
by  transporting  to  this  point  a  large  part  of  the  caval- 
ry forces  which  had  hitherto  been  employed  in  the 
western  field  where  the  coming  winter  had  made  their 
services  no  longer  necessary. 

By  the  11  th  of  November  this  army  was  concen- 
trated. 

The  Russian  cavalry  had  been  raiding  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Thorn  and  even  to  the  South  of  it  across  the 
German  border.  As  usual,  the  Russians  were  imper- 
fectly acquainted  with  the  movements  of  the  enemy's 
troops,  and  this  cavalry  (mostly  Cossacks),  which  had 
rather  rashly  advanced  into  German  territory,  woke  up 
on  the  12th  of  November  to  find  itself  surrounded, 
and  was  mercilessly  cut  to  pieces  ;  not  over  ten  per  cent, 
of  its  numbers  succeeded  in  reaching  safety.  This  was 
done  by  the  cavalry  brought  from  the  western  field. 
Immediately  after  this,  this  newly  assembled  army  ad- 
vanced into  Poland  again  in  two  columns,  one  on  the 
north  and  one  on  the  south  side  of  the  Vistula.  On 
November  15th  the  army  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Vistula  attacked  the  Russians  at  Lipno,  some  twenty 
miles  north  of  Wloclawek,  and  inflicted  an  important 
defeat  upon  them,  and  continued  advancing  to  the  east- 
ward. South  of  the  Vistula,  the  Germans  advanced  to 
Plock  with  almost  incredible  speed,  and  attacked  this 

137 


The  Campaimi  m  the  East 

town;  following  this  up  by  advancing  on  Kutno, 
Lenczwei  and  Unignow,  ten  miles  south  of  Kolo.  Thus, 
in  a  few  days,  they  regained  more  than  half  the  ground 
which  they  had  ceded  in  the  last  days  of  October. 

A  battle  was  joined  here  on  the  16th  of  November, 
between  the  Russians  who  had  been  hastily  thrown 
forward  from  Warsaw  and  those  German  forces  which 
extended  in  a  line  from  Flock  on  the  Vistula  almost 
due  southwest  to  I'nignow  on  the  W'arta. 

In  the  south,  at  the  same  time,  the  force  which  was 
entrenched  on  the  southern  Warta  held  the  line  from 
Sieradz   to  Czestochowa. 

This  battle  only  lasted  a  short  time,  when  tlie  Rus- 
sians were  driven  back  badly  beaten  and  the  Germans 
resumed  their  advance,  sending  back  into  Prussia  the 
twenty  odd  thousand  prisoners  which  they  had  taken 
during  the  fight. 

The  next  day  the  Russians  were  again  defeated  be- 
tween Dubie  and  Leczyca,  and  driven  nortiieast  along 
the  Bzura  towards  Lowicz.  Continuing  to  pursue, 
the  Russians  reached  Lowicz  on  the  20th,  and,  passing 
that  place,  established  themselves  between  it  and  Ski- 
erniewice,  while,  on  the  18th,  fighting  began  around 
Lodz.  For  the  next  ten  days  a  desperate  fight  took 
place;  the  Russians  attempting  an  enveloping  move- 
ment in  the  vicinity  of  Lodz  and  Lowicz,  and  announc- 
ing, day  after  day,  in  flamboyant  bulletins,  the  anni- 
hilation of  one  army  corps,  the  capture  of  another,  the 
breaking  of  the  German  line,  and  the  panic-stricken 
retreat  of  the  entire  German  army.  Unfortunately  for 
them  in  these  bulletins,  "the  wish  was  father  to  the 
thought."  and  the  Russian  projected  movement  was 
announced  as  an  accomplished  one.  For  one  moment 
the  army  of  General  von  Mackenseii.  which  had  over- 
extended itself  in  an  effort  to  cut  the  railroad,  was  in 
danger.  But  its  cohesion  and  marching  powers,  the 
steadfastness  of  the  German  soldiers,  and  the  co-ordi- 
nation the  German  officers  had  worked  out  in  man- 
oeuvres, extricated  it  from  its  somewhat  difficult 
position ;  while  the  main  German  army,  having  re- 
ceived heavy  reinforcements,  was  able  to  resume  the 
advance,  and  in  place  of  a  Russian  victory  the  final 
outcome  of  this  two  weeks'  battle  was  the  capture  of 
Lodz  on  December  6th.  and  with  it  some  40,000  Rus- 
sian prisoners. 

It  i'-  not,  however,  to  be  supposed  that  these  results 
were  gained  without  great  losses,  though  these  losses 

138 


Poland 

were  perhaps  mitigated  in  the  minds  of  the  survivors 
by  the  knowledge  that  they  had  involved  much  heavier 
losses  upon  their  Russian  opponents.  The  deductions 
to  be  drawn  from  a  careful  study  of  the  German  offi- 
cial reports  of  this  two  weeks'  action  and  of  the  Rus- 
sian general  staff's  precis,  is  that  the  Russian  losses  in 
the  fighting  in  this  terrain  which  culminated  in  the 
capture  of  Lodz  on  the  6th  of  December  were  not  less 
than  150,000,  and  that  these  losses  were  peculiarly 
important,  in  that  three  of  the  Siberian  army  corps, 
which  are  the  best  of  the  Russian  troops,  were,  to  all 
intents  and  purposes,  wiped  out  of  existence  as  units. 

On  the  8th  of  December,  the  German  line  occupied 
a  position  stretching  from  the  south  bank  of  the  Vis- 
tula (Glovno  and  How  having  fallen  into  their  hands), 
due  south  a  distance  of  about  forty  miles  from  Warsaw. 

While  these  things  were  going  on  south  of  the  Vis- 
tula, north  of  the  Vistula  the  German  army  operating 
in  that  field  was  advancing  steadily  to  the  eastward; 
and  a  new  army,  starting  from  Soldau,  on  the  East 
Prussian  border,  had  struck  southwardly  towards 
Warsaw  from  the  north,  advancing  through  Mlawa; 
and  on  the  7th  of  December  captured  Przasnysz,  twen- 
ty miles  to  the  eastward  of  Mlawa.  At  Przasnysz 
about  10.000  Russians  were  taken  prisoners,  and  on 
the  8th  the  Germany  army  advanced  from  Przasnysz  to 
Ciechanow  on  the  railroad  leading  towards  Novo 
Georgievsk.  Here  they  were  attacked  by  a  superior 
Russian  force  and  were  successfully  driven  back  out 
of  the  positions  that  they  had  won  at  Przasnysz, 
through  Mlawa  and  back  to  and  across  the  Nieden- 
burg,  Soldau  and  Lappenburg  line  within  the  borders 
of  East  Prussia.  This  same  Russian  army  which 
forced  them  back,  reached,  with  its  left  wing,  to  Dob- 
rzyn  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula,  about  ten  miles 
from  Plock.  At  this  point,  (Dobrzyn),  when  the  Rus- 
sians reached  it,  the  Germans  on  the  north  bank  were 
discovered  attempting  to  throw  pontoon  bridges 
across  the  Vistula  near  to  the  established  communica- 
tion with  the  other  bank.  This  attempt,  the  arrival 
of  the  Russian  army  frustrated.  These  positions  were 
reached  about  Christmas. 

The  German  army  south  of  the  Vistula,  after  severe 
fighting,  forced  back  the  Russians  to  the  Bzura  river 
and  defeated  them  on  December  15th  at  Sochaczew,  a 
town  only  thirty  miles  east  of  Warsaw,  capturing  the 
railroad  communication  between  Lodz  and  Warsaw. 

139 


The  Campaign   in   the  East 

On  the  18th  the  Germans  captured  Lowicz  with  a 
great  many  prisoners,  and  driving  the  Russians  across 
the  Bzura  river,  forced  them  to  take  up  a  new  posi- 
tion along  tlic  right  l)ank  of  the  Bzura  river  on  the  line 
of  the  \'istula  river,  Sochaczew  anil  Skicrnicwice.  In 
their  retreat  the  Russians  l>urned  the  bridges  over  the 
Bzura.  Nevertheless,  the  Germans,  a  few  days  later, 
just  before  Christmas,  forced  a  passage  at  Sochaczew 
and  at  Skierniewice,  the  Russians  again  falling  back. 

Between  Christmas  and  the  first  of  January,  severe 
fighting  took  place  along  a  line  south  of  the  Vistula  and 
along  the  Bzura,  Rawka  and  Pilica  rivers,  which  re- 
sulted in  practically  no  materially  changed  position 
during  the  week.  On  this  front  this  situation  has  con- 
tinued from  the  early  days  of  January  to  the  time  of 
the  closing  of  this  record  on  the  first  of  March.  There 
has  been  severe  fighting  along  the  lines  of  tlicse  three 
rivers,  and  at  intervals  the  Germans  have  made  slight 
advances  from  their  position,  but  only  to  be  driven 
back. 

During  the  latter  weeks  of  this  period  the  character 
of  the  fighting  here  assumed  much  of  tlic  character  of 
the  fighting  in  the  West ;  that  is,  both  sides  were  so 
thoroughly  entrenched,  and  their  efforts  so  well  pro- 
tected, that  neither  side  could  make  any  impression  on 
the  line  of  the  other. 

Artillery  duels,  varying  in  severity,  have  taken  place 
from  time  to  time,  but.  as  said,  the  whole  situation  has 
remained  practically  what  it  was  in  the  early  days  of 
January. 

Another  reason  for  this  comparative  inaction  was  the 
change  in  the  weather  towards  the  middle  of  January, 
when  heavy  falls  of  snow  occurred  and  made  the  move- 
ment of  troops  and  their  train  practically  impossible 
for  some  time. 

The  campaign  in  North  I'nland,  between  the  Vistula 
river  and  the  East  Prussian  border,  was  modified  early 
in  January,  by  the  events  in  East  Prussia  which  have 
been  alrearly  narrated. 

In  South  Poland,  during  this  time  tlie  Germans  suc- 
ceedcfl  in  extending  their  lines  to  the  east  of  Czesto- 
chowa.  During  this  process  there  wcro  no  particularly 
rcmarkal)le    ocrnrrcnces,    altliough    the    advance    was 

Juite  considerable,  .so  that  when  this  record  closes  the 
rcrman  and.  in  the  .southern  extremity,  the  .Austrian 
front,  follows  the  line  to  Tomaszow,  Kiclce  and  the 
Nida  river,  to  the  Galician  border. 

140 


CHAPTER  XI. 
THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  EAST 

GALICIA 

Austria  was  able  to  mobilize  more  rapidly  than  Rus- 
sia and  to  take  advantage  of  this  fact,  it  was  planned 
at  the  start  to  invade  South  Poland.  An  army  under 
General  Dankl,  consisting-  of  about  five  army  corps, 
was  to  advance  from  its  base  on  Przemysl  and  Jaros- 
lau  and  push  upwards  between  the  Vistula  and  the 
Bug  to  Lublin  and  Kohln.  These  towns  seized, 
this  army  would  cut  the  Warsaw-Kieff  railroad  and 
throw  open  the  road  beyond  towards  the  communica- 
tions in  the  rear  of  Warsaw.  Another  army  was  placed 
under  General  von  Auffenburg  which  was  to  advance 
northeast  from  Lemburg,  thus  dominating  Eastern 
Galicia  from  the  Bug  to  the  Dneister,  which  army  num- 
bered at  the  beginning  200,000  men.  A  third  army, 
under  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand,  was  to  push 
out  from  the  left  flank  of  General  Dankl  and,  crossing 
the  Polish  border,  occupy  Kielce  and  Radom. 

As  is  known,  Russia  mobilized  faster  than  was  ex- 
pected and  as  a  result  the  Austrian  campaign  was  not 
carried  out  in  the  form  planned.  In  a  very  short  time, 
the  Russians  gathered  a  much  superior  force  to  the 
Austrians  in  front  of  them,  but  during  the  time  between 
this  concentration  and  the  taking  the  offensive,  the 
Russian  general  staff  adopted  a  delaying  plan  of  ac- 
tion. Against  the  main  Austrian  advance  of  General 
Dankl  no  serious  resistance  was  immediately  offered, 
and  it  was  permitted  to  nearly  reach  Lublin. 

General  Dankl's  army  crossed  the  frontier  west  of 
Tangorod  on  August  10th.  Slight  skirmishing  with 
the  Russian  frontier  posts  took  place  and  these  fell 
back.  A  small  fight  took  place  at  Goraj,  and  something 
more  serious  at  Krasnick,  where  the  Austrians  defeated 
a  larger  Russian  force  and  made  quite  a  number  of 
prisoners.  The  Russians  then  fell  back  towards  Lublin 
and  Kohln  to  Zamosc  on  the  right,  and  the  Archduke's 

141 


The  Campaign  in  the  East 

army  advanced  to  the  positions  which  it  had  intended 
to  take. 

General  Ivanoff,  in  the  meantime,  had  been  massing 
an  army  on  the  line  from  Lublin  and  Koliln,  a  well 
chosen  concentration  area,  as  it  was  on  one  oi  Russia's 
important  railroads  to  Warsaw  in  one  direction  and  to 
Kicft  and  Odessa  in  the  other.  From  the  middle  of 
August  the  Russian  forces  here  probably  amounted  to 
about  450,000  to  500,000  men.  The  Austrians,  when 
within  fifteen  miles  of  Lublin,  took  contact  with  tliese 
forces  and  found  themselves  checked  first,  and  then 
held  up  by  a  force  much  j^reater  than  their  own,  but  it 
was  not.  however,  at  this  time,  the  intention  of  these 
Russian  forces  to  take  the  offensive.  Events  had  to 
happen,  according  to  their  plan,  to  the  southwest 
before  the  moment  would  have  been  right  to  attack  the 
Austrian  force  opposed  to  them. 

General  von  Auffcnburg's  army  which,  as  has  been 
said.  had.  as  its  first  task,  to  threaten  but  not  to  push 
much  beyond  the  frontier  in  the  direction  of  the  Rus- 
sian fortress  Dubro,  Rorwo-Neutzh,  besides  Vladimar- 
\'olynsk.  His  chief  business  was  to  hold  back  any  Rus- 
sian advance  which  might  occur  in  this  quarter  and  to 
protect  General  Dankl  on  flank  and  rear.  As  Dankl  ad- 
vanced, skirmishes  began  all  along  this  border  of  Galicia. 
On  August  6th  the  Austrians  captured  the  I^emburg- 
Odcssa  railroad  near  Podolia  and  blew  up  an  arch  of  the 
railroad  bridge.  On  August  11th  the  town  of  Brody  on 
the  Leniburg-Kieff  railroad,  was  attacked  by  Russian 
cavalry,  and  on  August  l^Uh  a  fight  occurred  at  Sokal. 
the  terminus  of  the  railroad  line  to  Rawa  and  Ruszka 
and  Lcmburg.  The  Austrian  brigade  was  rather  roughly 
handled  here  and  fell  back  towards  Lemburg.  This 
incident  was  of  strategic  importance  and  it  was,  there- 
fore, the  most  momentous  fighting  which  had  occurred. 

On  August  17th  the  Russians  took  a  general  offen- 
sive, and  the  chief  command  of  the  army  opposing  von 
Auffenf)urg  was  given  to  General  Ruszky,  who  had 
studied  Galicia  minutely  for  many  years.  He  had  fore- 
seen that  some  day  Russia  would  attack  .\ustria  in  this 
exposed  province,  and  had  made  it  his  business,  by  all 
possible  means,  to  thoroughly  inform  himself  of  the 
topography  thereof,  even  going  so  far  as  to  spend 
months  in  that  province  in  disguise,  making  foot  jour- 
neys for  the  purpose  of  increasing  his  knowledge  of 
the  local  topography.    Associated  with  him  was  General 

142 


Galicia 

Brusiloff.  The  total  force  under  Ruszky  was  not  less 
than  14  army  corps  with  several  divisions  of  cavalry, 
a  total  well  over  650,000  men.  Thus  he  had  more  than 
twice  as  many  men  as  von  Auffenburg  could  oppose 
to  him,  and  on  finding  out  the  strength  of  his  opponents, 
von  Auffenburg  drew  on  the  Archduke's  army  for  re- 
inforcements. On  August  17th,  Ruszky,  flinging  his 
forces  into  the  Austrian  left  and  center,  crossed  the 
frontier  on  the  22nd,  and  occupied  Brody  with  no  op- 
position, on  the  23rd.  On  the  22nd,  Brusiloff,  who 
commanded  the  left  of  the  Russian  army  under  Ruszky, 
crossed  the  frontier  at  Noloczysh,  the  frontier  station 
of  the  Lemburg-Odessa  railway.  The  seizure  of  the 
railroads  gave  the  Russians  little  advantage  because 
their  railroad  equipment,  cars.,  etc.,  are  not  of  the  same 
gauge  as  that  used  by  other  European  countries,  and 
when  the  Austrians  retreated  here,  their  own  rolling 
stock  was  sent  away  before  the  retreat.  However,  a 
good  road  ran  toward  Lemburg,  along  which  Brusiloff 
sent  his  cavalry  which  forced  the  Austrians  out  of  Tar- 
nopol  after  some  fighting  on  August  23rd.  The  Aus- 
trians fell  back  to  the  line  of  the  Zlota-Lipa,  which  flows 
into  the  Dniester.  On  the  25th  and  26th  of  August  there 
was  some  heavy  fighting  along  this  river,  particularly 
at  Brazezany.  This  position  was  finally  carried  and  the 
Austrians  fell  back  towards  Halicz  on  the  Dniester. 

While  the  Russian  left  was  thus  pounding  the  Aus- 
trian right,  Ruszky  was  hammering  the  left  and  center. 
After  crossing  the  frontier  at  Brody,  Ruszky's  army 
spread  out  on  a  wide  front,  the  center  pushing  straight 
in  a  direct  line  towards  Lemburg,  while  the  right, 
moving  westwardly,  pressed  with  all  its  weight  on  the 
Austrian  left,  trying  to  drive  a  wedge  between  the 
army  of  von  Auffenburg  and  that  of  Dankl  to  the  north. 
Ruszky's  own  left  marched  southward  trying  to  join 
Brusiloff.  The  fighting  was  severe  and  both  sides 
lost  heavily,  but  here,  as  usual,  the  Russian  generals 
did  not  spare  the  lives  of  men  to  accomplish  their  end 
and  the  Austrians,  fighting  gallantly,  were  over- 
powered by  the  weight  of  numbers  and  driven  back. 
General  Ruszky  finally  succeeded  at  the  end  of  the 
week  in  forcing  his  way  into  Tomascow,  and  in  driving 
back  the  enemy's  center  to  the  Bug  and  across  the 
railroad  to  Zlocow. 

By  this  time  Brusiloff  had  brought  his  right  in  touch 
with  Ruszky's  left.    The  united  Russian  armies  then 

143 


The  Campaign  in   the  East 

ajjjxuiltcd  ihe  Austrian  j)o>iiit)n  along  tlic  seventy  or 
eighty  miles  fnmt  stretching  from  Bush  in  the  north 
to  Halicz  and  the  Dniester  on  the  south.  The  fight- 
ing here  was  very  severe,  the  severest  ])robably  on  any 
front  tluring  the  war.  and  the  Anstrians  resi>tecl  strenu- 
ously until  a  breach  was  made  in  their  lines  on  August 
31st.  This  breach  nuule  the  entire  line  give  way  and  a 
retreat  was  effected  in  some  disorder.  On  September 
2n»l  the  Austrian  army  fell  back  west  of  a  line  which 
ran  from  Grtnleck  tt)  Kawa  and  Kuska. 

When  von  .\uffenburg">  army  fell  back  from  Lem- 
burg  to  the  Gri>deck-Kawa-Kuszka  line,  it  there  found 
a  new  line  of  defense  which  had  been  prepared  for  it. 
This  retreat  in  reasonably  go<xl  order,  in  view  of  the 
arm)  *s  previous  rough  liandling.  was  quite  to  the  credit 
of  the  .Austrian  general,  and  hcrr  fresh  troops  were 
thrown  into  this  line.  Immediately  after  the  capture 
of  Lcmburg.  this  force  wa.s  attacked  at  Grodeck  in  the 
south  of  Rawa-Ruszka  ,in  the  north.  The  fighting  was 
very  severe  at  the  northern  |X)int  and  lasted  eight  whole 
days  and  nights,  the  Anstrians  fighting  gallantly,  mak- 
ing stands  in  one  single  mile  at  no  less  than  eight  dis- 
tinct points.  Owing  to  the  enormous  numerical  superi- 
ority of  the  Russians,  they  were  compelled  to  give  way, 
but  this  was  without  dishonor. 

On  this  point  we  may  cite  the  testimony  of  the  cor- 
respondent of  the  London  Times  who  examined  the 
battle  field  a  very  few  <lays  after  the  fighting  and  bears 
witness  to  the  extraordinary  tenacity,  obstinacy  and 
gallantry  with  which  the  Austrians  had  defended  their 
position  under  very  discouraging  conditions.  In  fact, 
it  may  be  said  here,  in  view  of  the  criticism  to  which 
the  Austrian  troops  had  been  subjected  by  the  Ameri- 
can press  (which  criticisms  were  the  result  of  crass  ig- 
norance), that  all  through  this  Galician  campaign  when 
Austrians  and  Russians  had  met  on  anything  like  even 
terms,  the  Russians  invariably  were  defeated.  The 
Russians  can  only  win  when  they  outnumber  their  op- 
pc)nents,  which  is  shown,  not  only  in  this  Galician  cam- 
paign, but  in  the  Polish  and  Caucasian. 

Oil  the  afternoon  of  the  eighth  day  of  battle  the  north- 
cm  end  of  the  Austrian  line  lay  at  Rawa-Ruszka,  and 
by  nightfall  of  that  day,  September  lUh,  the  centre 
gave  way,  also.  The  residt  of  this  was  that  on  the  ISth 
Saml)or  was  taken  aiul  Jaroslau  fell  on  September  21st. 
Thfiiu'li   liftwcfii   tlu'sr   two  places   there   wnc   a   heavy 

144 


Galicia 

fight  at  Jabrow,  Chrow  to  the  south  was  taken  on  Sep- 
tember 24th.  The  capture  of  this  place  surrounded  the 
fortress  of  Przemysl  on  the  east,  north  and  south,  and 
behind  this  defence  the  brave  army  of  von  Auffenburg 
had  already  taken  refuge. 

It  must  be  remembered  that,  in  considering  this  cam- 
paign, in  addition  to  the  disadvantage  of  being  out- 
numbered two  to  one,  the  Austrians  had  another  great 
and  serious  difficulty  to  contend  with.  The  country  be- 
yond the  Galician  border  and  the  city  of  Lemburg  is 
largely  inhabited  by  Ruthenians.  These  are  of  a  re- 
ligious faith  closely  resembling  the  Russian  Orthodox 
church,  and  for  many  years,  that  church  by  means  of 
secret  agents,  excited  among  the  Ruthenians,  who  are 
Slavonic  by  race,  the  desire  of  uniting  themselves  to 
the  Orthodox  mother  church  and  becoming  an  integral 
part  thereof.  This  propaganda  had  been  going  on  for 
more  than  twenty-five  or  thirty  years,  and  the  Ruthe- 
nians, when  the  Russians  entered  Galicia,  believing  the 
promises  made  by  these  agents  as  to  the  temporal  and 
spiritual  advantage  which  would  accrue  to  them  as  a 
result  of  Galicia's  becoming  Russian,  aided  the  Russian 
army  by  every  means  in  their  power,  betraying  to  them 
the  position  and  movements  of  the  Austrian  army. 

It  is  a  satisfaction  to  say,  however,  that  since  the 
Russian  occupation  of  this  portion  of  Galicia,  and  its 
coming  under  Russian  government,  the  Ruthenians 
have  found  out  that  the  old  proverb  that  "all  that  glit- 
ters is  not  gold,"  is  particularly  true  of  Russian  prom- 
ises, and  that  they  are  being  subjected  to  persecutions 
by  the  Russian  authorities  in  charge  of  this  portion  of 
Galicia,  and  are  feeling  in  more  ways  than  one  the 
thongs  of  the  Russian  knout.  A  traitor,  though  he  may 
be  of  momentary  use,  is  never  an  object  of  admiration, 
even  to  those  he  serves. 

Lemburg  is  the  largest  city  of  Galicia,  and  from  it 
radiate  railway  lines  in  all  directions.  Its  importance 
was.  therefore,  considerable  to  the  Russians,  as  it  gave 
them  direct  communication  with  Kieff,  Odessa.  Dubrow, 
Rognor  and  Warsaw.  There  need  be  no  surprise  that 
no  attempt  was  made  to  hold  Lemburg ;  the  city  is  with- 
out defenses  of  any  kind,  and  any  attempt  to  defend 
it  would  merely  have  resulted  in  its  ruin  and  destruc- 
tion. The  Russians  claim  to  have  taken  64,000  pris- 
i-ners  during  this  fight  and  they  estimate  the  Austrian 
losses  at  130,000.     These  figures  betray  the  usual  exu- 

146 


The  Campaign  in  the  East 

berance  of  Russian  imajjination.  Divided  by  two,  the 
figures  would  probably  be  more  nearly  correct. 

Alter  the  capture  of  Lemburg,  Count  Bobrinsky  was 
appointed  Governor  General  of  the  city  and  the  prov- 
ince, and  within  less  than  a  month  from  the  day  that 
the  Russians  entered  the  city, — there  being  many  Jews 
in  the  population — the  Russians  characteristically  cele- 
brated the  victory  by  a  pogrom  in  which  not  only  the 
chief  Rabbi,  but  with  him  some  sixty  or  seventy  of  his 
co-religionists  were  killed  or  wounded.  The  other  usual 
features  of  this  variety  of  festivities  were,  of  course, 
present. 

Turning  now  to  the  operations  to  the  north  where 
we  had  left  General  Dankl  facing  the  army  of  General 
Ivanutf  in  the  middle  of  August.  Nothing  much  hap- 
pened until  the  early  days  of  September.  Un  the  4th  of 
that  month  the  Russian  army  assumed  the  offensive 
along  the  line  of  front  between  the  Vistula  and  the 
Bug.  The  rcmaiiuler  of  the  troops  which  had  oppo.sed 
the  Austrian  army,  the  great  bulk  having  been  sent  to 
re-inforce  General  von  Auffenburg,  was  increased  by 
two  further  corps  ajid  a  few  (»ermans.  During  the  last 
days  of  .August  and  the  first  few  days  of  September, 
there  was  considerable  heavy  skirmishing  in  the  fron- 
tier region  between  Zomac  and  Sokal,  and  finally  the 
Russians  succeeded  in  driving  a  wedge  through  Tomas- 
cow,  inflicting  a  severe  and  definite  defeat  upon  the 
army  of  the  Archduke,  which  fell  back  upon  Tarngorod. 

On  September  2nd,  as  a  result  of  the  defeat  of  von 
Auffenburg  and  the  driving  of  this  wedge  by  the  Rus- 
sians, the  situation  of  General  Dankl's  army  became  so 
critical  that  he  was  forced  to  attempt  to  break  through 
the  Russian  defences  in  front  of  Lublin,  or.  failing 
there,  to  fall  back.  On  that  day  an  attack  was  made 
upon  the  Russian  line.  At  first  this  attack  was  success- 
ful and  the  Austrians  reached  within  a  few  miles  of 
Lublin,  but  ultimately  the  attack  was  thrown  back  and 
the  Austrians  were  forced  to  retreat.  The  Knglish  have 
filled  the  newspapers  of  the  world  with  the  reports  of 
the  scientific  strategy  which  was  displayed  by  General 
French  in  his  retreat  from  Mons  before  an  equal  force 
of  Germans.  This  retreat  was  as  nothing  compared 
to  the  difficulties  and  obstacles  which  General  Dankl 
overcame  in  drawing  off  his  army  before  a  force  of 
Russians  which  outnumbered  him  at  least  two  to  one, 
in  the  enemy's  country. 

M6 


Galicia 

Petrograd  assumed  that  this  Austrian  army  was  de- 
stroyed, and  with  the  characteristic  impetuosity  of 
statement,  which  has  been  one  of  the  two  leading  fea- 
tures of  the  Russian  bulletins  in  this  war,  the  other  be- 
ing plain  fabrication,  announced  the  fact,  but  as  in 
many  other  instances,  the  sequel  did  not  bear  them  out. 
The  exact  details  of  the  fighting  during  the  retreat  are 
lacking,  but  we  know  that  there  was  heavy  fighting  at 
Schodals,  and  again  at  Krasnick,  and  also  Frampol.  At 
Zamosc,  the  Russians  were  temporarily  held,  but  the 
retreat  continued  until  the  Austrian  army  reached  the 
frontier.  From  this  point  on  the  operations  became 
involved,  and  the  retreat  did  not  stop  until  by  Septem- 
ber 33rd,  Dankl's  army  had  been  driven  back  to  the 
line  of  the  Wisloka.  On  the  way  to  this  position  on 
the  Wisloka  on  September  13th,  in  crossing  the  San, 
they  suffered  very  severely,  the  Russians  shelling  the 
bridges  upon  which  they  crossed,  as  a  result  of  which 
many  were  forced  through  the  bridges  and  drowned  in 
addition  to  those  killed  by  the  shell  fire  itself,  and  the 
Russians  also  took  many  prisoners. 

The  Russians  were  now  in  front  of  Przemysl,  and 
they  succeeded  by  September  26th  and  27th  in  com- 
pletely investing  this  fortress  for  the  first  time.  The 
Austrian  defense  was  in  the  hands  of  General  Kus- 
maneh.  Przemysl  is  technically  a  fortified  camp  of 
considerable  circumference,  and  in  addition,  besides 
the  outer  defense  works,  in  the  centre  is  a  town  of 
over  50,000  inhabitants,  a  very  large  proportion  of 
these  being  Jews.  The  fortress  was,  on  the  occa- 
sion of  this  first  investment,  amply  provisioned  for  a 
year,  and  it  was  a  misfortune  for  the  Austrians  that 
the  fortress  was  thereafter  relieved,  since  when  it  was 
relieved,  its  store  of  provisions  and  munitions  of  war 
was  drawn  upon  to  supply  the  food  for  the  army  fight- 
ing outside,  which  had  an  unfortunate  effect  on  its  fate 
in  the  second  investment. 

As  soon  as  the  Russians  surrounded  this  fortress,  it 
was  called  upon  to  surrender.  On  refusal  an  attempt 
to  take  the  place  by  storm  was  made,  which  was  re- 
pulsed with  enormous  losses.  This  attempt  was  given 
up  and  the  Russians  planned  a  regular  investment  till 
such  time  as  heavy  siege  guns  could  be  brought  up  and 
a  way  prepared  for  assault.  In  the  middle  of  the  fol- 
lowing month,  November,  the  Austro-German  offensive 
forced  the  Russians  back  from  this  fortress,  so  that 

147 


The  Campaign   in  the  East 

there  was  unrestricted  communication  with  the  exte- 
rior world.  This  period  of  freedom  lasted  only  about 
ten  or  twelve  days,  and  when  the  Austrians  once  more 
receded,  towards  the  end  of  Noveml>er.  the  fortress 
was  aj^ain  surrounded  by  the  Russians  and  the  lines 
drawn  more  tightly  than  they  had  been  before. 

The  heavy  sic^c  gims  the  Russians  intendetl  to  bring 
up,  however,  did  not  arrive  until  well  into  January, 
1915.  At  this  time  a  determined  effort  was  beinj^  made 
to  relieve  the  fortress  from  the  direction  of  the  Car- 
pathians, and  it  was  decided  to  wait  before  bei^inning 
the  bombardment  until  the  danger  of  its  beinp  relieved 
by  this  attempt  had  passed  away,  for  even  though  un- 
successful, the  sieg^e  puns  and  their  e(iuipment  might  be 
captured.  The  real  bombardment  of  the  fortress  did 
not  begin  until  after  March  1st.  1915.  and  hence  will 
not  be  treated  here.  During  the  intervening  time  from 
the  end  of  November  to  March  1st.  the  Russians  kept 
a  large  force  of  from  rj.*). (»(»(»  to  I'lO.OOO  men  surround- 
ing the  forts,  and  from  time  to  time  making  efforts  for 
its  capture  by  st(^rtning. 

All  the  Russian  losses  in  front  of  Przemysl  are,  rea- 
sonably stated,  killed,  wounded  and  died  from  disease, 
to  have  exceeded  100.000.  At  the  end  of  September, 
the  Russians  were  in  control  of  all  of  Eastern  Oalicia, 
and  held  Lemburg.  Jaroslau,  Brody.  Busk.  Grodeck, 
Tarnopol.  Sambor.  BrazcTiany  and  other  towns  of  im- 
portance, with  the  railroad  systems  between  them. 
They  also  controlled  the  rich  Calician  oil  fields  which 
were  of  great  importance  to  the  Teutonic  allies,  and 
their  advance  guards  were  already  in  Southern  Galicia 
at  the  entrance  to  the  passes  traversing  the  Carpathians 
into  flungary.  Przemysl  alone  of  the  important 
positions  in  this  portion  of  Galicia  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  Austrians. 

Towards  the  end  of  September,  the  Austrians  began 
to  show  some  signs  of  taking  the  offensive,  which 
they  did  about  the  first  of  October,  attacking  from 
the  southwest  and  from  the  southeast,  the  main  attack 
coming  from  the  southwest.  This  advance  moved  slowly 
and  cautiously,  and,  for  a  time,  met  with  consider- 
able successes,  and  before  it  the  Russians  gradually 
fell  back,  though  bitterly  contesting  the  territory 
ceded,  until  the  first  week  in  October  when  the  Rus- 
sian line  had  reached  a  position  behind  the  San  River, 
vvhich  constituted  a  formidal)lc  obstacle  to  the  success- 
ful rush  of  the  .'\ustrian  advance. 

148 


Galicia 

Another  force  of  Austrians  made  a  diversion  a  little 
further  to  the  east,  and  succeeded  in  relieving  the 
fortress  Przemysl,  so  that,  on  October  10th,  the  entire 
western  line  of  this  fortified  camp  was  clear  of  the 
Russians,  although  the  eastward  line  was  still  invested 
by  them. 

The  Austrians  made  a  capital  mistake  in  their  treat- 
ment of  this  fortified  camp  at  this  time,  in  that  they 
drew  on  this  source  for  nearly  all  the  munitions  of  war 
and  provisions  which  were  contained  therein  and  which 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  have  sustained  the  fort- 
ress for  a  year  with  its  original  garrison.  In  the  sequel, 
as  will  appear  when  the  capture  of  this  fortress  by  the 
Russians  is  dealt  with,  this  prevented  the  fortress  from 
holding  out  the  length  of  time  which  it  would  have 
done  under  favorable  circumstances. 

About  this  time  the  autumnal  rains  set  in  and 
made  the  movement  of  troops  and  their  train  difficult; 
and  particularly  did  this  affect  the  movements  of  the 
ammunition  train. 

On  the  13th  of  October  a  very  severe  engagement 
took  place  on  the  west  bank  of  the  San,  and  fighting 
began  on  the  Przemysl  front.  On  the  16th  there  was 
very  heavy  infantry  fighting  to  the  south  and  south- 
west of  that  fortress. 

From  the  18th  to  the  22nd  of  October,  for  four  days, 
the  Austrians  tried  with  great  gallantry  to  effect  a 
crossing  of  the  San,  which  was  absolutely  essential  if 
their  offensive  was  to  be  pushed  forward  and  Galicia 
cleared  of  the  Russians.  This  effort,  gallant  as  it  was, 
was  not  successful,  and  the  Austrians  lost  heavily;  so 
heavily,  in  fact,  that  the  resumption  of  the  defensive 
by  the  Russians  was  possible. 

The  high  water  mark  of  this  Austrian  attack  seems 
to  have  been  on  or  about  the  22nd  of  October.  A 
few  days  later  the  Russians  again  began  to  advance, 
fierce  fighting  occurred  around  Jaroslau,  and  on  the 
88th  of  October  the  Austrians  received  a  severe  defeat 
near  Sambor,  a  little  further  to  the  south.  The  29th, 
30th  and  31st  of  October  fighting  continued  between 
the  Austrian  rear  guards  and  the  Russian  advance 
guards,  and  the  Austrians  were  slowly,  but  surely, 
forced  backward.  This  retreat  was  conducted  with 
great  skill  on  the  part  of  the  Austrian  general,  von 
Auffenberg;  and  particularly  did  Gen.  Bohm-ErmolH, 
who  was  in  command  of  the  Austrian  Cavalr}^  Force, 

149 


The  Campaign  in  the  East 

distingui>h  himself,  but  the  Russians,  who  had  been 
reinforced,  outnumbered  the  Austrians  so  greatly  that 
tlicre  was  no  possibility  of  successful  opposition  by 
the  Austrians  to  the  Russian  flood  of  numbers. 

On  the  22nd  of  November  the  Russians  definitely 
assumed  the  offensive  along  the  whole  line  of  the 
San,  and  began  crossing  the  river  to  the  westward, 
which  operation  they  succeeded  in  completing  by  the 
ith  of  November,  establishing  themselves  in  well 
fortified  positions  on  the  west  bank  of  that  river. 

On  November  6th  the  Austrians  were  in  full  retreat, 
and  this  retreat  did  not  end  until  towards  the  end  of 
the  month  when  the  River  Dunajcc  was  reached  and 
crossed  by  them,  when  they  made  a  stand  on  the  other 
side  of  this  stream.  Their  hold  here,  the  Russians  were 
never  able  to  break.  The  west  bank  of  the  River 
Dunajec  was,  for  northern  Galicia,  the  limit  of  the  Aus- 
trian retreat.  It  is  true  that  at  this  time  there  were 
various  reports,  emanating  from  partisan  sources,  of 
the  city  of  Cracow  hoing  invested  by  the  Russians  and 
its  siege  begun,  but  these  reports  had  no  basis  in  fact, 
and  Cracow  itself  was  never  very  seriously  menaced. 
Some  few  reconnoitering  parties  of  Russians  did  cross 
the  Dunajec  and  push  their  raids  a  little  to  the  west- ' 
ward  of  this  river,  but  these  attacks  were  sporadic  and 
presented  no  serious  danger  to  the  town. 

When  the  Russians  found  that  they  were  unable  to 
break  through  this  barrier  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
Dunajec.  they  turned  tlieir  attention  to  the  south,  and 
successful  advances  carried  them  through  Jaslo,  Krasno 
and  Sanok  to  the  foothills  of  the  Carpathians,  and,  in 
some  cases,  they  forced  the  passes  leading  through 
these  mountains  and  advanced  down  the  southern 
slope  to  the  first  town  in  Hungary.  Bartficld  and  the 
Munkacs  region  being  the  extreme  southern  limits  of 
this  advance.  From  these  towns,  however,  earlv  in 
December,  they  were  expelled  and  thrown  back  to  the 
northern  «;lopc  of  the  Carpathians. 

In  East  Galicia  their  progress  was  practically  unim- 
peded. Moving  from  I.embnrg  southcastwardly.  they 
attacked,  one  after  another,  the  towns  of  Stry.  Halicz, 
Stanislau  and  Kolomea.  and  overran  all  ca^^tcrn  Galicia. 
The  .Austrians  were  not  here  in  great  force,  .nnd.  as 
usual,  the  Russians  were  present  in  crushing  numbers, 
so  that  there  was  little  left  for  the  .Xiistrians  to  do  but 

to    <.tr,-.t 

150 


Galicia 

The  Russians  continued  this  advance  into  the  Austrian 
crown  lands  of  Bukowina,  which  lie  in  the  extreme  south- 
east of  Galicia,  between  that  province  and  Hungary. 
Czemowitz  fell  into  Russian  hands  on  the  27th  of  No- 
vember, and  tlie  Russian  movement  southward  in  that 
province,  while  resisted  strongly  by  the  Austrians,  pur- 
sued a  victorious  course,  town  after  town  falling  into 
their  hands,  until,  by  the  middle  of  January,  not  only 
had  Bukowina  been  completely  invested,  but  detachments 
of  Russian  troops  were  moving  along  the  Roumanian 
border  in  Transylvania  and  across  the  mountain  passes 
of  southern  Bukowina,  Borgo,  Rodna  and  Strol  into 
northeastern  Hungary,  while  all  the  other  mountain 
passes  of  the  Carpathians,  from  the  Borgo  to  the  Uzsok, 
had  again  fallen  into  Russian  hands. 

At  this  time,  however,  Hungary  became  alarmed,  and, 
as  a  result  of  her  appeals,  Germany  came  to  the  rescue 
and  a  forward  movement,  supported  by  German  troops, 
was  begun.  This  forward  movement  began  on  the  Buko- 
winean  end  of  the  line,  and,  during  the  month  of  January, 
and  early  February,  this  fighting  was  pushed  with  such 
energy  that  the  Russians  were  completely  cleared  out  of 
Bukowina;  the  capital,  Czernowitz,  being  retaken  c«i 
the  first  of  February,  the  Russians  being  driven  over  the 
border  a  few  days  later. 

This  offensive  was  then  pushed  to  the  northwest,  and 
the  Russians  were  successfully  forced  out  of  Kolomea, 
Nadworna  and  Stanislau,  and  thrown  back  to  the  other 
side  of  the  north  bank  of  the  Dniester  River,  north  of 
Halicz. 

As  the  record  closes,  these  advances  were  held,  and 
eastern  Galicia,  to  the  line  of  the  Dniester  and  Pruth 
Rivers,  had  been  completely  cleared  of  the  invading 
forces. 

During  these  months  in  the  Carpathian  Mountains 
the  tide  of  battle  ebbed  and  flowed.  One  day  the  Rus- 
sians were  successful  in  making  an  advance,  to  be 
hurled  back  the  next.  And  this  fighting  went  on  under 
tremendous  difficulties,  occasioned  by  the  weather  con- 
ditions in  the  mountains.  The  northern  slope  of  the 
Carpathians  is  one  of  the  coldest  regions  of  Central  Eu- 
rope, and  the  temperature  drops  lower  and  the  snow- 
fall is  much  heavier  than  it  is  in  Northern  Poland. 
The  Austrian  and  Russian  troops  fought  under  condi- 
tions of  great  hardship  all  of  these  months  of  Decem- 
ber, January  and  February. 

151 


The  Campaign   in   the  East  ' 

The  ol)ject  of  the  Austriaiis  was  to  prevent  the  Rus- 
sians from  p<nirinp  from  the  Carpatliians  into  Hungary 
and  establishing  themselves  there;  and  this  the  Aus- 
trians  succeeded  in  achieving,  though  some  of  the  most 
violent  figliting  in  the  world's  history  took  place  in 
these  mountains  at  a  height  of  from  4,000  to  G.OOO  feet 
in  deep  sncnv. 

On  the  first  of  March  the  general  position  continued 
as  alx^ve.  and  may  be  descril)cd  as  iH'ing  that  the  Rus- 
sians held  all  the  passes  of  the  Carpathians  from 
Delatyn  Pass  westward,  including  the  approaches  to 
the  Heskid.  Turka,  directly  north  of  the  Uzsok,  the 
approaches  to  Lupkow  and  the  Dukla  Pass,  while  the 
Pass  of  Mezo  I^borcz  was  in  their  hamls  and  they  had 
here  succeeded  in  establishing  themselves  to  a  degree 
on  the  southern  slope  of  the  mountain. 

Too  much  praise  cannot  be  given  to  the  Austrian 
Army  for  its  determined  defense  of  the  southerly  slopes 
of  the  line  of  the  Carpathians  in  this  three  months' 
battle  from  the  end  of  Xovcmbcr  to  the  first  of  March. 
By  holding  here,  they  made  the  Russian  campaign 
come  to  a  standstill,  and  a  standstill  is  as  apt  to  l>e  a 
fatality  in  military  campaigning  as  in  the  battle  of  life; 
remaining  stationary  for  any  considerable  time  is  apt 
to  be  followed  by  retrogressive  movements ;  and  of 
this  retrogressive  movement  on  the  part  of  the  Rus- 
sians, the  first  warnings  could  be  noticed  in  the  latter 
days  of  February. 

Much  criticism  and  much  sarcasm  have  fallen  upon 
the  Austrian  Army  during  these  three  months,  but 
probably  no  army  in  any  recent  campaign  in  Europe 
had  to  contend  with  such  great  difficulties  as  did  the 
Austrian  Army  during  this  period,  and  the  verdict  of 
history  will  certainly  be  that  it  acquitted  itself  with 
great  distinction  under  verv  adverse  circumstances. 


152 


CHAPTER  XII. 
TURKO-RUSSIAN  CAMPAIGN 


Turkey  had  had  in  the  last  ten  years  a  rather  trou- 
bled history,  not  only  internally,  but  externally.  The 
revolt  of  the  young  Turks  in  June,  1908.  reversed  the 
government  of  the  empire,  and  in  1911  Italy  attacked 
her,  gained  Tripoli  and  seized  some  of  the  Turkish 
islands.  In  1912  the  Balkan  League  made  an  attack 
upon  Turkey  and  succeeded  in  almost  driving  her  out 
of  Europe,  in  fact,  her  frontier  v^as  pushed  very  close 
to  Constantinople,  the  Enos-Midia  line  being  desig- 
nated as  Turkey's  western  frontier  by  the  treaty  of 
peace.  Thereafter,  however,  when  Bulgaria,  Servia 
and  Greece,  her  former  allies,  came  to  blows,  Turkey 
recaptured  Adrianople,  and  retained  that  city  by  the 
treaty  of  Bucharest. 

For  some  years  the  Turkish  army  had  been  under- 
going reorganization  under  German  direction,  and  in 
the  autumn  of  1913,  the  German  military  mission  had 
largely  increased  in  numbers,  and  apparently  has 
achieved  a  very  considerable  result,  backed  as  it  was 
and  is  by  the  influence  of  Enver  Pasha,  the  ablest  man 
who  has  become  a  power  in  Turkey  for  many  years. 
The  Turks  are  naturally  good  fighters,  particularly  the 
infantry,  which  has  always  shown  itself  to  be  relied 
upon  for  a  stubborn  defense,  but  the  question,  of 
course,  arises  as  to  whether  in  the  short  time  that  has 
been  available  for  the  reorganization  and  training  of 
the  army  anything  like  efficient  results  have  been 
brought  about. 

About  5,000  German  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  have  been  injected  into  the  Turkish  army,  and 
this  has  presumably  given  strength  to  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  troops. 

On  October  30th  the  Russian  ambassador  demanded 
his  passports  and  left  Constantinople  the  next  day,  and 
Turkey  had  entered  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Teutonic 
allies.  When  the  war  began  the  Turkish  army  was 
mobilized  almost  at  once  and,  so  far  as  can  be  exactly 

153 


Turko-Russian   Campaign 

computed,  there  were  under  the  colors  on  October  31st, 
some  oJO.OUii  trainctl  men  and  irregulars,  witli  men  in 
process  of  training  to  an  e(iual  number.  Of  this  army 
about  200,000  were  left  in  and  aroiuid  Constantinople, 
and  about  150,000  were  thrown  toward  the  Russian 
frontier,  the  remainder  being  held  for  the  invasion  of 
Persia  and  the  movements  toward  Hg)pt. 

Very  shortly  after  Turkey  entered  the  war,  England, 
who  had  for  many  years  been  supreme  in  Egypt,  though 
recognizing  the  sovereignty  of  the  Turks  over  that  coun- 
try, threw  off  the  mask  and  deposed  the  Khedive,  elevat- 
ing a  member  of  his  family  to  the  rather  precarious  posi- 
tion of  Sultan  under  British  protection.  The  EngHsh 
had  also  maintained  a  garrison  force  of  approximately 
10,000  to  12,000  men  in  Eg>'pt  from  the  British  regular 
army,  and  had  in  addition  organized  and  officered  the 
native  army.  At  the  commencement  of  the  war,  the  regu- 
lar troops  had  been  withdrawn,  but  their  places  had  been 
taken  by  troops  fumished  by  Australia,  Canada  and  a 
considerable  force  of  English  second  line  troops,  the 
so-called  Territorials.  It  is  impossible  to  say  how  many 
men  were  thus  mustered,  but  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the 
a&Ri'^&^tc  amounted  to  several  times  that  of  the  regular 
British  garrison  withdrawn. 

The  cajnpaign  against  Russia  was  opened  by  the  Rus- 
sians early  in  November,  who.  after  various  skirmishes 
with  small  bodies  of  Turkish  troops,  succeeded  in  cap- 
turing a  position  dose  to  Koprikevi  on  the  road  to  Erze- 
rum.  The  frontier  is  a  mountain  wall  running  from  the 
Black  Sea  on  the  west  to  Ararat  on  the  cast,  and  the 
motmtains  there  attain  a  vcrv  great  height,  in  places 
reaching  lO.oOO  to  11.000  feet.  The  only  roarls  afford- 
ing communication  cross  these  mountain  heights  at  right 
angles  and  arc  buried  in  snow  during  the  winter.  There 
is  one  railroad  running  south  from  Kars  to  Sari  Kamish 
just  north  of  the  Turkish  frontier.  Batum  is  the  centre 
of  the  Russian  oil  fields,  and  is  located  on  the  Black  Sea, 
j^  little  north  (>f  the  frontier. 

•  The  Ru'^siau  troops,  who  advaiKed  to  Kopri  Keui,  did 
not  remain  there  long,  as  on  November  13th  the  Turks, 
by  this,  had  got  up  a  force  of  troops  which,  though  still 
inferior  to  the  Russian  troops  in  point  of  numl>crs.  were 
able  to  clrive  them  out.  The  Russians,  however,  were 
strongly  reinforced  and  after  three  days'  fighting,  on 
November  SJoth  again  took  possession  of  the  town. 

'I'hc  Turks    howrvcr,  in  the  plan  of  campaign  which 

154 


Turko-Russian  Campaign 

they  had  adopted,  had  no  intention  of  acting  upon  the 
defensive.  Towards  the  end  of  November  they  started 
an  advance  from  a  base  at  Erzerum  where  by  this  time 
they  had  concentrated  three  army  corps.  The  Russian 
mihtary  base  was  Kars.  The  distance  between  these  two 
positions  is  about  100  miles,  and  both  are  situated  son.  e 
6,000  feet  above  the  sea,  while  the  road  between  them 
rises  to  a  much  greater  height,  the  whole  country  b  .- 
tween  being  a  jumble  of  mountain  ranges  and  hif^h 
valleys.  The  Turks  expected  and  assumed  that  the 
Russians  would  move  their  main  forces  forward  from 
Kars  to  Erzerum,  because  by  this  road,  the  railroad  as 
far  as  Sari  Kamish  could  be  utilized  and  would  bring 
the  Russian  troops  to  within  fifteen  miles  of  the  Turk- 
ish frontier.  This  Russian  force  advancing  along  this 
line  was  to  be  held  and,  at  the  same  time,  columns  would 
be  sent  around  on  the  left  for  an  enveloping  attack 
against  the  Russians'  right  flank  and  their  base  at  Kars. 
Another  Turkish  force  was  to  advance  from  the  coast 
against  Ardahan  and  form  the  extreme  Turkish  1-^ft. 

Enver  Pasha  disposed,  all  told,  of  perhaps  120,000 
men  to  carry  out  this  manoeuvre;  the  Russians  out- 
numbered him  by  about  30,000.  The  Russians  were  at 
first  pushed  back  to  Khorusau,  which  is  about  30  miles 
south  of  Sari  Kamish,  and  held  this  place  through  heavy 
fighting  to  the  first  of  January  or  thereabouts.  An- 
other force  moved  to  the  north  on  Ardahan  in  order  to 
ultimately  occupy  Kars  and  to  cut  the  railroad  running 
from  Sari  Kamish  to  that  place.  This  force  succeeded 
in  capturing  Ardahan  on  January  1st.  The  remnants  of 
the  9th  and  10th  army  corps,  which  had  struggled  through 
the  mountains  at  great  heights,  and  were  greatly  impeded 
by  snow  in  so  doing,  were  unable  to  join  the  11th  corps 
at  Sari  Kamish  on  Christmas  day  as  intended,  but  the 
10th  finally  got  through  and  began  attacking  the  rail- 
road north  of  this  place  two  or  three  days  later.  The 
9th  corps  got  up  late  and,  though  it  occupied  Saganuk 
Heights  at  Sari  Kamish,  it  arrived  too  late  to  permit 
the  movement  being  carried  out  as  originally  planned. 
The  10th  corps,  as  a  result  of  being  unsupported,  was 
driven  out  of  its  position  on  January  1st  and,  on  January 
3rd,  the  first  corps  was  driven  out  of  Ardahan.  In  both 
of  these  actions  the  Russian  force  outnumbered  the  Turks. 

Thus  the  10th  and  1st  corps  being  in  retreat,  the  9th 
corps  north  of  Sari  Kamish  found  itself  in  a  desperate 
position,  and  was  surrounded  and  very  badly  cut  up. 

155 


Turko-Russian   Campaign 

The  Russians,  with  their  customry  disregard  for  the 
truth,  reported  that  they  had  captured  the  entire  9th 
corps.  This  was  an  absolute  falsehood  ;  they  captured 
some  6,000  men  together  with  Iskan  Pasha,  and  killed 
and  wounded  about  4,000  more;  the  remainder  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  the  base.  The  11th  corps  proceeded 
from  lieyond  Kliorusau  and  forced  its  way  to  Karanghu, 
thus  saving  the  lOth  corps,  since  tlic  Russians  were 
compelled  to  cease  their  pursuit  of  the  lOth  corps  and 
hurry  troops  to  Karanghu  where  a  long,  fierce  struggle 
began  and  lasted  until  January  17th  when  the  11th 
corps  was  defeated,  but  drew  off  in  good  order  towards 
Erzerum,  which  it  reached  after  a  heavy  fight  at  Yeni- 
koi.  The  10th  corps,  thanks  to  this  diversion  by  the 
11th  corps,  succeeded  in  reaching  its  base  and  was 
joined  by  tiie  remainder  of  the  9th  and  1  Ith  corps.  In 
the  north  the  1st  corps  was  driven  from  Ardahan  and 
the  Chorok  valley. 

At  the  end  of  January  the  Turks  made  another 
movement  forward  in  the  country  around  the  Chorok 
River  and  the  region  of  Sultain  Seilem.  At  -Alty  they 
also  resumed  the  offensive,  pushing  forward  a  column 
which,  however,  was  held.  [)uring  February  the  Turks 
forced  their  offensive  forward  and  succeeded  in  driving 
the  Russians  completely  out  <>f  Turkish  territory,  and 
in  the  last  days  of  March  fighting  was  resumed  in  Rus- 
sian territory  towards  Ratum,  .Mty  and  Sari  Kamish, 
and  a  forward  movement  towards  Kars  was  once  more 
initiated.  The  Russian  bulletins  concerning  this  fight- 
ing are  greatly  to  be  distrusted,  even  more  so  than  their 
bulletins  of  events  in  Poland  and  Oalicia.  In  the  fight- 
ing in  early  January,  they  announced  that  thev  had 
taken  74.000  prisoners  in  one  week.  Thi*n,  subsequently, 
in  February,  apparently  forgetful  of  their  assertion  c  n 
ccrning  this  week  in  January,  they  announced  that  the 
total  Turkish  prisoners  taken  from  the  beginning  of  hos- 
tilities to  the  mifidlc  of   February,  amounted  to  17.450! 

Another  campaign  between  the  Turks  and  the  Tv.s 
sians  took  place  in  Persia.  It  will  be  remembered  th.it 
Russia  has  been  for  many  years  stealing  Persian  terri- 
tory in  the  north  and  has  generallv  interfered  with  and 
harasser!  the  Persian  gr)vcrnment.  her  object  l>eing  to 
bring  about  a  condition  of  anarchy  there,  whi  Mi  would 
give  her  a  plausible  excuse  for  the  annexatiop.  of  th.it 
country.  In  this  laudable  scheme  for  the  past  throe  or 
four  years,  she  has  had  the  support  of  Great  Rritain, 
who.  herself,  is  desirous  of  annexing  that  portion  of 

166 


Turko-Russian   Campaign 

Persian  territory  which  surrounds  the  Persian  Gulf. 
In  the  west  and  south,  Turkey  has  encroached  upon 
Persian  territory  and  has,  to  a  small  degree,  pushed 
her  boundary  forward  to  the  west  side  of  Lake  Urmia. 
Affairs  in  Persia,  besides,  have  been  complicated  by 
internal  dissension. 

Fighting  took  place  between  the  Turks  and  the  Rus- 
sians around  Lake  Urmia,  to  the  north  of  Lake  Urmia 
in  November  and  again  in  December,  with  indecisive 
results.  This  fighting,  which  was  of  an  irregular  char- 
acter, continued  in  this  region  all  through  January  and 
February,  neither  side  seeming  to  obtain  any  perma- 
nent advantage.  Further  to  the  south  the  Turks  made 
an  advance  in  the  early  part  of  January  and  entered 
Tabriz,  and  advanced  further  to  Sufian  and  Marand, 
on  the  south  towards  Julfa.  The  Russians  sent  a  force 
southward  and,  after  defeating  the  Turks  at  Sufian,  re- 
entered Tabriz.  The  last  of  January  the  Turks  made 
another  advance  and  again  drove  the  Russians  out  of 
Tabriz  and  re-took  Sufian.  Towards  the  end  of  Feb- 
ruary the  Russians  again  took  Sufian  and  fighting  was 
going  on  between  this  place  and  Tabriz  late  in  Feb- 
ruary. 

Near  the  Persian  Gulf  there  has  been  fighting  be- 
tween the  Turks  and  English.  The  English  had  some 
years  before  practically  annexed  the  town  of  Basra 
at  the  head  of  the  Gulf  and  established  a  protectorate 
by  rather  dubious  means  over  Koweit  on  this  western 
side  near  Basra.  Before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
the  government  of  India,  in  whose  jurisdiction  these 
two  non-British  towns  are  placed,  deemed  it  prudent 
to  strengthen  its  forces  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  To  this 
end  the  Poona  Brigade  was  sent  to  the  island  of  Bah- 
rain, where  it  had  arrived  before  war  broke  out  be- 
tween Turkey  and  Great  Britain. 

This  island  is  also  not  British  territory.  It  seems 
peculiar  that  England  should  violate  the  rule  of  the 
sanctity  of  neutral  territory  in  the  Gulf  of  Persia  which 
she  so  loudly  asserts  in  Europe.  When  hostilities  broke 
out  between  Turkey  and  Great  Britain,  this  brigade 
was  moved  forward  and  reached  the  bar  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Shatt-el-Arab,  and  mounted  the  stream  to  the 
village  of  Faro  which  was  immediately  taken.  A  small 
garrison  was  left  here  and  the  mai;i  force  proceeded  up 
the  river  to  Abadan,  the  headquarters  of  the  Anglo- 
Persian  Oil  Company,  of  somewhat  peculiar  history. 

167 


Turko-Russian   Campaign 

The  expedition  passed  this  place  and  proceeded  lo  San- 
iyeh  where  it  was  disembarked.  Un  November  11th  a 
Turkish  reconnoitering  force  attacked  the  position.  On 
the  Tith,  having  been  joined  in  the  nicantnne  by  rein« 
torcemenls,  the  entire  force  advanced  towards  Basra, 
and  after  a  fairly  warm  figlit  at  Saliil  in  wljicli  the 
British  casuaUics  were  al)out  lou,  the  Turks  evacu- 
ated Basra  and  the  British  river  force  entered  the  city 
on  November  '^Srd.  The  Turks,  who  retreated  from 
Basra,  toc)k  up  a  position  at  Kurna  at  tlic  junction  of 
the  Tigris  and  Euphrates,  these  rivers  beiniaf  known  as 
Shait-ei-Aral).  from  this  point  to  the  sea. 

Un  December  'Jnd  the  British  started  an  expedition 
against  Kurna  by  river  forces  and  by  troops.  Eventu- 
ally on  December  'Jth  this  town  was  taken,  but  only 
after  a  gallant  defense  by  the  Turks,  who  lost,  approx- 
imately, :i,on(»;  the  I'.ritish  casualties  were  within  the 
vicinity  of  5U(>. 

In  January  some  5,000  Turks  estal)lished  themselves 
on  the  Katta  Canal,  about  seven  miles  from  Mezera 
Camp,  These  were  driven  out  on  January  20th  by  a 
British  force  advancing  from  both  sides  of  the  river 
from  Kurna  to  Mezera.  but  only  after  the  British  had 
suffered  rather  heavily.  After  this  episode  until  the 
end  of  February,  no  further  hostilities  have  been  re- 
ported from  this  region. 

Sixty-five  miles  south  of  the  Damascus-Mecca  rail- 
road, across  the  sandy  plain  of  Tina,  lies  Egypt.  Across 
this  jilain  in  the  last  year  of  the  18th  century.  Napoleon 
had  moved  an  army,  and  from  that  time  to  the  present, 
it  has  never  been  crossed  by  a  military  force,  in  fact 
such  crossing  was  deemed  impossible.  When  the  Turks 
made  up  their  minds  to  launch  an  expedition  against 
the  Suez  Canal  and  against  Egypt,  they  planned  to  cross 
this  sandy  desert,  the  very  idea  of  their  doing  so  being  a 
source  of  amusement  to  tlieir  opi)oncnts.  Nevertheless, 
they  did.  They  moved  forward  in  twct  columns, — 
from  Jerusalem  to  El  Arish,  and  thence  to  Kantara  on 
the  Canal,  following  the  westerly  caravan  route,  while 
another  force  inovcd  along  the  older  caravan  route,  from 
Akaba  towards  the  town  of  Suez.  The  force  comiK)S- 
ing  this  later  expedition  was  mostlv  irregulars  with  a 
backl)one  of  regular  artillery  and  a  small  force  of  regu- 
lar military. 

The  British  had  concentrated  on  the  canal  a  force 
amounting  to  alK)Ut  70,000,  the  bulk  of  which  were  Aus- 
tralians with  some  few   British   regular  troops  intcr- 

158 


Turko-Russian   Campaign 

mingled.  Owing  to  their  loyalty  being  doubted,  no 
native  Egyptian  troops  were  with  this  force.  In  fact, 
at  this  time  as  at  the  present,  the  attitude  of  the  na- 
tives in  Kgypt  was  giving  the  British  just  cause  for 
anxiety.  Their  high-handed,  arbitrary  course  in  de- 
throning the  legitimate  Khedive  and  in  substituting  for 
him  a  creature  of  their  own,  had  aroused  great  resent- 
ment among  the  native  Egyptians,  who  saw  in  this 
action  the  last  shred  of  their  independence  vanish. 

This  British  force  entrenched  itself  along  the  canal, 
protecting  its  front  by  all  the  many  devices  used  in 
modern  warfare,  had  with  it  a  reasonably  strong  force 
of  artillery,  and  was  further  supported  by  the  guns  of 
the  warships  in  the  canal,  of  which  the  British  at  this 
time  took  absolute  possession,  closing  it  to  commerce, 
although  it  does  not  belong  to  Great  Britain  and  does 
belong  a  private  company. 

Towards  February  1st  the  Turkish  advance  guard 
reached  the  canal  near  Suez  and  succeeded  in  driving 
the  British  across  the  canal  to  the  west  bank.  The 
British  report  of  this  series  of  actions,  which  took  place 
at  this  point,  and  which  represents  them  as  skirmishes 
of  no  particular  importance,  and  with  little  loss  to  them 
are  not  entirely  to  be  relied  upon.  The  Turks,  as  we 
will  find,  when  the  full  list  of  casualties  at  this  point 
are  made  public,  inflicted  much  heavier  losses  upon 
the  British  than  they  had  been  given  credit  for,  and  did 
succeed,  as  has  been  said,  in  driving  them  completely 
from  their  positions  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Canal. 

Except  in  small  parties  too  weak  to  be  effective 
against  the  force  on  the  west  bank  where  was  the  main 
British  position,  the  Turkish  forces  could  not  cross  the 
Canal,  and,  consequently,  after  several  days  of  effort, 
the  main  body  withdrew  and  retired  a  few  marches  into 
the  desert  where  it  is  still  maintaining  itself.  In  the 
interval  British  reconnoitering  forces  have  endeavored 
to  determine  its  position  and  some  skirmishing  has 
taken  place. 

The  other  expedition  against  the  Canal,  which  ad- 
vanced along  the  western  route  from  El  Arish,  sent 
forward  advance  parties  which  reached  the  Canal  at 
El-Kantara  and  took  contact  with  the  British  forces 
there  a  few  days  later  than  the  arrival  of  the  eastern 
expedition  at  Suez.  For  some  reason  not  known  this 
force  retreated  after  a  few  skirmishes  with  the  British, 
and  rejoined  its  main  body,  which  went  into  camp  a 
little  to  the  north  of  El  Arish  where  it  now  is. 

159 


Turko-Russian   Campaign 

The  future  developments  of  the  Turkish  campaign 
against  Hg}pt  will  depend  largely  on  the  result  of  the 
attack  of  the  Allies  on  Constantinople  and  Smyrna  and, 
possibly,  also  on  the  completion  of  a  branch  railroad 
which  the  Turks  are  said  to  be  ctmslructing  towards  the 
Suez  Canal  from  the  Damascus  and  Mecca  Railway. 

In  addition  to  the  political  war,  the  Sultan  of  Tur- 
key, who  is,  at  the  same  time,  Calipha,  and  successor 
of  the  i'rophet,  in  the  eyes  of  the  majority  of  those 
professing  the  Mohammedan  religion,  declared  the 
Jedah,  or  Holy  War,  which  was  duly  proclaimed  by  the 
Sheik  ul  Islam,  the  religious  head  of  the  Church.  By 
tliis  declaration  of  a  Holy  War  upon  Great  Britain, 
France  and  Russia,  it  became  the  duty  of  every  true 
believer  to  oppose  these  Powers,  not  only  with  arms, 
but  by  every  other  means  in  his  power:  and  this  proc- 
lamation, being  addressed  to  the  whole  orthodox  Mo- 
hammedan world,  was  expected  to  produce  considerable 
results,  not  only  in  Turkey  itself,  but  among  the  Mo- 
hammedans living  in  other  political  units  of  the  world; 
more  particularly  India,  Persia,  Afghanistan,  Egypt, 
the  French  Colonies  on  the  northern  coast  of  Africa, 
and  other  places  where  the  Mohammedan  element  of  the 
population  is  the  stronger. 

At  the  present  writing,  the  results  of  this  proclama- 
tion of  the  Holy  War  are  not  fully  known.  There  have 
been  rumors  and  reports  of  Mohammedan  unrest  and 
uneasiness  occasionally  translating  themselves  into 
uprisings  in  various  parts  of  the  world ;  notably,  the 
northwestern  border  of  India.  There  have  also  been 
reports  of  unrest  in  Algeria,  Tunis  and  Morocco,  while 
the  situation  in  Egypt  is  said  to  be  one  of  extreme 
tension. 

How  serious  and  how  grave  the  situation  really  is, 
cannot  definitely  be  said,  owing  to  the  extreme  rigidity 
of  the  censonship  of  all  news  coming  from  countries 
which  would  be  liable  to  be  affected  by  this  declaration 
of  a  Holy  War.  But,  from  scattering  reports  which 
leak  through,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  in  most  of  the  Mo- 
hammedan countries  there  is  great  uneasiness,  and 
that  the  situation,  particularly  in  India,  is  a  very  grave 
one.  The  revolt  of  the  Mohammedan  regiment  of 
British  Indian  trf>ops  at  Singapore,  early  in  the  year, 
which  was  looked  upon  as  sporadic  and  unimi>ortant  at 
the  time  of  its  occurrence,  in  the  light  of  suhscqiicnt  re- 
ports docs  not  seem  so  unimportant  as  originally  thought. 

160 


Turko-Russian   Campaign 

Huucvcr,  the  facts  necessary  to  form  an  opinion  of  the 
extent  and  gravity  of  the  results  produced  by  this  Holy 
War  are  not  fully  known,  and  so  the  consifleration  of 
the  subject  must  be  postponed  until  later,  when  the  facts 
are  more  fully  known  and  when,  as  a  result,  a  more  in- 
telligent judgment  can  be  arrived  at. 


161 


CHAPTER   XIII. 


THK     SKKHIAN     CAMI^AKJN 


The  Serbian  army  at  the  time  of  ihc  declaration  of 
war  with  Austria  liad  had  only  six  months'  rest  from 
the  war  with  llulgaria.  and  its  troops  were  thus,  more 
than  those  of  any  other  nation,  war  hardened,  antl,  while 
in  fact  they  were  outnunil)ered.  yet  it  nnist  he  remein 
bered  that  nearly  every  man  was  a  veteran,  v^erbia 
Iwpan  mobilization  «>n  July  *^<ith,  the  date  that  Baron 
Giesl.  the  Austro-1  lungarian  minister,  left  Belp^rade.  On 
the  da\  of  declaration  of  war.  which  was  July  2Sth.  she 
had  but  a  few  troops  at  lalj^rade.  it  seems  peculiar 
that  the  Austrians  (lid  not  immediately  seize  that  city, 
even  though  with  a  small  ft>rce.  as  it  would  have  .saved 
them  much  trouble  thereafter.  However.  Austria  had 
at  this  time  onlv  one  division  concentrated  between 
Semlin.  directU  opiKJsite  Belgrade,  and  Panscova,  a  little 
to  the  eastward,  and  this  force  was  possibly  too  small 
to  enable  them  to  take  the  offensive  in  the  manner 
suggested. 

The  Austro-Serbian  frontier  exten(l>  o\ei  .i  length  of 
alxmt  ;H(»  miles,  and  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  the 
Danube  and  Save  rivers,  and  on  the  west  by  the  Drina. 
The  Drina  and  the  Save  are  shallow  and  have  fords  at 
intervals,  hence  their  cn^ssing  is  not  a  matter  of  very 
great  difficulty.  The  Serbian  general  staff  was  unable, 
of  cour.se.  to  foresee  at  what  point  along  the  frontier  the 
advance  w<tuld  Ik.-  made  into  Serbia,  and  they  concluded. 
con.se(juently.  that  in  place  of  attempting  to  defend  at 
all  points  on  the  frontier,  it  would  be  advisable  for 
them  to  i)€rmit  the  Austrians  to  advance  into  Serbian 
territory,  and  there  inflict  u|)on  them,  if  |Ktssible,  a 
strategic  clef  eat. 

I'Vojn  July  '^itth  to  .\ugust  llili.  the  .\ustrians  made 
eighteen  attempts  to  cross  the  frontier  at  various  |M>ints. 
their  object  undoubtedly  being  to  divert  the  attention 
of  the  Serbians  frtMU  that  |)oint  at  which  their  .serious 
invasion  was  to  Ik-  la\mchcd.  The  Serbians,  who  ha<I 
a  cordon  of  out|>osts  all  along  the   frontier,  were  able 

162 


The  Serbian  Campaign 

bv  means  of  the  \varni11j4s  which  ihcy  received  iunu  these 
advance  guards,  to  send  sufficient  forces  to  each  of  the 
frontier  points  to  repulse  these  feints  at  invasion. 

It  finally  became  apparent  thai  the  serious  invasion 
would  be  made  on  the  western  frontier  by  crossing  the 
Drina  river  and  moving  forward  on  the  town  of  Loz- 
nitza,  which  movement  began  on  August  12th.  In  front 
of  the  town  of  Loznitza,  the  Drina  has  frequently 
changed  its  channel,  and  in  so  doing  cut  out  numerous 
small  islands,  which  are  an  aid  to  an  army  attempting 
to  cross  the  river  in  either  direction.  The  Austrians 
seized  the  largest  of  these  islands.  Kuriachista.  and  used 
that  as  a  base  for  their  operations.  The  Serbian  forces 
at  this  point  made  such  resistance  as  lay  in  their  power, 
and  then  retired  to  the  heights  behind  Loznitza.  The 
Austrians  threw  a  pontoon  bridge  over  the  river  and 
the  13th  Army  Corps  entered  Serbian  territory.  On 
the  same  day.  that  is  August  12th,  the  River  Save 
was  crossed  at  the  north  of  Shabatz.  The  island  of 
Drenovatz  was  seized  and  then  detachments  were  thrown 
across  to  the  Serbian  shore,  which  established  themselves, 
and  drove  back  the  Serbian  troops  there  stationed,  who 
retired  to  the  hills  to  the  southeast  of  the  town.  The 
Austrian  advance  guard  then  occupied  the  town  and 
constructed  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  river  to  Klenak. 
The  Drina  was  crossed  at  two  other  points.  Zvornik 
and  Liubovia.  Thus  the  Austrians  had  several  columns 
heading  towards  Valiero,  which  town  may  be  taken  as 
their  objective  point. 

The  plain  of  Matchya.  wliicli  is  absolutely  flat,  is  much 
broken  up  by  cultivated  fields  and  woodland,  and  lies 
north  and  west  of  Shabatz,  l^eing  bounded  by  the  Save 
on  the  east  and  north  and  on  the  west  by  the  Drina.  To 
the  southeast  the  ground  is  undulating  with  excellent 
defensive  positions,  while  due  south  the  mountain  chain 
of  the  Tzer  rises  abruptly  otit  of  the  plain  and  stretches 
directly  across  from  the  Drina  to  the  Dobrava  river. 
The  south  slopes  of  this  chain  are  not  as  steep  as  those 
of  the  north,  and  fall  slowly  into  the  valley  of  the  L.esh- 
nitza  river  which  is  divided  from  the  vallev  of  tlie  Jadar 
river  by  the  Iverak  mountains. 

It  was  along  the  Jadar  "that  the  hardest  fighting  took 
place,  subsequent  to  August  r2th.  and  hence  the  river 
has  given  its  name  to  the  battle.  On  the  left  bank  of 
the  Jadar  to  its  junction  with  the  Drina.  a  rolling  plain 
runs  south  to  the  Guchevo  mountains.     In  all  this  dis- 

163 


The  Serbian  Campaign 

trici  ilicre  is  only  .>nc  road,  in  our  sense  «.ii  the  WL'id. 
from  Shabaiz  to  Lozniua.  There  are  mud  roads  run- 
ning through  the  district,  but  these  are  hardly  ileserv- 
ing  the  name  oi  highways,  and  even  of  these  there  are 
lew.  t.J)therwise.  the  communications  consisted  of  traib 
beaten  by  traffic  cross  the  fields  and  mountains.  Due 
great  difficulty  the  Austrians  encountered  was  the  lack 
of  maps.  Serbia,  a>  has  been  seen  from  the  descriptions 
g^ven  of  this  particular  section  of  the  country,  is  dif- 
ficidi  to  campaign  owing  to  the  lack  of  communications 
and  the  almost  total  lack  of  maps,  both  which,  of  course, 
constitute  a  great  advantage  lor  the  ilefending  army,  as 
it  inevitably  contains  men  who  rcsitle  in  the  particular 
di.«.iricts  and  know  every   foot  of  the  ground. 

In  order  U)  carry  out  offensive  military  operations 
against  \alier<i,  po.»session  of  lx>th  the  moniuain  ranges 
and  of  tiie  few  roads  is  necessary.  General  I'utnik  was 
in  charge  of  the  Serbian  strategy.  It  may  be  noted  here 
that  General  J'utnik  considered  that  no  persons  with 
any  self  res|)ect  would  either  l)e  a  reporter  or  a  corres- 
pondent for  a  newspaix'r.  or  Ix?  a  politician.  Holding 
thoc  opinions,  tlic  general  nalurally  eliminated  from 
all  contact  with  the  Serbian  army  any  rei)rcsentative  of 
the  hated  classes.  As  a  result  our  knowledge  of  what 
actually  did  happen  in  the  Serbian  campaigns  is  limitecl 
because  correspondeius  were  also  l>anished  from  tin- 
Austrian  forces. 

.\  general  movement  westward  of  the  Serbian  army 
took  pK'ice  as  soon  as  it  was  seen  that  the  main  opera- 
tions of  the  .\ustrians  were  being  directed  against  V'ali- 
ero  and  not  down  the  Morara  valley.  I'art  of  the  sec- 
ond and  the  whole  third  of  the  Serbian  armies  were 
sent  to  the  Jadar  valley,  and  the  remainder  of  the  second 
army  was  sent  towards  Shabatz  to  resist  the  invaders 
there.  Un  August  14th,  the  Austrians  made  an  attack 
on  the  heights  <»f  Koznitza  and  succeeded  in  driving 
back  the  Serbian  forces  which  had  retired  there  at  the 
time  of  the  passage  of  the  river.  These  were  thrown 
back  to  Jarel)itzc  where  they  were  joined  by  reinforce- 
ments and  proceeded  to  entrench  themselves  on  a  front 
of  ten  miles,  extending  from  north  to  south  over  the 
town  across  the  Jadar  valley.  The  next  couple  of  day.'^ 
were  occupied  by  both  sides  in  jjreparing  for  the  com- 
ing conibat.  the  principal  strength  oi  the  Serbians' 
effort  being  an  attempt  to  prevent  the  juncti<Mi  of  the 
\'-irian  trtxips  C(»ming  from  Shab.U/    >-<.nil)  ..f  this,  and 

164 


1  he  Serbian  Campaign 

moving  on  JUoznitza  east.    Skirmishes  toolc  place,  with 
this  object  in  view. 

On  the  16th  a  fight  took  place  at  Tekerish  between 
an  Austrian  defending-  column  and  the  Serbian  left 
flank,  which  resulted  in  heavy  losses  to  the  Serbians, 
though  the  Austrians  did  not  fare  much  better.  The 
Serbians,  however,  were  able  to  retreat  as  far  as  the 
line  Kosa-Kik,  where,  reinforcements  meeting  them, 
they  dug  in  and  held  the  line.  On  the  IGth  the  Ser- 
bians also  lost  Poporparlok,  but  this  advance  was  not 
followed  out  as  it  should  have  been,  and  at  Beglok  the 
Serbians  defeated  the  Austrians  in  a  slight  skirmish. 
From  Poporparlok  the  Austrians  now  developed  a  vig- 
orous offensive  in  an  attempt  to  turn  the  Serbian  left 
and  capture  the  road  to  Valiero,  which  succeeded  in 
taking  Jarebitze,  and  forced  the  Serbians  to  retire  to 
Soldatovitcha  where  they  were  joined  by  the  force 
who  fell  back  on  Krupani. 

The  extreme  right  of  the  Serbian  arm\-,  while  these 
things  were  taking  place  to  the  south,  had  defeated  the 
Austrian  advance  coming  south  from  Shabatz  and 
Belikawimen,  and  had  forced  them  back  in  the  direc- 
tion from  whence  they  came,  and  had  thus  prevented 
the  joining  of  those  forces  with  the  Austrian  forces  at 
the  south.  This  subsequently  turned  out  to  exercise  a 
very  important  influence  on  the  Austrian  campaign. 
As  soon  as  the  Serbian  forces  had  rested,  they  pressed 
northward  towards  Shabatz  in  pursuit  of  the  fleeing 
Austrian  army,  and  found  that  this  town  had  been 
strongly  fortified  by  field  works  and  obstacles,  and 
was  provided  with  heavy  artillery  so  that  they  could 
not  take  it.  However,  they  invested  it  in  such  a  way 
as  to  prevent  any  attempt  to  leave  it.  and  then  awaited 
the  arrival   of  reinforcements. 

On  the  TTth  an  Austrian  column  was  defeated  at 
Troyan.  one  of  the  most  important  points  in  the  Tzer 
mountains,  and  another  column  was  defeated  at  Parlog 
>o  that  the  Serbian  centre  was  relieved,  leaving  only  the 
left  wing  in  trouble.  On  the  18th  it  became  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  Austrian  army  in  Shabatz  to  attempt 
to  join  the  Austrian  troops  farther  to  the  south.  At 
first  they  were  successful  in  throwing  back  the  Serbian 
forces  opposing  them,  but  the  Austrians  pressed  their 
advantage  too  slowly  w^hich  gave  the  Serbians  oppor- 
tunity to  bring  up  reinforcements,  thus  preventing  the 

165 


The  Serbian  Campaign 

Austrian  culuinn  irom  Shabaiz  advancing  to  the  soutli. 
\  arious  skirini>hc«»  took  place  on  the  other  fronts  of 
the  hne  this  siune  day,  in  one  of  which  the  Serbians  suc- 
ceeded in  cai)tiirin^  an  inijK^rtant  position  in  Kosanin- 
g^ad.  which  paved  tlie  way  for  their  operations  against 
kashuhitchu.  On  the  extreme  soutli  on  this  same  day 
the  Serbians  recaptured  Soldatovitcha  and  were  now  in 
a  position   for  a  general   fi»rward  advance. 

In  the  meantime,  on  the  liUh,  the  Austrians  at  Sha- 
batz  made  another  effort  tt)  advance  which  was  success- 
iid  to  the  extent  that  the  Serbians  were  thrown  further 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  Dobrava  river.  (  )n  the  I'.Kh 
the  Austrian^  were  defeated,  practically  all  along  the  line 
in  the  south,  and  they  fell  back  aband«)ning  the  fort  of 
l'oi)orparlok  and  Rutchiplast.  while  on  the  2Uth  the 
Serbian  army  in  the  north  was  able  to  cross  the  Dobrava 
and  establish  themselves  on  the  left  bank. 

( )n  the  '^Ist  the  Austrians  were  in  retreat  everywhere. 
And  in  the  next  day  or  two  their  entire  force  recrossed 
the  Driiia  River  and  the  invasion  of  Serbia  at  this  point 
was  abandoned.  The  Serbs,  who  had  cn»ssed  the  Do- 
brava river  on  August  *2<tth,  followed  up  their  advantage 
and  pressed  north  towards  Shabatz.  The  whole  of  the 
21st  a  stubborn  combat  took  place  in  front  of  the  town. 
(>n  August  22nd  this  combat  continued  and.  on  August 
2;Jrd.  the  Serbians,  who  had  managed  to  get  up  their 
artillery,  began  a  Ixniibardment  of  the  .\ustrian  trenches 
with  ninety-eight  guns,  but  during  the  night,  .\ugust  22- 
2.'5.  the  Austrians  had  evacuated  Shabatz. 

The  afternoon  of  the  2.'{r(l  the  Scrl)ian  tnx^ps  came 
to  the  banks  of  the  Save  again,  and  the  Austrian  inva- 
sion of  Serbia  was  for  the  time  ended.  ( )ne  reason  for 
its  ending  was  that  .\ustria  had  been  compelled  by 
events  in  Poland  and  (ialicia  during  the  campaign  with 
Russia,  not  only  to  materially  change  the  plan  of  cam- 
paign against  Serbia,  but  also  to  withdraw  from  the 
army  invading  Serbia  fidly  one-half  its  strength,  which 
left  it  numerically  inferior  to  the  Serbian  army.  Under 
these  conditions  it  was  evident  that  the  Austrians  had 
biu  a  small  chance  of  success,  in  view  of  the  difficult 
topography  of  the  country  through  which  this  campaign 
had  to  be  conducted.  Numbers  do  not  always  govern 
the  issue,  but  a  mountainous  and  rugged  country,  held 
by  a  determined  enemy  knowing  the  points  of  vantage, 
is  a  «liffictdt  one  to  campaign   in   <uccessfullv.  .ind  can 

I  fir, 


The  Serbian  Campaign 

only  be  so  campaigned  wiien  the  invading   force  is  nu- 
merically superior  to  that  of  the  enemy. 

In  this  campaign  the  Austrians  lost,  all  told,  about 
25,000  men.  The  Serbians  lost,  at  least,  an  equal  num- 
ber. Few  prisoners  were  taken  on  either  sifle,  but  the 
Austrians  lost  practically  all  the  war  material  which 
changed  hands. 

After  I  he  defeat  of  tlie  first  Austrian  invasion  of 
Serbia,  Serbia  and  Montenegro  undertook  an  invasion 
of  Southern  Bosnia.  This  amounted  to  little,  from  a 
military  standpoint ;  the  advance,  at  its  maximum,  did 
not  amount  to  more  than  a  few  miles  into  Austrian  ter- 
ritory and  no  substantial  results  were  achieved. 

This  lasted  for  six  or  seven  weeks,  when  Austria 
began,  about  the  21st  of  November,  another  advance 
into  Serbia,  crossing  the  Kolubara  River,  and  forcing 
the  Serbians  on  the  next  day  to  execute  a  retreat  to- 
wards Belgrade.  This  invasion  was  pushed  with  con- 
siderable vigor,  with  the  result  that  the  Austrians  cap- 
tured Belgrade  on  the  2nd  of  December  and  then  turned 
southward  in  a  movement  against  central  Serbia.  This 
had,  however,  hardly  begun  when  Austria  was  obliged 
to  hurriedly  recall,  for  use  in  Galicia.  where  the  situation 
was  at  that  time  threatening,  four  of  the  five  army  corps 
which  she  had  in  Serbia.  As  a  result,  knowledge  of  this 
coming  to  the  Serbian  commanders,  the  Serbians  took 
a  new  offensive,  and  driving  the  one  army  corps  of  the 
Austrians  before  them,  succeeded  on  the  14th  of  Decem- 
ber in  occupying  Belgrade  ;  the  Austrians  withdrawing 
from  Serbia  completely  on  the  following  day.  This  re-- 
verse  terminated  any  active  fighting  in  Serbia,  but  the 
Serbians  were  exhausted,  so  that  since  then  there  has 
been  almost  absolute  quiet  along  the  Serbian  front. 

On  January  2nd  an  epidemic  of  typhus  commenced 
to  rage  in  Serbia,  and  it  is  still  raging  with  great  vio- 
lence. It  is  said  that  tens  of  thousands  of  Serbians 
have  died  of  this  malady,  and  the  efforts  which  have 
been  made  to  control  it  have  not  met  with  any  success. 
It  is  partially  accounted  for  by  the  filthy  personal  hab- 
its of  the  Serbians  and  the  prevalence  in  Serbia,  at  the« 
same  time  of  this  epidemic  of  typhus,  of  a  plague  of 
disgusting  vermin  which  are  everywhere  and  which  act 
as  carriers  of  this  terrible  disease. 

Many  devoted  physicians  from  the  neutral  countries, 

167 


The  Serbian  Campaign 

who,  moved  by  humanity,  have  gone  to  Serbia  to  aid 
in  fighting  this  epidemic,  have  laid  down  their  Hves  in 
that  service.  It  seems  fitting  that  this  real  altruism 
and  real  devotion  to  humanity  on  the  part  of  these 
physicians  should  not  ]>a>s  unrecognized. 


168 


CliAP'I^Ek  XI  \. 
KIAO-CHAU  AND  SOUTH  AFRICA 


In  the  early  pari  of  the  war  Englanchabtoni.shed  the 
white  world  by  the  publication  of  the  Treaty  of  Alli- 
ance between  herself  and  Japan,  which  bound  England 
to  operate  with  Japan  against  her  white  brothers  under 
certain  conditions,  and  introduced  Japan,  a  yellow- 
skinned  race,  as  a  factor  in  the  affairs  of  the  white 
races.  This  treason  to  ethnic  considerations  will  very 
possibly  bear  bitter  fruit  for  the  traitor  in  the  not  very 
distant  future. 

Early  in  August  Great  Britain  asked  the  Imperial 
Government  of  Japan  for  assistance  under  the  terms 
this  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  Japan's  reply  to  Great 
Britain's  demand,  w^as,  on  the  15th  of  August  (to  use 
the  Japanese  phraseology),  "to  give  advice  to  the  Ger- 
man Government,"  which  advice  was  to  the  effect  that 
Germany  turn  over  to  her  before  the  23rd  day  of 
August  the  German  Colony  of  Kiao-Chau  on  the  east- 
ern coast  of  China.  In  the  language  of  Europe,  this 
advice  would  have  been  called  an  ultimatum.  To  this 
ultimatum  Germany  did  not  reply,  and  on  the  24th  day 
of  August  Japan  issued  a  declaration  of  war  against 
Germany. 

The  reason  alleged  by  Japan  was  that  Germany  was 
making  Kiao-Chau  a  base  for  warlike  preparations^ 
and  her  armed  vessels  were  cruising  the  seas  of  east- 
ern Asia,  menacing  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain  and 
Japan. 

As  far  as  the  allegation  that  Germany  had  at  that  time 
interfered  with  the  commerce  of  Japan  in  any  way  was 
concerned,  the  statement  was  simply  and  purely  false. 

Kiao-Chau,  of  which  Tsing-Tau  is  the  capital,  had 
originally  come  into  Germany's  possession  as  a  repara- 
tion from  China  for  the  murder  of  two  German  mis- 
sionaries. Originally  seized  for  a  temporary-  occupa- 
tion for  this  reason,  a  long  lease  of  the  territory  was 
obtained.     Germany   proceeded  to    turn   an    uninviting 

169 


Kiao-Chau  and  South  Africa 

niud-tlat  into  uiw  ul  iIk-  uu»t  attraLti\e  oi  the  Euro- 
pean colonies  in  the  tar  East.  So  attractive  had  the 
town  become,  thanks  to  German  efforts,  that  it  had 
ittained  the  position  oi  being  the  reco<^nized  summer 
>vaterinj;-placc  of  the  whites  all  over  the  East. 

The  naturally  Hue  harbor  had  been  developed  by 
the  erection  of  a  massive  breakwater  nearly  three 
miles  long  and  by  the  construction  of  |)iers,  docks  and 
jetties,  until  tiic  port  was  the  finest  in  the  East.  Hand- 
some and  commcnlious  buildings  of  all  kinds,  including 
hospitals,  schools  and  water-works,  were  built,  and 
built  with  that  solidity  which  characterizes  (ierman 
construction  nearly  everywhere. 

While  the  material  side  was  thu>>  given  great  atten- 
tion, at  the  same  time  the  educ;iti<>nal  and  social  side  of 
the  colony's  life  was  not  neglected,  and.  at  the  time  of 
the  attack  by  japan,  there  was  a  comj)lete  system  of 
■schools  operated,  not  only  for  the  whites,  but  for  the 
Chinese  inhabitants  also;  which  system  was  distin- 
guished by  the  usual  (^lerman  excellence  in  educational 
matters. 

The  health  of  the  nati\e  inhabitants  was  alsd  care- 
fully looked  after,  and  hospitals  for  their  special  bene- 
fit had  been  established.  All  told,  dermany  had  spent 
on  this  possession  over  one  hundred  and  fifty  million 
iloljars ;  most  of  which  was  contributed  by  the  Im- 
perial Exchequer,  the  local  taxes  being  light. 

W  hen  japan  entered  upon  her  campaign,  like  her 
ally  she  veneered  her  real  object  with  Pecksniffian 
hypocrisy,  in  the  hope  of  deceiving  the  neutral  world 
as  to  her  ulterior  objects,  and  she  alleged  and  inserted 
this  in  her  ultimatum,  that  her  object  in  taking  Kiao- 
Chau  from  Germany  was  because  Germany  had  by  force 
compelled  China  to  grant  the  lease  which  was  Ger- 
many's title  to  the  territory,  and  that  said  granting  of 
such  lease  brought  about  by  such  a  cause  was  an  im- 
moral abuse  f>f  strength  by  Germain  at  the  ex|)en'JC  of 
China;  that  '^he  (japan),  actuated  by  purely  altruistic 
motives,  intended,  should  Kiao-Chau  come  into  her 
possession  as  the  result  of  her  declaration  of  war  upon 
Germanv  and  the  '^ubseriucnt  campaign,  to  return  the 
same  to  the  original  possessor,  China,  thus  rectifying 
the  abuse  of  "Strength  of  which  Germany  had  In-en  giiihv. 

To  a  large  extent,  the  neutral  peoples  were  deceived, 
and  this  deception  was  aided  by  the  gift  of  a  small  sum 
of  money  fsrime  thf>u'^nnds  of  dollar^^)  bv  the  Mikado 

170 


Kiao-Chau  and  South  Africa 

t(j  icrlaiii  American  missionary  S(Kiclics  in  Japan  about 
this  time;  which  gift  made  these  missionaries  most  en- 
thusiastic and  ap])arently  disinterested  proclaimers  of  the 
purity  of  Japan's  motives  in  this  war. 

Kiao-Chau  has  now  been  in  possession  of  Japan  for 
many  months,  and,  curiously  enough,  each  successive 
month  of  Japan's  possession  has  found  a  new  and  ex- 
tremely specious  reason  why  it  has  not  been  handed  over 
to  China  and  why  it  has  become  more  and  more  import- 
ant for  Japan  to  retain  its  possession. 

By  way  of  proving  the  truth  of  her  allegations  of 
altruistic  solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  China,  Japan 
opened  her  land  campaign  against  Kiao-Chau  by  a  vio- 
lation of  Chinese  territory  on  the  2nd  day  of  September, 
191-i,  when  she  landed  troops  in  the  Chinese  province 
of  Shan-tung  and  maintained  them  there  against  the 
protest  of  China. 

Japan  blockaded  Tsing-Tau  by  sea  on  the  27th  of 
August,  and  occupied  certain  Chinese  islands  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  harbor  mouth  as  a  basis  for  these  opera- 
tions. The  Japanese  fleet,  however,  contented  itself 
with  maintaining  a  blockade  and  only  occasionally  spas- 
modically bombarded  the  exterior  defenses  of  the  harbor. 

The  land  forces  landed  on  the  2nd  of  September,  1914. 
but  were  unable  to  make  much  progress  for  a  consider- 
able time,  owing  to  the  autumnal  rains  which  had  trans- 
formed the  country  all  around  the  territory  of  Kiao- 
Chau  into  a  bog.  and  made  the  rivers  and  streams  which 
flowed  through  this  territory  impassable.  Therefore, 
the  Japanese  land  forces  were  obliged  to  remain  nearly 
inactive  at  Lungkow  and  other  places  in  Chinese  territory 
for  a  considerable  time. 

On  the  13th  of  September  they  captured  the  railroad 
station  at  the  Chinese  town  of  Kiao-Chau,  which  is 
twenty-two  miles  distant  from  Tsing-Tau  and  outside 
of  the  German  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau.  During 
this  period  Tsing-Tau  was  attacked  several  times  by 
air-craft  and  bombs  dropped,  with  no  particular  result. 

On  the  23rd  of  September  British  forces  arrived  to 
co-operate  with  the  Japanese  under  General  Barnardis- 
ton,  and  the  world  was  treated  for  the  first  time  in  its 
history  to  the  sepctacle  of  a  white  Brigadier-General 
acting  under  the  orders  of  a  Japanese  General. 

On  the  2Gth  of  September,  the  Japanese  began  their 
advance,  the  floods  having  somewhat  abated ;  and  that 
day  drove  the  Germans  by  assault  from  the  ground  be- 

171 


Kiao-Chau  and  South  Africa 

tween  the  rivers  Paisha  and  Li-Tshuni;.  and  continued 
thus  advancing  on  the  two  following  days  until  they 
attained  positions  within  five  miles  of  the  central  for- 
tress, which  the  success  of  this  movement  almost  cotn- 
pletely  invested. 

On  the  'JiUh  of  Septemhcr  the  Japanese  fleet  landed 
a  force  which  successfully  occupied  Lao-Shan  Ilarltnr. 
very  close  to  the  town  of  Tsing-Tau. 

On  September  3uth  the  Japanese  sank  a  German 
destroyer,  but  lost,  themselves,  two  mine  sweepers. 
The  next  day  tlie  Germans  made  an  effort  to  repel  the 
Japanese  attack  both  by  land  and  by  sea,  but,  owing  to 
the  enormous  disparity  between  the  forces,  were  unsuc- 
cessful. 

On  the  ."{rd  of  Octol)er  the  Japanese  laid  violent 
hands  on  the  Shan-tung  Railroad  from  Tsinganfu  to 
W'eiksin.  which  was  largclv  ont^-idc  n\  the  tcrritdrv 
leased  by  China  to  Germany. 

The  psendo-sentimentalist>^  whd  ha\  c  tiiied  tiic  air 
with  their  clamor  concerning'  the  alleged  German  viola- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  IVlgium.  have  tiovor  fonnd  it 
fitting  to  make  any  protest  in  regard  to  the  deliberate 
violation  of  Chinese  neutrality  bv  the  Japanese  during 
these  operations  around  Kiao-Chau.  There  is  appar- 
ently in  the  minds  of  these  persons  a  great  distinction 
between  violation^  of  neutrality  ;  if  such  violations  are 
bv  the  Germans,  or  alleged  to  be  by  the  Germans,  they 
are  highlv  reprehensible ;  but  if  bv  those  fighting 
against  the  Germans,  they  are  a  measure  of  real  neces- 
sity and  permissible ;  but  no  violations  I)y  the  Germans 
are.  by  these  peculiarly  constituted  intellect'^,  consid- 
ered to  be  ever  real  necessities, 

Whv  this  distinction  is  made,  as  it  is  made,  by  the 
pseudo-sentimentalists  and  the  adherents  of  the  Skibo 
School  of  altruistic  philandering,  is  not  di.^^cerniblr. 
At  all  events,  the  Japanese,  these  practical  altruists, 
seized  this  railroad  and  subsequently  occupied  the  Chi- 
nese territorv  of  "S'weihsien.  The  Germans  |)Uf  up  '^uch 
defense  as  was  possible,  but,  being  out-numbered  in 
proportions  of  ten  or  twelve  to  one.  necessarily  their 
efforts  could  not  accomplish  much,  and  when  the 
Prince  Heinrich  hill,  a  dominant  position  which  com- 
manded all  forts  of  Tsing-Tau.  was  taken,  it  was  evi- 
dent that  the  defence  could  not  last  much  longer. 

On  the  I'Jth  of  October  the  combined  Japanese  and 

I'.ritish  f  ■"■■  -  ^t  ir,.  Jti  1  r„.titi,.ii  1,.  becin  a  cotmr-il  l^.m. 


Kiao-Chau  and  South  Africa 

bardineiu  from  the  sea,  whieli  wdb  commenced.  Tlie- 
Kaiser  and  litis  forts  received  the  most  attention  and 
were  considerably  injured  by  this  bombardment. 

(Jn  the  31  st  day  of  (Jctober  the  general  lx)mbardment 
I'rom  both  land  and  sea  was  begun  anrl  continued  until 
the  "th  da\'  of  November,  the  i^>ritish  and  Japanese  ad- 
vancing steadily.  On  the  ?th  of  November  the  fortress 
hoisted  the  wliite  flag,  and  at  eight  o'clock  on  that  even- 
ing the  terms  of  capitulation  were  signed.  On  the  10th 
of  November  the  Governor  General  formally  surrendered 
the  leased  territory  and  the  garrison  to  the  Japanese 
General,   Kaimo. 

.\t  the  time"  of  the  surrender,  the  (Jerman  forces  were 
about  3,500  strong,  the  Japanese  land  forces  engaged  in 
the  siege  itself  were  about  30,000  strong,  the  British 
forces  1,500  strong,  and  the  Japanese  fleet  comprised,  all 
told,  some  32  vessels  with  8,0(/0  or  9,000  men.  The 
curious  allies  lost  some  300  killed  and  1,:jOI)  wounded. 
The  Germans  surrendered  a  few  small  gunboats,  other' 
unimportant  craft,  one  Austrian  cruiser,  the  Kaiserine 
Elizabeth,  which  had  been  in  the  harbor,  having  been 
blown  up  before  the  surrender.  The  Japanese  lost  one 
cruiser,  the  Takachiho.  blown  up  by  a  mine,  243  of  her 
crew  being  drowned  ;  and  also  some  small  craft,  and  a 
loss  in  lives  in  these  naval  afairs  of  about  350. 

Thus  was  an  outpost  of  white  civilization  transferred 
to  the  Japanese. 

In  late  September  and  early  October  the  revolt  of 
the  Boers,  under  Colonel  Maritz,  broke  out  in  South 
Africa,  and  a  force  assumed  to  be  about  10,000,  which 
was  subsequently  somewhat  increased,  took  the  field 
against  the  British. 

Late  in  October  this  force  was  joined  by  the  Boer 
Generals  Dewet  and  Beyers.  Owing  to  our  lack  of  in- 
formation, it  is  impossible  to  give  any  connected  account 
of  this  campaign.  The  censorship  exercised  over  news 
from  South  Africa  was  exteremely  severe,'  and  only 
from  time  to  time  did  bits  of  information  reach  us.  It 
would  not  appe^ar,  however,  that  by  the  end  of  the  year 
the  rebels  had  been  completely  subdued. 

General  Dewet  was  captured  at  Waterburg  in  Brit- 
ish Bechunaland,  on  the  first  of  December.  General 
Beyers  is  reported  to  have  been  killed  in  the  fighting, 
and  the  fate  of  Colonel  Maritz  is  not  known  with  abso- 
lute certainty  at  the  present  time,  though  it  is  prob- 
able that  he  has  perished. 

173 


Kiao-Chau  and  South  Africa 

The  other  fighting  in  Africa  between  tiic  IJritish  and 
the  Germans  is  also  wrapped  by  considerable  mys- 
tery. We  know  that  there  lias  been  fighting  of  con- 
siderable .severity  from  time  to  time  in  the  German 
CoK'nies  in  Africa,  in  the  T.elgian  Congo,  and  in  the 
northern  portions  of  the  States  ttf  the  South  African 
L'nion ;  hut  here,  again,  owing  to  cinnmunication  being 
practically  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain,  we  have  no 
information  from  which  any  reasonable  account  of 
this  fighting  could  be  given.  The  British  casualty 
list  published  in  the  London  Times  would  indicate 
that  such  successes  as  have  been  achieved  by  the  Brit- 
ish have  been  paid  for  with  a  consiileral)le  number  of 
lives.  But  this  does  not  give  us  sufficiently  detailed 
facts  upon  which  t.>  b:i«^e  nii\-  de<cripti' mi  <■''  «'ir  «ani- 
oaign. 


174 


cii.\i''i'I':k  w 


THE  NAVAL  WAR— NORTH  SEA 


(  Hi  Monday.  August  ord,  Great  Britain  called  all  her 
naval  reserves  to  the  colors  and  extended  the  time  of 
service  of  all  unexpired  men  in  the  royal  navy  to  five 
years.  This  was  the  first  active  war  measure  Great 
Britain  took,  and  was  followed  immediately  by  the  de- 
parture of  what  is  known  as  the  "home  fleet"  on  August 
5th  for  the  North  Sea.  under  instructions  to  "seek  out 
the  enemy  and  destroy  it." 

This  fleet  was  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Sir 
John  Jellicoe.  The  area  of  the  district  of  the  North  Sea 
which  was  to  be  covered  by  this  fleet  is  380  miles  wide 
to  the  north  from  Denmark  to  the  Scotch  coast,  and  21 
miles  to  the  south  between  Dover  and  Calais,  while  the 
north  and  south  distance  between  these  two  lines  was 
about  360  miles.  However,  much  of  the  sea  included  in 
this  area  is  not  navigable  by  large  ships,  owing  to  shal- 
lowness. On  the  English  side  this  sea  could  be  entered 
from  a  hundred  ports,  while  on  the  German  side  there 
were  luit  four  or  five  ports  of  sufficient  depth  of  water 
for  large  ships. 

The  first  action  which  took  place  was  between  the 
Amphion,  the  third  destroyer  flotilla,  and  the  German 
auxiliary  cruiser  Konigen  Louise,  about  forty  miles  from 
Antwerp.  The  German  vessel  was  originally  a  Hamburg- 
American  liner,  and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  had  been 
converted  into  a  mine  layer.  The  Amphion  gave  chase 
to  this  vessel  and  summoned  her  to  surrender  a  few 
hours  later,  on  catching  up  with  her.  She  refused  to 
surrender  and  was  sunk,  and  twenty-eight  wounded  men 
of  her  crew  were  brought  into  Harwich  and  landed  by 
a  destroyer. 

The  Amphion  herself,  however,  did  not  survive  very 
long.  The  very  next  day.  in  fact,  she  struck  a  mine  and 
sank  at  once.  She  was  a  cruiser  of  3.440  tons,  the  loss 
of   life   was  considerable,    though    a    large    percentage 

175 


The  Naval  War — North  Sea 

ui  lier  crew  was  saved.  A  few  days  afterwards,  Sun- 
day, Augfust  i)th,  the  submarine  made  its  first  appear- 
ance in  the  war  in  a»i  attack  on  the  first  light  cruiser 
squadron  of  the  Britisli  navy  by  two  or  more  Cerman 
under-sea  boats.  Tliis  encounter  ended  disastrously  for 
the  submarines,  the  I  -l">  Ix-ing  >unk  by  the  r.inninghaiu 
and  no  damage  being  inflicted  uikmi  the  cruiser  squadron. 

By  this  lime  the  Xorih  Sea  and  the  channel  hatl  been 
fairlv  well  s<>wn  with  mines  by  b<.'lh  liritish  and  Ger- 
mans, navigation  hail  become  dangerous  to  merchant 
V  esseis,  and  was  exciting  considerable  irritation  among 
neutrals,  who  feared  that  their  merchantmen  would  be 
injured  by  these  mines.  .\t  this  moment,  however, 
little  came  of  this  feeling,  though  'Subsequently  the  ma- 
jt»rity  of  the  neutral  government^  protested  to  the  eom- 
^atants  without  avail. 

Mine  ^weepers  were  put  into  operation  almost  imme- 
Jiately  by  the  British,  and  for  this  purpose  the  well- 
known  North  Sea  trawlers  were  used.  The  method  of 
mine  sweeping  is  simple,  but  at  the  same  time  dan- 
i^jerous.  to  the  vessels  engaged  in  the  operation.  Two 
vessels  are  employed,  between  which  a  steel  hawser  is 
stretched  and  allowed  to  fall  to  the  bed  of  the  sea.  The 
vessels  at  each  end  of  the  hawser  then  move  forward 
at  the  same  speed,  and  in  this  manner  sweep  the  bed 
ji  the  ocean  with  the  steel  hawser  between  them.  \\  hen 
the  hawser  strikes  the  mooring  of  a  mine  it  breaks 
through  the  f^ame  and  the  mine  rises  to  the  surface 
of  the  water.  An  armed  vessel,  usually  a  destroyer, 
follows  the  trawlers,  anri  when  a  mine  rises  to  tJie  sur- 
face explodes  it. 

The  third  week  of  August  a  sweep  by  the  British 
fleet  was  made  of  the  entire  waters  betw-een  the  ('er- 
man  and  the  British  coasts,  but  without  result.  The 
ships  of  the  enemy  were  apparently  still  stowed  away 
in  their  safe  harbors  or  under  the  gtms  of  Helgoland. 
\  few  days  later  a  fight  took  place  in  1  lelgoland  Bight 
A  certain  activity  in  the  enemies'  cruisers  had  been 
noticed  for  some  days  preceding  and  an  attempt  was 
made  to  draw  them  out  by  a  British  force  arranged  in 
the  following  manner: 

In  front  were  two  sw  ift  cruisers,  the  Arethusa.  brand 
new,  and  the  Fearless,  accompanied  by  the  first  and 
third  flotillas  of  destroyers.  Behind  them  a  cruiser 
squadron,  and  behind  this  a  fleet  of  battle  crui.sprs, 
amr^ng  which  were  sr^me  of  the  strongest  vessels  of  the 

176 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

British  navy,  the  admiral  in  charge  of  the  operations 
^eing  on  one  of  tlie  battle  cruisers.  On  August  21st, 
i  message  came  from  the  advance  guard,  the  Arethusa 
and  the  Fearless,  stating  that  they  were  engaging  the 
enemy's  cruisers,  and  the  cruiser  fleet  almost  immedi- 
ately received  instructions  from  the  admiral  to  proceed 
to  their  assistance. 

This  they  did,  but  to  no-  avail,  as  before  they  had 
reached  the  Fearless,  which  had  drawn  the  enemy 
away  from  his  coast,  the  ships  of  the  enemy  had  aban- 
doned the  pursuit.  However,  on  the  28th  of  August 
the  Fearless  and  the  Arethusa  ran  into  a  point  about 
six  miles  south  and  three  miles  west  of  Helgoland 
Bight  accompanied  by  a  fleet  of  small  cruisers. 
Towards  eight  o'clock,  the  day  was  fine  but  extreme- 
ly hazy.  Three  vessels  became  visible  through  the 
mist  to  the  English  ships,  and  these  turned  out  to  be 
German  destroyers.  The  course  was  slightly  altered, 
and  at  half-past  eight  the  Arethusa  began  to  fire,  as 
did  some  of  the  destroyers,  the  rest  of  the  destroyers 
coming  into  action  a  few  minutes  afterwards. 

At  this  time  three  German  cruisers  of  about  five 
thousand  tons  each  were  sighted.  These  ships  came 
into  action  and  the  fight  became  general.  The  German 
fire  was  fairly  well  directed  and  the  Arethusa  came  in 
for  severe  handling.  At  ten  o'clock  she  was  forced  to 
leave  the  battle  line  temporarily,  only  one  gun  work- 
ing, and  engage  in  repairs,  but  after  staying  out  of  the 
fight  for  an  hour  she  was  able  to  return.  It  is  a  mys- 
tery why  the  German  cruisers,  seeing  her  plight,  did 
not  close  in  on  her  and  finish  her  off,  which  could 
have  been  easily  done.  'On  her  return  to  the  fight  the 
Arethusa  was  again  hit,  and  her  feed  tank  damaged, 
which  materially  reduced  her  speed. 

Shortly  after  this  one  of  the  German  cruisers,  it  be- 
came evident,  was  very  badlv  off,  two  of  her  funnels 
being  shot  away,  also  her  mainmast,  and  she  was  on 
fire  amidships.  She  nevertheless  continued  to  fight  on 
spiritedly,  firing  from  her  foremost  aft  guns.  Th's 
cruiser  was  the  Mainz,  which  though  slightly  superior 
in  size,  was  inferior  in  armament  and  speed  to  the  Brit- 
ish vessel,  besides  being  considerably  older.  Up  to  thv? 
time  the  fight  had  been  waged  between  light  cruisers 
and  destroyers  only.  The  battle  cruiser  fleet  had  taken 
no  part,  but  towards  half-past  twelve  the  Lion  arrived 
on  the  scene,  and  perceiving  the  Koln  in  front  of  h.-^r, 

177 


The  Naval  War — North  Sea 

nrcil  two  salvio.  which  mI  Ikt  on  lire.  Slic  .>ank  within 
a  lew  minutes 

Several  of  thv  litrtiiaii  destroyers  l)v  tliis  time  had 
l>cen  severely  damaged  and  another  Cierman  cruiser,  the 
Ariadne,  was  in  the  latter  action  set  on  fire  and  sunk. 
The  Mainz  went  down  gallantly,  absolutely  wrecked  be- 
low and  aloft,  and  with  her  whole  midships  aflame,  she 
sank  with  «)ne  gun  forwarti  and  one  giui  aft  still  in  action. 
Four  baiile  cruisers,  n(.>ne  of  which  was  under  2o,iH)0 
tons,  the  Lion,  tlie  (Jueeu  Mary,  the  Invincible  and  the 
Xew  /ealan«l,  finally  took  pan  in  this  navai  fight,  so 
that  it  is  not  wonderful  that  three  light,  unprotected 
cruisers  aiul  a  few  destr«)yers  were  sunk. 

The  British  lost  sixty-nine  men  killed  and  wounde<l. 
Tio  ship  iK'ing  permanently  injured.  The  Germans  lost 
the  three  protected  cruisers  mentioned  and  several  de- 
stroyers and  about  ^T^t  men  (lr«>wned  or  killed,  with  300 
taken  prisoner. 

Ju.st  after  this  battle  a  rather  dramatic  incident  took 
place.  The  Defender,  a  F'.ritish  vessel,  lowered  her 
trailer  for  some  purpose.  l'.eft»re  its  return  a  larger 
vessel  came  up  and  opened  fire  on  the  Defender  and 
<lrove  her  away.  The  men  in  this  trailer  as  a  result 
foun<l  themselves  without  food,  twenty-five  miles  from 
the  nearest  land,  and  that  land  an  enemy's,  and.  sur- 
rounded by  fog  and  foes,  had  not  a  very  pleasant  prospect 
l)efore  them.  Suddenly  through  the  water  alonside  of 
them  the  British  submarine  K- 4  shot  up,  opened  her 
conning  tower,  took  the  men  on  Ijoard.  shut  up  the  con- 
ning tower  again,  dove  and  brought  them  all  home  safely, 
two  huuflred  and  fifty  miles. 

r>n  the  whole,  however,  this  action  r»f  the  Melgolanti 
r.ight  was  rather  of  a  minor  character. 

The  next  loss  that  occurred  to  either  navy  was  that 
of  the  Speedy,  on  Sei)lember  .'kd,  by  striking  a  mine. 
This  was  an  old  British  gunlH)at  of  no  particular  imporl- 
ancc.  and  few  lives  were  lost.  Two  days  later,  on  Sep- 
tember r»th.  the  Pathfinder,  a  British  light  cruiser  of 
2,940  tons  and  a  crew  of  two  hundred  anrl  sixty-eight  be- 
came the  first  victim  of  a  German  submarine.  The  loss  of 
life  was  considerable,  and  as  the  sinking  took  place  off 
the  l-'irth  of  l<*orth.  an  important  naval  ba>^e.  it  created 
considerable  excitement  and  worry  in  Great   Britain. 

The  next  victim  was  the  German  light  cniiser.  the 
Hela.  which  on  September  l.'ith  was  stmk  by  the  British 
siibmarine    E-9    six    miles   south    of     Helgoland.     This 

178 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

vessel  carried  a  crew  of  one  hundred  and  scventy-eiglit, 
but  was  not  of  very  great  value  as  a  fighting  ship. 

In  the  earlier  part  of  September,  the  British  admiralty 
issued  an  order  to  the  British  warships  in  the  Channel 
and  the  North  Sea  that,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  mine 
laying  was  still  going  on,  that  as  the  order  stated  no 
ship  dared  show  the  German  flag  in  the  North  Sea, 
it  was  obvious  that  these  mines  must  be  laid  by  vessels 
under  neutral  flags,  and  henceforth  all  such  neutral 
vessels  must  be  searched.  ( )n  September  11th,  a  rather 
violent  storm  broke  out  and  continued  with  more  or  less 
severity  for  the  next  ten  days,  culminating  in  what  is 
technically  known  as  a  whole  gale  on  the  18th,  with  a 
very  high  wind. 

Un  the  morning  of  the  22nd,  the  wind  having  moder- 
ated somewhat,  the  three  British  armored  cruisers,  tho 
Aboukir,  the  Hogue,  and  the  Cressy,  started  out  from 
the  harbor  where  they  were  lying  to  go  on  patrol  duty. 
These  cruisers  had  just  separated  to  go  to  their  stations, 
which  were  three  miles  apart,  when  about  six  A.  M.  the 
Aboukir  was  seen  to  reel  violently  and  then  settle  down 
with  a  list  to  port.  In  the  words  of  an  eye  witness,  "there 
was  only  one  explosion,  and  most  of  the  spectators  were 
of  the  opinion  that  she  had  struck  a  mine,"  and,  follow- 
ing the  first  impulse,  bt)th  the  Cressy  and  the  Hogue 
closed  in  to  save  lives.  At  seven  o'clock  both  were  with- 
in a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  her. 

The  Aboukir  had  started  to  lower  her  sea  boats,  but 
the  list  had  become  so  great  that  the  boats  stuck  and 
could  not  be  gotten  away.  The  sun  was  shining  very 
brightly  and  the  red  glow  of  her  copper  bottom  with  the 
pink  naked  bodies  of  her  men  as  they  climbed  down  her 
sides  made  an  unforgettable  picture.  Some  jumped  into 
the  water,  others  sat  down  and  slid  down  the  sides, 
others  contented  themselves  with  walking  a  few  paces 
as  the  vessel  keeled  over. 

Suddenly,  with  two  tremendous  crashes,  the  Hogue 
was  struck,  both  torpedoes  exploding  in  the  same  place 
just  aft  of  the  starboard  after-bridge.  The  ship  leaped 
up  like  a  spurred  horse,  and  as  she  was  a  vessel  of  12.000 
tons,  this  gives  some  idea  of  the  force  of  the  explosion. 
•  The  Hogue's  two  sea  boats  had  been  cleared  away,  to- 
gether w^ith  her  launch,  in  aid  of  the  Aboukir.  and  the 
later,  with  a  number  of  the  saved  on  board,  ran  very 
close  to  her  port  bow,  when,  seeing  the  Hogue  struck, 
she  stood  off  a  few  yards  and  waited.     The  men  stood 

179 


The  Naval  War — North  Sea 

quietly  by  tui  ilic  iiuyuc,  waitiiii;  lor  tlic  order  to  jump, 
and  parsing  tlic  time  in  slipping  off  their  clothes.  In  a 
moment  or  two  the  order  came,  and  the  men  went  in. 
Lnfortunately,  by  far  the  j^reaier  majority  went  over 
tlie  port  bow,  close  to  where  the  launch  lay.  The  Hoj;ue 
disappeared  about  six  minutes  after  she  had  been 
struck  and  scores  of  them  clung  to  the  gunwales  of  the 
launch  until  she  was  unable  to  stand  the  strain  and  fell 
to  pieces,  precipitating  her  own  crew  and  those  un- 
fortunates already  saved  from  the  Abuukir.  All  those 
from  the  llogue  who  were  lost  perished  here.  .\s  the 
Hogue  went  down  she  partially  righted  herself  and  her 
steam  picket  boat  and  her  steam  pinnace  both  floated 
off  her  undamaged,  and  in  this  manner  many  of  the 
survivors  were  saved. 

Hv  this  time  the  Cressy  came  up  and  opened  fire 
witli  both  batteries  on  the  sui)marinc,  whose  periscope 
was  visible,  but  she  herself  was  almost  immediately 
struck  amidships  by  tw(j  torpedoes  and  sank  in  less 
than  two  minutes.  Phe  Titan  of  Rotterdam,  the  Flora 
of  Vmuiden.  two  Dutch  boats,  and  a  Lowestoft  traw- 
ler, which  happened  to  be  in  the  vicinity,  closed  in  and 
rescued  all  who  were  saved  from  the  three  ships.  The 
total  loss  of  life  was  about  <»'»  officers  and  1,400  men. 
The  cruisers  themselves  were  old  and  their  loss  did  not 
materially  weaken  the  British  fleet. 

.'\s  a  result  of  this,  on  the  3rd  of  October,  notice  wa.-> 
given  bv  the  British  admiralty  that  they  had  adopted 
counter  measures  to  tlie  Ocrman  policy  of  mine  laying 
and  submarine  activities,  and  had  laid  mines  in  the 
area  embraced  between  latitude  51.1.')  Xorth  to  r^]AO 
North  and  longitude  1.35  East  and  3  East. 

The  next  episode  in  the  North  Sea  was  the  sinking  of 
the  Ilawke,  a  British  cruiser  of  7,3.')0  tons,  which  was 
torpedoed  by  German  submarines,  and  the  Theseus,  her 
sister  ship  was  also  attacked  at  the  same  time,  but  was 
not  damaged.  Of  the  crew  of  541,  only  73  were  saved. 
The  llawkc  was  an  oM  ship  and  her  loss  was  not  of  great 
importance.  Two  days  after  this,  on  October  17th.  the 
British  new  light  cruiser  Undaimted.  accompanied  by 
three  destrovcrs,  engaged  four  German  destrovors,  the 
S-llT).  S-117',  S-118  and  S-11J>,  off  the  Dutch  coast.  The 
Undaunted  was  a  sister  ship  to  the  .\rcthusa,  which 
figured  in  the  battle  off  Helgoland.  .All  the  German 
destroyers  were  sunk  while  the  British  loss  was  only 
five  men  wotmded  and  practically  no  damage  to  the  vcs- 

180 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

sels.  The  German  loss  in  lives  was  somewhere  in  the 
vicinity  of  300,  and  31  were  taken  prisoner.  The  fig-ht 
lasted  about  two  hours  and  began  at  a  range  of  from 
four  to  five  miles. 

About  October  18th,  the  British  in  some  mysterious 
manner  lost  the  submarine  E-3.  No  details  of  her  end 
have  ever  been  made  public,  the  fact  alone  was  stated. 
On  October  27th,  the  Audacious,  a  new  dreadnought  of 
25,000  tons,  came  to  a  mysterious  end  off  the  northern 
Irish  coast.  This  was  one  of  the  most  powerful  vessels 
of  the  British  battle  fleet.  This  loss  was  concealed  for 
many  days  from  the  British  public,  and  from  the  world, 
by  the  British  admiralty,  and  to  tliis  day  it  is  unknown 
whether  she  struck  a  mine  or  was  torpedoed  by  a  sub- 
marine. The  whole  affair  is  shrouded  in  mystery.  The 
loss  of  life  was  very  slight, — only  two  men, — as  she 
was  surrounded  by  other  vessels,  some  warships  and 
some  merchant  vessels,  who  took  off  her  crew  when  it 
was  seen  that  she  was  doomed  to  sink. 

Between  this  and  the  end  of  the  month,  from  Octo- 
ber 25th  to  30th,  the  British  claim  to  have  destroyed 
two  submarines  in  the  North  Sea  by  shell  fire.  The 
numbers  of  these  vessels  are,  however,  unknown,  and 
no  details  were  given.  If  they  were  sunk,  the  loss  of 
life  would  have  been  24.  On  the  last  day  of  October, 
the  Germans  torpedoed  and  sank  the  Hermes  in  the 
North  Sea,  a  medium  sized  protected  cruiser  of  an  old 
type,  with  a  loss  of  22  lives ;  and  on  the  3rd  of  Novem- 
ber the  D-5,  a  British  submarine,  struck  a  German 
mine  near  Helgoland  and  was  destroyed  with  all  her 
crew  of  21.  During  November  two  German  submarines 
were  lost,  one  on  the  13th,  off  the  Belgian  coast,  which 
was  rammed  by  a  French  warship  and  sent  to  the  bot- 
tom with  a  loss  of  her  entire  crew  of  12,  and  one,  the 
U-18,  on  the  23rd,  which  the  British  sank  in  the  same 
manner  in  the  North  Sea,  but  of  her  crew  only  one  was 
lost,  the  other  seventeen  being  made  prisoner. 

The  German  submarines  during  this  month  became 
extremely  bold,  entering  the  harbors  on  the  British 
coast  almost  at  will  in  spite  of  their  defense  of  mines 
and  nets.  The  only  casualty  to  the  British  fleet,  how- 
ever, resulting  from  this,  was  the  loss  of  the  Niger,  a 
small  torpedo  gunboat,  which  was  blown  up  in  the  very 
harbor  of  Deal,  and  besides  the  vessel  15  lives  were  lost. 

On  the  26th  of  November  an  old  British  battleship,  the 
Bulwark,  blew  up  in  a  most  mysterious  manner  while 

181 


The  Naval  War  -North  Sea 

lying  at  tlic  diK-k  in  Sliccrncss  Harbor.  No  salisfaciurv 
explanation  of  what  produced  the  explosion  on  her  has 
ever  been  made.  The  Britisli  admiralty  officials  investi- 
^led,  and  reiK»ned  that  the  expk)sii>n  liad  taken  place  in 
lier  magazines,  but  the  evidence  .supporting  this  conclusion 
is  not  of  the  most  convincing  nature,  although  it  is  hard 
to  say  what  else  could  Iiave  caused  this  explosion  in 
broad  daylight  in  the  early  morning.  Of  her  crew  of 
T80.  T50  disappeared.  The  word  "disappeared"  is  the 
only  word  which  can  be  useil  in  describing  what  happened 
in  this  catastrtjphe.  as  almost  nothing  of  any  of  them 
was  ever  found. 

During  the  month  of  Xovember  the  Berlin,  an  auxil- 
iary cruiser,  which  escaped  from  the  Bahic  with  a  view 
of  joining  the  (ierman  warships  still  at  liberty  in  the 
outer  ocean,  and  engaged  in  commerce  raiding,  found 
that  after  getting  out  of  the  Baltic  it  was  impossible  for 
her  to  gain  the  outer  sea,  and  consequently  she  entered 
the  harbor  of  Trondhjeim,  Norway,  and  there  interned 
until  the  cntl  of  the  war. 

Dn  Xovemlx^r  l.Uh,  the  first  of  the  raids,  which  were 
made  by  the  Germans  on  the  English  coast,  took  place. 
Eight  ships  were  employed  in  this  raid,  including  the 
three  battle  cruisers,  Seydlitz,  Moltke  and  \  on  der  Tann, 
the  armored  cruisers  Bluecher  and  Vorck,  lx)th  com- 
paratively old  vessels,  though  of  great  speed,  and  three 
unjjrotected  cruisers.  The  objective  was  Yarmouth, 
which  was  bombared  at  long  range,  but  little  damage 
was  done.  The  evident  purpo.sc  ni  the  raid  was  more 
psychological  than  material. 

The  coast  of  Great  Britain  had  not  been  attacked  by 
hostile  warships  in  over  a  hundred  years,  and  the  moral 
effect  produced  upon  the  British  people  was  considerable, 
although  the  material  effect  was  slight.  This  raid  was 
followed  by  another  on  ncccml)er  IHth,  on  Scarborough, 
Whitby  and  HartlepcH)!.  which  resulted  in  a  very  con- 
siderable loss  of  life  in  all  three  places.  Great  c<immcnt 
was  created  by  these  raids,  and  an  attenij)t  was  made  to 
place  them  outside  of  the  attacks  which  are  justified  by 
the  rules  of  war.  hut  a  careful  examination  of  the  case 
does  not  lead  to  that  conclusion,  and  as  far  as  the  Hartlc- 
pools  go.  they  were  not  only  defended  but  fortified 
towns. 

The  London  Ec«)nf)mist.  in  its  issue  of  December  2Gth, 
lf>14.  disctissing  the  bombardinent  of  these  three  towns, 
9»y»  amr»nR  other  things: 

18? 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

"In  warfare  there  are  two  species  of  atrocities — those 
which  are  unavoidable  accidents  and  those  which  are 
mere  brntahties  committed  by  either  an  individual  or  by 
the  orders  of  a  commanding  officer.  A  shell  aimed  at  a 
fort  or  barracks,  and  which  explodes  among  private 
dwellings  and  kills  women  and  children,  is  an  example 
of  the  first  kind.  Cruelty  to  prisoners  or  deliberate  firing 
on  the  Red  Cross  is  an  example  of  the  second  kind. 
Hardly  a  newspaper  on  either  side  but  what  has  attrib- 
uted countless  atrocities  of  this  sort  to  the  enemy,  and 
denied  all  accusations  made  against  their  own  sides. 

"We  have  assumed  the  burden  and  responsibilities  of 
war,  and  if  the  enemy  is  successful  in  piercing  our  de- 
fenses, it  behooves  us  to  face  the  fact  with  calm  and 
fortitude.  We  must  be  prepared  and  expect  to  endure 
our  part  of  the  common  suffering,  and  be  thankful  that, 
so  far,  our  share  has  been  a  slight  one  compared  with 
those  of  our  Allies.  The  bombardment  of  undefended 
towns  is  forbidden  by  the  recognized  conventions  of  naval 
warfare.  Unhappily,  no  agreement  as  to  the  definition 
of  an  undefended  town  has  ever  been  achieved.  The 
term  'undefended'  is  certainly  very  much  wider  Jhan  'un- 
fortified.' For  instance,  in  ratifying  the  conventions  of 
The  Hague  conference  on  this  subject,  the  British  gov- 
ernment, supported  by  those  of  Germany  and  France,  in- 
sisted that  the  laying  of  contact  mines  off  a  harbor  should 
be  sufficient  to  expose  the  same  to  bombardment. 

"The  conventions  further  direct  that  even  in  the  case 
of  defended  towns,  the  commander  of  an  attacking  force 
must  give  due  notice  of  bombardment,  but  only  when 
military  exigencies  allow  (again  a  British  reser:  ation) , 
which  clearly  they  do  not  in  the  case  of  a  sudden  raid ; 
that  the  enemy  must  do  his  best  to  spare  churches,  civic 
buildings,  hospitals  and  the  like  (but  o»/a') where  these 
are  distinguishable  by  the  exhibition  of  large  rigid  panels 
divided  into  white  and  black  triangles.  And  here  it  may 
be  remarked  that  the  official  British  Manual  of  Military 
Law  lays  it  down  that  its  towns  and  its  defences  coii- 
stitutc  an  indivisible  whole. 

"Finally,  the  immunity  of  undefended  towns  does  not 
extend  to  military  works,  establishments  or  depots  or 
to  any  workshops  or  plant  capable  of  supplying  military 
needs — excc])tions  that  would  probably  be  held  to  cover 
railway  stations,  bridges  and  coal  stores  whether  in  pub- 
lic or  private  ownership. 

"Now.   Hartlepool   is  clearly  a   defended   town.     The 

183 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

war  office  rep<»rted  that  the  German  vessels  eny;aged 
the  fortress,  which  replied  and  drove  the  enemy  oft. 
The  Germans,  on  the  other  hand,  pretend  to  have 
silenced  its  puns.  There  were  presumably  <>ther  mill- 
tan-  targets  as  well,  for  shells  are  reported  to  have 
been  dropped  on  the  royal  engineers'  and  infantry 
lines.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  the  town  suffered  far 
more  than  the  militant'  works.  This  may  have  been 
the  result  of  malice,  or  carelessness,  or  incompetence, 
or  it  may  have  been  inevitable  in  the  case  of  a  bombard- 
ment at  considcrabU  rantje  on  a  misty  morning. 

"At  Whitby,  the  chief  officer  of  the  coast  guard 
stated  that  the  whole  fire  was  directed  at  the  signal 
station.  This  was  a  legitimate  target.  It  is  a  fact  that 
the  shells  were  scattered  over  a  very  wide  area. 

".\t  Scarborough,  the  circumstances  are  much  more 
obscure.  There  is  a  castle,  but  it  is  said  to  have  had 
no  long  range  guns.  The  first  shot  struck  the  castle, 
the  second  the  coast  guard  station.  This  looks  as 
though  military  action  was  intended,  at  any  rate,  at 
first.  What  otlier  targets  there  may  have  been  we  can- 
not say,  \)UX  we  have  no  official  information  regarding 
the  military  disposition  at  Scarborough. 

"There  is  one  consideration  which  seems  t<i  have 
been  lost  sight  of  by  some  people.  It  is  this — that,  as 
indicated  above,  several  proposed  restrictions  upon  the 
freedom  of  bombardment  have  been  resisted  by  the 
British  government  in  the  past.  In  view  of  our  posi- 
tion as  a  paramount  naval  power,  the  decision  was 
very  likely  a  wise  one,  at  least  from  a  military  point 
of  view,  but  we  must  be  prepared  to  take  the  conse- 
quences, and  we  shall  cut  a  very  poor  figure  before 
the  world  if  wc  complain  when  others  turn  to  our  rlis- 
advantage  the  freedom  we  have  ourselves  reserved. 

"There  seem  to  be  people  to  whom  any  hostile  ac- 
tion directed  against  the  coasts  of  this  country  appear*; 
in  the  light  of  an  intolerable  affront,  but  it  is  in<leed 
difficult  to  look  with  the  eye  of  an  impartial  historian 
at  the  actions  of  your  enemies.  To  discover  their 
atrocities  and  expose  them,  is  thought  to  be  a  patriotic 
task.  To  acknowledge  that  yotir  own  government  or 
your  allies  have  ever  offended  in  the  least  against  in- 
ternational law  is  a  kind  of  treason. 

"Before  we  give  vent  to  an  excess  of  fnry.  certainly 
before  wc  indict  a  whole  nation.  Irt  us  rrmrttihcr  that 
our  mm  nary  has  hern  cnn^at^rd  in  similar  of>crations, 

18i 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

fraught  with  possible  loss  to  the  life  and  property  of 
non-combatants.  If  coast  towns  are  garrisoned,  they 
are  not  likely  to  escape  bombardment  when  the  ene- 
my's fleet  gets  within  range.  And  if,  at  the  end  of  the 
war,  an  impartial  neutral  commission  were  to  convict 
the  British  as  well  as  the  German  navy  of  bombarding 
unfortified  towns,  merely  because  soldiers  were  quar- 
tered in  them,  and  of  thereby  killing  or  wounding 
many  women  and  children,  then  some  of  the  letters, 
speeches  and  articles  recently  published  would  be  stultified. 

"It  is  certainly  to  be  hoped  that  in  attacking  the 
coast  defenses  of  the  enemy,  our  fleet  will  succeed  in 
inflicting  greater  military  damage  at  a  less  cost  of 
civilian  suffering,  and  we  trust  to  the  skill  and  hu- 
manity of  our  commanders  to  see  that  this  is  so,  but 
the  fact  remains  that  coast  towns  have  to  take  their 
chance.  The  killing  of  women  and  children,  and  of 
civilians  generally,  is  an  abomination,  but  war  itself  is 
an  abomination  and  will  always  be  so." 

Colonel  Maude,  the  leading  British  authority  on  mili- 
tary custom,  in  commenting  on  this  bombardment,  ex- 
presses views  in  harmony  with  those  stated  above. 
Further,  that  an  attack  on  an  enemy's  coast  analogous 
to  the  bombardment  of  these  three  English  coast  towns 
was  considered  by  British  naval  officers  with  favor  is 
proved  by  what  happened  as  a  result  of  the  mimic  war 
in  the  British  naval  manoeuvres  of  1888.  During  these 
manoeuvres  a  British  squadron  bombarded  several  un- 
defended watering  places  in  Scotland  and  in  the  north 
*of  England.  A  controversy  concerning  this  action 
arose,  brought  about  by  a  letter  to  the  London  Times 
from  Mr.  T.  E.  Holland,  who  denounced  this  bombard- 
ment as  a  breach  of  international  law.  Several  dis- 
tinguished naval  officers  and  several  authorities  on 
international  law  replied  to  him,  among  whom  was 
Lord  Charles  Beresford,  who  wrote  the  London  Times, 
August  18,  1888:  "The  whole  art  of  war  is  to  strike  at 
the  enemy's  weakest  points  wherever  they  are  and 
whatever  they  be.  There  is  no  sentiment  after  the  ac- 
tion commences.  I  say  boldly  and  openly  that  if  an 
officer  could  damage  his  enemy  and  procure  panic  or 
demoralization  in  the  enemy's  country,  he  would  be 
wrong  to  demur  a  moment  in  exacting  a  ransom  or  in 
bombarding  a  sea-port  town  if  the  opportunity  occurs." 

This  view,  the  concensus  of  opinion  of  the  majority 
who  participated  in  the  discussion,  is  upheld  as  the  cor- 

185 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

rect  one.  It  ihcac  bombardnuiit.N  .iiv  legal  and  in  ac- 
conlancc  with  the  rules  <tl  war  for  r»riti>li  ship>  lo  prac- 
lice.  docs  it  not  folluw  that  they  are  equally  legal  for  all 
the  worhl "'  l-'urtluMMJore,  in  this  ver)  war,  llriiish  otficiai 
reports  >lu>\v  that  British  ships  on  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor  bi«mbarded  Turkish  villages  and  forts  which  were 
fully  as  much  undclcndcd  as  these  English  coast  towns, 
and  therein  Turkish  women  and  children  were  killed  in 
numbers,  i'he  dales  and  places  of  thc^e  bombardments 
were:  December  1st  and  ;{rd.  .\kba ;  December  !;20th, 
Rapaz ;  December  ',ilst,  Deurtyvc;  December  xJ3rd, 
Voumourtalik  and  Sarisseki;  January  5th,  Karadivar. 

An  undue  amtnint  of  space  has  perhaps  been  given 
this  matter,  but  in  \  iew  of  the  deluge  nf  malicious  abuse 
poured  forth  by  a  large  portion  of  the  British  and 
American  Press  on  the  German  naval  commanders  at 
the  time  of  these  raids,  compounded  in  almost  equal 
parts  of  ignorance  of  military  law  and  prejudice,  it  is 
thought  that  the  expression  in  permanent  form  of  the 
opinions  of  those  competent  to  judge,  is  an  act  of  justice. 

By  way  of  retaliating  for  these  raids,  the  British 
made  a  combined  attack  on  the  (icrman  warships  in 
Cuxhaven  harbor,  by  seven  sea  planes,  which  were  es- 
corted by  a  light  cruiser  and  destroyer  force,  together 
with  submarines.  This  attack  was  delivered  at  day- 
break, starting  from  a  p(Mnt  in  the  vicinity  of  Helgo- 
land. The  ships  were  seen  by  the  C^.ermans  from  Helgo- 
land, and  two  Zeppelins,  some  sea  planes  and  several 
submarines  were  sent  out  to  attack  them.  As  a  result 
of  this  discovery,  a  novel  combat  took  place,  viz:  sub-, 
marines,  /ejipclins  and  sea  planes,  against  cruisers. 
By  rapid  manoeuvring  the  Briti^^h  cruisers  succeeded 
in  avoiding  the  submarines,  while  the  Zeppelins  were 
put  to  fliglit  bv  the  guns  of  the  Undaunted  and  the 
Arethusa.  The  British  ^ea  planes  were  more  successful, 
in  that  they  succeeded  in  dropping  bombs  near  enemy's 
■^hips.  but  did  not  hit  anything.  This  combat  lasted 
three  hours,  during  which  no  surface  vessels  attacked 
the  British  fleet,  which  remained  in  its  position  until 
three  of  the  seven  airmen  engaged  in  the  attack  on 
Cuxhaven  had  returned. 

What  damage  was  done  in  thi*^  Cuxhaven  raid  is  not 
known.  The  B.ritish  claim  that  its  moral  effect  was 
great.  Of  the  seven  aviators,  all  returned  in  safety, 
though  four  of  them  lost  their  machine^. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war.  there  were  constrticting 
in  Rrifi«.b  yards  f«»r  the  accomit  of  I'ra/il.  three  monitors 

186 


The  Naval  War — North  Sea 

inounting  a  number  of  powerful,  long  range  guns.  These, 
with  all  other  vessels  constructing  for  foreign  powers  in 
British  yards  were  taken  by  Great  Britain,  as  she  had 
an  absolute  right  to  do,  according  to  the  practice  of  na- 
tions, on  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  these  monitors 
were  used  with  considerable  effect  from  October  on- 
wards, in  support  of  the  left  flank  of  the  Belgian  army, 
along  the  Belgian  seacoast.  Naval  balloons  observed 
and  reported  the  shore  positions  which  the  squadron 
was  consequently  able  to  bombard  with  some  effect. 
This  bombardment  continued  intermittently  for  weeks, 
and  on  November  23rd  Zeebrugge,  which  the  Germans 
had  made  a  submarine  base,  received  particular  attention 
from    this   bombarding   squadron. 

(Jn  the  24th  of  January,  1915,  a  British  squadron  of 
battle  cruisers  and  light  cruisers,  with  destroyer  flotillas, 
was  patrolling  the  North  Sea  when  the  flash  of  guns  was 
noticed  to  the  southeast.  A  few  minutes  afterwards  the 
light  cruiser  Aurora  reported  to  the  fleet  that  she  was 
engaged.  The  fleet  turned  to  the  southeast  at  an  in- 
creased speed,  sending  forward  the  light  cruisers  and 
destroyer  flotilla  to  take  contact  with  the  enemy  and  re- 
port their  movements.  These  instructions  were  antici- 
pated by  the  Arethusa,  which  reported  that  the  enemy's 
ships  consisted  of  three  battle  cruisers,  the  armored 
cruiser  Bluecher,  six  light  cruisers  and  some  destroyers. 
The  British  fleet  was  composed  of  five  battleships,  the 
Lion,  Tiger,  Princess  Royal,  New  Zealand  and  Indom- 
itable, the  Tiger  and  Lion  being  among  the  newest  and 
most  powerful  ships  of  the  navy,  with  particularly  high 
speed.  The  Princess  Royal  was  another  new  ship  of 
equal  size  and  speed  to  the  Lion  and  Tiger.  All  three  of 
these  are  known  as  battle  cruisers. 

The  German  fleet  consisted  of  three  battle  cruisers, 
the  Moltke.  the  Seydiitz,  a  new  and  very  fast  battle- 
cruiser,  and  the  Derflinger.  These  three  are  all  of  equal 
speed  with  the  Lion  and  Tiger  of  the  British  fleet.  The 
other  German  vessel  was  the  Bluecher,  an  armored 
cruiser  about  six  or  seven  years  old,  running  about  three 
to  four  knots  an  hour  slower  than  the  other  vessels.  As 
will  be  seen  in  the  sequel,  this  lack  of  speed  proved  her 
undoing.     There  were  also  a  number  of  destroyers. 

The  German  ships,  on  sighting  the  British,  changed 
their  course  to  southeast.  The  British  working  up  to 
full  speed,  steered  southward.  At  7.30,  the  Germans 
came  in  sight  on  the  port  bow  at  a  distance  of  14  miles 

187 


The  Naval  War — North  Sea 

and  -^tcainmg  ia>t.  The  British  then  altered  their  course 
to  southeast,  parallel  to  the  eiicuiv  ancl  settled  down  to 
a  stern  chase.  Speed  wa>'  j^raduaily  increased  to  28f/j 
knots  an  hour  and  the  squadron  gradually  drew  up  to 
within  20,o«H)  yards  of  the  rear  German  ship,  the  Bluccher. 

The  Cierinans  were  j^rocccdinj^  in  sinj^lc  line  ahead, 
with  a  light  cruiser  in  front  and  on  starhoard  l)cam. 

The  first  shot  of  the  battle  was  fired  by  the  Lion  at 
8  :5v*.  but  the  vessel  was  too  far  distant  for  her  ^^uns 
to  reach.  Shots  w  ere  fired  afterward  at  intervals  to  test 
the  ranj;e  and  at  9:10  the  Blucher  was  hit  by  tlie  Lion 
for  the  first  time.  At  i>  :"20  the  Tiger  had  gotten  up  with- 
in range  of  the  lyncher  and  opened  fire  on  her,  while 
the  Lion  turned  her  attention  to  the  next  ship  in  the 
German  line,  which  is  said  to  have  been  hit  several 
times  at  18,000  yards.  The  Princess  Royal  now  drew 
up  in  range  and  opened  fire  on  the  Blucher.  which 
slackened  speed  and  Ijccame  exposed  to  the  guns  of 
the  New  Zealand.  The  Princess  Royal  then  shifted 
her  fire  to  the  third  ship  in  the  (icrman  line,  and  at 
this  point  the  German  destroyers  threatening  an  at- 
tack on  the  British  fleet,  the  British  destroyer  division 
passed  ahead  oi  their  battle  cruisers.  At  M:15  the  Lion 
was  engaging  the  light  German  ship  as  was  the  Tiger. 
The  Princess  Royal  was  still  engaged  with  the  third 
ship,  which  was  on  fire,  while  the  Blucher.  her  speed 
still  slackening,  was  tiie  target  of  the  New  Zealand. 

The  Germans  changed  course  slightly,  which  man- 
oeuvre was  made  the  re.lson  fur  a  corresponding  change 
by  the  British.  The  I'luchcr  at  H>:l.")  had  fallen  con- 
siderably astern  of  the  other  vessels,  was  on  fire,  had  a 
heavy  list,  and  was  unable  to  defend  herself.  .\t  11:03 
the  Lion  suffered  an  injury  which  put  her  out  of  the 
battle  line,  and  the  British  admiral  tran^^fcrred  his  flag 
to  a  destroyer,  and  thence  to  the  Princess  Royal.  Ixtard- 
ing  her  at  11.4'..  and  rejoining  on  her  the  rest  of  the 
squadron  to  the  north,  meeting  them  returning  at  noon. 

.About  11:20.  the  Blucher.  which  had  been  falling 
steadilv  l)chind.  sank.  Of  her  crew  alK)Ut  2."»0  were  saved. 
A  few  minutes  after  the  remaining  vessels  of  the  Ger- 
man squadron  ran  into  the  German  mine  fields,  where 
it  was  not  deemed  prudent  for  the  British  vessels  to  fol- 
low. The  Seydlitz  and  the  Derflinger  were  both  con- 
siderably injnrcfl  in  this  fight.  Of  the  British  ves.9cl8. 
the  Tyion  was  badly  injured,  having  been  strnrk.  accord- 
ing tf»  official  report,  rightcen  times,  and  it  was  only  by 

188 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

consuniniatc  seamanship  on  the  part  of  her  captain  that 
she  avoided  foundering.  She  was  towed  to  port  by  the 
Indomitable,  and  four  months  later  had  not  resumed  her 
l)lace  on  the  active  list  of  the  navy.  The  Tiger  was  also 
hit  and  considerably  damaged.  Her  damages,  however, 
were  not  as  great  as  those  of  the  Lion.  The  torpedo  boat 
Meteor  was  destroyed.     The  British  loss  in  hves  in  this 
action  ran  to  16  men  killed  and  49  wounded. 
_    Nothing  further  of  interest  happened  until  the  first  day 
of  January,  1915,  when  the  Formidable,  a  battleship  of 
15,000  tons,  was  torpedoed  by  German  submarines  and 
sunk  in  the  channel.  Curiously  enough  she  was  a  sister 
ship  of  the  Bulwark,  whose  end  by  a  mysterious  explo- 
sion has  been  hereinbefore  narra'ted.  The  Formidable 
was  struck  between  3  and  3.30  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
and  of  her,  crew  of  800,  only  301  were  saved.    Though 
an  old  boat,  she  was  still  of  considerable  fighting  value. 
Captain  Loxley,  her  commander,distinguished  himself 
by  calmness  and  courage,  remaining  on  the  bridge  until 
the  last,  directing  operations  and  going  down  with  his 
ship  in  accordance  with  the  tradition  of  the  sea. 

From  this  time  onward  until  the  adoption  of  a  new 
submarine  policy  by  the  Germans,  there  is  little  to  chron- 
icle in  naval  warfare  in  the  channel  or  the  North  Sea. 
On  January  26th,  1915,  Germany  adopted  a  measure 
of  conservation  for  the  civil  population  only,  by  means 
of  a  company  organized  for  such  purposes,  of  all  food 
stuffs  in  Germany.  This  company  was  given  authority  to 
take  over  all  stocks  of  food  anywhere  in  the  empire'ex- 
ceedinga  specified  amount,  varying  with  the  different 
foods,  and  to  warehouse  the  same,  and  sell  it  in  quanti- 
ties which  were  fixed  per  capita  to  the  people  of  the  em- 
pire, at  not  exceeding  a  definitely  specified  maximum 
price.  The  object  of  this  legislation  was  to  prevent  the 
possibility  of  scantiness  in  one  part  of  the  empire  and 
plentifulness  in  another,  and  to  further  prevent  the 
undue  and  arbitrary  advance  of  prices  by  private  deal- 
ers. The  above  is  an  accurate  summary  of  its  import- 
ant provisions. 

On  February  3rd,  Great  Britain,  immediately  on  re- 
ceipt of  the  general  information  that  a  policy  of  conserv- 
ation had  been  adopted,  and  before  a  copy  of  the  decree 
could  have  been  in  the  hands  of  her  government,  and 
therefore  before  that  government  could  have  known 
either  the  scope  or  the  purpose  of  the  measure,  asserted 
that  this  was  a  confiscation  of  the  foodstuffs  in  Germany 

189 


The  Naval  War — North  Sta 

for  nuliiary  purln)^t•^.  rcialiaicil  b\  jdaciiig  all  Icxxlstntfs 
of  anv  kind  \.\\Km  the  list  of  contraband  of  war.  and  an- 
nounced that  her  warships  had  orders  to  seize  tlie  com- 
mercial ships  of  neutral  countries  prtKceding  to  Germany 
with  carj^ocs  of  this  character;  and  further,  to  seize,  on 
suspicion,  neutral  shi|)s  procee<Iing  to  neutral  {X)rts  laden 
with  such  carjjoes.  unless  >uch  ships  c(ndd  clearly  prove 
that  the  idtimate  ilestination  <»f  their  cargi»es  was  not 
either  Germany  or  Austria. 

This  constilutetl  an  absolutel\  unprecedented  act  in- 
fringing ujK)n  the  rights  of  neutral  powers  and  practi- 
cally anuumtedtoa  claim  that  the  iiigh  seas  were  private 
property  of  Great  I'ritain.  and  not  the  highway  of  the 
world's  commerce.  Furthermore,  never  Inrfore  in  the 
history  of  the  world  had  any  nation  made  all  foinlstuffs. 
destined  for  the  civil  i>opulation  of  its  enemy,  conirabanrl 
of  war.  Kxtremelv  arbitrary  and  without  .sanction  of 
precedent,  this  action  violated  th<*  principle  that  Great 
i>ritain  had  always  lieretofore  contended  for  in  her  deal- 
ings with  other  combatant  nations,  she  being  a  neutral. 
'  It  is  further  to  Ix*  remarked  that  she  did  not  blockade 
the  German  coa.st  either  in  form  or  fact,  but  she  did 
claim  the  right  to  examine  the  cargoes  of  neutral  ships 
an\  where  uih»ii  the  high  seas.  The  scheme  of  |)rocedure 
is.  of  course,  more  convenient  than  exjjosing  ships  of 
war  to  the  risks  of  a  blockailing  station,  but  it  neverthe- 
less constitutes  a  great  breach  of  what  may  be  called  the 
common  rights  of  humanity  to  the  ocean  as  a  highway. 
.\nd  here  it  may  be  remarked  that  in  the  whole  history 
(jf  Great  liritain,  from  the  time  that  she  fir.st  secured 
preiK)nderance  of  maritime  |)owcr.  C()Upled  with  its  neces- 
sary adjunct  of  preponderance  of  naval  power,  she  has 
always  been  disregardful  of  the  rights  of  i»ther  nations, 
as  though  the  Almighty  had  made  the  seas  her  own 
property.  She  has  asserted  this  doctrine,  sometimes  with 
mildness,  sometimes  with  brutality,  but  always  with  con- 
sistency. 

From  a  neutral  stan<li)onu.  the  real  issue  involved  in 
this  war  is  whether  or  not  (treat  Britain  can  force  her 
absolute  control  of  the  seas  tij)on  an  unwilling  worM. 
No  one  can  blame  Great  Britain  for  asserting  this  con- 
trol ;  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  her  people  and  it  is  the 
duty  of  her  statesmen  or  of  the  statesmen  of  any  coun- 
try, to  use  the  strength  and  power  of  that  country  to 
promote  the  advantage  of  the  people  thereof,  but  the 
blatju*  is  to  l)c  laid  at  the  do*>rs  of  those  nations  which 


The  Naval  War— North  Sea 

have  so  great  a  lack  of  feeling  of  nationality  as  to  ac- 
quiesce in  this  reduction  to  the  status  of  pri\ate  prop- 
erty of  Great  Britain  of  that  which  was  manifestly  in- 
tended as  a  free  and  untramnicled  highway  of  copi- 
nierce  l)etween  the  different  nations  of  the  world.  The 
subject  is  too  important  and  t(K)  vast  to  be  UKjre  than 
alluded  lo  here.  At  some  future  time  1  hope  to  have  the 
opportunity  of  discussing  this  (juestion  more  at  length. 

As  a  result  of  this  arbitrary  action  by  Great  Britain 
Germany,  on  February  4th,  issued  a  notice  whereby  she 
established  a  blockade  of  the  waters  immediately  ad- 
jacent to  the  British  Isles  and  the  northern  and  western 
coasts  of  France,  and  warned  the  neutral  powers  that  it 
was  her  intention  to  sink,  without  notice,  all  British, 
French  and  Russian  mercantile  ships  found  within  that 
area  after  the  18th  day  of  February,  and  further,  warn- 
ing neutrals  that  ships  of  theirs  entered  the  area  de- 
scribed at  their  own  risk.  The  limits  of  si)ace  forbid  the 
full  discussion  of  the  apparent  legal  defects  of  this  Ger- 
man blockade  of  the  British  Isles  using  the  submarine  as 
a  means  of  blockade.  This  new  weapon  of  naval  war- 
fare changes  to  a  very  great  degree  the  conditions  under 
which  blockades  are  hereafter  to  be  conducted,  and 
necessitates  the  taking  of  greater  risks  by  neutral  ship- 
ping in  the  event  that  submarines  are  to  be  used,  while  it 
is  self-evident  that,  owing  to  their  peculiar  character  and 
limitations,  the  rules  of  blockade,  which  have  hereto- 
fore obtained,  can  no  longer  be  considered  satisfactory. 

This  whole  question  will  probably,  after  this  war  is 
finished,  be  regulated  by  appropriate  international  ac- 
tion. 

As  a  sort  of  retaliation  for  an  illegal  act  of  Great 
Britain,  however,  this  submarine  blockade  stands  upon 
a  totally  different  footing.  From  the  beginning  of  this 
war  to  the  date  on  which  these  words  are  written,  the 
Allies  have  seemed  to  take  the  position  that  they  were 
entitled  to  fix  the  rules  under  which  Germany  should 
wage  war,  and  to  be  bound  b}-  no  rules  themselves. 
In  other  words,  in  their  view,  sauce  for  the  goose  was 
not  sauce  for  the  gander.  They  have  invoked  repeat- 
edly against  Germany  the  sanction  of  conventions  of 
The  Hague  conferences  which  were  not  binding  to  the 
combatants  in  the  least,  owing  to  the  fact  that  in  the 
years  prior  to  the  war  Great  Britain,  for  purposes  of 
its  own,  had  not  ratified  these  conventions,  which  by 
their  very  terms  required  the  ratification  of  all  com- 

191 


The  Naval  >X^ar — North  Sea 

batant  powers  to  be  bindinj^  on  any.  This  contention, 
tojicther  with  other  absurd  propositions  of  interna- 
tional law.  has  been  advanced  by  the  Allies  with  the 
manite>t  purpose  of  confusing  the  issue  in  the  minds 
of  the  peoples  of  the  neutral  countries.' 

Accordingly  ofi  February  17tl).  when  the  nulice  to<ik 
effect.  Germany  began  to  sink  British  merchant  ves- 
sels wherever  found,  without  warning,  and  in  the 
eight  or  ten  days  succeeded  in  destroying  by  means  of 
the  submarines  ten  British  ships,  besides  one  or  two 
neutral  vessels.  While  the  material  effect  of  this 
bUickade  was  perhaps  not  very  considerable  in  view 
of  the  enormous  number  of  vessels  arriving  at  or  leav- 
ing the  British  Isles,  the  moral  effect  was  consider- 
able, as  evidenced  by  the  successive  steps  taken  to 
meet  the  emergency  by  Great  Britain.  On  the  2-1  th 
of  February,  she  closed  the  Irish  and  N'orth  channels 
to  all  navigation.  The  same  day.  Germany,  by  procla- 
mation, added  the  Orkney  and  Shetland  Islands  to  the 
war  zone.  On  March  1st.  this  blockade  had  been  in 
operation  such  a  short  time  that  it  was  impossible  to 
say  how  great  its  material  effects  would  be  in  the 
long  run. 


[d'Z 


CHAPTER  XVI. 
THE  NAVAL  WAR— HIGH  SEAS 


When  the  war  broke  out,  the  British  squadrons 
available  outside  of  European  waters,  were  distributed 
pretty  nearly  as  follows : 

China     Station — One     battleship,    four    cruisers,    six 
smaller  vessels,  eight  destroyers,  four  torpedo 
boats  and  three  submarines. 
East    Indian    Station — One    battleship,    two   cruisers, 

four  smaller  craft. 
Cape  Station — Three  cruisers. 
New  Zealand — Three  cruisers,  one  small  cruiser. 
West  Coast  of  Africa — Three  small  cruisers. 
West  Coast  of  America — Three  small  cruisers. 
East  Coast  of  South  America — One  cruiser. 
Australian  Coast — One  battle  cruiser,  three  light  cruis- 
ers, three  destroyers,  two  submarines. 
In  addition,  a  fourth  cruiser  squadron,  consisting  of 
five  ships,  was  on  the  point  of  returning  from  Mexico 
in  the  West  Atlantic.  When  hostilities  opened  a  num- 
ber of  fast  liners  were  immediately  put  in  commission 
as  auxiliary  cruisers  under  naval  commanders.  Further- 
more, a  number  of  merchant  steamers  were,  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  owners,  provided  with  guns  for  the  pur- 
pose of  defence  in  the  event  of  being  chased.  It  is  im- 
portant to  remember  this,  because  hereafter  this  arm- 
ing of  merchantmen  will  become  a  matter  of  some  im- 
portance.    France  and  Russia  only  had  some  few  and 
unimportant  vessels  far  from  their  bases. 

Against  this  force  of  the  Allies  there  were  some  eight 
or  nine  German  cruisers  abroad,  several  of  very  high 
speed,  all  efficient  for  commerce  destroying  purposes. 
In  addition  to  these  Germany  had  some  merchant  vessels 
and  liners  which  were  converted  into  auxiliary  cruisers 
precisely  the  same  as  the  British  have  done,  although  for 
some  reason  best  known  to  themselves  the  British  have 
claimed  in  print  that  the  liners  so  converted  by  the  Ger- 
mans were  in  reality  privateers,  whereas  the  liners  so 
converted  by  them  were  men-of-war.     The  reason  for 

193 


The  Naval  War-  -High  Seas 

this  distinction  is  nut  appurcni  to  any  but  tlie  British 
mind.  Both  sides  threw  thonjsclvcs  with  zeal  into  the 
kvork  of  captnriii)^  the  enemy's  merchant  vessels.  Nec- 
essarily the  Germans  were  at  a  i^rcat  disadvantaj^^c  in 
this  game,  owing  to  the  lack  of  ports  where  they  could 
obtain  coal  and  supplies,  which  abounded  for  Great 
Britain  all  over  the  world,  and  consc(|uently  the  Ger- 
man cruisers  were,  from  the  beginning,  inevitably 
doomed  to  be  captured  or  sunk  in  the  course  of  time, 
unless  they  sought  internment  in  foreign  harbors. 

The  first  German  converted  cruiser  to  be  disposed  of 
was  the  Kaiser  VVilhelm  der  Grosse,  which,  on  August 
v7th,  was  sighted  by  the  British  cruiser  Highflyer,  of 
5,600  tons,  carrying  six-inch  guns,  and  faster  than  the 
(ierman  ship  by  a  c«»u|)le  •>!  knots.  .\t  ilie  linic  the 
Highflyer  sighted  her,  the  Kaiser  was  coaling,  and  all 
evidence  points  to  the  fact  that  she  was  in  Spanish  co- 
lonial waters,  and  hence  the  attack  on  her  was  illegal. 
This  case  nearly  conforms  with  the  attack  on  the  Dres- 
den in  Chilean  waters,  which  will  be  hereafter  referred 
to.  liefore  the  Kaiser  could  separate  her-^elf  imnx  her 
collier  and  take  to  her  heels, the  1  lighflyer  was  in  range. 
Of  course,  there,  it  could  be  with  but  one  result,  the 
liner  being  greatly  outclassed  in  the  matter  of  ordnance. 
She  put  up  a  fight,  hit  the  cruiser  a  few  times,  killing 
one  man  and  wounding  five,  but  was  sunk  shortly, 
though  her  crew  was  rescued  by  the  attendant  collier. 

This  fight  took  place  within  three  miles  of  the  coast 
of  Africa,  near  the  Reo  de  ( )ro.  Bef<jre  she  was  sunk, 
the  Kaiser  had  sunk  one  British  vessel,  the  llyarles,  off 
Pernambuco,  and  had  held  up  the  Cape  Mail  steamer, 
Galician.  which.  howc\er,  she  did  not  sink. 

On  the  1 1th  of  September  a  fight  took  place  off  the 
east  coast  of  South  America,  between  two  of  these  con- 
verted cruisers,  the  Carmania  being  the  B.ritish  repre- 
sentative, and  the  German  ship  of  like  nature,  and  near- 
ly equal  force,  the  Caj)  Trafali^ar.  The  fight  here  was 
stubborn  ;  for  two  hours  they  banged  away  at  each 
other  at  a  range  of  from  9,000  to  .S,000  yards,  but  never 
.vithiji  the  latter  distance.  It  is  said  that  the  British  hits 
»vere  mr)stly  in  the  hull  or  mar  the  water  line,  while  the 
r.crman  hits  were  mostly  in  the  boats  and  ui)i)er  work«. 
f^oth  sides  took  their  punishment  without  weakening, 
(n  the  night  tin-  C.tp  Trafalgar  wriil  down,  most  of  the 
:rcw  saving  themselves  on  a  German  collier  with  which 
the  captain  was  in  wireless  communication  rlnring  the 

104 


The  Naval  War — High  Seas 

fight.  The  Cap  Trafalgar  started  to  burn  after  the  action 
was  half  an  hour  old,  and  capsized  before  she  sank.  The 
Carmania  had  nine  men  killed  and  'iC)  wounrled.  The 
loss  on  the  Cap  Trafalgar  is  unknown. 

On  September  2Uth,  in  Zanzibar  harbor,  the  British 
:ruiser  Pegasus,  which  had  done  considerable  destruc- 
tion in  German  East  Africa,  met  her  fate. 

The  Germaii  cruiser  Konigsberg  entered  the  harbor 
ind  attacked  her.  In  a  short  time  the  Pegasus  was  badly 
'mattered  and  was  beached,  with  2o  killed  and  SO  wounded 
)ut  of  her  crew  of  234.  The  Konigsberg  steamed  away 
ind  disappeared  for  a  long  time,  but  was  finally  found, 
as  will  be  narrated  in  due  course. 

Other  exploits  of  the  Piritish  cruisers  were  as  follows : 
The  Berwick  captured  the  Spreewald,  which  had  been 
fitted  up  as  an  auxiliary  cruiser,  and  also  sank  several 
German  merchant  vessels  and  captured  others,  besides 
an  American  and  Norwegian  ship.  The  French  cruiser 
Conde  made  one  capture  in  the  North  Atlantic.  The 
V^armouth  in  the  East  Indian  ocean  sank  the  Hamburg- 
A.merican  liner  Markomania. 

While  these  things  were  going  on,  the  German  cruiser 
Karlsruhe  made  life  exciting  for  the  commanders  of 
British  merchant  vessels  in  the  Atlantic,  as  in  two  weeks 
she  intercepted  and  destroyed  no  less  than  thirteen  steam- 
ers. During  her  career  she  nearly  equalled  the  record 
of  the  cruiser  Emden,  the  most  successful  of  the  German 
merchant  raiders,  whose  story  merits  a  separate  account. 
The  eventual  fate  of  the  Karlsruhe  is  somewhat  shrouded 
in  mystery,  and  apparently,  from  the  best  information  we 
have,  an  explosion  took  place  on  board  her  in  the  West 
Indies  in  late  November,  and  she  sank.  Her  crew  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  Germany,  it  is-^aid,  in  safety. 

In  the  Pacific  the  Leipzig  and  Nurnberg  had  consid- 
erable success,  while  the  Dresden  and  Strassburg  and 
Bremen  had  some  successes  of  minor  importance  in  the 
South  and  West  Atlantic.  When  Japan  took  a  hand  in 
the  war  on  August  15th  by  sending  an  ultimatum  to 
Germany  demanding  the  surrender  of  Kiao-Chau,  there 
were  quite  a  number  of  German  men-of-war  in  the  har- 
bor, most  of  them  of  minor  importance,  and  one  Austrian 
cruiser.  Two  of  the  German  vessels,  however,  the 
Scharnhorst  and  the  Gneisenau,  were  important  fighting 
units,  being  armored  cruisers  of  11,400  tons  each.  These 
had,  however,  left  as  soon  as  the  ultimatum  reached 
Germany,  and  started  on  a  cruise  in  the  Pacific.   During 

195 


The  Naval  War— High  Seas 

the  course  of  this  crui>c.  uii  Stpi.  vviul,  ilie\  arrived  off 
I'apeeia.  the  chief  tt>\vn  of  Tahiti,  a  Ireucli  colony  in  the 
Southern  Pacific,  and  licre  they  sank  a  y:unboat.  shelled 
;uul    practically   destroyed    the   town.     This    incident   is 
sjHjken  of  by  the  llritish  as  a  cruel  and  absolutely  use- 
less proceeding,  but  during  their  expedition  against  New 
Pojnerania    in    the    Bisniark    Archipelago,   ihcy    did    the 
same  thing,   which,  oi  course,  was  different.     We  will 
hear  of  the  subse(|uent  exploits  of  these  cruisers  later. 
The  most  romantic  and  most  interesting  career  of  any 
vessel  on  either  siile  during  the  war.  was  that  of  the 
l-".mden.      The  I-'mden  was  a  small  ves-sel  of  3,,")(>(>  tons, 
with  a  speed  of  alx)ut  25  knots  and  a  light  armament. 
She  was  built  for  just  such  service  as  that  which  she 
|>erforn)ed.     Too  weak   to   fight   a   war   vessel  of  any 
>trength,  .she  was  strong  enough  for  her  purpose,  fast 
enough  to  catch  her  prey  and  al>o  fa.st  entnigh  to  suc- 
cessfully   run    away    when    necessary.      Capt.    Carl    von 
Mueller,  her  commander,  handled  her  with  great  ability, 
and  managed  to  always  have  her  appear  at  the  sj>ot  where 
she  was  least  expected,  and  whence,  after  reaping  a  har- 
vest of  merchantmen,  he  made  her  as  unaccountably  dis- 
ap])ear.     It    may    be   assumed    that    tlie   l«erman    captain 
had  some  information  by  wireless  which  aitled  him.    In 
any  case,  he  was  a  very  courageous  and  enterprising  man 
and  a  thoroughly  good  sportsman,  as  even  his  enemies 
admitted. 

During  the  career  of  the  iCmden,  she  often  varied  the 
dull  routine  of  capturing  merchantmen  by  atlventure. 
For  instance:  One  evening  she  suddenly  appeared  in 
Madras  Roads,  the  last  place  in  the  world  where  she  was 
expected,  shelled  the  oil  tanks,  set  them  afire,  exchanged 
her  compliments  with  Fort  George  and  retired.  Again, 
on  October  2Tth,  disguising  herself  by  an  extra  dumm\ 
funnel  and  flying  the  Japanese  colors,  she  ap|x.'ared  in  the 
British  harbor  of  Penang  and  gave  the  Russian  cruiser 
Jcmtchug  a  startling  surpri.se  by  hoisting  the  German 
colors  as  .soon  as  within  range.  She  torpedoed  her  twice, 
sending  her  to  the  l>>ttom.  wliich  fate  the  I'rench  destroy- 
er Mousquet  also  shared  a  little  dulside  of  the  harbor. 
This  operation  comj)leted,  she  shelled  the  fort  for  a  few 
nnnute.->  and  then  mysteriously  vanished  into  the  night. 
I  ler  bag  of  merchantmen  was  the  largest  made  by  any 
German  cruiser.  The  Fmdcn  also  had  the  luck  to  pick  up 
a  collier  whenever  the  coal  in  her  own  bmikcrs  was  run- 
ning low.  At  times  she  was  accompanied  bv  (juitc  a  fleet. 

196 


The  Naval  War — High  Seas 

since  it  was  her  captain's  invariable  practice  to  sink  his 
prizes,  reserving  one  in  which  to  send  all  the  crews 
and  passengers  from  the  others  into  port.  This  he  was 
obliged  to  do,  as  there  was  no  chance  of  his  taking  his 
prizes  into  friendly  port,  nor  did  he  have  room  on  his 
own  ship  for  the  crews  and  passengers  of  the  sunken 
merchantmen. 

Some  sentimentalists  have  alleged  tliat  the  destruc- 
tion of  enemy's  vessels  by  this  warship  was  contrary 
to  international  law  as  they  manufactured  it,  and  at  the 
time  aided  in  filling  the  columns  of  newspapers  by 
letters  of  protest.  Their  understanding  of  the  law, 
however,  was  imperfect,  as  it  is  today  and  always  has 
been  quite  within  a  captain's  rights  to  destroy  an  ene- 
my's property  at  sea  or  anywhere  else.  These  critics 
confused  the  rule  applying  to  a  neutral  nation  with  the 
rule  applying  to  an  enemy  nation. 

On  November  10th  came  the  end  of  the  Emden's 
career.  She  suddenly  appeared  in  accordance  with  her 
usual  habit  at  Keeling,  Cocos  Island,  south  of  tiie  Malay 
Peninsula,  between  it  and  Australia,  and  sent  a  boat 
ashore,  whose  crew  were  ordered  to  destroy  the  wire- 
less. During  the  time,  however,  which  elapsed  between 
her  being  sighted  and  recognized  and  her  boat's  crew 
arriving  the  wireless  was  at  work  and  succeeded  in  ad- 
vising the  Sydney  of  the  Australian  navy,  which  was 
near  at  hand,  that  the  long-sought  Emden  was  where  she 
could  get  at  her.  The  Australian,  which  was  at  but  a  little 
distance,  promptly  appeared,  and  an  action  took  place. 

The  fight,  in  the  nature  of  things,  could  not  be  a  pro- 
longed one.  The  Emden  was  set  on  fire  and  driven 
ashore,  where  she  burned  completely.  Her  crew  suffer- 
ed heav\^  losses,  but  her  gallant  captain  was  saved  and 
taken  to  Australia,  whence  she  was  sent  to  England.  The 
boat  crew  which  landed  on  the  island  and  witnessed  the 
arrival  of  the  Sydney,  seized  a  small  trading  schooner 
and  escaped.  Afterwards,  according  to  one  version  of 
their  subsequent  adventures,  they  were  captured,  and 
according  to  another,  they  succeeded  fn  reaching 
safety,  after  a  rather  romantic  career. 

The  story  of  how  the  Emden  got  away  from  Kiao- 
Chau  has  not  often  been  told,  and  is  rather  interesting. 
She  left  there  after  Japan  and  Germany  were  at  war 
and  there  was  every  chance  of  her  being  caught  by  Jap- 
anese vessels,  with  whom  she  could  not  come  to  action 
with  any  hope  of  success.  The  expected  happened,  and. 

197 


The  Naval  >X  ar— High  Seas 

shortly  after  leaving  her  anchorage  she  icU  in  with  a 
Japanese  armored  cruiser,  but  it  was  not  the  three- 
funnelled  Enidcn  nor  a  black,  white  and  red  German 
man-of-war  ensij^n  that  passed  the  Japanese  armored 
ship,  but  a  ves-sel  witli  four  funnels  flying  the  British 
white  ensign,  whose  crew,  as  she  steamed  by  the  Jap- 
anese, lined  the  rail  and  gave  her  three  hearty  English 
cheers,  while  her  ensign  dipped. 

During  the  seven  weeks  that  she  was  at  large  she 
destroyed  70,UU0  tons  of  Jiritish  shipping,  the  total 
money  value  of  wli<'<e  cargoes  is  computed  to  be  about 
$20,060,00<i 

The  relief  of  (ireai  IJriiain  ai  llu-  news  of  llie  I'm 
den's  destruction  was  great.  For  weeks  she  had  been 
hunted  over  tlie  Indian  ocean  and  the  Eastern  Pacific 
by  warships  of  the  allied  powers  and  had  skilfully  elud- 
ed them  all.  It  is  but  due,  however,  to  the  British  to 
say  that  in  their  treatment  of  the  captain  and  crew  of 
this  vessel,  and  in  tiicir  admiration  of  the  ingenuity  and 
courage  with  which  the  Emdcn  had  been  handled,  in 
one  case  at  least  during  this  whole  war.  they  were  true 
to  the  finer  traditions  of  their  race. 

During  August,  September  and  October,  some  Brit- 
ish and  some  Japanese  took  possession  of  the  German 
island>  in  the  Pacific,  making  prisoners  of  the  officials. 
Among  these  were  Upolu  Island,  Samoa,  New  Pomer- 
ania,  Solomon  Islands,  German  New  Guinea,  Caroline 
Islands,  the  Marshall  Group,  etc.,  etc.,  etc. 

.•\fter  their  attack  upon  Papeeta,  the  Scharnhorst  and 
the  Gncisenau  sailed  for  the  coast  of  Chile  in  South 
America.  During  the  v(\vage  thither,  the  Dresden,  the 
Nurnhurg  and  the  Leipzig  managed  to  join  them.  On 
the  Oth  of  November  the  British  admiralty  received  in- 
formation that  an  action  had  been  fought  on  the  1st  of 
November  between  these  vessels  and  the  British  ar- 
mored cruisers  Good  Hope,  Monmouth  and  the  light 
cruiser  Glasgow,  and  the  Otranto.  an  auxiliary  cruiser. 
This  news  was  not  at  first  credited  because  the  admir- 
alty had  sent  an  old  battleship  named  the  Canopus  to 
join  the  British  fleet,  which  was  commanded  by  Rear 
Admiral  Sir  Christopher  Cradock.  which,  liad  she  ar- 
rived in  time,  would  have  given,  the  admiralty  thouglit, 
the  Briti'>h  '^quadrun  the  superiority.  Biit  the  Canopus 
had  not  arrived. 

The  Good  IIoj)!-  u.l^  an  armored  cruiser  i>f  1  1,000  tons, 
the  Monmouth  of  O.ROO  tons,  and  lx)th  were  over  twelve 

infi 


The  Naval  War— High  Seas 

years  old ;  the  Glasgow  was  a  light  cruiser  of  4,800  tons, 
and  the  Otranto,  the  auxiliary  cruiser,  was  of  12,100 
tons.  The  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau  were  sister  ships 
of  ll,(iOO  tons  and  were  completed  in  1907.  The  Dresden 
and  Xurnlnirg  were  small  cruisers,  ;{,G00  tons,  the  Leip- 
zig was  a  still  smaller  vessel.  A  comparison  of  guns  in 
the  two  squadrons  is  as  follows:  Germany,  sixteen  8.2 
inch,  twelve  G  inch ;  thirty-four  1  inch,  forty  twenty-four 
pounders,  sixteen  ."i-pounders.  British,  two  9.2  inch; 
thirty-two  (>  inch;  ten  4  inclv  twenty  12-pounders  and 
ten  3  pounders. 

On  Sunday,  November  1st,  the  Good  Hope,  Mon- 
mouth and  Glasgow  sighted  the  Scharnhorst,  Gneisenau, 
Leipzig  and  Dresden  about  half  past  four  in  the  after- 
noon. There  was  a  strong  wind  and  a  very  considerable 
sea.  Both  squadrons  were  steaming  to  the  southward 
and  the  Germans  kept  out  of  range  and  declined  action 
till  sunset,  when  the  light  gave  them  an  important  ad- 
vantage, the  British  fleet  being  silhouetted  between  them 
and  the  sun.  At  sunset  the  battle  began  and  lasted  about 
two  hours.  Both  the  Good  Hope  and  the  Monmouth 
caught  fire  early  therein,  but  they  continued  fighting  un- 
til dark,  when  an  explosion  took  place  on  the  Good  Hope 
and  she  foundered.  Just  as  dark  came  on  the  Monmouth 
closed  with  the  enemy  in  a  gallant  attempt  to  ram,  but 
she  was  sunk  in  the  attempt  quite  close  to  the  enemy's 
ships.  The  battle  finished  at  about  half  past  nine.  The 
Glasgow,  which  was  damaged. and  set  on  fire,  quit  the 
fight,  about  half  past  seven,  and  took  no  part  in  the  fight 
thereafter,  nor  did  the  Otranto  at  any  time.  The  Nurn- 
burg  of  the  German  fleet  also  took  no  part  in  the  battle, 
coming  up  too  late. 

After  the  battle,  three  ships  of  the  German  fleet  went 
into  the  harbor  of  Valparaiso  and,  as  far  as  was  per- 
mitted, repaired  damages.  Their  loss  was  said  to  have 
been  slight.  The  British  loss  was  1,670  killed  and  about 
GO  or  70  wounded  on  the  Glasgow. 

After  this  the  squadron  sailed  to  the  southward,  passed 
through  the  straits  of  Magellan,  proceeding  very  slowly, 
and  nothing  definite  w^as  heard  of  it  until  the  8th  of  De- 
cember. In  the  meantime,  the  British,  being  roused  by  the 
severe  defeat  off  the  Chilean  coast,  took  every  means 
possible  to  destroy  this  German  squadron,  which  had  be- 
come an  imperative  necessity  and  which  it  was  also 
necessary  to  accomplish  in  the  shortest  possible  time. 
Consequently,   they   organized   and   sent   out.   we  know 

199 


The  Naval  War — High  Seas 

positively,  iwd  tleet>,  lo  uiic  ut  which  uiulcr  Admiral 
Sturdcc,  the  German  squadron  fell  a  prey.  The  British 
squadron  was  comprised  of  the  Invincible,  the  Inflexible, 
the  Carnavoii,  the  C.lasgow.  the  survivor  of  the  l»attle 
off  the  Chilean  coast,  the  Kent,  the  Cornwall,  the  Bristol, 
the  Macedonia  and  the  Canopus.  The  Kent  ami  Corn- 
wall were  sister  ships  of  the  Monmouth.  The  Carnavon 
was  an  armored  cruiser  of  10,Hr)0  tons,  the  Cornwall  and 
Bristol  were  sister  ships,  while  the  Invincible  and  In- 
flexible were  battle  cruisers  of  2b  knots  speed,  and  each 
carryinj^  eight  12  inch  guns.  The  Canopus  was  an  old 
battleship.  This  British  fUci  dutclasscd  the  German 
squadron  about  2  l-:;^  to  1. 

Admiral  Sturdee's  squadron  was  despatched  in  abso- 
lute secrecy,  and  no  one  except  the  I'.nglish  admiralty 
had  any  knowledge  of  its  departure.  W  hat  information 
German  Admiral  von  Spce  had  l)een  able  to  gather  con- 
cerning the  enemy's  movements  since  the  sinking  of  the 
Monmouth  and  Good  Hope,  has  never  become  known, 
but  what  is  quite  certain  is  that  he  was  miaware  of  the 
arrival  of  the  squadron  commanded  by  .\<imiral  Sturdee. 
Admiral  von  Spec  had  made  f<»r  the  I-'alkland  Islands 
with  the  intention  of  seizing  th<Mii  ;.n,I  ilm*.  supplying 
himself  with  a  much  needed  ha^> 

After  the  Glasgow  fled  southward  from  ihc  battle  off 
the  Chilean  coast,  she  jiicked  up  the  Canopus  2()o  miles 
further  down  and  both  these  shii)s  pn)ceeded  to  the 
Falkland  Islands,  where  they  arrived  on  November  8th. 
They  were  then  directed  to  proceed  to  Montevideo,  but 
on  their  voyage  tliither  were  intercepted  by  wireless  and 
ordered  to  return  to  the  Falklands.  On  December  Tth 
the  remainder  of  the  squadron  arrived. 

On  the  morning  of  Decemlier  Mth,  the  l(X)kout  on  Sap- 
per Hill  .signalled  "two  men-of-war  in  the  offing."  and 
the  Kent  was  ordered  to  reconnoitcr.  At  !>.20  the  two 
leading  ships  of  the  Germans,  the  Gncisenau  and  the 
Xurnburg,  came  w  ithin  range  oi  the  Canopus  in  the  har- 
bor, which  opened  fire  at  them  across  the  lowland,  at  a 
range  of  10,000  yards.  The  Germans  hoistcfl  their  colors 
and  turned  away.  A  few  minutes  later,  seeing  the  Kent, 
they  ahered  their  cotirse  as  though  alxnit  t«i  clo.sc  with 
her.  but  at  alxmt  the  time  it  seems  that  the  Invincible 
and  Inflexible  were  seen  over  the  lowland,  so  the  (tcr- 
mans  at  once  altered  (heir  course  :uid  increased  speed  to 
join  tlieir  consorts. 

At  1>.4/)  the  entire  British  squadron,  except  the  Bristol, 

,  200 


The  Naval  War — High  Seas 

proceeded  out  of  tlie  harbor,  the  Carnavon  leading.  The 
five  ships  of  the  Germans  appeared  clearly  in  sight  to  the 
southeast,  hull  down.  The  visibility  was  at  its  ma.ximum, 
the  sea  was  calm,  with  a  bright  sun,  clear  sky  and  a  light 
breeze  from  the  northwest.  At  10. 2U  the  British  ad- 
miral made  signal  for  a  general  advance,  the  battle 
cruisers  taking  the  lead ;  at  11.15  speed  was  ea.sed  to 
enable  the  other  cruisers  to  get  into  position.  The  enemy 
was  still  maintaining  its  distance,  and  at  12. ^0  it  was  de- 
cided to  attack  with  the  two  battle  cruisers  and  the  Glas- 
gow. 

At  12.4?  a  signal  to  open  fire  and  engage  the  enemy 
was  made.  The  Inflexible  opened  the  fire  at  12.55,  the 
Invincible  following  suit,  the  target  in  both  cases  being 
the  light  cruiser.  This  light  cruiser,  the  Leipzig,  in  about 
half  an  hour,  turned  away  with  the  two  other  light  cruis- 
ers, the  Nurnburg  and  the  Dresden,  to  the  southwest,  and 
were  followed  by  the  Kent,  Glasgow  and  Cornwall  of 
the  British  fleet.  The  fight  developed  finally  into  three 
separate  actions,  the  British  battle  cruisers  directing 
their  fire  on  the  Scharnhorst  and  the  Gneisenau  which 
replied,  opening  fire  at  1.30.  The  range  varied  from 
13,500  yards  to  16,500  yards.  At  about  2  P.  M.  the 
Gneisenau  turned  away  and  a  second  chase  ensued  until 
2.45  p.  m.,  when  the  battle  cruisers  again  opened  fire 
which  was  replied  to  by  the  Germans  at  2.55.  The 
Scharnhorst  was  hit  twice  and  was  set  on  fire,  while  the 
Gneisenau  was  hit  by  the  Inflexible  more  than  once. 

At  3.30  the  Scharnhorst  turned,  which  turn  was  dic- 
tated by  a  desire  to  bring  her  starboard  guns  into  action, 
her  port  battery  having  been  damaged.  The  fire  on  her 
had  grown  worse.  She  kept  up  the  fight,  but  at  4.04  P. 
M.,  suddenly  listed  heavily  to  port  and  at  4.17  she 
sank  with  her  flag  flying.  The  Gneisenau  passed  on  the 
far  side  of  her  late  flagship  and  continued  a  determined 
but  ineffectual  effort  to  finish  with  the  two  battle 
cruisers.  A  few  minutes  after  5.  she  was  evidently  in 
serious  straits  and  her  fire  slackened.  At  5.15  one 
shell  from  the  Gneisenau  struck  the  Invincible.  This 
was  her  last  effort.  At  5.30  P.  M.  she  stopped,  badly 
on  fire,  but  continued  to  fire  from  time  to.  time  with 
a  single  gim.  At  5.40  the  'British  squadron  closed 
in  on  the  Gneisenau,  whose  flag  continued  flying.  At 
6  P.  M.  she  keeled  over  suddenly,  lay  for  a  few  min- 
utes on  her  beam  ends,  and  sank.  Her  prisoners  of  war 
reported  that  her  ammunition  had  given  out  about  5.30. 

301 


The  Naval  War— High  Seas 

About  150  men   were   picked   up  alter  llie  aciii'ii,  l)ut 
some  were  dead. 

When  the  Dresden  and  the  other  light  cruiser 
turned  away  from  the  tight  at  about  1  V.  M.,  they 
were  pur>ued  by  three  of  tlie  British  ships,  the  Glas- 
gow, the  Kent  and  the  Cornwall,  The  Licpzij;  was 
unable  to  distance  the  Glasgow,  was  l)adly  hit,  and, 
though  she  kept  afloat  until  9  P.  M.,  she  was  on  fire 
from  7  o'clock.     Eighteen  of  her  crew  were  saved. 

The  Nurnberg  was  equally  unfortunate.  The  Kent 
got  within  range  of  her  at  about  5  P.  M.,  and  at  G.30 
she  was  on  fire  above,  the  Kent  by  this  time  having 
closed  to  within  3,00(i  yards.  She  kept  up  her  fire 
until  about  6.50,  but  turned  over  and  sank  conif>l<  t.lv 
at  about  7.15.    Seven  survivors  were  rescued. 

The  Dresden  managed  to  make  her  escape,  iier 
speed  was  greater  than  that  of  her  consorts,  and  the 
only  vessel  which  could  catch  her,  the  Glasgow,  was 
engaged  with  the  Liepzii;.  The  two  transports  or 
colliers  which  accompanied  the  German  fleet,  the 
Baden  and  Santa  Isabel,  were  sunk  by  the  Mace- 
donia. Had  the  British  arrived  forty-eight  hours 
later,  the  Falkland  Islands  would  probably  have  been 
in  German  hands  and  would  have  cost  hundreds  of 
H\cs  to  regain. 

The  effect  of  this  victory  was  to  completely  clear 
the  southern  Pacific  seas  of  all  German  ships  except 
the  Dresden,  and  her  escape  necessitated  employing 
several  British  ship<  in  her  search  which  could  have 
been  otherwise  employed,  and  indirectly  led  to  tlie 
loss  of  a  Japanese  cruiser. 

The  G.erman  loss  at  the  battle  of  the  Falkland  Islamic 
was.  as  close  as  can  be  figured,  about  1600  men.  all 
billed.  The  British  loss  we  do  not  know,  but  from  what 
can  be  conjectured,  it  was  slight,  not  more  than  thirty 
or  forty  killed  and  a  few  wounded. 

The  Konigsberg.  which  sank  the  Pega'^U'^  in  Zan- 
zibar harbor,  as  hereinbefore  told,  wa>^  l)ottled  up  in 
the  Rufigi  river  on  the  east  coast  of  .\frica  in  Novem- 
ber. After  a  chase  bv  a  British  cruiser  she  took  refuge 
in  this  rivei  and  managed  to  force  her  way  up  stream 
until  she  was  out  of  range.  A  coal  vessel,  the  Kew- 
bridcre.  and  a  cable  ship,  the  Duplex,  were  requisitioned 
and  sunk  in  the  channel  of  the  "Stream,  so  as  to  prevent 
her  coming  out.  This  was  not  done  without  los-^  of 
life.  The  Konigsberg  then  concealed  herself  bv  fas- 
tening palm  branche-i  to  her  masts  and  fimnels.  mak- 

202 


The  Naval  War— High  Seas 

in^  her  indistinguishable  from  the  sea.  This  difficulty 
the  British  overcame  by  bringing  an  aeroplane  down 
the  coast  which  flew  inland  and  marked  the  position 
of  the  German  cruiser  by  smoke  bombs,  thus  enabling 
her  to  be  destroyed  by  artillery  carried  to  land  from 
the  British  cruisers. 

In  the  Baltic  little  took  place  after  the  sinking  of 
the  Palada  and  the  internment  of  the  Berlin.  On  the 
18th  of  December  the  Friedrich  Carl,  the  German  ar- 
mored cruiser,  struck  a  mine  in  the  Baltic  and  was 
lost,  378  of  her  crew  going  down  with  her.  Occasional 
attacks  on  Russian  towns  along  the  shore  of  the  Baltic 
were  made,  Libau  being  the  principal  point  aimed  at 
by  the  German  ships,  but  the  results  do  not  appear  to 
have  been  commensurate  with  the  efforts.  The  Rus- 
sian navy  remained  in  its  ports,  which  policy  of  pru- 
dence is  not  at  all  surprising  in  view  of  its  weakness. 

A  complete  list  of  the  ships  lost  to  March  1st  by  the 
several  contending  powers  will  be  found  in  the  ap- 
pendix. 


2{y,i 


CHAl'l  hK   \\  II. 

THE  NAVAL  WAR^ 

MEDITERRANEAN  AND  BLACK 

SEA 


In  the  early  pari  of  tlie  war,  the  western  part  of  the 
Mediterranean  was  larjjely  turned  over  to  the  bVench  to 
guard.  Two  Ciernian  sliips.  the  ()oel^n  and  the  Breslau. 
were  in  the  Mediterranean,  cut  off  from  tlie  possibihty 
of  rejoining  the  main  German  naval  force.  The  Goeben, 
which  was  near  the  Algerian  coast,  proceeded  thither  and 
threw  a  few  shots  into  Rone,  but  learning  tiiat  a  portion 
of  the  Trench  fleet  was  searching  for  her.  she  went 
across  and  put  into  the  port  ^)f  Messina,  near  which  she 
had  been  jcjincfl  by  the  Hreslau.  At  tiie  expiratitni  of  the 
time  limit  fixed  by  the  Italian  authorities  for  the  stay  of 
these  ves.sels.  which  was  forty-eight  hours,  on  August 
8th  both  left  Messina  for  an  unknown  destination.  This 
destination  turned  out  to  be  the  Dardanelles,  where  they 
arrived  after  many  adventures,  successfully  eluding  ves- 
sels of  the  French  fleet,  and  of  the  British  fleet  from 
Malta. 

The  Knglish  fleet  at  .Malta  at  the  begitming  of  hostili- 
ties consisted  of  three  battle  cruisers,  four  armored 
cruisers  and  four  light  cruisers,  besides  smaller  craft. 
Otherwise,  during  the  early  days  of  the  war.  there  was 
little  that  ha{)pene(!  in  the  Mediterranean  of  interest. 
The  French  endeavored  to  bottle  up  the  .Austrian  fleet 
at  Pola.  and  to  that  end  botnbarded  Cattaro,  but  were 
successful  only  to  a  degree  in  their  operation.  They  suc- 
ceeded on  the  Ifith  of  .'\tigust  in  sinking  a  small  .Austrian 
cruiser,  the  Zenta.  The  only  real  effect  the  I'Veiich  ofx^r- 
ation  had  was  to  blockade  to  commerce  all  the  .Austrian 
ports  from  Trieste  as  far  as  Pola. 

Early  in  the  war  the  Britisb  government,  finding  that 
the  Suez  Canal  was  lacing  used  as  a  sanctuary,  or  refuge, 
from  capture,  by  merchant  ships,  put  presstirc  on  the 
F.g)'ptian  government,   which,  of  course,  wa'i  and   is  a 

201 


The  Naval  War 

creature  of  Great  Britain,  to  expel  them  from  this  sup- 
posedly neutral  territory,  with  an  absolute  disregard 
for  the  rules  of  international  law  which  had  heretofore 
obtained. 

In  the  ,JJaltic  nothing  of  great  interest  happened.  The 
German  fleet  had  to  pay  a  certain  amount  of  attention 
to  the  Russian  fleet,  because  while  this  was  not  very 
formidable,  to  leave  the  Baltic  altogether  unguarded  by 
sea  would  be  to  invite  the  landing  of  Russian  troops  on 
the  defencless  German  coast.  While  performing  this 
guard  duty,  the  Germans  were  unfortunate  enough  to 
lose  the  cruiser  Magdeburg  on  the  27th  of  August. 
She  ran  ashore  in  the  fog  and  was  blown  up  by  her 
crew.  Some  time  afterwards,  the  Russians,  hearing  of 
this  accident,  made  the  claim  of  having  destroyed  her, 
but  this  is  not  probable. 

Only  one  battle  took  place  in  the  Baltic  between  the 
Russians  and  the  Germans.  On  October  10th  three 
Russian  armored  cruisers,  Admiral  Makaroff,  Palada 
and  Bayan,  were  doing  patrol  duty  in  the  northeastern 
Baltic.  In  the  morning  the  Admiral  Makaroff  was  at- 
tacked by  a  submarine  of  the  enemy  and  several  tor- 
pedoes were  fired  at  her,  but  none  took  effect.  In  the 
afternoon  of  October  11th,  this  submarine  attacked  the 
Bayan  and  the  Palada.  The  cruisers  fired  on  the  sub- 
marine, but  in  spite  of  this  the  submarine  got  home  on 
the  Palada  with  a  torpedo  and  struck  her  probably 
under  her  magazine,  with  the  result  that  she  sank  im- 
mediately, carrying  all  her  ill-fated  crew,  numbering 
568,  with  her.  She  was  built  in  1906  and  had  a  dis- 
placement of  7,775  tons. 

On  the  26th  of  October,  Duala,  German  West  Africa, 
was  moved  against  and  on  the  31st  a  joint  land  and  naval 
expedition  was  launched  against  the  town,  the  French 
cruiser  Bruix  taking  a  prominent  part  in  the  operations, 
and  this  culminated  in  the  occupation  of  Buea  on  No- 
vember loth.  There  were  also  operations  about  the  same 
time  in  the  Red  Sea,  the  first  against  Sheik  Seyd  Penin- 
sula. This  was  undertaken  by  the  battleship  Duke  of 
Edinboro,  supported  by  a  battalion  and  a  half  of  Indian 
troops,  and  resulted  in  the  Turks  being  driven  out  of  Fort 
Tuba  and  captured  by  the  British  with  slight  casualties. 
Akaba  and  its  fort  on  the  Gulf  of  Akaba  were  captured 
by  the  British  cruiser  Minerva  on  November  7th  without 
casualties.  On  the  8th  of  November  Faro,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Shatt-el-arab,  was  also  captured  by  an  expedition 

205 


The  Naval  War 

comprising  the  British  cruiser  Odin,  a  few  troops  and  a 
naval  brigade. 

\\  c  will  now  ...;  ..  glance  on  the  operaiioa^  in  the 
Black  Sea,  resulting  from  the  acts  of  war  by  Turkey 
against  Russia  and  her  entrance  into  the  European  con- 
tlict.  On  (  )ctober  *^l>th  the  now  Turkish  cruisers,  the 
former  Ciennan  Goebcn  and  fireslau.  which,  as  we  have 
seal,  in  the  early  part  of  the  war  took  refuge  in  Turkish 
waters,  and  were  sold  by  Germany  to  Turkey,  appeared 
in  the  Black  Sea  and,  on  ( )ctobcr  ^Dth,  bombarded  sever- 
al iM)rts  on  the  northern  Russian  coasts  tliereof.  This 
action  uas  followed  the  next  day  by  Russia  declaring 
that  a  state  of  war  existed  l>etwein  herself  and  Turke\, 
and  on  the  1st  of  November,  the  Goeben  boml)arded  Se- 
vastopol, throwing  over  a  hundred  shells  into  the  town, 
and,  it  is  said,  inflicting  some  damage.  Various  naval 
skirmishes  thereafter  look  place  in  the  Black  Sea.  the 
most  imi>ortant  of  which  was  on  the  '.)th.  when  the  Rus- 
sians Ixjinbarded  the  Turkish  forts  on  the  Armenian 
coasts  of  tiic   Black  Sea. 

The  onlv  fight  which  took  place  between  the  Russian 
and  Turkish  fleets  in  the  Black  Sea  was  on  the  18th  of 
November,  when  the  Russian  fleet  aiK)Ut  ncK>n  was  re- 
turning from  a  cruise  along  the  Anatolian  coast  and  was 
nearly  abreast  of  Sevastopol,  the  Goeben  and  the  Breslau 
were  seen.  The  Russian  fleet  immediately  took  battle  for- 
mation and  opened  fire  at  a  range  of  S.OOO  yards,  with  the 
enemy  on  their  starboard.  The  Efstafi  is  said  to  have  hit 
the  Goeben  with  her  first  salvo  and  caused  a  fire.  The 
action  then  became  general,  tiic  (joeben  concentrating  her 
fire  on  the  Russian  flagship.  The  battle  lasted  only  four- 
teen minutes  when  the  Goeben  withdrew.  The  Russian 
casualties  were  four  officers  and  twenty-four  men  killed 
and  wounded,  but  it  is  said  that  the  material  damage 
was  slight.  The  I'.reslau  remained  in  the  offing,  taking 
no  part  in  the  action. 

The  next  appearance  of  the  Goeben  was  off  Batum 
but  was  only  momentary.  On  the  .'Ird  of  November  the 
.Mlies  with  a  small  squadron  as  a  reply  to  the  Turkish 
attack  on  the  Russian  Black  Sea  forts,  bombarded  tlie 
Dardanelles  forts  at  long  range.  No  damage  resulted  to 
either  side  and  probably  the  intention  of  this  attack  was 
merely  to  ascertain  the  range  of  the  guns  of  the  forts. 

The  dcsultnrv  1x)mbarding  continued  for  some  time, 
but  the  attacking  fleet  was  not  yet  recruited  to  the  neces- 
sary .strength  for  the  general  attack.     The  entrances  to 

206 


Mediterranean  and  Black  Sea 

the  Dardanelles  were  known  to  be  mined  scientifically, 
hut  nothing^  of  any  importance  occurred  here  for  many 
weeks,  the  only  event  which  is  worthy  of  notice  bein^ 
the  exploit  of  the  British  submarine  li-ll  on  December 
13th,  which  entered  the  Dardanelles  on  that  date,  and 
after  diving-  under  five  rows  of  mines,  torpedoed  the 
old  Turkish  battleship  Alessoudiyeh,  which  was  guard- 
ing the  mine  field.  Although  pursued  by  torpedo  boats 
and  fired  on  by  the  forts,  the  B-U  managed  to  get 
away  safely.  There  was  little  loss  of  life/  on  the  Mes- 
soudiyeh  and  her  sinking  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  se- 
rious loss  on  account  of  her  age  and  lack  of  power,  This, 
however,  does  not  detract  from  the  unquestioned  gal- 
lantry of  the  exploit  accomplished  by  the  B-11. 

The  Dardanelles  straits  are  extremely  difficult  for 
submarine  invasion,  owing  to  the  swift  currents  which 
always  jare  running  through  them  and  which,  in  addi- 
tion to  their  onward  motion,  often  cause  local  whirl- 
pools and  eddies  on  their  striking  a  projection,  besides 
which  the  five  rows  of  mines  add  very  enormously  to 
the  danger.  In  fact,  this  exploit  may  be  considered  as 
one  of  the  most  brilliant  single  exploits  performed  by 
the  British  during  the  naval  war. 

On  January  5th,  the  British  fleets  shelled  the  capital 
of  German  East  Africa,  destroying  all  the  vessels  in 
the  harbor,  and  on  the  7th  of  January  the  Turkish  ship 
Goeben,  which  had  been  repaired  after  her  damage  in 
the  action  with  the  Russian  fleet  in  November,  was 
again  injured  by  running  on  a  Russian  mine  towards 
the  Russian  Black  Sea  coast. 

Various  other  raids  by  the  Russians  and  Turks  on 
each  other's  coasts  in  the  Black  Sea  took  place  from 
time  to  time,  none  of  which  was  of  any  great  impor- 
tance, the  only  one  worthy  of  notice  being  that  by  the 
Russian  fleet  on  January  23rd  on  the  northern  Turk- 
ish coasts  in  the  Black  Sea. 

On  February  15th  the  Russian  fleet  came  out  of  Pola 
and  bombarded  Antivari  on  the  Dalmatian  coast. 

From  time  to  time  during  January  and  February  the 
Allies  made  more  or  less  desultory  attacks  on  the  Dar- 
danelles, but  with  ndl  appreciable  effect  upon  the  forts 
guarding  the  straits.  There  is  nothing  else  to  chronicle 
prior  to  March  1st,  the  date  of  the  closing  of  thi-  record. 


307 


STATISTICS 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 


Known  inlcrnaiionally  as  the  Ausiro-llungarian  mon- 
archy, really  consisting  of  two  states,  the  Austrian  Em- 
pire ami  the  Kingdom  of  Hungary,  according  to  the 
Compromise  of  18(>7  arc  perfectly  intlepentient  of  each 
other,  having,  however,  a  dose  ix)litical  union  through 
the  identity  of  tlie  sovereign  and  the  ooinniunity  of  cer- 
tain departments  of  state  affairs. 

The  common  head  is  the  Emperor  ut  Austria  and  the 
ApostoHc  King  (Apostoli  Kiraly)  of  Hungary. 

The  common  departments  of  state  affairs  are  <1)  For- 
eign affairs.  {"2)  military  and  naval  affairs,  and  (3) 
finance,  as  far  as  it  relates  to  common  affairs. 

Legislative  power  relating  to  common  affairs  is  vested 
in  the  so-called  Delegations.  These, — there  are  two, — 
consist  of  sixty  members  each,  .selected  from  the  Parlia- 
ments of  their  respective  countries. 

Resides  this  political  connection  there  is  a  commercial 
union.  This  is  not  permanent,  Init  is  renewed  every  ten 
years,  the  last  renewal  being  in  1907.  This  amounts  to 
a  customs  and  commercial  union,  with  the  same  coinage, 
weights  and  measures,  a  joint  bank  of  issue,  while  the 
monopolies  and  ta.xes  connected  with  salt,  tobacco,  spir- 
its. Ijeer,  sugar  and  mineral  oil  are  administered  on  iden- 
tical princijiles  in  Ixtth  countries. 

The  tlircc  ministries  for  common  affairs  are  Foreign 
Affairs,  War  and  Common  Finance. 

Austria-Hungary  lies  in  the  geographical  heart  of 
luiropc.  The  following  are  its  chief  natural  defenses 
considered  as  a  whole :  Towards  liavaria.  the  I'ichtel 
Mountains,  the  Bohmerwald.  the  Inn  and  the  Salzach ; 
towards  Switzerland,  the  Salle,  the  Alps  and  the  Rhmc ; 
towards  Italy,  the  High  Alps,  the  I^go  di  Garda  and  the 
Arnic  Alps;  towards  Serbia,  the  Save  and  tlic  Danube; 
towards  Rumania,  the  South  F,ast  and  South  Carpathi- 
ans; towards  rfermany.  the  Rie.sen  and  Iscr  C.cbirge 
and  the  Erz-Gcbirgc.  These  natural  defences  arc  suj)- 
plemented  by  artificial  defences  as  follows:  In  Galicia, 
Cracow  and  the  fortified  and  entrenched  camp  of  Przcm- 
ysl ;  in  Hungar)'  on  the  left  of  the  Ti'^za.  Gyulafchervar. 

208 


Statistics 

Arad  and  Temesvar;  on  the  Danube,  Komarom,  Peter- 
varad  and  Ursova ;  in  iJalniatia  is  the  coast  fortifica- 
tion of  Cattaro;  in  Istria,  Pola,  a  fortified  naval  har- 
bor. The  Alpine  frontiers  in  the  Tyrol  have  defenses 
on  all  the  routes,  and  also  between  Tyrol  and  the 
Adriatic  Sarajevo  is  a  fortified  place.  Neither  of  the 
capitals  and  Vienna  and  Budapest  are  defended. 

Pola  is  the  chief  naval  port,  and  is  strongly  fortified, 
both  towards  land  and  sea,  and  has  been  recently  en- 
larged and  can  accommodate  the  entire  fleet,  Triest  is 
the  great  storehouse  and  also  an  arsenal  of  the  navy. 

The  Austrian  Hungarian  army  reflects  the  peculiar 
constitution  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  first  line  is 
under  the  Common  Army.  The  Austrian  Landwehr 
and  Landsturm  are,  however,  entirely  separate  from 
the  Hungarian  Landwehr,  (Honved)  and  Landsturm 
(Nepfolkeles). 

Military  service  is  compulsory  and  universal  through- 
out the  Empire,  extending  to  all  races.  Liability  extends 
from  the  19th  to  the  end  of  the  42nd  year  and  active 
service  usually  begins  in  the  21st  year.  In  the  Common 
Army  and  both  Landwehrs  continuous  service  is  for  2 
years  (3  for  the  cavalry  and  horse  artillery)  followed  by 
10  years  in  the  reserve,  and  then  2  years  in  the  reserve  of 
the  Landwehr.  At  the  completion  of  the  12th  year  of 
service  the  soldier  passes  to  the  Landsturm,  where  he  re- 
mains until  his  42nd  birthday. 

Both  Austrian  Landwehr  and  Hungarian  Honved  are 
permanently  embodied  and  train  their  own  recruits. 
When  the  young  men  of  proper  age  present  themselves 
each  year  to  perform  their  military  service  numbers  are 
drawn.  Those  who  draw  the  lowest  are  allotted  to  the 
Common  Army  until  the  required  contingent  is  obtained. 
This  is  fixed  at  167,263.  of  whom  6,000  are  for  the  navy. 
The  next  lowest  go  to  the  Landwehrs,  the  contingent  for 
the  Austrian  being  28,000  and  the  Hungarian  25,000.  The 
remainder  of  those  physically  fit  pass  into  the  Ersatz  or 
supplementary  reserve. 

The  Ersatz  reserve  is  intended  primarily  to  maintain 
the  strength  of  the  units  on  field  services  and  there  are 
separate  Ersatz  reserves  for  the  Common  Army  and  the 
Landwehrs.  These  undergo  eight  weeks'  training  the  first 
year  and  thereafter  the  same  training  as  the  other  reserves 
of  the  force  to  which  they  belong. 

The   weapon  used   is  the  Mannlicher   magazine  rifle 

209 


Statistics 

nicxJcl  \)o,  calibre  31J.  The  cavalry  carry  the  Mannlicher 
carbine  of  like  calibre. 

The  field  gi\n  f irts  a  shrapnel  of  14  1-2  lbs.  The  field 
howitzer  batteries  arc  armed  with  a  10.5  cm.  piece  weigh- 
ing 1,000  pounds  and  firing  a  ^0  lb.  shell.  The  mountain 
gim  is  the  7  cm.  malleable  bronze  gun,  weighing  257  lbs., 
shell  10  1-2  lbs.  .Ml  batteries  have  six  guns  in  time  of 
war,  except  mountain  batteries,  which  have  four. 

The  total  peace  strength  of  the  Austrian  army  was, 
in  19i;5,  ;i4,(Mt')  officers,  390.249  men  and  89,877  horses. 
The  war  strength  is  about  860.000  troops  of  the  first  line 
(actives  and  first  two  years  of  reserves)  1,250,000  troops 
of  the  second  line  (eight  years  of  reserves)  500,000 
Krsatz  reserves  and  1,500,000  troops  of  the  thir<l  line. 

In  191 ;}  the  budget  contained  the  following  sums  for 
the  Army:  Common  .Xrmy  $88,590,000;  Hungarian 
Honved  $17,Tl^v^0<Ml ;  Austrian  Landwchr  $11,894,350; 
Bosnian  establishment  $1.()25.000.  Tlie  Landslurms  are 
provided  for  separately  in  the  particular  expenses  of 
Austria  and   Hungary. 

The  .Austrian  navy  is  a  joint  expense  and  there  was 
expended  for  naval  purp<iscs  in  1913  $15,006,147.  in  1912 
$14,501,000  and  in   1911  $13,674,500. 

At  the  end  of  1914  the  effective  strength  was:  Dread- 
noughts, 4;  I 're- Dreadnoughts.  12;  armored  cruisers,  3; 
torpedo  giml)oats,  7  :  destroyers,  18  ;  torpedo  boats,  63  ; 
submarines,   15. 

In  addition  to  those  there  was  a  flotilla  of  monitors 
used  on  the  Danube  and  other  rivers. 

The  names  of  the  principal  ships  of  the  navy  will  l>e 
found  on  the  opposite  page. 

The  personnel  of  the  navy  consisted  in  1913  of  9oT 
officers  and  cadets,  1513  mechanicians,  engineers,  doc- 
tors, etc.,  and  alxjut  15,500  sailors. 

The  general  debt  of  Au.stria  Hungary  in  1913  was 
$1,047,154,000,  bearing  interest  at  from  3  to  5  per  cent., 
with  an  annual  interest  charge  of  $47,900,000. 

The  common  monetary  unit  of  the  Austrian  Hungarian 
monarchy  is  the  crown,  which  is  equal  to  20.3  cents  in 
Anurirau  money.     The  empire  uses  the  gold  standard. 

AUSTRIA. 
Au.stria  proper  has  a   Parliament    (Reichsrath)    con- 
sisting of  two  houses,  the  I'pper  or  Herren  House,  com- 
posed of  princes  of  the  blood,  11  in  1913,  HI  nobles  who 
fXTupy  hereditary  seats.  17  archbishops  and  bishops  and 

210 


Statistics 


AUSTRIAN     NAVY 


DREADNOUGHTS 

Begun  Name                           Displacement         Main  Armament 

1910     Veribus    Unitis 20,300     12  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

1910     Teggethoff 20,300     12  12-in.,  12  6-in, 

1910     Prinz    Eugen 20,300     12  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

1910     Svent  Istvan    20,300     12  12-in.,  12  6-in. 


e  Power 

Speed 

25,000 

20 

25,000 

20 

25,000 

20 

25,000 

20 

PRE-DREADNOUGHTS 


1893  Monarch    5,()00 

1893  Wien    5,000 

1893  Budapest    .5.600 

1899  Hapsburg    8,300 

1899  Arpad   8,300 

1899  Babenberg  8,300 

1901  Erzherzog  Karl    10,000 

1901  Erz.  Friedrich 10,000 

1901  Erz.  Ferdinand  Max. . .  10,000 

1907  Erz.  Franz  Ferdinand.  14, 500 

1907  Radetzky 14.500 

1907  Zrinyi    14,500 


4  9.4- 

in. 

6  6-in. 

8,000 

17.0 

4  9.4- 

in. 

6  6-in. 

8,000 

17.0 

4  9.4- 

in. 

6  6-in. 

8,000 

17.0 

3  9.4- 

in. 

12  6-in. 

15,000 

19 

3  9.4- 

in. 

12  6-in. 

15,000 

19 

3  9.4- 

in. 

12  6-in. 

15,000 

19 

4  9.4- 

in. 

12  17.6- 

in. 

18,000 

20 

4  9.4- 

in. 

12  17.6- 

in. 

18,000 

20 

4  9.4- 

in. 

12  17.6- 

in. 

18,000 

20 

4  13-i 

n.. 

8  9.4-in. 

20,000 

20 

4  13-i 

n.. 

8  9.4-in. 

20,000 

20 

4  13-i 

n., 

8  9.4-in. 

20,000 

20 

CRUISERS  (Armored) 

1890     Maria   Theresa 5,200       2  7. 6-in.,  8  6-in. 

1896     Kaiser  Karl  VI 6,300       2  9.4-in..  8  6-in. 

1901     St.   Georg   7,300       2  9.4-in.,  5  7-in.,  4  6-in. 


9,000 
12,300 
15,000 


19.0 
20.0 
22 


CRUISERS  (Protected) 

1887  Kaiserin    Elisabeth ....  4^000  8  6-in. 

1887  Kaiser  F.  Joseph 4.000  8  6-in. 

1896  Zenta   . .  .' 3,400  8  4.7-in. 

1896  Aspern 2,400  8  4.7-in. 

1896  Szigetvar   2,400  8  4.7-in. 

1908  Admiral  Spaun   3,500  7  4.1-in. 

1911  Saida    3,500  9  4.1-in. 

1911  Helgoland 3,500  9  4.1-in. 

1911  Novara   3,.500  9  4.1-in. 


8,000 

20 

8,000 

20 

7,200 

20 

7,200 

20 

7^200 

20 

20,000 

26 

25,000 

27 

25,000 

27 

25,000 

27 

211 


Statistics 

of  life  members,  not  less  than  160  or  more  than  170, 
nominated  by  the  Emperor  on  account  of  being  distin- 
guishecl  in  art  or  science  or  who  have  renderetl  signal 
services  to  church  or  state. 

The  Lower  House  (Abgcordnclcnhausj  is  elected  by 
all  Austrian  male  citizens  over  the  age  of  24,  who  have 
resided  one  year  in  the  place  where  they  vote,  l)y  uni- 
versal, equal  and  ilirect  suffrage. 

In  Lower  Austria.  Upper  Austria,  Salzburg,  Carniola, 
Moravis,  Silesia,  VorarllK'rg  and  Bukowina  voting  for 
raembcrs  of  the  Lower  House  is  compulsory  and  absten- 
tion is  punished. 

The  term  vi  the  Lower  House  is  six  years  and  mem- 
bers receive  compensation  and  meet  annually,  electing 
their  own  officers.  All  constitutional  matters  concerning 
rights,  duties  and  interests  that  are  common  to  all  the 
provinces  of  Austria  must  be  regulated  by  the  Keichs- 
ralh.  Members  of  either  House  can  propose  legi.^lalion 
which,  to  become  law,  must  pass  both  Houses  and  be 
approved  by  the  Executive. 

The  ministry  is  responsible  to  the  Reichsrath.  In  ad- 
dition to  this  central  legislative  body,  there  is  a  Diet  in 
each  province,  which  occupies  itself  with  local  legislation, 
fulfilling  very  much  the  same  funclii)ns  as  the  American 
state  legislatures.  There  are  17  of  these  Diets  in  all. 
Each  commune  has  an  elective  council  which  takes 
charge  of  local  affairs. 

The  iKjpulation  of  Austria  proper  in  1900  was  26,921,- 
671;  in  lOKi  iJH,:?^  1,;U0,  thus  showing  an  annual  increase 
of  .89.  Of  this  population  1 1,O.M.022  were  males  and 
14,5:n.yi2  females.  The  ethnic  elements  on  the  basis  of 
language  were : 

German  .    U,050,266 

Kuhcminii     .\I'm;i\  lan   aiKi    .^i;iv.tk  .    6,435,983 

Kuthcniati 3.:.18,8.^4 

Slovene 1  2.'.2,940 

Serbian   and   Croatian  "^T.'i.sa* 

Italian  an.!   I    ..li..  7f.>H.422 

Rumania  :275,n5 

.Magyar  in,<t74 

These  are  all  of  Austrian  birth  and  parents.  It  is  im- 
{Kirtant  not  to  confuH'  race  with  nationality  in  reading 
these  statistics.  ( )f  Rumanians,  born  in  Rumania,  there 
are  .■{,.*»78  resident  in  .\ustria,  not  included  in  the  Ru- 
manians mentioned  in  the  alx)vc  tables. 

The  average  births  from  1906  to  1912.  inclusive,  were 
just  under  9tO.(»()(».     Religious  libcrtv  is  a  leading  prin- 

21? 


Statistics 

ciple  of  the  Austrian  constitution  and  the  Minister  of 
Ecclesiastical  Affairs  will  grant  legal  recognition  to  any 
religious  bodies  if  their  doctrine,  worship,  constitution 
and  designation  contain  nothing  illegal  or  immoral  (Stat- 
ute of  May  20,  18Ti).  The  large  majority,  78.8  per  cent., 
of  the  population  are  Roman  Catholics,  Protestants  only 
forming  ^.1  per  cent,  and  Jews  4.6(  per  cent,  thereof. 

In  1911  there  were  24,220  elementary  schools  in  the 
empire,  with  110,607  teachers  and  4,533,734  pupils  en- 
rolled, a  total  numher  of  4,88."j,734  children  of  school 
age.  Attendance  is  compulsory  from  6  to  14  throughout 
Austria  generally,  in  four  provinces  till  12  only,  and  in 
one  till  13.  Instruction  is  in  the  local  language.  Thus,  of 
these  schools,  in  9,180  German  was  used,  in  G,033 
Czech,  in  7,809  other  Slav  dialects,  etc.  Secondary, 
higher  and  technical  education  is  well  provided  for. 

The  cultivated  area  in  1912  reached  28,304,933  hec- 
tares (49,141,489  acres),  held  by  2,856,349  holders,  of 
whom  2,054,035  were  owners. 

The  statistics  of  the  leading  crops  for  three  years 
will  be  found  on  the  following  page. 

Mining  is  an  important  industry,  employing  over 
175,000  workmen  and  in  1912  producing  the  following 
quantities  and  values  of  the  leading  mineral  and  metal- 
lic products : 

Minerals              Metric  tons  fCrowns  Metric  tons     Crowns 

Gold 301.920  603,840  204*  662,775 

Silver     217,935  4.076.705  49,355*  4,905,366 

Copper     173,537  1,668,525  30,572  4,613.740 

Quicksilver     . .  .      1,177,797  2,882,630  7,626  3,972,912 

Zinc     346,747  2.887,256  172,979  10,555,550 

Iron     29,266,857  27,364,903  17,598.505  143,893,646 

Lead     279,515  6,567,943  199,934  9,521,859 

Graphite    453,748  1,869,998  —  — 

Brown  Coal   ...362,836,895  141,045,962  —  — 

Coal     157.978.895  162,600,453  —  — 

*Kilogrammes. 

fThe  crown  is  20.3  cents. 

Manufacturing  is  extensively  carried  on  in  the  large 
cities.  In  manufacturing,  the  character  of  the  plants 
differs  according  to  locality.  In  the  large  cities  are 
many  important  modern  establishments,  such  as  iron 
foundries,  vehicle  factories,  glass  works,  sugar  mills, 
and  plants  for  manufacturing  woolen  and  cotton  goods, 
leather  goods,  furniture,  etc.  In  the  smaller  towns 
and  mountain  hamlets,  handwork  is  carried  on  to  an 
enormous  extent. 

213 


Statistics 


The  commercial  marine  of  Austria  is  as  follows: 


Vessels    Ton-    Crews  Vessels  Ton-  Crews 


Sea-going  vessels 
Coasting  vessels 


nage 

1911       1011  1911 
186  384,553     4.965 
1.008     35,311     4,811 


nage 

1012        1912  1013 

193   407.016  8,378 

1,603      35,428  4,87S 


Fishing  vessels,  etc.  14,435 
Total 


37,966  34,082   14,960     28,808  35,311 


T-.L'29   437,830  43.858   16,764   471,252   45,567 


STATISTICS  OF  LEADING  CROPS 

ACREAGE 

1910  1911  1912 

Wheat    2,997.540  3.001,272  3,112,983 

Barlev    .  2.720,767  2.708.792  2.632,780 

Oats'.                    4.527,554  4,638.803  4.611,320 

Rye     5.090.621  4.992.722  8,019.381 

Maize    (1st   crop)    764,692  742.462  748,891 

Spelt     • 13,449  14,976  15,373 

Buckwheat   (1st  crop")    170.959  169.200  167,404 

Buckwheat   (2nd   crop)    208.564  205,707  204,fl3« 

Mixed    Corn    121.830  95,372  111,150 

Other    kinds    (1st    crop) 89.310  87.527  76,711 

P.'Uo             625.592  625.730  636,404 


PRODUCE 

1910  1911  1912 

Wheat                                                     7.051.746  7,130,757  8.444.702 

Barley     7.86.n,650  8,404.871  8.981.688 

Oats    15,329.670  16,380.755  17.731,556 

Rye    13,627.589  12.751.977  14  490,30-» 

Maize    (ISt  crop) 2,026,950  1,431607  1.822,660 

Spelt    69.845  95,093  128,407 

Buckwheat    (1st  crop)    1.413,809  1.313.127  998.951 

Buckwheat  (2nd  crop)    1,14.'.. 572  768  659  654.476 

Mixed  Corn    1.428.271  1.110,474  1,492.376 

Other  kinds  (1st  Crop>    770,802  r,73.416  497.515 

Pill                                                               5,176.820  4.746,771  4  007,515 


214 


Statistics 

There  are  8,053  miles  ol  railroad  in  Austria,  owned 
by  the  state  ;  state  lines,  8,053  miles ;  private  companies' 
lines  worked  by  the  State,  430  miles ;  private  companies' 
lines  worked  by  themselves,  5,637  miles ;  of  foreign 
companies  in  Austrian  territory,  20,798  miles. 

There  are  9,859  post  offices,  7,171  telegraph  offices 
and  there  were  369,671,096  telephone  conversations 
held  in  1912. 

The  separate  debt' of  Austria  in  1913  was  $1,484,489,- 
000,  bearing  interest  at  from  3  to  4  per  cent.,  with  an 
annual  charge  of  $63,851,000. 

HUNGARY. 

The  Hungarian  Parliament  (Orszaggyules)  has  leg- 
islative authority  for  Hungary  and  for  Croatia  and  Sla- 
vonia  in  matters  which  concern  these  provinces  in  com- 
mon with  Hungary  proper.  It  consists  of  an  Upper 
House  (Forendihaz)  and  a  Lower  House  (Kepviselo- 
haz). 

The  House  of  Magnates  consists  of  the  adult  Arch- 
dukes, certain  Hungarian  princes,  counts  and  barons, 
at  least  24  years  old,  and  paying  at  least  6,000  crowns 
a  year  land  tax,  whose  families  possess  the  right  of 
hereditary  peerage,  50  ecclesiastical  representatives  of 
the  Roman  Catholic,  Greek  and  Protestant  churches,  life 
peers  appointed  by  the  crown  not  exceeding  50  in  number, 
life  peers  elected  once  for  all  by  the  upper  he-use,  17  state 
dignitaries,  members  ex-officio.  3  delegates  of  Croatia, 
Slavonia,  and  the  governor  of  Fiume. 

The  lower  house,  or  house  of  representatives,  is  elected 
by  the  vote  of  all  male  citizens,  of  20  years  of  age,  who 
pay  a  small  direct  tax  on  house  property  or  land,  or  on 
an  income  varying  with  occupation ;  but  in  all  cases  low. 
Members  of  the  lower  house  are  paid.  Parliament  must 
meet  annually.  The  executive  power  of  the  kingdom  is 
iri  a  responsible  ministry,  consisting  of  a  presidency  and 
nine  departments. 

The  provinces  of  Croatia  and  Slavonia  have  autonomy 
for  'home  affairs,  public  instruction,  and  justice.  These 
provinces  also  have  their  own  provincial  diet,  consisting 
of  90  members,  elected  for  five  years. 

The  local  government  in  Hungary  is  divided  into  com- 
munes and  municipalities.  The  electoral  right  is  pos- 
sessed by  every  male  inhabitant  over  20  years  of  age.  who 
for  two  years  has  paid  the  state  tax. 

The  population  of  Hungary  in  1910  was  20,886,487, 

215 


Statistics 

of  whom  10,345;133  were  males  and   10,541,164  were 
females.  The  averajje  yearly  increase  percent,  was  0.86. 
The  ctlniic  clcnicnt.s  of  the  ti>tal  population  on  the 
basis  ot  lanj,'uag^e  \va>  as  follows  in  iyi<»: 

HuiiRarun    iM.ikiyar)    lO.OSO.STS 

CcruKin  a,o:»7.435 

Slovak  1.907,970 

Rmn.inian  2.949.031 

Uutlu'iii.iii  472,r)b7 

Croiitian  l.^;i;{.162 

Scrl)ian  1,106,471 

Others   44i9.2,s.'i 

It  is  ai;ain  to  be  remarked  that  none  of  the  Rumani- 
ans or  Serbians  shown  in  the  tabic  have  ever  lx*cn 
citizens  <ir  .subjects  of  those  political  units  designated 
by  the  terms  Rumania  and  Serbia. 

The  total  birtlis  in  Hungary  for  the  year^.  1908  to 
1912,  inclusive,  averaf^e  about   7tj8,00(t. 

There  is  |)crfeLi  equality  anu»ng  all  legally  recognized 
religions.  Tiiese  are :  The  Roman  and  Greek  Catholic, 
the  Evangelical  (Augsburg  and  Helvetian),  Unitarian. 
Greek  Oriental,  Gregorian  Armenian,  the  Baptists,  and 
the  Jewish.  Each  has  an  independent  administration 
of  its  own  affairs. 

The  Roman  Catholics  form  52.1  per  cent,  of  the  pop- 
ulation, the  Protestants  19,  the  Greek  Oriental  14.3, 
the  Jews  4.5. 

Public  education  in  Hungary  is  compulsory  for  chil- 
dren from  ()  to  12  years,  and  repetition  courses  for  chil- 
dren from  12  to  15  years;  the  industrial  law  of  1854 
rccjuires  special  courses  for  apprentices;  and  by  the  law 
of  1891  children  from  3  to  6  years  may  be  sent  to  infant 
schools,  unless  otherwise  provided  for.  Every  com- 
mune is  bound  to  maintain  an  infant  school.  In  1912 
there  were  2.885  such  schools  with  252,750  infants  at- 
tending. Every  commune  is  bound  to  have  a  primary 
school  if  the  number  of  scliool  age  is  30.  In  1912  tliere 
were  19.521  primary  schools,  with  49,150  teachers  and 
2,969,111  pupils.  The  total  number  of  children  of 
school  age  was  3,548.305. 

Secondary,  technical  and  higher  education  are  amply 
provided  for. 

The  production(of  wheat,  corn,  oats,  l)arley  and  rye 
in  1912  was  as  follows: 

\Vhc;«t  l84.ft4.3.SC2  bushels 

Corn    ..  •..•OR. 14,1.004  Unslidi* 

Oat«   ..."  so.ornns?  huslipU 

Raricv  72,11 0,35«  l.nshcU 

Ryr  .  '.rt,fl73.2ftO  bu-ihds 

2  I  ('. 


Statistics 

The  total  area  of  all  cultivated  lands  in  Hungary  in 
1912  was  H(),26U,2;i9  acres. 

In  Hungary  there  were  (April,  1913)  2,0()o,019  horses, 
905  mules,  1(5,157  asses,  6,200,807  cattle  (including  161,- 
683  buffalos),  0,659,858  sheep,  6,824,057  pigs,  268,752 
goats,  and  607,986  beehives.  The  exports  of  horses, 
cattle,  and  sheep  far  exceed  the  imports. 

Miningemploys  about  79,000  persons  and  the  salt  works 
3,000.  The  principal  productions  are  iron  ore,  pig  iron 
and  lignite. 

Manufactures  employ  12.8  per  cent,  of  the  earning 
population,  or  1,127,130  persons.  Clothing,  foodstuffs, 
iron  and  metals,  buildings,  wood  and  bfjne,  machinery, 
earthenware  and  glass  are  the  principal  industries.  The 
beet  sugar  industry  is  also  a  large  one. 

The  commerical  marine  of  Hungary  in  1912 : 

Number  of  Tonnage  Crews 
vessels 

Sea-going  vessels  68  127,96;i  1,518 

Coasting  vessels    160  10,730  753 

Fishing  vessels,  etc 305  594  86'.) 

Total 533  139,289  3,131 

Of  the  total  number  of  vessels  133  of  137,416  tons 
were  steamers,  and  400  of  1873  tons  were  sailing  vessels. 

The  following  are  the  railway  statistics  for  1912 : 
State  lines  5,061  miles ;  companies'  lines  worked  by  the 
state  6,170  miles;  companies'  lines  worked  bv  companies 
2,102  miles;  total  length,  13,333  miles. 

In  1912  there  were  6,489  postoffices,  4,994  telegraph 
offices  and  201,504,419  telephonic  conversations  were 
held. 

The  separate  debt  of  Hungary  in  1911  was  $1,267,- 
801,000,  bearing  interest  at  from  3  to  4^  per  cent.,  with 
an  annual  charge  of  $53,763,000. 

BOSNIA  AND  HERZEGOVINA 

The  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were,  by 
the  treaty  of  Berlin  (July  13,  1878),  handed  over  to 
the  Austro-Hungarian  government  for  administration 
and  military  occupation.  By  autograph  letter  of  the  Em- 
peror, of  October  5,  1908,  addressed  to  the  premiers  of 
the  two  states,  the  sovereignty  of  his  Majesty,  the  Em- 
peror-King, was  extended  over  these  two  provinces. 
The  direction  of  their  administration  is  exercised  by 
the  Bosnian  bureau.    A  new  constitution  was  proclaimed 

217 


Statistics 

on  February  :<ioth,  lyio.  A  diet  chosen  by  imiversal 
suffrage  is  competent  to  ileal  with  provincial  finance, 
taxes,  railways,  police,  public  works  and  civil  and  crim- 
inal law,  subject  to  Austrian  or  Hungarian  veto.  This 
diet  is  elected  and  the  number  of  seats  are  apportioned 
among  the  divers  religions  practised.  At  present  the 
Jews  have  one  seat,  the  Roman  Catholics  IG,  the  Ma- 
hometans 'v4  and  the  Orthodox  'M.  The  government  ap- 
points besides,  20  members.  1  representing  the  authori- 
ties, the  other  IG  being  the  spiritual  heads  of  the  various 
religions. 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  contain  G  districts  with  an 
area  of  19.TGS  square  miles.  The  population  in  1S>1U  was 
1,898.044  (994,852  males  and  903,192  females)  and  in 
1912  there  were  81,994  births. 

Elementary  education  is  free  and  under  circumstances 
compulsory.  In  the  village  schools  the  teaching  of  prac- 
tical agriculture  has  been  lately  introduced.  There  are 
altogether  about  l.Htiu  elementary  schools  and  provision 
is  made  for  higher  instruction. 

The  agricultural  population  in  1910  was  87  per  cent, 
of  the  whole,  but  agriculture  is  still  in  a  low  state  of 
development  though  the  soil  is  very  fertile.  Forest  land 
occupies  49.8  per  cent,  of  the  whole  area. 

Maize,  wheat,  barley,  oats,  rye,  millet  and  buckwheat, 
potatoes,  flax  and  hemp  are  cultivated. 

In  these  provinces  in  1910  there  were  221,981  horses, 
1,308,9:30  cattle,  1,393,068  goats,  2,499,422  sheep  and 
52T,271  swine. 

Minerals  are  abundant;  mining  is  now  carried  on 
(mainly  by  the  government)  for  iron  and  copper,  man- 
ganese, chromium,  quicksilver  and  coal. 

Manufacturing  is  still  in  its  infancy. 

There  were  in  1912  l,2ir)  miles  of  railway,  222  post- 
offices,  and  a  small  telephone  service. 

Military  service  is  compulsory  over  21  years  of  age. 
The  native  troops  comprise  4  infantry  regiments.  4  bat- 
talion scadre  of  reserve.  4  sections  of  train,  1  battalion 
of  Jagers  with  a  total  of  7.200  men  on  peace  footing. 

BELGIUM 

According  to  the  constitution  of  1831  Belgium  is  "a 
constitutional  representative  and  liereditary  monarchy." 
The  royal  succession  is  in  the  direct  male  line  in  the  or- 
der^ primogeniture.     No  act  of  the  King  can  have  effect 

218 


Statistics 

unless  countersigned  by  one  of  his  ministers  who  thus 
becomes  resjjonsible  for  it. 

The  Parliament  consists  of  two  chambers,  the  Senate 
and  the  Chamber  of  Representatives.  The  Senate  con- 
sists of  120  members,  each  of  whom  must  be  at  least 
forty  years  of  age;  27  of  these  are  elected  by  the  Pro- 
vincial Councils,  a  number  equal  to  half  the  membership 
of  the  Chamber  of  Representatives  is  elected  directly  by 
vote  of  the  electors,  who  possess  the  same  qualifications 
as  electors  for  the  Chamber,  except  that  each  elector 
must  be  thirty  years  old.  Senators  must  pay  at  least  $240 
yearly  in  direct  taxes  or  have  an  income  from  real  estate 
of  $2,400.  The  term  is  8  years.  All  members  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  are  elected  directly.  Their  num- 
ber, at  present  186,  is  proportioned  to  the  population,  one 
to  each  40,000.  The  term  is  four  years,  one  half  retir- 
ing every  second  year,  except  that  after  a  dissolution  a 
general  election  takes  place.  Deputies  must  be  25  years 
of  age. 

The  franchise  is  peculiar.  Every  citizen  over  25  years 
of  age,  domiciled  in  the  same  commune  for  at  least  one 
year,  has  one  vote.  Citizens  35  years  of  age,  having 
children  and  paying  one  dollar  or  over  a  year  house  tax, 
and  citizens  25  years  of  age  owning  real  property  worth 
$400,  or  having  a  corresponding  income  from  such  class 
of  property,  or  who  has  received  for  two  years  an  income 
of  twenty  dollars  a  year  from  government  funds,  has  a 
supplementary  vote.  Every  citizen  over  25,  who  has  re- 
ceived a  diploma  of  higher  instruction,  or  a  certificate  of 
higher  secondary  instruction,  or  who  fills,  or  has  filled, 
offices,  or  engaged  in  private  professional  practice  imply- 
ing at  least  average  higher  instruction,  has  two  supple- 
mentary votes.  No  person,  however,  can  have  more 
than  three  votes.  Voting  is  compulsory  and  a  failure  to 
vote  is  punished. 

Deputies  receive  $800  and  transportation. 

The  Parliament  must  meet  annually  in  November  and 
sit  at  least  40  days. 

The  King  has  power  to  convoke  on  extraordinary  oc- 
casions, and  can  dissolve  either  or  both  houses,  separate- 
ly or  simultaneously.  In  case  of  dissolution,  a  new  elec- 
tion must  take  place  in  forty  days  and  a  meeting  of  the 
newly-elected  Parliament  within  sixty  days.  Money 
bills  and  bills  relating  to  the  army  must  originate  in  the 
low^er  house. 

The  executive  consists  of  11   departments  under  the 

219 


Statistics 

following^  ministers:  i'rcsidrtu  of  Council  and  Wa.r, 
Science  and  Art,  Interior,  Finance,  Aj^icnlture  and  Pub- 
lic Works,  Foreign  Affairs,  Justice,  Colonies.  Industry 
and  Labor.  Railways,  Marine  anil  of  Post  an  Tele- 
graphs. 

The  principle  of  proportional  representation  of  parties 
obtains  in  all  elective  offices. 

The  provinces  atul  comtnunes  have  a  large  amount  of 
autonomous  g»)vcrnnient.  though  the  system  is  extremely 
intricate  and  the  central  government  has  a  kind  of  super- 
visi.»ry  |x)\\er.  To  descrilK-  tliis  system  would  exceed  the 
space  available,  however. 

The  population  of  Pelgiuni  in  PJlu  was  7,423,784.  the 
increase  per  annum  for  the  ten  preceding  years  was  109 
per  cent.  i)(  this  jxjpulation  3,()8O,7*J0  were  males,  and 
;J, 742. 994  females,  or  yh  males  for  every  100  females. 
Of  this  populatiiMi  li ,>i'A:i ,'-V.i i  s|)oke  French  only.  ;i,«?v'(»,- 
6\i'^  I'leniish  oniy,  .U.ilo  C.erman  only,  871,'.iht>  French 
and  Flemish,  T  l.l'lt.j  French  and  German,  8.Go2  Flemish 
and  Cerman  and  52,.i47  all  three  languages.  The  total 
nimiber  of  births  in  1910  was  176,4KK 

The  vast  niajc^rity  of  the  inhabitants  are  Roman  Cath- 
olics, though  all  religions  under  the  usual  reserves  are 
permitted  and  the  state  does  not  interfere  in  any  way 
with  the  internal  affairs  of  the  churches.  Part  of  the 
income  of  the  priests  and  ministers  is  paid  from  the  na- 
tional treasury;  this  in  lin;{  amountetl  to  sj^l.  IH.},(>4^»  to 
Catholics.  *2;{,K»0  to  Protestants  and  $*^,00(»  to  Jews.  The 
census  makes  no  intjuiry  as  to  religious  ])rofessitin  and 
hence  the  memlxJrs  of  each  faith  cannot  l>e  given. 

Primary  eilucation  cost  in  1910  $11,477..'>10.  There 
were  in  1911  T,r»!to  primary  schools  with  9;^l,^';iO  pupils, 
3,18<»  infant  sch(X)ls  with  27o,!»ll  pupils  and  41.940 
adult  primary  schools  with  2 16,292  i)U|)ils.  There  arc 
al.so  many  private  or  free  schools  imder  tx'clesiasticaJ 
care.  Ample  provision  is  ma<le  for  secondary  and  higher 
education. 

The  percentage  of  illiteracy  in  I'.elgium  is,  however, 
fairly  high;  in  1910  13.1  per  cent,  of  the  population  over 
the  age  of  8  could  loeither  read  nor  write. 

The  lielgian  deht  on  January  Ist,  19i;{,  was  $74T.«06,- 
747.  Uaring  interest  at  2).-  and  -i  j)er  i^nl. 

The  army  is  recruited  partly  by  voluntary  enlistment 
antl  partly  by  conscription,  the  latter  consisting  of  49 
per  cent,  of  the  aimual  contingent.  N'ohintaiy  enlj>^tment 
i&  retained  for  those  who  wish  to  make  the  army  a  pro- 

220 


Statistics 

fession.  Engagements  are  for  five  and  seven  years  for 
those  less  than  18  years  old,  and  three  and  five  for  those 
older.  Compulsory  recruits  serve  15  months  in  the  in- 
fantry, engineers'  and  garrison  artillery,  one  year  and 
nine  months  in  the  field  artillery  and  two  years  in  the 
cavalry.     The  annual  contingent  is  33,000. 

The  total  length  of  service  is  eight  years  in  the  first 
line  or  "active  army"  and  five  years  in  the  reserve.  Re- 
servists are  called  to  the  colors  for  brief  periods  of 
training  at  stated  intervals. 

The  peace  strength  of  the  army  authorized  is  3,300 
officers  and  50,300  men ;  the  war  strength  is  estimated 
at  350,000,  170,000  field  army,  140,000  fortresses,  etc., 
and  the  remainder  train,  commissary,  sanitary  troops, 
etc.  In  addition  there  is  the  gendarmerie  of  3,800  men, 
half  mounted,  and  the  Garde  Civique,  46,000  men  with 
large  reserves. 

The  infantry  is  armed  with  the  Mauser  rifle.  The  field 
artillery  has  the  shielded  Krupp  quick-fire  gun,  calibre 
7.5  cm. 

The  army  estimates  for  1914  were  $20,220,000.  Bel- 
gium has  no  navy. 

The  following  table  shows  the  agricultural  products  for 
the  latest  vear  available.  Of  the  7,298,474  acres  of  total 
area,  4,290,090  are  under  cultivation,  1,289,614  are  forest 
and  the  remainder  fallow  or  uncultivated,  roads,  marshes, 
rivers,  etc. 

The  principal  crops  for  the  two  years  1911  and  1912 
yielded : 

Crop  Acreage  Produce  in  cwt. 

1911  1912  1911  1912 

Wheat    398,423         396,499         8,432,736         8,219,836 

Barley    88,313  84.279         1,904,358         1,822,041 

Oats    638,591         647,612       12,353,477       10,021,930 

Rye 647,543  650,077        12,176,821        10,653,382 

Potatoes    386,800         387,009         2,702,847         3,253,067 

Beet  Sugar 145,061         152,851         1,482,518         1,702,535 

Tobacco    10,542  9,922  166,874  197,352 

In  1912  there  were  262,709  horses,  1,830,747  horned 
cattle  and  1,348,514  pigs. 

Of  the  important  industries  the  following  may  be  men- 
tioned :  artificial  silk,  motor  cars,  glass,  iron,  steel,  lace 
(particularly  hand  made),  linen  and  gloves. 

Coal  mining  is  a  very  important  industry.  In  1912 
145,670  persons  were  employed  and  2,972,000  tons  were 
raised,  of  a  value  of  about  $76,088,800. 

Pig  iron  in  1912,  2,301,290  tons ;  manufactured  iron 

221 


Statistics 

334,750  tons;  btocl  ingots  2,ol5,4uu  tons;  steel  rails  1,- 
yo3,2u7  tons;  *'y4,:G4  of  raw  and  121,226  tons  of  re- 
fincil  raw  sugar  were  produced  in  VJll.  Tlie  Belgian 
ntercham  niarnie  in  1U12  embraced  i)"!  steamers  of  174,- 
U21  tons  burthen. 

The  total  length  of  roads,  mostly  paved  with  stone, 
was  25.446  miles;  navigable  water-ways  1,2^58;  length  of 
railways  .'),()41,  nearly  all  uwneil  by  the  state.  There  were 
1,7U8  pc^stolficcs,  l,G7y*telegraph  offices,  and  there  were 
i;{o,2U(»,4T2  telephonic  conversations  held  in  1912. 

Belgium  has  one  colony,  Belgian  Congo,  located  in 
western  Africa.  This  colony,  founded  by  Leopold  II.  of 
Belgium  and  originally  known  as  the  Congo  Independent 
State,  was  aimcxed  to  Belgium  formally  in  1908.  It  has 
an  area  of  909,654  square  miles  and  a  population  esti- 
mated at  15,000,000.  The  chief  pnxlucts  are  rubber, 
[jalm  nuts  and  palm  oil,  white  copal,  cocoa  and  ivory. 

FRANCE 

The  government  of  France  is  republican  in  form. 
L'nder  tiie  constitution  the  legislative  power  i-^  vested  in 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  and  the  Senate,  and  the  execu- 
tive power  in  the  President  and  the   Ministry. 

The  President  is  elected  for  a  term  of  seven  years  by 
an  absolute  majority  of  the  Senate  and  Chamlx'r  voting 
together  as  one  body.  He  selects  a  ministry  from  the 
two  chambers,  promulgates  and  ensures  the  execution 
of  the  laws,  appoints  to  all  civil  and  military  posts,  par- 
dons, and  is  responsible  only  in  case  of  high  treason. 
The  President  concludes  treaties  with  foreign  powers, 
only  those  affecting  the  area  of  France  or  her  colonics 
needing  approval  by  the  legislature,  and  he  must  have 
the  assent  of  the  legislature  to  declare  war.  Every  act 
by  the  President  must  be  countersigned  by  a  minister. 
He  can  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  Senate.  In  case  of  vacancy,  a  new  President 
is  at  once  elected. 

The  mini.sters,  whose  numl>er  varies,  are  usually,  but 
not  necessarily,  members  of  the  Senate  or  Chamber  of 
Deputies.  The  President  of  the  Council  ch(X)ses  his 
colleagues.  Each  minister  has  the  direction  of  one  of  the 
great  administrative  departments,  and  is  responsible  to 
the  Chaml>crs  for  his  acts,  while  the  ministry  as  a  whole 
is  responsible  for  the  general  policy  of  the  government. 

222 


Statistics 

The  Ministry  resigns  on  an  adverse  vote  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies. 

The  Senate  is  composed  of  300  members  elected  for 
nine  years  from  citizens  over  forty,  one-third  retiring 
every  three  years.  The  election  is  indirect  and  is  made 
by  an  electoral  body  composed  of  delegates  chosen  by 
the  Municipal  Council  of  each  commune  in  proportion 
to  population  and  of  the  Deputies,  Councillors,  Gen- 
eral and  District  Councillors  of  the  department. 

Deputies  are  elected  for  four  years  by  universal  suf- 
frage from  citizens  twenty-five  years  of  age  at  least. 
Deputies  need  not  live  in  their  districts  but  can  be  a 
candidate  in  one  district  only.  A  deputy  must  have  a 
clear  majority  of  the  vote  to  be  elected  on  the  first 
voting,  otherwise  another  election  takes  place,  when 
a  plurality  elects.     There  are  in  all  597  deputies. 

The  legislature  must  meet  on  the  2nd  of  January 
each  year  and  must  sit  five  months  in  each  year.  It  can 
be  convoked  by  the  President  at  any  time,  and  must  be, 
if  one-half  of  each  Chamber  so  demands.  The  Presi- 
dent can  adjourn  the  legislature,  but  not  for  more  than 
one  month  nor  more  than  twice  in  the  same  session. 

All  bills,  except  money  bills,  can  originate  in  either 
Chamber.  Bills  appropriating  money  must  originate  in 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Bills  can  be  presented  by 
either  the  Government  or  by  a  member. 

The  Senate,  as  a  High  Court  of  Justice,  tries  cases 
of  treason  and  the  like.  Both  Senators  and  Deputies 
are  paid  $3,000,  the  President  of  both  Chambers  $17,- 
000.  The  President  of  the  Republic  receives  $240,000 
and  has  certain  allowances. 

France  has,  besides,  a  special  institution  called  the 
Council  of  State.  The  Minister  of  Justice  presides  and 
the  council  is  composed  of  Councillors,  Masters  of  Re- 
quests (Maitres  des  Requetes)  and  Auditors,  all  named 
by  the  President.  Its  duties  are  to  prepare  rules  for 
the  public  administration,  act  as  judge  in  the  last  re- 
sort in  administrative  suits,  and  to  give  its  opinion  on 
such  questions  as  the  government  may  submit  to  it. 

France  is  divided  into  87  departments,  under  the  di- 
rection of  a  Prefect  and  several  Sub-prefects,  appoint- 
ed by  the  central  government.  The  Prefect  is  thus  a 
representative  of  the  Executive.  He  supervises  the 
execution  of  the  laws,  issues  police  regulations,  nom- 
inates subordinate  officials  and  has  under  his  control 
all  officials  of  the  state. 

223 


Statistics 

The  unit  of  local  g«ovenimeiit  Is  the  commune,  of  which 
there  arc  3G.v  v*l>.  whose  size  and  j>opulatioii  varv  gjeatly. 
from  less  than  ^00  to  many  thousands.  EUich  commune 
has  a  mayor  and  numicipai  council  elected  by  universal 
suftrasje.  The  mayor  is  both  the  representative  of  the 
commune  and  the  agent  of  the  central  government;  he 
is  also  the  head  of  the  local  police  and  acts  imder  the 
orders  of  the  Prefect. 

The  next  unit  is  the  canton  (v.'Jll  in  all;,  usually  com- 
posed oi  1?  communes,  though  this  varies  and  sometimes 
large  connmuies  are  divided  into  several  cantons.  Each 
canton  is  the  seat  of  a  justice  of  the  peace  (juge  de  paix  ). 
otherwise  it  is  not  an  administrative  unit. 

The  district  or  arrondissemcnt  (362)  has  an  elective 
council  with  as  many  mcmliers  as  there  are  cantons,  its 
chief  function  being  to  allot  the  taxes  among  the  com- 
mimcs.  A  varying  number  of  districts  form  a  depart- 
ment, with  an  elected  general-council,  one  councillor  for 
each  canton.  These  deliberate  upon  all  the  economical 
affairs  of  the  department,  the  roads,  the  normal  schtxjis, 
the  poor,  the  repartition  of  taxes  among  the  districts, 
etc.  Their  decisions  are  controlled  by  the  fVefect  and 
may  Ik  annulled  by  the  President. 

The  population  of  P'rance  in  March,  1911,  was  39,601,- 
d09,  of  whom  1,132,69(1  were  foreigners.  The  total 
number  of  births  in  1912  was  T50,().")l  and  the  birthrate 
per  1,000  was  only  19,  the  lowest  in  the  world.  (Ger- 
many 40,  Great  Britain  3T).  Xo  religion  is  now  recog- 
nized by  the  State,  but  the  vast  majority  of  the  population 
is  Catholic,  or  nominally  so. 

Education  in  France  is  now  compulsory  from  6  to  13 
years  of  age.  In  France  and  .'Mgcria  in  1912  the  public 
and  private  schools  embracing  these  years  were  82,787 
in  number,  had  158,787  teachers  and  5,682,362  pupils, 
and  the  co.st  thereof  to  the  state  was  $47,000,000.  More 
advanced  e<lu(alion  is  also  well  provided  for.  Illiteracy 
is  comparatively  low,  in  1912  3  per  cent,  of  the  con- 
scripts could  neither  read  nor  write,  and  in  1910  2.1  per 
cent,  of  men  and  3.2  per  cent,  of  women  who  were  mar- 
ried signed  the  register  with  a  cross. 

The  French  national  debt  on  Januarv  1st.  1913,  was 
$6,570,299,167  and  the  interest  charirc  $263.66 1.861. 

In  addition  to  the  national  debt  the  departineuts  and 
communes  were  indebted  more  than  $1,100,000,000. 

France  has  a  coast   line  of  1,760  mile<^.   1..'Kt4  on  the 

224 


Statistics 

Atlantic  and  456  on  the  Mediterranean.  The  land  fron- 
tier extends  over  J, 575  miles,  of  which  1,156  are  along 
the  Belgian,  German.  Swiss  and  Italian  frontiers  and 
119  along  the  Spanish. 

The  fortified  places  are  specially  administered.  Paris, 
which  is  considered  the  center  of  defense,  is  surrounded 
by  a  wall  which  has  97  bastions,  17  old  forts  and  38  new 
advanced  forts,  or  batteries,  the  whole  forming  two  en- 
trenched camps  at  St.  Denis  and  Versailles.  The  strong- 
holds of  the  first  class  in  the  north  and  east  are  Verdun 
Toul,  Epinal,  IJelfort,  Maubeuge,  La  Fere,  Reims,  Lan- 
gres,  Dijon  and  Besancon.  Towards  the  Italian  frontier 
are^Briancon,  Grenoble  and  Lyons.  There  are  also  a  few 
isolated  forts  d'arrets  near  Nancy,  Luneville,  Remire- 
mont,  Nice,  and  other  towns.  Toulon,  Rochefort,  Brest 
and  Cherbourg  are  naval  harbors  defended  by  forts. 

Military  service  in  France  is  compulsory  and  it  is  uni- 
\  ersal  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  term,  no  exceptions  be- 
ing allowed  except  for  physical  disability.  Liabilit)-  to 
service  extends  from  the  age  of  20  to  48.  According 
to  the  law  of  191;)  the  term  of  service  in  the  ranks  of  the 
first  line  is  three  years,  and  the  men  join  at  2(».  When 
this  service  is  ended  the  soldier  then  passes  into  the  re- 
serve for  11  years,  after  which  he  passes  into  the  terri- 
torial army  for  7  years:  finally  completing  his  service 
with  7  years  in  the  territorial  reserve.  Men  in  the  re- 
serve of  the  active  army  are  recalled  to  the  colors  for 
.vtwo  terms  of  four  weeks'  service  during  their  stay  in  the 
reserve,  and  the  territorials  once  for  two  weeks. 

Owing  to  the  length  of  reserve  service,  the  number  of 
reservists  of  the  active  army  is  very  large,  over  2.000  per 
battalion,  and  on  mobilization  this  reserve  not  only  brings 
the  battalions  up  to  war  strength  but  a  corresponding  re- 
serve unit  is  formed,  with  a  varying  surplus  for  depot. 

The  strength  of  the  French  armv  on  a  peace  footing 
in  the  spring  of  1914  was  790,000. ' 

The  military  budget  of  France  for  1914  called  for  the 
expenditure  of  $287,298,310. 

The  naval  budget  for  1914  was  $117,031,538.  Cher- 
bourg, Brest.  Lorient,  Rochefort  and  Toulon  are  the 
naval  ports.  The  French  navy  is  manned  partly  by  con- 
scription and  partly  by  voluntary  enlistment.  The  time 
of  service  is  the  same  as  that  in'the  army.  A  summary 
of  French  ships  at  the  end  of  1913  is  as  follows: 

225 


Statistics 


Coinplrte  at  end  of 

1914  1915 

Drcailnuu>;bt>    .7  11 

Prc-Drcadnoiight   battleships* -1  1» 

Pre-Drcadnoiight  armored  cruisers 19  19 

Protected   Cruisers    12  18 

Torpedo  gunboats,  etc.  .  .   7  7 

Destroyers    ..87  — 

Torpedo   boats  .159  — 

Submarines    .  .  .76  — 


•Six  of  these,  the  Danton  class,  are  "Scmi-Urcadnoughts." 

The  table  on  pa^es  "-'^7  and  V'iS  ^\\i:s  the  French 
armorclad  .ship.s  and  first-class  cruisers,  those  in  l)oId 
face  tvpe  were  not  completed  August  1,  1914: 

Of  the  total  area  of  France  1.10.712.1)13  acres,  23,068.- 
117  acres  were  forest  in  1011  and  5»8.0l8,30.3  were  un- 
der crops,  fallow  and  ;;rass. 

The  following'  table  shows  the  area  under  the  lead- 
inj^  crops  and  the  production  ( 1  metric  ton :  2205  lbs.) 
for  two  vears  : 


Crop 
Wheat    . 
.Mixed    Corn 

Rye     

Barley    

Buckwheat 

Oats 

Maize   ... 

Potatoes    

Beetroot,  suga: 

Tobacco 

Colza    .  . 

Hemp     

On  January  1st.  1912.  the  number  of  farm  animals 
was:  Horses  .3,2.36.110.  mules  19 1,0 JO.  asses  360..590. 
cattle  14,43.')..530.  sheep  16, 4  2. '3.3.3(1,  pigs  6,719,.')70. 
goats  1.124,180. 

Mining  is  an  important  industry,  employing  223.969 
workers  and  producing  in  1912  41.308,.'i80  metric  tons 
of  coal  and  lignite.  le.-'iOO.OOO  of  iron  ore,  and  of  fin- 
ished metal  products.  4,826..563  metric  tons  of  pig  iron 
and  1,103.688  of  worked  steel. 

Manufactures  are  also  important,  the  most  important 
being  those  of  clothing  of  all  kinds  (938,90.')  workers')  ; 
woodwork  (701.695);  building,  etc.  (S.^O.ISO) ;  linen 
garments  (212,716);  leather  (334,203);  iron  work  and 
tool  making,  etc.,  (291.246)  ;  pottery  (166,831)  ;  foundry 
work  (282.656);  cotton,  silk  and  wool  textiles  (465.- 
148)  lace,  etc    (156,5.';4). 

226 


.\ 

rca 

Pro<i 

luce 

( 1.000 

acres) 

(  1.000  metric  tons) 

I'.ML' 

191.3 

1912 

1913 

•i. '_'.'■;'.' 

16.16.T 

•.•09.915 

S78,332 

:tiH 

311 

15.546 

15,838 

-'/»•■>.•> 

2.956 

12.1,822 

135.553 

1.H77 

1.889 

110,142 

109,402 

1.1. ^.^ 

— 

.50.069 

— 

0.26.S 

9.877 

.M  5,4 16 

543.381 

1.191 

— 

60.2H6 

— 

.i.908 

.1.792 

1.502,515 

1.298.495 

6:?7 

.')77 

722.210 

603,009 

.IS 

25 

3.262 

1,622 

63 

— 

•J,995 

— 

34 

— 

1.386 

— 

Statistics 

FRENCH    NAVY 
PRE-D-REiADNOUGHTS 

B«Kun         Name                            Displacement         Main  Armament         Horae  Power  Speed 

1890     Jaureguibcrry    11,324      2   12,  2  lO.b,  8  5.5-in.  14,000  16 

about  about 

1890     Charles  Martel 12,000     2  12,  2  10.8,  8  5.5-in.  15,000  18 

to       Carnot    12,000     3  12.  2  10.8,  8  5.5-in.  15,000  18 

1902     Massena                     .          12,000     2  12,  2  10.8,  8  5.5-in.  15,000  18 

Bouvet 12,000     2  12,  2  10.8,  8  5.5-in.  15,000  18 

1893     Charlemagne    11,260      4   12-in.,   10   5.5-in.  14,500  18 

1893     St.    Louis 11,260     4   12-in.,   10   5.5-in.  14,500  18 

1893     Gaulois    11,260      4   12-in.,   10   5.5-in.  14,500  18 

1897  Henri     IV 8,950      2   10.8-in,   7    5.5-in.  11,500  18 

1898  Suffren    12,728     4  12-in.,   10   6.4-in.  16,000  18 

1901     Republique     14,865     4  12-in.,   18  6.4-in.  18,000  18 

1905     Patrie     14,865     4   12-in.,   18  6.4-in.  18,000  18 

1901     Democratic    14,865     4   12-in.,  10   7.6-in.  18,000  1& 

to       Verite     14,865     4    12-in.,   10   7.6-in.  18,000  18 

1905  Justice   14,865     4   12-in.,   10  7.6-in.  18,000  18- 

1906  Diderot     18,000     4  12-in.,  12  9.4-in.  22,500  19^ 

1906     Danton     18,000     4  12-in.,  12  9.4-in.  22,500  19. 

1906     Condorcet 18,000     4  12-in.,  12  9.4-in.  22,500  19 

1906     Vergniaud    18,000     4  12-in.,  12  9.4-in.  22,500  1& 

1906     Voltaire     18,000     4  12-in.,  12  9.4-ln.  22,500  19 

1906     Mirabeau     18,000     4  12-in.,  12  9.4-in.  32,500  19 

DREADNOUGHTS 

1910     Jean  Bart   23,400     12    12-in.,    22    5.5-in.  36,000 

1910  Courbet 23,400      12    12-in.,    22    5.5-in.  36,000 

1911  France    23,400      12    12-in.,    22    5.5-in.  36,000 

1911  Paris    23,400     12    12-in.,    22    5.6-in.  36,000 

SUPER-DREADNOUGHTS 

1912  Bretagne    23,550     10  13.4-in.,  22  5.5  in.  29,000  21 

1912     Lorraine    33,550     10  13.4-in.,  22  5.5  in.  29,000  21 

1912     Provence    23,550     10  13.4-in.,  22  5.5  in.  29,000  21 

1912     Beam 25,387     12    13.4-in.,    4    5.5-in.  29,000  21.5 

1912     Gascogne   25,387     12   13.4-in.,   4    5.5-in.  29,000  21.5 

1912     Flandre    25,387     12   13.4-in.,    4    5.5-in.  29,000  21.5 

1912     Languedoc     25,387      12   13.4-in..    4    5.5-in.  29,000  21.5 

1912     Normandie 25,387     12   13.4-in..    4    5.5-in.  29,000  21.5 

ARMORED  CRUISERS 

1892     Pothuau    5,360     2  7.6-in.,   10  6.4-in.  10,000  19 

1895     Jeanne  d'Arc   11,270     2  7.6-in.,  14  5.5-in.  28,500  21 

1897     Montcalm 9,517      2  7.6-in.,  6  4-in..  4  4-in.  19,600  21 

1897     Dupetit  Thouars 9,517     2  7.6-in.,  6  4-in.,  4  4-in.  19,600  21 

1897  Gueydon 9,517     2  7.6-in.,  6  4-in.,  4  4-in.  19,600  21 

1898  Desaix 7J00     8  6.4-in..  4-in.  17.100  21 

1898     Dupleix   7,700     8  6.4-in.,  4-in.  17,100  21 

227 


Statistics 

FRENCH  NAVY— (Continued) 
ARMORED    CRUlSHRvS— (Continued) 

Bofun         N«m«  Dlsplacemant  Main  Armament  Horae  Power    89««d 

19y8      Klcbcr          7.7(Hi  ><  «i  4-in..  4-in.                      17.100  21 

189tt     Condc     10.060  :.'  7.6-in.,  8  6.4-iii..  6  4-in.  20,500  21 

lgy9     Gloire     lO.ueti  3  7.6-in.,  8  6.4-in.,  6  4-in.  20,500  21 

1199     Admiral    Auhi-     10.060  "J  7.6-in.,  8  6.4-in.,  6  4-in.  20,500  31 

Marseillaise 12.4  H,  4   7.fl-in.,    16  6  4-in.            27,500  32 

L.    Ganibcit.i      ..               I2,41h  4   7.fl-in.,    16  6.4-in.            27.500  22 

1900      I.    Ferry 12.41t.  4   7.0-in.,    16   6.4-in.            27,500  32 

to       Victor     HuKu     12.411.  4  7.6-in.,    16  6.4-in.           27,600  22 

1904  J.    Michclet 13,641  4   7.6-in.,    12   6.4   in.            29,0O(i  23.-. 

Ernest   Kenan    13.644  4  7.6-in.,   12  6.4-in.           S6.000  28.5 

1905  Edgar    Qujnc;  .14,:<0n      m    7.6-in.  40,000       24 
1905     W.    Rosseau                      i  »,:.0"»     i«    7  6-in.                            40.000      24 

PRINCII'M.   PROTECTED  CRUISER? 

189:5  D'Entrecastcaux     8.014  2  9.4-in.,   12  5.5-in.  14.600  18 

1895  Guichen     8,200  2    6.4-in..   6   6.4   in.  24.000  23 

189.'-.  Chateaurcnault     8.20n  8  6.4-in.,  6  6.4-in.  17.000  83 

1897  J.   dc   la    Graviere n.-'iOO  8    6.4-in.  17.000  23 

•1914  Six    new   minor  cruisers. 

VI 

Minor  cruisers  include  the  aerial  depot  ship  Foudre,  the  Descartes. 
3.088  tons  (designed  1892),  4  6.4-in..  6  5.5-in.  guns,  present  speed  ahoiit 
15  knots;  3  Friant  type,  4,000  tons  (dc^iRned  l«ltn,  6  6.4-in.,  4  4-in.  guns, 
speed  about  17  knots;  Lavoisier  and  D'Estrecs,  2,300  tons  (designed 
IHO'J)  4  5.5-in.,  2  4-in.  guns,  speed  ahont  20  kTiots;  also  2  old  cruisers  of 
Jean  Bart  rla'^s.  and   a  few  prunboats,   etc. 


228 


Statistics 

Fisheries,  including  tli<JM  of  Al;^eria,  employ  129,000, 
but  this  industry  has  declined  of  late. 

On  December  31,  1911,  the  French  mercantile  navy 
consisted  of  15,949  sailing  vessels  of  624,621  tons  net, 
with  crews  of  701,888,  and  1,780  steamers  of  838,118 
tons,  with  crews  of  281,038.  Only  223  of  these  steam- 
ers were  engaged  in  ocean  navigation. 

There  were  23,899  miles  of  national  roads  in  France 
on  January  1,  1912,  besides  vicinal  roads. 

The  length  of  railroad  line  open  to  traffic,  in  1912, 
was  26,390  miles  of  lines  of  general  interest  and  6,001 
miles  of  local  interest.  Some  of  these  lines  are  worked 
by  companies  strictly  supervised  by  the  state  and 
others  are  worked  by  the  state. 

In  1912  there  were  14,634  postoffices,  22,500  tele- 
graph offices  and  there  were  396,102,000  telephonic 
communications.  Telegraphs  and  telephones  belong 
to  the  state. 

France  has  a  large  colonial  empire,  a  summary  of 
which    follows: 


Year  of  Area  in 

IN  ASIA:                               Acquisition     Sq.  Miles  Population 

India 1679  196  273,000 

Annam    :*...^V 1884 

Cambodia 1862 

Cochin-China     1861  309,980  14,500,000 

Tonking    1884 

Laos     1892 

Total    Asia    310,176  14.773,000 

IX  AFRICA: 

Algeria,  Northern  Territory  1830  80,197  5,069,522 

Algeria,  Southern  Territory  1902  141,870*  494,306 

Sahara    .•.■••.•,.■. 1,544,000^  tSOO.OOO 

Tunis     ,.?."..'. 1881  45,779  1,878,620 

Senegal    1637-1889  ...  1,250,000 

Upper  Senegal  and   Niger..    1893  ...  5,100,000 

Guinea     1843  1,585,8101  1,900,000 

Ivory    Coast    1843  .  .  .  1,400,000 

Dahomey    1893  .  .  .  900,000 

Mauritania    1893  ...  250,000 

Congo     1884  553,030  3,900,000 

Reunion    1649  970  174,000 

Madagascar    1643-1896  226,015  3,257,895 

Mayotte    1843  840  94,400 

Somali  Coast   1864  5,790  14,000 

Total   Africa    4,184,401  25,681,243 

829 


Statistics 

Year  of  Are*  in 

IN    AMIIKICA                       Acquisition  Sq.  Miles    Population 

St  Pierre  and  Miquelon   .    .    1635  90                  4.800 

Guadeloupe                                        1634  6ft8               212.500 

Martinique                                         1635  378                185.400 

Guiana     .  .                                        1626  34.060                 48.800 

Tot.ll  Aniciu  ..  35,222                450,900 

IN  OCEANIA: 

New    Caledonia     1854-1887  7.200                 50,500 

Tahiti,  etc 1841-1881  1.544               30,600 

Total  Oceania    8,744  81,100 

Grand    Total     4,538.543           40.986.24J 

*  Including  the  Algerian  Sahara. 
+  Including  Military  Territories. 
t  .^pproxiniuf f  fiuinrcs 


GERMANY 

The  constitution  of  the  Empire  bears  date  April  1. 
1871.  By  its  terms  all  the  states  of  Germany  "form  an 
eternal  union  for  the  protection  of  the  realm  and  the 
care  of  the  welfare  of  the  German  people. 

In  its  general  structure  of  government  the  German 
empire  bears  a  close  resemblance  to  the  scheme  of  the 
federal  union  of  the  United  States.  There,  as  here,  the 
several  component  states  retain  full  sovereignty,  except 
as  to  matters  covered  by  the  powers  conceded  to  the 
government  of  the  empire. 

Under  the  constitution,  the  supreme  direction  of  mili- 
tary and  iK)litical  powers  is  vested  in  the  Kmpcror.  Ar- 
ticle II  of  the  Constitution  further  declares  the  Emperor 
to  represent  the  Empire  internationally  and  gives  him 
power  to  make  war.  if  defensive,  to  make  peace,  as  well 
as  enter  into  treaties  with  other  nations  and  to  appoint 
and  receive  ambassadors,  etc. 

But  when  treaties  relate  to  matters  regulated  by  im- 
perial legislation,  and  when  war  is  not  merely  defensive, 
the  Emperor  must  have  the  consent  of  the  Rundesrath. 

The  legislative  functions  are  vested  in  the  Bundcsrath, 
which,  like  the  .American  Senate  before,  in  response  to 
popular  clamor,  the  histf>rir  tmities  and  the  balance  of 


Statistics 

power  so  nicely  adjusted  by  the  framers  of  the  Ameri- 
can constitution  were  ignorantly  destroyed,  represents 
the  component  states  of  the  Empire,  in  their  s()\ereij<n 
capacity.  The  Bundesrath  has  Gl  members  appointed 
for  each  session  by  the  Oovernment-of  the  individual 
states. 

The  Bundesrath,  in  many  of  its  functions,  has  the 
same  power  as  the  American  Senate. 

The  Reichstag,  the  lower  house  of  the  German  Parlia- 
ment, has  ;i9T  members  and  is  elected  by  universal  suf- 
frage, by  ballot,  for  a  term  of  five  years.  Its  members 
receive  payment.  The  number  of  electors  in  1(»12  amount- 
ed to  14,442,387,  of  whom  12,260,731  actually  voted. 

Both  the  Bundesrath  and  the  Reichstag  must  meet 
in  annual  session.  With  the  consent  of  the  Bundes- 
rath, the  Emperor  can  prorogue  and  dissolve  the 
Reichstag.  Without  its  own  consent,  the  porogation 
cannot  be  for  a  greater  period  than  30  days  and.  if  dis- 
solved, new  elections  must  take  place  in  sixty,  and  a 
new  session  in  ninety  days. 

All  laws  for  the  Empire  must  receive  the  votes  of  an 
absolute  majority  of  both  the  Bundesrath  and  the 
Reichstag.    This  latter  body  elects  its  own  officers. 

Law^s  passed  by  the  Parliament  are  promulgated  by 
the  Emperor,  which  promulgation,  like  all  other  official 
acts  of  the  Emperor,  requires  the  counter-signature  of 
the  Chancellor  of  the(  Empire. 

The  Emperor  is  assisted  by  fourteen  ministers. 
These,  however,  do  not  form  a  Ministry  of  Cabinet, 
but  act  independently  of  each  other,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Chancellor. 

The  population  of  Germany,  census  of  1910,  and  the 
area,  by  separate  states,  will  be  found  on  the  follow- 
ing page. 

Of  this  population  4,231,189  spoke  a  language  other 
than  German  only. 

The  males  numbered  32,040,166,  females  32,885,827. 
In  1911   the  births  numbered  1,927,039  and  in  1912 
1,925,883.  ' 

The  number  of  foreigners  in  Germany  is  1,259,873. 

The  constitution  provides  for  entire  liberty  of  con- 
science and  for  complete}  social  equality  among  all  re- 
ligious confessions.  The  relation  between  church  and 
states  varies  in  the  different  individual  states.  The  Jesuit 
order  is  interdicted  in  all  parts  of  Germany.  Protestants 

.   231 


Statistics 

form  61.6  of  the  population.  Cathulics  36.?,  Jews  I, 
Koiuan  Catholics  are  in  the  maioritv  in  NKace-l.orraiiie, 
Havaria  aiul  Baden. 


CENSUS  OF  uno 

Population 

Stales  ol  I".    i.i.iMt.  IfllO 

Prussia    40.l6r>,21'.> 

Bavaria     . .  .  fl.9S7.20l 

WiirttemhiirK  2,437,S74 

Baden    -'.142,883 

Saxony,  Kingdom  m  4.806.661 

Mccklenl.urK'-Srhw  fillO.O.^O 

Hesse    1.282.0ftl 

OldenburK 483,042 

Brunswick    4'i4.339 

Saxony.  Grand  Dnchv  of  417,149 

MecklcnhurK-Str.  106.442 

Saxc-^^ciningen  'J78,762 

.•\nhah   ,  .131.128 

Saxc-Cohurg-Gotha  2J7.177 

Saxc-.\hcnburg    'ilG.lSS 

Lippe    1S0.937 

Waldeck 61.707 

Schwarzburg-Rud.    .  100.702 

Schwarz!>urg-SoiKi.  s<.».917 

Rcuss  Junr.  Branch    .  l.'>2.7.")2 

Schaumburg-Lippc  46,652 

Rcuss  Elder  Branch  .  72.76'.» 

Uamhure   1.014,664 

Luberk  116,.')9'.» 

Bremen  299.526 

.Msace-I.ortMinr  1.874,014 

Tota'  rt4.925,»93 


.\rca  English 

sq.  miles 

134,616 

29.292 

7,584 

5,828 

5.780 

:).068 

2.966 

2,4H2 

1,418 

1.397 

1.131 

9SS 

888 

764 

511 

469 

433 

363 

333 

319 

131 

122 

160 

115 

99 

5.604 


208.780 


liLstrmtiun  i:.  general  and  compuUory  in  Germany. 
I'he  laws  of  Prussia,  which  provide  for  the  estahlish- 
inent  of  elementary  schools  supported  by  local  taxation 
and  compel  all  parents  to  send  their  children  to  these  or 
other  scnools,  have  been  adopted,  with  slight  modifica- 
tions, in  all  the  states  of  the  empire. 

In  r.ni  there  were  a  total  of  61, ^r)?  elementary  schools 
in  the  Empire,  employing  148,219'  male  and  39.2f)8  fe- 
male teachers  with  5,1.57,460  lx>ys  and  5.152,50:5  girls 
enrolled.  In  addition  there  were  4S0  private  schcxjls  with 
'.'6,151  children  enrolled.  The  most  ample  provision  is 
made  for  secondary  and  higher  education. 

1(1  191?  the  percentage  of  illiteracy  was  .05  among  the 
iHrriiit'^.     The  cost  of  schools  ift  very  difficult  tf>  state 


Statistics 

exactly,  as  the  expense  is  not  met  by  the  central  govern- 
ment. 

Compnlsory  insnrance  of  workmen  against  sickness, 
the  employers'  liability  iaw  and  the  insurance  of  work- 
men against  old  age  and  infirmity,  originated  in  Ger- 
many, as  has  practically  all  reasonable  .social  legislation, 
some  of  which  has  been  copied  by  England  and  the 
United  States. 

The  debt  of  the  German  Empire  amounted  to  $1,804,- 
568,200  in  October,  1913,  which  bears  interest  at  from 
3  1-2  to  4  per  cent.  At  the  date  mentioned,  there  were 
important  set-offs  in  invested  funds,  which  materially 
reduced  this  total. 

The  separate  states  also  have  individual  debts,  aggre- 
gating a  very  large  sum,  but  hold  assets,  railways,  in- 
vested funds,  etc.,  nearly  offsetting  this  debt. 

Germany  has  a  total  frontier  length  of  4,570  miles. 
On  the  north  it  is  bounded  for  293  miles  by  the  North 
Sea,  Denmark  47  miles  and  the  Baltic  927  ;  on  the  south 
well-defined  mountain  ranges  and  the  Lake  of  Con- 
stance separate  it  from  Austria  1,043  miles,  and  Swit- 
zerland 256;  on  the  east,  it  is  bounded  by  Russia  for 
843  miles;  on  the  west  by  France  242  miles;  Luxem- 
berg  111,  Belgium  70  and  Holland  377. 

The  Empire  is  divided  into  10  fortress  districts:  1st, 
Konigsberg  District  contains  Konigsberg,  first  class, 
Danzig,  first  class  land  and  coast;  Pillau  and  Memel, 
coast;  2nd  Boyen  Posen :  (1st)  Glogan  (2)  Neisse 
(1st)  Glatz;  3rd  Berlin:  Spandau,  Magdeburg,  Kus- 
trin,  all  first  class,  Turgau  (2nd)  ;  4th  Mainz :  May- 
ence,  Ulm,  Rastatt,  all  first  class;  5th  Metz :  (1st) 
Diedenhofen  (2nd),  Bitsch  (2nd);  6th  Cologne:  Co- 
logne, Coblentz,  both  first  class,  Wesel,  Saarlouis,  both 
second;  7th  Kiel:  Kiel,  first  class,  Friedrichsort,  Cux- 
haven,  Geestemunde,  Wilhelmshaven,  Swinemunde, 
the  lastl  five  coast ;  8th  Thorn :  Thorn,  Grandenz  Vis- 
tula Passages,  Dirchau,  all  second  class ;  9th  Strass- 
burg:  Strassburg,  first  class.  New  Breisact;  10th  Mu- 
nich :  Inglodstat,  first  class,  Germersheim.  second 
class. 

These  fortresses  are  all  connected  with  each  other 
by  means  of  underground  telegraphs,  while  strategical 
railway  lines  lead  from  the  principal  military  centres 
towards  the  frontiers. 

Military  service  in  Germany  is  compulsor}'  and  uni- 

233 


Statistics 

\crsal.     Liability  commencc>  at  the  age  of  17  and  ends 
at  45. 

The  term  of  service  in  the  First  Line  or  active  army 
i>  sc\  en  years,  two  in  the  ranks  and  five  in  the  reserve, 
except  in  the  cavalry  and  htirse  artillery .  where  it  is 
three  in  the  ranks  and  four  in  the  reserve.  During  the 
period  of  reserve  the  soldier  joins  his  corps  twice  for 
a  training  perioci  nf  not  more  than  eipht  weeks. 

The  next  stage  is  five  years  in  the  First  l^an  of  the 
Landwehr.  During  this  service  there  are  two  training 
periods  of  eight  to  fourteen  days. 

This  service  completed,  the  soldier  passes  into  the 
Second  Ban  of  the  Landwehr.  and  remains  there  till 
he  finishes  his  39th  year,  when  he  passes  into  the 
Second  Ban  of  the  Landsturm  until  he  reaches  the  age 
of  45. 

The  First  Ban  of  the  Landsturm  consists  of  all  those 
from  17  to  '^9,  who  for  one  reason  or  another,  have  re- 
ceived no  military  training;  these  pass  into  the  Second 
Ban  on  reaching  their  39th  birthday. 

Well  educated  young  men  arc  permitted  to.  perform 
one  year's  service  only  as  volunteers,  provided  they 
pay  all  their  own  expenses.  These  supply  almost  all 
the  Reserve  and  Landwehr  officers. 

The  Er.satz  reserve  is  composed  of  young  men  fit  for 
military  service,  but  who  are  in  excess  of  the  number 
required  for  the  annual  contingent  of  recruits.  They 
are  liable  to  three  trainings  of  ten,  eight  and  six  weeks, 
respectively.  Owing  to  the  very  large  number  of 
young  men  in  Germany,  this  speci^al  re.ser\  e  runs  to 
about  160,000  a  year. 

Saxony,  the  XII  and  XL\  Corps.  \\  urltemburg.  the 
Xin.  and  Bavaria  tliree  corps  have  certain  special 
arrangemcnt>; ;  the  rest  of  the  I'jnpire  musters  IS  corps 
in  peace. 

The  total  peace  strength  ot  the  Cerinan  .\riny  in 
191.'^  was  ;iH,Mn.|  officers.  r.M.CSl  mi'n  and  ir.r'.HlfJ 
horses.  The  tr)tal  strength  of  the  field  army,  i.  e.,  the 
active  arm\  and  its  reserves,  on  this  basis  would  be 
about  2,150,000  men.  The  military  expenditure  for  the 
year   1913  was  $168,682,981. 

The  expenditiiti-  f. .r  the  the  n.iv\-  in  ini  I  was  estimated 
at  $107.785,34t; 


S84 


Statistics 

The  ships  are  divided  between  the  Baltic  and  North 
Sea  stations.  The  chief  naval  establishments  are  at 
Kiel  on  the  Baltic  and  Wilhelmshaven  on  the  North 
Sea,  and  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  across  the  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  neck  from  Kiel  to  the  Elbe,  which  was 
opened  in  June,  1896,  and  recently  deepened  and  en- 
larged to  permit  ships  of  any  burden  to  pass  freely  to 
and  fro  between  these  ports. 

The  following  is  a  statement  of  the  strength  of  the 
German  fleet  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war: 

Effective  at  end  of 
Class  1914  1915 

Dreadnoughts   31  23* 

Pre-Dreadnought  battleships 21  20 

Old  and  coast  service  battleships 2+7  2+7 

Armored  cruisers 9  9 

Protected  cruisers   38  40 

Destroyers   152  164 

Torpedo  boats  (old)  47  47 

Submarines    37  or  more 

*Three  others  will  be  nearly  completed. 

The  list  of  the  German  Navy  will  be  found  on  pages 
237,  238  and  239. 

The  German  navy  is  manned  by  the  obligatory  ser- 
vice of  the  maritime  and  semi-maritime  population. 
The  naval  personnel  is  about  73,000  plus  a  reserve  of 
about  110,000.  Practically  the  entire  fleet  is  always  in 
commission.  Very  elaborate  precautions  are  taken  to 
keep  the  personnel  free  from  certain  diseases  which  im- 
peril efficiency,  with  success. 

According  to  the  latest  returns  91  per  cent,  of  Ger- 
man land  is  productive. 

,  The  areas  of  the  principal  crops  in  acres  and  the 
yield  were  as  follows  for  1913 : 

Areas  Metric  Tons 

Wheat    4,935.222  4,655,956 

Rye 16,035.347  12,222.394 

Barley    4,134,527  3,673,254 

Oats   11,095,388  9,713,965 

Potatoes    8,530,077  54,121,146 

Hay    14,808,492  29,184,994 

There  were  in  1912  4,516,297  horses,  20,158,738 
cattle.  5,787,848  sheep,  21,885,073  swine  and  3.383,971 
goats. 

23,^ 


Statistics 

Forotry  in  Geriiwny  is  an  industry  of  great  impor- 
tance, conducted  under  the  care  of  the  state.  The 
total  area  oi  the  forests  is  3  l,.'>(i'J.800  hectares,  of  wliich 
about  hall  belongs  to  the  governtnent,  cither  of  the 
Empire  or  the  states.  The  yield  is  over  2(i.ooO.(MM)  cubic 
yards  oi  limber  and  'J3,(mm>,iioo  of  fircwo<3d. 

Mining  is  a  very  important  German  industry.  The 
quantities  of  the  principal  minerals  raised  are  as  folU>ws 
tor  \9Vi: 

Metric  tons 

Coal    .       174,875,297 

Lignuc S0,934.7y7 

Iron  Ore J7.19y,»44 

Copper  Ore    U74,28:. 

Zinc  Ore 643, 59S 

Lead  Ore 142.8:t'J 


23G 


Statistics 


GERMAN   NAVY 


Begun 

1899 
1889 
1885 

to 

1898 
1899 

and 

1900 
1901 

to 

1903 
1903 
1904 

and 
inor, 


1907 
1907 
1907 
1907 
1907 
1908 
1908 
1908 
1909 
1909 
1909 
1909 
1909 
1910 
1910 
1910 
1910 
1911 
1911 
1911 
1912 
1911 
1912 
1913 

1913 
1913 
1914 
1914 


Name  Displacement 

K.  F.  Wilhelm 9,b4o 

Worth    9,840 

K.  Friedrich  111 11,180 

K.  Wilhelm  II 11,180 

K.  Wilhchn  der  Grosse  11,180 

K.    BHrl)arossa    11,180 

K.  Karl   der  Grosse. .  .11,180 

Wittelsbach   12,000 

MecklenburR    12,000 

Zahringen   12,000 

Wettin  12,000 

Schwaben   12,000 

Braunschweig 13,200 

Elsass    13,200 

Preussen    13,200 

Lothringen     13,200 

Hessen    13,200 

Deutschland    13,200 

Hanover    13,200 

Pommern    13,200 

Schleswig-Holstein     ...13,200 
Schelsien    13,200 

DRKADN( 

Westphalen    18,500 

Nassau    18,500 

Rheinland    18,500 

Posen    18,500 

Von  der  Tann 19,000 

Thuringen 20,500 

Ostfriesland 20,500 

Helgoland     20,500 

Oldenburg 20,500 

Moltke  23,000 

Goeben    23,000 

Kaiser    24,700 

Friedrich  der  Grosse.  .24,700 

Kaiserin    24,700 

Konig  Albrecht    24,700 

Prinz  Regent  Luitpold.24,700 

Seydlitz   25,000 

Konig   24,700 

Grosser   Kurfurst 24,700 

Markgraf  24,700 

Kronprinz    24,700 

Derflinger   

Lutzow 28,000 

Ersatz  Hertha 28,000 

about 

Ersatz  Worth    30.000 

"T"'    30,000 

E.   K.   Friedrich   III..  ..30,000 
E.  Viktoria  Louise  ....    


.Main  Ai'iiiament 

Horse  Power 

Speed 

6  11-in.^ 

6  4.1-iii. 

9,500 

15.0 

G  ll-in., 

6  4.1-in. 

y,500 

15.0 

4  9.4-in., 

14  6-in. 

13,000 

17.5 

4  9.4-in., 

14  6-in. 

13,000 

17.5 

4  9.4-in., 

14  6-in. 

13,000 

17.5 

4  9.4-in. 

14  6-in. 

13,000 

17.5 

4  9.4-in. 

14  6-in. 

13,000 

17.5 

4  9.4-in. 

18  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  9.4-in. 

18  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  9.4-in. 

18  (i-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  9.4-in. 

18  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  9.4-m. 

18  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  ll-in., 

14  6.7-in. 

16,000 

18 

4  11-m., 

14  6.7-in. 

16,000 

18 

4  ll-in., 

14  6,7-in. 

16,000 

18 

4  ll-in., 

14  6.7-m. 

16,000 

18 

4  ll-in.. 

14  6.7-in. 

16,000 

18 

4  11-in.. 

14  6.7-in. 

16,000 

18 

4  11-in., 

14  6.7-in. 

16,000 

18 

4  11-in., 

14  6.7-m. 

16,000 

18 

4  11-in.. 

14  6.7-in. 

16,000 

18 

4  11-in., 

14  6.7-in. 

16,000 

IS 

OUGHTS 

12  ll-in., 

12  6-in. 

20,000 

21 

12  11-in., 

12  6-in. 

20,000 

21 

12  11-in., 

12  6-in. 

20,000 

21 

12  11-in., 

12  6-in. 

20,000 

21 

8  11-in., 

10  6-in. 

80.000 

28 

10  12-in., 

14  6-in. 

23,000 

20.5 

10  12-in., 

14  6-in. 

23,000 

20.5 

10  12-in., 

14  6-in. 

23,000 

20.5 

10  12-in., 

14  6-in. 

23.000 

20.5 

10  11-in.. 

12  6-in. 

' 

28 

10  11-in., 

12  6-in. 

28 

10  12.2-in 

.,  14  6-in. 

35,000 

21 

10  12.2-in 

.,  14  6-in. 

35,000 

21 

10  12.2-111 

.,  14  6-in. 

35,000 

21 

10  12.2-in 

.,  14  6-in. 

35,000 

21 

10  12.2-in 

..  14  6-in. 

35,000 

21 

10  11-in., 

12  6-in. 

63.000 

26.5 

10  12-in., 

14  6-in. 

55.000 

— 

10  12-in., 

14  6-in. 

55,000 

— 

10  12-in., 

14  6-in. 

55.000 

— 

10  12-in., 

14  6-in. 

55j000 

— 

8  12-in., 

12  6-in. 

— 

15-in..  K)  G-in. 
15-in.,  IC)  6-in. 
lo-in.,   16  6-in. 


237 


4  'J.4-in.. 

12  6-in. 

13,600 

17; 

2  9.4-111.. 

10  6-in. 

15.700 

20 

4  8.2-111., 

10  6-in. 

18.000 

20 

4  8.2-in., 

10  6-in. 

18.000 

20 

4  8.2-in., 

10  6-in. 

19.000 

21 

4  8.2-iii., 

10  6-in. 

19.000 

21 

8  8.2-in., 

fi  6-in. 

26,000 

25 

8  8.2-in., 

6  6-in. 

26,000 

25 

12  8.2-in., 

.  8  6-in. 

40.000 

25 

Statistics 

GERMAN    NAVY— (Continued) 

COAST   DEFENCE  BATTLESHIPS. 

B«guB          Nam*                              Dlaplkcvment  Main  ArntAinani  Ilorer  Tower  Sp«*4 

1888     Siegfried                                  ^.lOO  3  9.4-in.  51.100   14  to  15 

Hciinilall                                 4.100  3  9.4-in,  51.100   14  to  15 

Hagcn    .                               •♦.lOO  3  9.4-in.  51,100  14  to  15 

•o      Frithjot                                -t.lOO  3  9.4-in.  51,100  14  to  15 

}lildcbran.l                             4.100  3  9.4-in.  .'M.lOO   14  to  15 

Odin     ..                                   ■♦.150  3  9.4-in.  51,100   14  to  15 

1892     .\cgir                                       4.150  3  9.4-in.  51,100   14  to  15 

.\K.\H  >KKD  CRUISERS. 

1896  Furst   ilismark    10,700 

1898     Prinz   Heinrich    8.'J:!0 

1900  Prinz   .Adalbert    •J.O.^O 

1901  Prinz   F.  Karl 9.050 

1902  Roon    9,500 

1903  Yorck     9,500 

1904  Scharnhorst 11,500 

1905  Gneisenaii   11.500 

1906  Blucher    1  VOOO 

PROTECTKD  CRUISERS. 

lny2     Kaisenn  Augusta   6.300  12  4-in.  12.000  20 

1893     Gefion    4.108  10  4-in.  7.000  18 

1895     Freya  5.650  2  8.2-in..  8  6-in.  10.000  18.6 

Hertha     5.650  2  8.2-in..  8  6-in.  10.000  18.5 

and     Victoria   Luise 5.650  2  8.2-in..  8  6-in.  10,000  18.5 

Vincta    5.6!SO  2  8  2-in..  8  6-in.  10.000  18.5 

\H'>6     Hansa    5.650  2  8.2-in..  8  6-in.  10.000  18.5 

1897  Gazelle 2.«45  10  4-in.  8.500  21 

and      Niobe    2.645  10  4-in.  8.500  81 

1898  Xymphe    2.645  10  4-in.  8.500  21 

1899  .\riadnc   2.650  10  4-in.  8.500  21 

and     Amazonc    2.650  10  4-in.  8.500  21 

Medusa    2.6.'50  10  4-in.  8,500  21 

1900  Thetis    2.650  10  4-in.  8.500  21 

1900  Frauenlob    2.715  10  4-in.  8.500  21.5 

and     .Arcona     2,715  10  4-in.  8..100  21.5 

1901  Undine     2.715  10  4-in.  8.500  81.5 

1902  Rremcn    3,250  10  4-in.  11.000  23 

Berlin     3.2.')0  10  4-in.  11.000  88 

xc       Lubrck     3.250  10  4-in  11.000  83 

Hamburg    3.250  10  4-in  11.000  83 

1904  Munchen     3.250  10  4-in  11.000  88 

1904      Leipzig    3.2.'.0  10  4-in.  13.200  23.5 

1004      Danziff     3,250  10  4-in.  13.200  23.5 

1905  Konigsberg    3,400  10    4-in.  13.210  83.5 

1905     Stuttgart    3.4.'>0  10    4-in.  13.200  88.5 

238 


Statistics 


GERMAN  NAVY— (Continued) 

PROTECTED  CRUISERS— Continued. 

Begun  Name                              Displacement  Main  Armament 

1905     Nurnberg    :{,450  10    4-iii. 

1905  Stettin    :i,450  lO    4-in. 

1906  Eniden     3,600  12    4-in. 

1906  Dresden    3,600  12    4-in. 

1907  Kolberg    4,300  12    4-in. 

1907  Mainz     4,300  12    4-in. 

1908  Koln    4,350  12    4-in. 

1908     Augsberg     4,350  12    4-in. 

1910     Strassburg    4,550  12    4-in. 

1910     Breslau    4,550  12    4-in. 

1910     Magdeburg     4,550  12    4-in. 

1910  Stralsund    4,550  12    4-in. 

1911  Karlsruhe   4,900  12    4-in. 

1911  Rostock     4,900  12    4-in. 

1912  Grandenz    

1912  E.    Irene    —  

1913  E.    Gefion    

1913  E.   Hela    

1914  E.   Gazelle    

1914     E.    Xiobe    


Horse  Power 

Speed 

13,200 

23.S 

13,200 

23.5 

13,500 

24 

13,500 

24 

20,000 

26 

20,000 

26 

30,000 

26 

30,000 

26 

30,000 

28 

30,000 

28 

30,000 

28 

30,000 

28 

26,000 

— 

26,000 

— 

239 


Statistics 

The  total  \'alue  of  thtrse  ores  in  thtg  year  was  $674,- 
(•uu.OOO. 

The  production  of  German  foundries  in  1911  was  as 
follows : 

Metric  ton>>  Value 

Pig   Iron    15,574.03y  $220,000,000 

Zinc     243,784  26,000,000 

Lead    161, 450  11,000,000 

Copper     37.455  11,000.000 

Kislieries  are  fairlv  iniportunt.  Jii  >ca  fishing  and 
inland  fishi^}^^  t>ver  il.'J.Oou  persons  arc  cniplnyed  and 
the  vahjc  ofi  fish  can^dit  is  r.ver  $100.nO(),a<^). 

rfiTinan  inanufacttire  is  among  tlic  m*»i  imixirtatn 
in  tlu-  World,  iron  is  made  in  I'nissia.  Alsacc-I-or- 
raine.  Havaria  and  Saxony ;  steel  in  Rhenish  Prussia ; 
textiles  in  Sax(»ny.  Westphalia  and  Silc-^-ia;  cotton 
j^oods  in  Alsace-Lorraine.  Wurttcmberg.  Baden  and 
Bavaria ;  woolens  in  Prussia,  Saxony  and  Bavaria;  silk 
in  Rhenish  Prussia.  Alsace  and  Baden  ;  sugar  is  made 
in  Prussia.  Brunswick.  Anhalt  and  Bavaria;  glass,  por- 
celain and  earthenware  in  Silesia,  Thuringia.  Bavaria 
and  Saxony  ;  clocks  and  woodenwarc  and  f^ys  in  Wurt- 
tcmberg and  Bavaria. 

( )f  the  vast  army  of  people  employed  in  ricrmany 
only  13,000  were  under  the  age  of  11. 

German  mercantile  shipping  ranks  next  to  that  oi 
Great  Britain  and  in  191  ;i  employed  some  Hn.OOO  sail- 
ors. 2.7r)'2  sailing  vessels  with  a  tonnage  of  198.2^8  and 
*.i.0()8  steamers  with  a  tonnage  of  2. (?.">.*), }!»(;.  These 
figures  are  exclusive  oi  vessels  of  less  than  17^2  tons 
gross  tonnage. 

The  German  railroad  system,  with  the  exception  of 
2,217  miles  of  standard  gauge  and  70!>  miles  of  narrow 
gauge,  belongs  to  the  various  states  of  the  Kmpire  and 
totals  36,139  miles,  including  the  private  lines. 

The  post  and  telegraph  services  are  retained  in  the 
hands  of  their  resfiective  state  governments,  as  are  the 
telephones.  Except  those  of  Bavaria  and  Wurttcm- 
berg. these  are  all  united  for  the  purpose  of  adminis- 
tration and  operation  in  an  imperial  union.  There 
were  41,102  pr)<;t  offices  and  18.107  telegraph  offices  in 
the  Empire,  and  ?,300.000.nnn  telephonic  conversa- 
tions took  place  in   1912. 

240 


Statistics 

The  German  Empire  has  a  colonial  system  of  con- 
siderable importance.     The  following  is  a  list: 

IN  AFRICA  ,  ...... 

Date  of  Estimated  Estimated 

Acquisition  Area  White        Native 

Sq.  Miles     Population     Pop. 

Togo     1884  33,700  368  1,031,978 

Kamerun      1884  191,139  1,871  2,648,720 

German  South  West 

Africa       1884-90  322,450  14,830  79,556 

German    East 

Africa     1885-90  384,180  5,336  7,645,770 

Total  African  Possessions  . .   931,460       22,405     11,406,024 
IN  ASIA 

Kio-Chow 1897  200  ...  168,900 

IN  THE  PACIFIC 

German  New  Guinea: — 

Kaiser    Wilhelm's 

Land     1885-86  70,000 

Bismark    Archipelago   1885  20,000 

Caroline  Islands    1899 

Palau  or  Pelew 

Islands       1899  560  1,427  600,000 

Marianne  Islands   1899  250 

Solomon  Islands    1886  4,200 

Marshall    Islands    1886  150  ...  ■    ... 

Samoan  Islands: — 

Savaii     1899  660  557  34,579 

Upolu 1899  340 

Total  Pacific  Pos- 
sessions      1884-99  96,160  1,984  634,579 

Total  Foreign  De- 
pendencies     ...1884-99       1,027,820         24,389     12,041,603 

GREAT    BRITAIN 


The  British  Empire,  in  its  entirety,  has  an  area  of 
11,429,078  square  miles,  and  contains  424,775,160 
inhabitants.  It  will,  however,  in  this  summary,  be 
impossible  to  deal  in  detail  with  anything  but  the  United 
Kingdom. 

The  government  of  the  United  Kingdom  is,  by  its 
constitution,  vested  in  the  King,  acting  through  a  re- 
sponsible ministry,  as  executive,  with  the  supreme 
legislative  power  given  to  Parliament.  In  theory,  the 
Crown  has'  a  power  of  veto  on  acts  of  Parliament,  but 
it  is  never  used. 

The  present  form  of  Parliament,  as  divided  into  two 
Houses  of  Legislature,  the  Lords  and  Commons,  dates 
from  the  middle  of  the  Fourteenth  century. 

241 


Statistics 

The  annual  ses»iun  oi  i'arlianicnt  begins  in  February 
in  each  year,  and  la>ts  as  lonjr  as  may  be  deemed 
necessary.  Every  session  must  end  with  a  prorogation. 
and  all  bills  not  then  passed,  laps>e.  A  dissolution  may 
(KTCur  by  will  of  the  sovercii;n,  or  by  proclamation,  usu- 
all}  during  recess,  or  by  lapse  of  time,  the  statutory 
limit  o!  the  duraiion  of  any  rarliaiiiciit  Ixing  five  years. 

Money,  bills,  passed  by  the  Commons,  if  not  passed 
by  the  House  of  Lords  without  amendment,  become 
inw  without  their  concurrence  on  rcccivinj.;  the  roya' 
assent.  Other  hills  of  a  publi-:  character  become  law 
without  the  ct)nsent  of  the  upper  house,  if  passed  by 
the  lower  house  in  three  successive  sessions  and  re- 
jected each  time  by  the  upper  house,  on  receiving'  tlie 
royal  assent,  provided  that  at  least  two  years  !iave 
elapsed  between  the  second  readintj  at  the  first  passage 
and  the  third  reading  at  the  third  passage. 

The  House  of  Lords  consists  of  peers,  who  hold  then 
seats  {I)  by  hereditary  right;  (2)  by  creation  of  the 
sovereign;  (3)  by  virtue  of  office;  (Law  Lords,  Arch- 
bishops, etc.);  (4)  by  election  for  life  (Irish  peers); 
(5)  by  election  for  duration  of  rarliamcnt  (Scotch 
peers)    The  full  house  at  present  would  consist  of  638 

The  House  of  Commons  consists  (^f  members  repre- 
senting County,  Borough  and  University  constituencies 
in  the  three  divisions  of  the  United  Kingdom.  No  one 
under  21  years  of  age  can  be  a  member  and  clergymen 
of  the  Church  of  Kngland,  the  Church  of  Scotland,  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church,  sheriffs,  government  contract- 
ors, and  returning  officers  are  disqualified  from  sitting 
as  members.   Members  of  the  Lower  House  are  paid. 

Every  elector  must  be  of  full  age  and  must  l>c  regis- 
tered in  the  electoral  lists.  I'roperty  qualifications  arc 
restricted  to  counties  and  to  such  boroughs  as  have 
county  privileges,  and  are  quite  intricate  in  character, 
but  do  not  affect  the  great  mass  of  the  electorate. 

In  ]in\  the  number  of  electors  was  H.  18 1,263. 

The  executive  power  is  exercised,  though  nominally  in 
the  King,  by  a  committee  of  ministers  called  the  Cabinet, 
the  size  of  which  varies. 

Local  g(»vernment  is  by  county  councils,  in  each  of  the 
62  administrative  counties,  which  differ  in  area  from  the 
geographical  counties.  This  is  an  elective  lx>dy.  which 
in  its  turn,  co-opts  a  prescril)od  munbcr  of  aldermen. 
Aldermen  sit  for  six  years,  councilmen  for  three.  Women 

248 


Statistics 

are  eligible  to  these  offices.  The  legislative  jurisdiction 
of  this  body  is  very  wide. 

Administrative  counties  arc  again  divided  into  districts 
which  also  elect  councils,  who  have  charge  of  local  af- 
fairs. These  again  in  the  "rural  districts"  are  divided 
into  civil  parishes,  which  also  have  an  elective  council. 

The  cities  are  apart  from  this  system  of  government 
and  are  governed  by  municipal  corporations  chartered 
by  the  Crowm  The  same  general  principles  of  local  gov- 
ernment obtain  in  Scotland  and  Ireland. 

The  total  population  of  the  Kingdom  was,  in  1911,  45,- 
370,530,  of  whom  22,016,661  were  males.  The  decennial 
rate  of  increase  for  the  last  period  was  9.1  per  cent.  In 
1912  there  were  1,096,518  births. 

Civil  disabilities  on  account  of  religion  do  not  attach 
to  any  class  of  British  subjects.  In  England  the  Church 
of  England  is  by  law  established,  but  the  exercise  of  all 
religions  is  freely  allowed. 

In  Scotland  the  Church  of  Scotland  is  established  and 
is  Presbyterian.  In  Ireland  there  is  no  established  church. 
The  bulk  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  Kingdom  are 
Protestants. 

In  England  and  Wales  elementary  education  is  under 
the  control  of  the  Board  of  Education  and  sufficient 
school  accommodations  must  be  provided  in  every  dis- 
trict for  all  resident  children  between  the  ages  of  5  and 
14.  The  local  authorities  maintain  the  schools  and  con- 
trol the  expenditures.  In  addition  to  these  schools  there 
are  many  schools  maintained  by  the  Church  of  Eng- 
land, the  Catholics  and  other  religious  denominations,  as 
well  as  some  private  schools.  The  total  number  of  all 
elementary  schools  on  July  1,  1913.  was  21,358,  with 
6,075,024  registered  pupils. 

In  Scotland  control  of  the  schools  is  in  the  hands  of 
the  Scotch  Educational  Department  and,  as  in  England, 
the  local  management  is  confined  to  the  local  authorities. 
In  1913  there  were  3.370  schools  with  841,427  registered 
pupils.  In  Ireland  the  system  is  much  the  same  as  in 
Scotland  and  in  1912  there  were  8.253  schools  and  668,- 
974  registered  pupils.  The  Parliamentary  grants  for 
education  totalled  about  $90,000,000  in  1912,  the  remain- 
der being  supplied  locally.  Very  few  schools  are  ab- 
solutely free  in  Great  Britain. 

Insurance  against  sickness,  unemployment,  as  well  as 
old  age  pensions,  have  been  introduced  into  British  legis- 
lation in  the  past  few  rears. 

243 


Statistics 

The  British  naticmal  debt  on  March  31,  1014,  ainount- 
etl  to  {?3,iT3,l»^^i,!^37,  bearing  interest  at  2  1-4  per  cent. 

The  British  army  is  the  only  important  army  in  the 
world  recruited  by  vohintary  enlistmoit.  That  of  the 
United  Kingdom  is  divided  into  the  Regular  Army  and 
the  Territtirial  Army.  The  Regular  Army  serves  every- 
wlicre,  and  it  is  customary  to  refer  to  these  troops  as  the 
British  Army  in  contradistinction  to  the  "Native  Army," 
or  "Indian  .\rmy  '  in  India,  or  to  the  "Ixxal  I'orces"  in 
South  .\trica  or  the  Colonies. 

The  Regular  Army  in  time  of  peace  consists  of  the 
permanently  emb<xlied  troops,  the  Army  Reserve  and  the 
Special  Reserve. 

Service  in  the  permanently  embodied  portion  of  the 
Regular  Army  and  the  Army  Reserve  is  for  twelve  years, 
with  permission  in  certain  cases  to  extend  to  twenty-one 
years.  Of  the  original  twelve  years,  three  to  nine  are 
spent  with  the  colors, i.e.,  on  permanent  service,  and  the 
remainder  with  the  Army  Reserve.  The  Special  Reserve 
serve  six  years,  undergo  five  months'  preliminary  train- 
ing, and  thereafter  are  called  up  annually  for  three 
weeks,  the  infantry  for  six  days  in  musketry  in  addition. 
The  age  of  enlistment  in  Regulars  and  Si>ccial  Reserve 
is  from  18  to  25. 

The  Territorials  are  intended  for  home  defense.  The 
term  of  service  is  four  years.  The  age  limits  for  en- 
listment are  IT  to  •i'i,  inclusive.  The  requirements  of 
training  arc  a  fortnight  in  camp  and  a  certain  number  of 
drills  varying  in  different  branches,  also  a  musketry 
course  for  arms  in  wiiich  it  is  necessary. 

Cavalry  and  infantry  are  armed  with  the  I^c-Enfield 
rifle,  calbre  3(i;5.  The  Regular  army  has  a  Impounder 
for  horse  artillery,  an  lh-p(jun<ler  lor  field  artillery,  a 
40-pounder  field  howitzer  and  a  60-pounder  for  heavy 
artillery. 

The  establishment  of  Regular  troops  on  January  1, 
1914.  numlx-red  ISIJOO;  of  the  Armv  Reserve  14(5. 756, 
of  the  Special  Reserve  63,089;  of  the  Territorials  251,- 
756.  The  expense  of  this  force  amounted  to  $140,365,150. 

There  are  also  78,476  British  troops  in  India  and  a 
native  army  of  164,000  with  3.'), 700  reservists.  Another 
force  exists,  made  up  of  luiropcans  and  Eurasians,  called 
the  volunteers,  numbering  about  39.ooo,  with  3,000  re- 
servists.   This  army  cost  in  the  year  1914  about  $106,- 

000,000. 

244 


I 

Statistics 

The  British  navy  is  the  largest  in  the  world  and  the 
upkeep  cost  in  191;M4  was  $237,701,291. 

The  total  naval  force  of  all  ranks  numbered,  in  191-1, 
146,000,  with  reserves  of  50,077. 

The  condition  of  the  fleet  in  the  beginning  of  1914  is 
shown  in  the  following  table : 

Complete  by  end  of 
Class  1914 

Super-Dreadnoughts    (1)    16 

Dreadnoughts    lo 

Pre-Dreadnought   battleships    40 

Cruisers     50 

Light   cruisers    76 

Torpedo  gunboats  18 

Sloops,    gunboats,    etc 23 

Destroyers    (about)   248 

Torpedo  boats  (2)    (about)   100 

Submarines    (about)      85 

(1)  "Super-Dreadnoughts'  are  those  carrying  guns  of  or 
over  13.5  inch.  No  distinction  is  made  between  so-called 
Dreadnought  battleships  and  Dreadnought  "cruisers" — the 
latter  being  simply  fast  battleships,  now  known  as  "battle 
cruisers."  For  lesser  craft  the  1913  revised  official  classifica- 
tion is  followed. 

(2)  Including  "coastal  destroyers"  and  many  very  old 
torpedo  boats. 

The  units  of  this  fleet  will  be  found  on  pages  247,  248, 
249  and  250. 

The  total  arable  land  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  about 
19,746,000  acres,  but  as  Great  Britain  cannot  raise 
enough  to  anything  like  feed  herself,  her  agricultural 
resources  need  not  be  dwelt  on. 

In  1913  there  were  in  Great  Britain  2,14  7,083  horses, 
11,895,122  cattle,  2'J^,549,817  sheep  and  3,293,816  pigs. 

Over  98,000  men  were  employed  in  the  fisheries  of 
Great  Britain  in  1913. 

The  mining  industry  is  important;  1,117,148  persons 
were  employed  therein  in  1912 ;  iron  ore,  lead,  tin  and 
zinc  were  the  principal  metallic  minerals  produced,  while 
coal  was  the  principal  non-metallic  (260,416,338  tons). 
Welsh  coal  is  the  standard  steam  coal  of  the  world. 

England  is  the  greatest  manufacturing  nation  in  the 
world.  This  is  so  well  known  that  only  a  summary  of  the 
principal  products  of  her  industry  will  be  given.  Tex- 
tiles, cotton,  woolen  and  linen  yarns  and  piece  goods  are 
made  to  a  value  of  more  than  $1,000,000,000  a  year. 
Iron,  steel  and  other  furnace  products  are  also  produced 
in  enormous  quantities. 

2^5 


Statistics 

III  1912  the  vessels  regfistered  as  belonging  lo  the 
United  Kingdom  were:  Sailing  vessels,  8.510,  with  a 
tonnage  of  90?. 718;  steam  vessels,  12.38?.  tonnage  10,- 
99?,o7;i :  a  total  of  20,89?  vessels;  and  tonage  of  11,-. 
894,791.  This  enormous  fleet  gave  employment  to  386,- 
806  men. 

In  191?  there  were  ?3.in  miles  of  railway  in  the 
kingdom,  all  owned  by  private  companies;  24,354  post- 
officfs.  1I.014  telcgraj^h  offices  and  tliero  were  nearly 
1,500,000  miles  of  telephone  line.  The  telegraph  and 
telephone  systems  are  operated  by  the  government. 

Great  Britain  has  the  largest  colonial  empire  of 
any  power  in  the  world.  These  colonies  are  divided 
into  three  classes : 

1.  The  Crown  colonies,  entirely  controlled  by  the 
home  government. 

?.  Those  possessing  representative  institutions  in 
which  the  Crown  has  no  more  than  a  veto  on  legisla- 
tion, but  the  home  government  retains  the  control  of 
public  officers. 

3.  Those  possessing  responsible  government  which 
the  home  government  has  no  control  over. 

Two  of  these  colonies,  Canada  and  Australia,  have 
taken  steps  towards  possessing  a  navy.  Canada  has  two 
old  cruisers,  the  Xiobe  and  the  Rainl)ow.  Australia 
has  the  Australia,  a  dreadnought  battle  cruiser,  the 
Melbourne,  Sydney  and  Brisbane,  protected  cruisers, 
and  six  destroyers. 


\C, 


Statistics 


BRITISH   NAVY 


PRE-DKliADNOUGHTS 


Begun         Name  Displacement 

1893  Majestic    15,000 

Magnificent    15,000 

and      Mars     15,000 

Prince   George   15,000 

Victorious   15,000 

1894  Jupiter    15,000 

1894  Caesar    15,000 

and      Illustrious     15,000 

1895  Hannibal    15,000 

1896  Canopus    12,950 

Glory    12,950 

and      Ocean    12,950 

Goliath    12,950 

Albion    12,950 

1897  Vengeance    12,950 

1897  Formidable    15.000 

and      Irresistible    .^. 15,000 

1898  Implacable    15,000 

1898  London    15,000 

1899  Bulwark  15,000 

1899     Venerable  15,000 

1899  Duncan    14,000 

1898     Exmouth    14,000 

1898     Cornwallis 14,000 

1898     Russell    14,000 

1900  Albemarle 14,000 

1900  Queen    14,000 

1901  Prince  of  Wales 15,000 

1901  King  Edward    16,350 

1902  Dominion    16,350 

1902     Commonwealth    16,350 

1902  Zealandia    16,350 

1903  Hindustan    16,350 

1903  Hibernia    16,350 

1904  Africa    16,350 

1904     Britannia     16,350 

1903     Swiftsure    11,800 

1903  Triumph 11.800 

1904  Lord  Nelson    16,600 

1905  Agamemnon     16,600 


Main  Armament    Horse  Power 

=!peed 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in..  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

12,000 

16 

4  12-in,  12  6-in. 

13,500 

18.5 

4  12-in,  12  6-in. 

13,500 

18.5 

4  12-in,  12  6-in. 

13,500 

18.5 

4  12-in,  12  6-in. 

13,500 

18.5 

4  12-in,  12  6-in. 

13,500 

18.5 

4  12-in,  12  6-in. 

13,500 

18.5 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

18,000 

19.5 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

18,000 

19.5 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

18,000 

19.5 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

18,000 

19.5 

4  12-in..  12  6-in. 

18,000 

19.5 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

18,000 

19.5 

4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

15,000 

18 

4  12,  4  9.2,  10  6-m. 

18,000  18.5 

to  19 

4  12,  4  9.2,  10  6-in. 

18,000  18.5  to  19 

4  12,  4  9.2,  10  6-in. 

18,000  18.5  to  19 

4  12,  4  9.2,  10  6-in. 

18,000  18.5 

to  19 

4  12,  4  9.2,  10  6-in. 

18,000  18.5  to  19 

4  12,  4  9.2,  10  6-in. 

18,000  18.5 

to  19 

4  12,  4  9.2,  10  6-in. 

18,000  18.5  to  V.t 

4  12,  4  9.2,  10  6-in. 

18,000  18.5  to  19 

4  10-in.,  14  7.5-in, 

14,000  19  to  20 

4  10-in.,  14  7.5-in. 

14,000  19  to  20 

4  12-in.,  10  9.2  in. 

16.750 

18.5 

4  12-in.,  10  9.2  in. 

16.750 

18.5 

DREADNOUGHTS 

1905     Dreadnought     17,000  10  12-in. 

1905  Invincible   17,250  8  12-in. 

1906  Indomitable    17,250  8  12-in. 

1906     Inflexible    17,250  8  12-in. 

1906     Bellerophon   18,600  10  12-in. 

1906  Temeraire     18,600     10  12-in. 

1907  Superb     18,600     10  12-in. 

1907     St.   Vincent    19.250     10   12-in. 

1907  Collingwood    19,2.50     10   12-in. 

1908  Vanguard     10.2.")0     10   12-in. 

?47 


23,000 

21 

43,000 

27 

43,000 

27 

43,000 

27 

23,000 

21.5 

23,000 

21.5 

23,000 

21.5 

24,500 

22 

24,500 

22 

24,500 

22 

Statistics 
BRITISH    NAVY— (Continued) 


DREADNOUGHTS— Continued. 

B«cun         N^mr                             Displacement          Uain  Armament          Horse  Power  Speed 

1008  N'cptiinc     19.900  10  12-in.  35,000  21 

1909  IndcfatiKable    18.750  8    12-in.  43,000  27 

1909  Hercules    20.000  10  12-in.  25,000  31 

I'JIO  Colossus    20.000  10  12-in.  25^000  21 

1909  Oric^n     22.500  10   13.5-in.  27.000  21 

1909  Thunderer     22.500  10l3.5-in.  27,000  21 

1910  Monarch    22.500  10   13.5-in.  27,000  21 

1910  Conqueror    22.500  lO   13.5-in.  27.000  21 

1909  Lion*    26.350  8    13.5-in.  70.000  30 

1910  Princess  Royal*   26,3.SO  8   13.5-in.  70.000  30 

1910  King  George    24.800  10   13.5   in.  31,000  21 

1910  Centurion    24.800  10   13.5   in.  31,000  21 

1911  .\jax    24.800  10    13.5   in.  31,000  21 

1911  Audacious     24.800  10   13.5   in.  31,000  21 

1911  Queen    Mary    2'<,8.10  8     13.5-in.  78,000  28 

1911  Bcnbow    2."),000  10  13.5-in.,  12  6-in.  30,000  21 

1911  Emperor  of  India    ....2.'.,000  10  13. .'.-in..  12  6-in.  30,000  21 

1912  Iron   Duke    2.'.,000  10  13.5-in..  12  6-in.  30.000  21 

1912  Marlborough 2.-..0OU  s    i3.5-in.  78.000  28 

1912  Tiger    29.000  H   13.5-in.  78,000  28 

1912  Qutcn    Elizabeth    27,500  8  i5-in..   12  6-in  58.000  25 

1912  Valiant     27.500  ,s   15-in..   12   6-in.  58.000  25 

1913  Warspitc     .                        27.500  s  15-in..   12  6-in.  58,000  25 

1913  Barham 27,500  S  15-in..  12  fl-tn.  58,000  25 

1913  Malava    27, .500  •=<    15-in..   12   6-in.  58,000  25 

1913  Royal  Sovereign  25,750  —  31.000  21 

1913  Royal    Oak     25,750  —  31.000  21 

1913  Ramilics    25,7.50  —  31.000  21 

1914  Resolution    25,750  —  31.000  21 

1914  Revenge     25.750  —  31.000  21 

•Rattle   Cruisers. 


CRUISERS 


1897  Cressy    12,000 

1897  Hogue    12,001) 

1897  Sutlej .12.000 

1898  .^bonkir 12.00<I 

1898  Eruyalus    12.000 

1898  P.arrhante    12.000 

1898  Drake    14,100 

1898  Good    Hope   14.100 

1899  Leviathan    14,100 

1899  King  Alfred 14.100 

1899  Essex     9.800 

1898  Kent    9.80<| 

1899  Motimouth    9.800 

1899  Berwick 9.800 

1900  Cornwall    9.800 

1900  Suffolk «.800 

1900  Cumberland  .    O.'iOM 


9.2- 

9.2- 

0.2- 

9.2- 

9.2- 

0.2- 

9.2- 

9.2- 

9.2- 

9.2- 

6-in. 

6-in. 

A-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 


n..  12 
n..  12 
n.,  12 
n..  12 
n..  12 
n..  12 
n..  16 
n..  16 
n.,  16 
n..  16 


6-in. 
6-in. 
6-in. 
6-in. 
6-in. 
6-in. 
6-in 
6-in. 
6-in 
fl-in 


21,000 

21.000 

21.000 

21.000 

21.000 

21,000 

30,000 

30,000 

.{0  000 

30  000 

22.000  23 

22,000  23 

22,000  23 

22,000  23 

22,000  23 

22,000  23 

22.000  23 


21 

21 

21 

21 

21 

21 

24 

24 

24 

34 
to  24 
to  24 
to  24 
to  24 
to  24 
to  24 
to  24 


248 


Statistics 


BRITISH    NAVY— (Continued) 


CRUISERS— (Continued) 


Begun         Name 

1901     Donegal 

1901     Lancaster   

1901     Devonshire 

1901     Argyll    

1901  Antrim   

1902  Roxburgh   

1902     Carnarvon  

1902     Hampshire    

1902  Black  Prince   

1903  Duke  of   Edinburgh 
1903     Warrior 

1903  Achilles  

1904  Natal 

1904  Cochrane  

1904  Minotaur  

1904  Shannon    

1905  Defence    

1905     Edgar   

1899  Hawke 

1900  Theseus 

1900     Endymioii 

1900     Grafton    

1900     Gibraltar   

1889  Crescent  

1890  Royal  Arthur 

1895     Terrible 

1895  Diadem 

1896  Europa 

1896     Spartiate    

1896  Ariadne   

1897  Amphitrite   

1897  Argonaut 

1888     Philomel    

1888  Sappho   

1889  Sirius   

1889     Melpomene 

1889     Astraea 

1889     Charybdis   

1889     Forte 

1889     Fox 

1889     Hermione   

1889     Eclipse 

1889     Minerva    

1889     Talbot    

1889     Venus    

1894  Isis    

1895  Dido 

1895     Doris    

1895     Diana   

1895  Juno  

1896  Vindictive    

1896     Pelorus    

1895     Pegasus 

1898  Pyramus    


Displacement 

9,800 

9,800 

10,850 

10,850 

10,850 

10,85(1 

10,850 

10,850 

13,550 

13,550 

13,550 

13,55(1 

13,550 

13,550 

13,550 

14,500 

14,500 

7,350 

7,350 

7,350 

7,350 

7,350 

7,700 

7,700 

7,700 

14,200 

1 1,000 

11,000 

11,000 

11,000 

11,000 

11,000 

2,575 

3,400 

3,400 

3,400 

4,360 

4.360 

4,360 

4,360 

4,360 

5,600 

5,600 

5,600 

5,600 

5,600 

.  5,600 

5,600 

5,60«) 

5  600 

5.750 

2.135 

2,1 3:1 

2,135 


6  6-in. 
6  6-in. 
6  6-in. 
6  6-in. 
6  6-in. 
6  6-in. 
10  6-in. 
10  6-in. 
4  7.5-in. 
4  7.5-in. 
4  7.5-in. 
4  7.5-in. 
4  7.5-in. 
10  7.5-in, 
10  7.5-in 
10  6-in. 
10  6-in. 
10  6-in. 
10  6-in. 
10  6-in. 
10  6-in. 
12  6-in. 
12  6-in. 
16  6-in. 


Main  Armament 

6-in. 

6-in. 

7.5-in., 

7.5-in., 

7.5-in., 

7.5-in., 

7.5-in., 

7.5-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in,, 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

9.2-in., 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-tn. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

4.7-in. 

6-in.,  6  4.7-in. 

6-in.,  6  4.7-in. 

6-in.,  6  4.7-in. 

6-in.,  8  4.7-in. 

6-in.,  8  4.7-in. 

6-in.,  8  4.7-in. 

6-in.,  8  4.7-in. 

6-in.,  8  4.7-in. 

6-in.,  6  4.7-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

6-in. 

4-in. 

4-in. 

4-in. 


Horsf  I'owei- 

22.000  23 

22,000  23 

21,000 

21,000 

21,000 

21,000 

21,000 

21,000 

23,500 

23,500 

23,500 

23,500 

23,500 

23,500 

23,500 

27,000 

27,000 

12,000 

12,000 

12,000 

12,000 

12,000 

12,000 

12,000 

12,000 

25,000 

16.500 

16.500 

18,000 

18,000 

18,000 

18,000 

4,000 

9,000 

9,000 

9,000 

9,000 

9,000 

9,000 

9,000 

9.000 


9,600 

9,600 

9,600 

9,600 

9,600 

9,600 

9,600 

9,600 

10, 

7, 

7, 

7. 


18.5 

18.5 

18.5 

18.5 

18.5 

18.5 

18.5 

18.5 

000 

000 

000 

000 


•Speed 
to  24 
to  24 
22.S 
22.5 
22..-. 
22.5 
22.5 
22.5 
22.6 
22.5 
22.5 
22.5 
22.5 
22.5 
22.5 
22.5 
22.5 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
22 
20.5 
20.5 
21 
21 
21 
21 
16.5 
20 
20 
20 
19.5 
19.5 
19.5 
19.5 
19.5 

to  19 

to  19 

to  10 

to  19 

to  19 

to  19 

to  19 

to  1") 

19 

20.5 

20.5 

20.5 


249 


Statistics 

BRITISH    NAVY— (Continued) 
CKUl^iliK^— J.  Continued) 

Hri  111         Ntiine  DUpUcem«nt         Main  Armament 

.^.'>  Proserpine    2.135  8  4-in. 

-  ^  Psyche -.135  8  4-in. 

-  '«  I'ionccr  .  .  -'-00  8  •i-in. 

l.sy^  Highflyer    5.600  11  6-in. 

IMOO  Hcrincs   5.600  u  6-in. 

I'JOI  liyaointh 5,600  n  6-in. 

1901  C'hallenger 5.800  ii  «-in. 

1901  Adventure    2,670  9  4-in. 

1901  .Xtttntive  2.670       9  4-in. 

1901  Pathfintlei  .    2.940       9  4-in. 

1902  Patrol    2.940  9  4-in, 

1904  Sentinel 2.895  9  4-in. 

1904  Skirmisher    ...< 2,895       9  4-in. 

1W4  lM>r\vard    2,850       9  4-in. 

1904  iM^rcsight     2,850       9  4-in. 

1907  Hoadicea    3.300  6  4-in. 

1909  Bellona 3.300  6  4-in. 

1909  Bristol    .    .  .1.000       2  6-in..  6  4-in. 

1908  r.lasROw 5.000       2  6-in.,  6  4-in. 

1910  r.Ioucestrr 5,000       2  6-in.,  6  4-in. 

1910  Liverpool    5.000       2  6-in.,  6  4-in. 

1910  Newcastle 5,000       2  6-in.,  6  4-in. 

1910  Weymouth    5.100       8  6-in. 

1910  Falmonih 5.100       8  6-in. 

1910  Yarmouth     5.100       8  6-in. 

1910  Dartmouth    5,100       8  6-in. 

1909  Blonde   3.350  10  4-in. 

1919  Blanche   3.350  10  4-in. 

1910  .\ctive    3,440  10  4-in. 

1911  .^mphiou     3.440  10  4-in. 

1911  Fearless     3,440  10  4-in. 

1910  Chatham    5.300        8  6-in. 

1910  Southampton   5,300       8  6-in. 

1911  Dublin    5.300       8  6-in. 

1911  BirminRham     5.300       9  6-in. 

1911  Nottingham 5.300        9  6-in. 

1912  Lowestoft  .    .',,300        9  6-in. 

1912  .Arethusa  .    .(.520        2  6-in.,  6  4-in 

1912  .Aurora  .  ;i.520        2  6-in..  6  4-in 

1912  Ga'atca      .  .    :t.520       2  6-in,,  6  4-in 

1912  Inconstant  :t.52<i       2  6-in..  6  4-in 

1913  Royalist  .    .1.530        2  6-in.,  6  4-in 

1913  I'enelope     :h,520       2  6-in.,  6  4-in 

1913  Fhacton     3,52(i       2  6-in..  6  4-in 

1913  Undaunted    3.52(1       2  6-in.,  6  4-in 

1913  Champion   3.700       3  6-in..  6  4-in. 

1913  Caroline    3,700       3  6-in..  6  4-in. 

1913  Cordelia    3.700       3  6-in..  6  4-in. 

1913  Comut   3,700        3  6-in..  6  4-in. 

1913  Cleopatra    3,70«)       3  6-in..  6  4-in. 

1914  Conquest    3.700       3  6-in..  6  4-in. 

1914  Calliopf  3.700       3  6-in..  6  4-in. 

1914  Caryst'Tt  .    3.700       3  fi-in..  6  4-in. 

1914  4  Pro  .  .        

850 


HuiBf  Powpr 

Speed 

7.000 

20.") 

7,000 

20.5 

9,800 

21V.; 

10,000 

20 

10.000 

20 

10,000 

20 

12.500 

21 

15.925 

S5 

14.900 

85 

16.500 

25 

16.500 

26 

17.000 

25 

17.000 

U 

15.000 

25 

19,000 

25 

18.000 

25 

18,000 

25 

22.000 

25 

22,000 

25 

22.000 

25 

22.000 

25 

22.000 

25 

25.000 

25 

25.000 

25 

25.000 

25 

25.000 

25 

18,000 

85 

18.000 

25 

18.000 

25 

18.000 

25 

18.000 

25 

25.000 

25 

25.000 

25 

25.000 

25 

87 
87 
27 
30 

30.000 

30.000 

30 

30.000 

30 

30.000 

30 

30.000 

30 

30.000 

30 

30.000 

30 

30.000 

30 

.^ 

— 

Statistics 

RUSSIA 

The  government  of  Russia,  since  tlie  year  1905,  is 
styled  a  constitutional  hereditary  monarchy,  but,  in 
fact,  the  legislative,  executive  and  judicial  powers  con- 
tinue to  be  united  to  a  great  extent  in  the  Emperor, 
who  continues  to  bear  the  title,  of  Autocrat. 

On  August  6,  (19  O.S.)  1905,  the  first  step  towards 
a  representative  government  was  made,  and  an  elective 
body  of  representatives  of  the  country,  empowered  with 
consultative  power  only,  and  named  the  States  Duma, 
was  created.  A  few  months  later,  October  17  (30)  a 
new  law  was  promulgated,  conferring  on  the  Duma 
legislative  powers.  At  the  same  time  the  principles  of 
the  inviolability  of  the  person  and  of  freedom  of  con- 
science, speech,  assembly  and  association  were  promul- 
gated by  the  Emperor,  and  it  was  established  that  no 
law  should  come  into  effect  without  the  approval  ot 
the  Duma  and  the  Council  of  the  Empire  (established 
1810). 

Under  a  manifesto!  of  February  20  (March  5)  1906, 
the  Council  of  the  Empire  was  transformed  into  a 
legislative  council. 

In  effect,  the  representative  government  thus  created 
was  a  two-chambered  legislature,  the  upper  house  be- 
ing the  Council  of  the  Empire,  the  lower  the  Duma, 
but  both  with  very  restricted  powers. 

The  Council  of  the  Empire  consists  of  an  equal  num- 
ber of  elected  members  and  of  members  appointed  by 
the  Emperor,  who  convokes  and  prorogues  the  Council 
annually. 

All  members  of  the  Council  must  be  40  years  of  age 
and  have  an  academical  degree.  The  President  and 
Vice  President  are  appointed  by  the  Emperor.  Elective 
members  are  eligible  for  nine  years,  one-third  being 
elected  every  three  years. 

The  election  is  indirect.  Each  assembly  of  the  Zem- 
stvo  (defined  in  another  paragraph)  of  each  province 
elects  one  member.  Six  are  elected  by  the  Synod  of  the 
Orthodox  Church,  six  by  the  Academy  of  Sciences  and 
the  Universities,  twelve  by  bourses  of  commerce  and 
industry,  eighteen  by  the  nobility,  and  six  by  the  land 
owners  of  Poland,  all  of  these  bodies  acting  through 
their  representatives. 

The  election  of  the  Duma  is  also  by  indirect  means, 
and  19  made  by  electoral  bodies  of  the  chief  towns  of 
governments  or  provinces  and  of  the  greatest  cities,  com- 

251 


Statistics 

posed  of  delegates  chosen  by  tlie  district  or  town  elec- 
tive  autlK>rities. 

The  electors  are  :  All  ItKlgers  in  towns  occupying  lor 
12  months  Kxlging  let  to  them,  all  clerks  of  state,  munic- 
ipal or  railway  administration ;  in  the  country,  all 
owners  of  a  determinate  area  of  land,  different  in  the 
various  districts,  or  of  non-industrial  estates  of  more 
than  50,0i)0  roubles  in  value ;  the  volvsts  or  peasant  com- 
munities are  each  represented  by  two  delegates,  and 
matiu factories  with  more  than  AO  workmen,  by  one  dele- 
gate per  lOOO  workmen. 

These  two  bodies  have  equal  legislative  ix)wcrs,  the 
same  right  of  initiative  in  legislation  and  of  addressing 
questions  to  the  nunistry,  but  cannot  receive  either  dep- 
utations <»r  petitions.  Sessions  are  public.  Every 
measure  passed  by  l)oth  houses  must  be  submitted  for 
Imperial  sanction  by  the  President  of  the  Council.  Bills 
rejected  by  the  Czar  can  not  be  passed  again  the  same 
session. 

The  adnwnistration  of  the  Jimpire  is  entrusted  to  great 
l)oards  or  councils.  The  most  important  are  the  Holy 
Synod,  the  Ruling  Senate,  the  Committee  of  Ministers. 
the  Council  of   Ministers. 

The  Empire  is  divided  into  governments  and  pnAinccs 
and  these  again  into  districts  or  circuits.  There  are  78 
governments  and  "21  provinces,  these  latter  mostly  i" 
Asia.  These  districts  in  European  Rus.sia  are  again 
divided  into  17,075  cantons.  The  principal  government 
and  district  officers  are  appointed  by  the  central  authori- 
ties. In  the  cantons  or  parishes,  the  government,  in-so- 
far  as  the  lands  of  the  peasantry  are  c<^icernc<l,  and  part 
of  the  local  a<lministration,  is  entrusted  to  the  people. 
The  cantons  arc  presided  over  by  an  elder  clecteil  by  the 
cantonial  assembly,  which  is  compo.scd  of  delegates  of 
the  village  community  in  the  proportion  of  one  man  to 
every  ten  houses. 

Each  village  elects  an  elder  and  also  a  tax  collector  by 
universal  suffrage,  and  every  householder  has  a  voice  in 
the  communal  meetings. 

The  Zcmstvos  are  the  di.strict  and  provincial  assemblies 
composed  of  rci)rc.scntatives  elected  by  the  peasantry, 
the  householders  in  the  towns  and  the  landowners. 

The  towns  anrl  cities  have  municii>al  institutions  of 
their  own,  in  .'M  provinces,  modeled  on  the  Zem.sivos. 

Finland  had  a  different  system,  but  since  the  war  l>e- 
gan,  its  ancient  institutions  arc  stated  to  have  l)ccn  al)ol- 


Statistics 

ished.  The  Baltic  provinces  are  in  the  same  case. 

The  Russian  Empire  comprises  one-seventh  of  the 
world's  surface.  Its  area  is  8,417,118  square  miles.  The 
population  was  estimated  in  1912  by  the  Central  Statis- 
tical Committee  (only  one  census  has  been  taken  of  late 
years,  that  of  1897)  at  171,059,900,  of  which  122,550,- 
700  is  in  European  Russia,  12,776,100  in  Poland,  3,140,- 
100  in  Finland,  12,288,100  in  Caucasus,  the  remainder  in 
Asia.  According  to  the  last  census,  76.93  per  cent,  of 
the  population  of  European  Russia  were  Slavs. 

In  1910  there  were  5,680,480  births  in  the  territory  of 
the  Empire,  the  birth  rate,  44.2,  being  one  of  the  highest 
in  the  world.  Of  late  years  there  are  more  immigrants 
into  Russia  than  emigrants  from.  The  vast  majority  of 
the  people  live  in  the  country,  there  being  710,000  vil- 
lages with  a  population  of  1,00€  or  less. 

The  established  religion  of  the  Empire  is  the  Graeco- 
Russian.  officially  called  the  Orthodox  Faith.  The  Em- 
peror is  thQ  head  of  the  Church ;  he  appoints  to  every 
office  therein,  and  is  restricted  only  so  far  as  to  leave 
the  bishops  and  prelates  the  privilege  of  proposing 
candidates.  Practically  the  Procurator  of  the  Holy 
Synod  enjoys  wide  powers  in  church  matters. 

With  the  exception  of  the  restraints  laid  on  the  Jews, 
all  religions  may  be.  freely  professed  in  the  Empire  in 
theory ;  in  practice,  however,  the  dissidents  have  been 
and  are  still  severely  persecuted. 

Most  of  the  schools  of  the  empire  are  under  the  Min- 
istry of  Public  Instruction. 

According  to  the  last  issue  (1913)  of  the  "Year  Book 
of  Russia,"  published  by  the  Central  Statistical  Commit- 
tee, the  numbers  of  all  kinds  of  schools  and  of  children 
attending  them,  on  January  1,  1911,  will  be  found  on 
page  254. 

The  total  expenditure  for  education  in  Russia,  not 
all  for  schools,  was  in  round  figures  $81,000,000  in  the 
budget  estimates  of  1913. 

The  Russian  national  debt  in  1913  was  $4,511,316,061, 
most  of  which  has  been  borrowed  in  France. 

Russia  has  an  extensive  frontier,  both  by  sea  and 
land,  protected  by  fortifications  of  various  classes. 

The  most  important  fortresses  and  forts  are  divided 
into  three  classes  as  follows :  In  the  first  class  are  War- 
saw, Novogeorgievsh,  Brest-Litovsk,  in  the  Warsaw 
district,  and  Kovna  in  the  Velna  district.  The  second 
class  consists  of  Kronstadt  and  Sveaborg  in  the  Petro- 
grad  and  Finland  district ;  Ivangorod  in  the  Warsaw 

253 


Statistics 

district;  Kerch  in  the  Odessa  district;  Libau  in  the  Vil- 
no  district  and  \'ladivo^lok  ii<  the  Arnuir  district.  In 
the  tliird  chis>  are  Xiluirj;  m  tlie  I'inland  district;  Se- 
vastopol and  L'st-Dvinsk  in  the  \'ehia  district  and  Kars 
and  Batum  in  Caucasus  district.  Tlicro  are  also  46 
places  unclassed. 


.\,M..,              M      ALL     KINDS  or     SCHOOLS 
JANUARY  1.  1911. 

European    Russia  'n4l-' 

I'oland    ti,776 

Ciscaucasia    ...  -.780 

Transcaucasia  2,693 

Siberia    .">,687 

Central  .\sia  .  '.»,587 

I'otal 117.941 


CHILUKL.N  AITENJMNL.    IHL.M  JANUARY   1.  1911. 


Fligli      Middle    Special 
schools  schools  schools 


European  Russia  .'i7,691 

Poland     4.010 

Ciscaucasia    ....      

Transcaucasia..     3.186 

Siberia    .1.241 

Central    Asia...      


351,65.') 
20,345 
9,899 
12,99:) 
20.852 
11,555 


193.486 
18,020 
3.225 
2,894 
8,274 
3,144 


Trimary 
schools 

5.192.090 
282,735 
176.66<J 
115,668 
273,851 
108,909 


Toul 

5,794.922 
325,110 
189,793 
131,683 
306;!18 
123,608 


Total     65.218     427.301      328,983     6.149.922     6.871,334 


Military  '^crvire  in  Russia  is  uni\(Msal  and  ooinpnl- 
sorv  and  hcpins  at  the  age  of  20  and  extends  to  the 
rnd  f>f  the  -l.'Jrd  vf-ar.  Owinp  to  the  extent  of  the  Em- 
pire there  arc  three  armies,  known  as  the  army  of  Euro- 
pean Russia,  of  the  Caucasus,  of  Asia. 

?r,4 


Statistics 

Service  in  the'  first  line  or  active  army  is  for  three 
years  in  the  infantry  and  field  artillery,  four  years  other 
arms.  This  completed,  the  soldier  is  then  transferred  to 
the  Reserve  (Zapas)  where  he  serves  fourteen  or  fif- 
teen years,  having  two  trainings  of  six  weeks  each  dur- 
ing this  period.  The  soldier  then  passes  into  the  "Opol- 
chcnie,"  where  he  remains  five  years.  The  Cossack> 
hold  their  lands  by  military  tenure  and  serve  during  life, 
providing  their  own  horses  and  equipments.  At  19  they 
are  trained  two  years  at  home,  then  enter  for  four  years 
the  "first  category"  regiment  of  their  district,  then  to  the 
"second  category"  regiment  for  another  four  years  and 
to  the  "third  category"  regiment  for  another  four  years, 
after  which  five  years  are  passed  in  the  reserves.  Except 
the  time  spent  in  the  first  category  regiment,  the  men 
live  at  home. 

The  "Opolchenie"  army  is  divided  into  two  classes  or 
bans.  The  first  includes  the  trained  men,  and  the  young 
men  surplus  to  the  annual  contingent,  and  all  are  em- 
bodied in  the  active  army  in  case  of  war.  The  second 
ban  of  the  "Opolchenie"  comprises  all  those  exempted 
from  actual  service,  those  not  quite  up  to  the  physical 
standard,  the  older  classes  of  the  surplus  men, — in  a 
word,  is  the  levy  "en  masse." 

There  is  a  system  of  one  year  volunteers  in  Russia 
which  furnishes  the  officers,  largely  required  for  the  re- 
serve troops  on  mobilization. 

The  field  army  of  Russia  has  a  grand  total  of  about 
1,850,000  men,  the  reserves  about  2,400.000. 

The  Russian  infantry  is  armed  with  "3  line"  rifle, 
model  1891.  It  is  a  5-cartridge  magazine  rifle,  299  cali- 
bre. The  cavalry  and  the  Cossacks  carry  a  similar  rifle, 
2  3-4  inches  shorter  in  the  barrel.  The  artillery  uses  a 
Q.F.  shielded  gun  model  1902,  firing  a  shell  of  13  1-2  lbs. 

The  military  budget  of  Russia  for  1913  amounted  to 
$478,878,600.  ' 

The  naval  budget  for  1913  was  $121,250,000.  The 
Russian  Navy  is  subject  to  special  conditions,  such  as  do 
not  affect  the  navies  of  other  powers,  owing  to  the 
geographical  conditions  of  the  Empire,  to  meet  which, 
Russia  is  obliged  to  maintain  four  distinct  fleets.  Of 
these  the  most  important  in  regard  to  European  rela- 
tions in  the  Baltic  fleet,  though  the  Black  Sea  fleet  is  also 
of  some  importance. 

The  chief  base  of  the  Baltic  fleet  is  Kronstadt,  which 
is   heavily    fortified.    The    Gulf   of   Finland    is   usually 

255 


Statistics 

blocked  with  ice  from  November  to  April.  The  new 
port  of  Libau  in  Courland  is.  however,  ice  free. 

In  the  Black  Sea.  Sevastojx)!  is  the  chief  naval  base 
and  is  appropriately  fortified. 

The  number  of  officers  and  men  is  about  53,600.  The 
following  is  a  statement  of  the  strength  of  the  Russian 
fleet,  including  ships  building  and  provided  for,  but 
excluding  training  ships,  transports,  and  non-effective 
vessels : 

H.M.TIC   FLEKT 

At  the  end  of 

1913  1914  1915 

Dreadnoughts   —  4  * 

Prc-Dreadnought   battleships    4  4  4 

Pre-Dreadnought  armored  cruisers 6  .«  6 

Protected  cruisers  6  •  H 

Torpedo   gunboats,  etc ?  ?  ? 

Destroyers   78  —  114 

Torpedo  boats    ?  ?  ? 

Submarines   ?  ?  ? 

BLACK  SEA  FLEET 

At  the  end  of 

1913  1914  1915 

Dreadnoughts    —  —  3 

Prc-Dreadnought  battleships 6  6(?)  6 

Armored   cruisers    —  —  — 

Protected  cruisers  2  11  13 

Destroyers   25  ?  ? 

Torpedo   boats    16  ?  ? 

Submarines   14  ?  ? 

There  are  also  two  armored  gunboats,  and  various 
very  old  tori>edo  boats  and  gimboats. 

The  Caspian  flotilla,  which  is  not  included  in  the 
above  statement,  consists  of  a  few  small  gunboats  and 
steamships. 

The  tables  on  pages  257  and  258  of  the  Russian  ar- 
mor-clad fleet  and  principal  cruisers  arc  arranged  in 
chronological  order. 

Russia  i^  almost  purely  an  agricultural  country  and 
her  crops  are  among  the  greatest  in  the  world  as  will  be 
seen  fr^m  the  following  harvest  for  1912: 

Wheat     (winter)     23.221.160.000  lbs. 

Wheat    (summer)     34.440,400.000  lbs. 

Rye    (winter)     64, 000. .'.00,000  lbs. 

Rve    (summer)    0.00fi,ft40,000  lbs. 

Oats    38, fli  1.960,000  lbs. 

Rarley     27. .189. 400.000  lbs. 

Potatoes     92.7.'50.680,OOO  lbs. 

Hay     149.080.080.000  lbs. 

256 


orse  i'ower 

bpueu 

4iJ,000 

az 

4;i,ooo 

zz 

iZ.OOO 

zz 

45i,000 

2a 

Gtt.OUO 

26.J 

66,UUU 

26.0 

66,000 

26.5 

66,000 

26.5 

16,500 

lb 

16,500 

lC5 

16,500 

lb 

17,600 

16 

Statistics 

RUSSIAN  NAVY 
DREADNOUGHTS 

Name  Displacement         Main  Armament 

Gaiigoot    23,a00  12  12-111.,  16  4.7-in. 

Toltava    23,300  12  12-iii.,  16  4.7-in. 

Fetropavlovsk   23,300  12  12-in.,  16  4.7-in. 

Sevastopol     23,300  12  la-iii.,  16  4,7-in. 

liorodino     26,000  y  14-iii.,  20  5-in. 

Ismail 2a,000  9  14-iu.,  20  5-in. 

Kinburn     2»,000  y  14-in.,  ao  5-in, 

iNavarin     28,000  y  14-in.,  20  5-in. 

PRE-DREADNOUGHTS 

Tsessarevitch    13,400  4  12-in.,  12  6-in, 

Slava    13,200  4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

Imperator   Pavel    13,200  4  12-in.,  12  6-in. 

Andreas    Pervozanny.  .17,200  4  12-in.,  14  8-in. 

CRUISERS 

Rossia    12,530  4  8-in.,  22  6-in. 

Diana    6,600  8  6-in. 

Auroro     6,600  8  6-in. 

Askold    6,500  12  6-in. 

Bogatyr     6,500  12   6-in. 

Uleg     6,500  12   6-in. 

Gromboi 12,336  4   8-in.,   22  6-in. 

Zhemchug     3,200  8   4.7-in. 

Makaroff     7,887  2  8-in.,  8  6-in. 

Pallada     7,887  2  8-in.,  8  6-in. 

Bayan     7,887  2  8-in.,   8  6-in. 

Rurik     15,000  4  10,   8  8,  20   4.7   ii 

Svietlana     6,750  12  6-in. 

Grieg    6,750  12  6-in. 

Boutakoff    6,750  12  6-in. 

Spiridoff     6,750  12  6-in. 

Mooraviev    4,500  8    5-in. 

Amursky     4,500  8    5-in. 

Xevelskoy     4,500  8   5-in. 


BLACK   SEA   FLEET 

DREADNOUGHTS 

1911      Ekaterina    H      22,500     12   12-in.,  20  5-in.  25,000       21 

1911     Imperitza   Maria    22,500     12  12-in..  20  5-in.  25,000       21 

iqil     Alexander   HI 22.500     12  12-in..  20  5-in.  25,000       21 


18,000 

18.5 

11,600 

20 

11,600 

20 

19,500 

23 

20,000 

22 

20,000 

22 

18,000 

19.5 

17,000 

23 

16,500 

21 

16,500 

21 

16,500 

21 

19,700 

21 

30 
30 
'-10 

30 
27.5 

27,400 

27.400 

27. o 

27,400 

27.5 

257 


Statistics 

RUSSIAN   NAVY— (Continued.) 
PRE-DREADNOUGHTS 

Mam*  Dtaplacement  Main  Armament         tloraa  Power  Speed 

G.    Pobiedonosetz    10,000       6  12-in.  (old),  7  fl-in.        12,600  16 

Tri  Sviatitelia   12,490       -t   i2-iii..  b  6-in.,  7  fl-in.  10,600  17 

Rostislav 8.800       -i   10-in.,  8  6-in.  8,500  16 

Pantelcimon 12,480       4    12-in.,    16  6-in.  10,600  17.5 

Ivan    Zlatoust    12,480       4  12-in.,  4  8-in.,  12  6-in.  10,600  17.5 

Efstafi    12,480       4  12-in.,  4  8-in..  12  6-iii.  10,600  17.5 

CRUISERS 

Kagul    6,500      12    6-in.  20,000  23 

Pamiat  Merkuria 6,500     12   6-in.  20,000  23 

Lazaroff 7.000      16     6-in.  30 

Nahkimoff 7.000     16     6-in.  30 


268 


Statistics 

The  total  number  of  horses  in  the  Empire  was  33,- 
170,000,  cattle  48,896,000,  sheep  and  goats  74,066,000, 
and  pigs  13,509,000. 

State  forests  cover  478,779,195  acres. 
The  soil  of  Russia  is  rich  in  ores  of  all  kinds  and  the 
mining  industry  is  steadily  increasing.  Gold,  platinum, 
silver,  pig  iron,  coal,  naphtha,  salt  are  among  the  prin- 
cipal productions  of  the  mines  and  furnaces,  the  coal 
production^  being  in  1911,  28,414,000  tons,  steel  2,887,- 
000.  pig  iron  3,589,000.  The  Russian  oil  fields  are  also 
of  importance. 

Manufactures  are  backward,  employing  only  2,151,- 
191  hands  in  1913.  Sugar  production  is  important,  but 
varies  greatly  in  quantity.  The  fisheries  are  the  third 
in  the  world. 

In  1913  Russia  possessed  1016  steamers  of  486,913 
tons  burden,  and  2,577  sailing  vessels  with  a  carrying 
capacity  of  256,844  tons.  The  railway  development  of 
Russia  is  very  backward.  Vast  as  the  country  is,  it 
possesses  only  46,573  miles  of  railroad ;  33,898  of  this 
mileage  is  owned  by  the  government,  the  rest  by  private 
companies. 

There  are  about  35,000  post-offices  and  20,000  tele- 
graph offices ;  the  telephone  is  not  greatly  developed. 

Russia  has  two  tributary  states  in  Asia :  Bokhara 
and  Khiva. 

SERBIA 

Serbia  is  nominally  a  constitutional  monarchy  and  ita 
present  organic  law  is  the  constitution,  voted  by  the 
Great  National  Assembly  January  2,  1889.  The  execu- 
tive! power  is  vested  in  the  King,  assisted  by  a  council 
bf  eight  ministers,  who  are  individually  and  collective- 
ly responsible  to  the  King  and  the  National  Assembly. 

The  legislative  authority  is  exercised  by  the  King,  in 
conjunction  with  the  National  Assembly,  or  "Narodna 
Skupshtina."  The  State  Council,  appointed  partly  by 
the  King  and  partly  by  the  National  Assembly,  is  al- 
ways sitting  and  deals  with  a  variety  of  administrative 
questions,  semi-judicially. 

The  National  Assembly  is  composed  of  166  deputies, 
elected  by  the  people.  To  sit  in  such  assembly  one  must 
be  a  Serbian,  30  years  of  age,  and  permanently  resid- 
ing in  Serbia,  paying  30  dinars  a  year  in  direct  taxes,  and 
not  a  minister,  state  councillor,  judge,  communal  mayor 

259 


Statistics 

or  middle  schoul  or  univcisiiy  pruiessor.  Tlie  term  of 
oiiicc  Is  lour  years  and  ll»c  a>scmbly  mccl^  ever)  )  ear 
on  September  'Zlsi. 

Counties,  districts  and  municipalities  iiave  their  own 
administrative  assemblies.  For  administrative  purposes 
Serbia  is  divided  into  17  provinces  or  counties,  81  dis- 
tricis,  1 183  comnmnes  and  81  towns. 

The  area  ot  Serbia  is  ii^.bUl  square  miles  and  the 
population  is  -l.iilT.Uy^,  this  including  the  territory 
added  as  a  result  of  two  Balkan  wars. 

In  lyiv*  tiiere  were,  in  the  old  territory,  lli.:;io« 
births. 

The  State  religion  of  Serbia  is  Greek  Orthodox,  and 
there  are  very  few  adherents  of  other  churches. 

IClementary  education  in  Serbia  is  comjmlsory  and  in 
all  the  primary  schools  under  the  Ministry  of  Kduca 
tion  it  is  free.  In  1U09  only  11  per  cent,  of  the  popula 
tion  could  read  and  write.  In  the  same  year  there  were 
i,2d6  elementary  schools,  with  2,581  teachers  and  138.- 
434  pupils,  and  the  expenditure  on  these  schools  wab 
$840,000.  On  January  1.  1'J13,  the  Serbian  debt 
amounted  to  $128,384,108  at  six  and  seven  per  cent, 
interest. 

Military  service  is  compulsory  and  universal.  Lia- 
bility is  from  18  to  50  years  of  age,  but  recruits  join  at 
21  and  complete  their  service  at  15.  The  National 
Army  has  three  Bans.  The  first  is  the  active  army  and 
its  reserves.  The  second  Ban  consists  of  reserve  troops 
and  the  third  is  the  territorial  army.  There  is  also  the 
levee  en  masse,  which  contains  all  males  l>etween  18 
and  50.  Service  in  the  infantry  is  for  one  and  one- 
quarter  years,  for  artillery  and  cavalry  two  years.  This 
completed,  the  soldier  passes  into  the  army  reserves, 
where  he  remains  until  ten  years  of  service  are  com- 
pleted. Then  service  of  six  years  in  the  second  Ban 
and  eight  in  the  third  Ban  ensue. 

The  Serbian  infantry  is  armed  with  the  Mau-^cr  rifk-. 
model  99,  calibre  7  mm. 

The  military  budget  for  1913  was  $933,095 

At  Ni'^h  a  scries  of  forts  is  being  built.  At  Zayechar 
near  the  Bulgarian  frnnlicr.  arc  five  fort.s,  and  Pirot  is 
al.so  provided  with  works. 

Serbia  is  an  agrictiltnral  r<nintry.  where  almost  every 
peasant  rnltivatos  his  own  land.  The  li<»ldings  vary  in 
HJze,  from  10  to  30  acres  mostly. 

The  area  and  ])rn(liirc  of  the  principal  crops  for 
thrr*    years  wore  .is  follow.^  : 

260 


Statistics 

Area  in  acres  Produce  in  cwts. 

1911  1911 

Wheat    <j:>4,«35  8,200.4452 

Barley    254,593  1,974,650 

Oats 258,789  1,442,536 

Rye    123,218  855,199 

Maize  1,442,638  13,261,866 

Beetroot  sugar  11,263  1,804,540 

There  were  in  liill  in  Serbia  152,61  r  horses,  957,911 
cattle,  ;i,8(i8,Hl.-)  sheep,  863,544  pigs  and  627,427  goats. 

The  Serbian  forests  cover  an  area  of  3,818,620  acres, 
but  are  badly  managed  and  hence  less  profitable  than 
they  might  be. 

Serbia  has  considerable  mineral  resources,  but  these 
are  poorly  worked. 

Serbian  manufactures  are  in  a  rudimentary  condition. 

Serbia  has  a  total  of  974  miles  of  railroad  and  3,495 
miles  of  highway,  many  of  them  in  a  ruinous  condition. 
There  were  1,556  post-offices  in  the  country  in  1912,  211 
telegraph  offices  and  about  61,000,000  telephonic  con- 
versations were  held  in  that  year. 

TURKEY 

The  fundamental  law  of  the  Empire  is  based  on  the 
Koran.  Next  to  the  Koran  the  laws  of  "Hadith,"  a 
code  formed  of  the  supposed  sayings  and  opinions  of 
Mahomet  and  the  sentences  and  decisions  of  his  im- 
mediate successors  are  binding  upon  the  sovereign  as 
well  as  his  subjects. 

Forms  of  constitution  after  the  model  of  the  West 
European  states  were  drawn  up  at  various  periods  by 
successive  Ottoman  governments,  the  first  in  1839,  the 
most  recent  embodied  in  a  decree  of  Sultan  Abdul- 
Hamid  II.  of  November,  1876. 

This  provides  for  the  security  of  personal  liberty 
and  property:  for  the  administration  of  justice  by  irre- 
movable judges;  the  abolition  of  torture,  the  freedom 
of  the  Press,  and  the  equality  of  the  Ottoman  subjects. 
Islam  is  declared  to  be  the  religion  of  the  state,  but 
freedom  of  worship  was  secured  to  all  creeds,  and  all 
persons,  irrespective  of  religion,  were  declared  eligible 
to  public  office. 

Parliament  consists  of  two  houses,  a  chamber  of  depu- 
ties and  a  Senate.  Senators  must  be  forty  years  of  age 
and  are  appointed  by  the  Sultan.  Deputies  are  elected 
by  an  indirect  method..  Each  six  hundred  electors  elect 
one  electoral  delegate  and  each  ten  of  these  electoral  del- 

261 


Statistics 

ejjates  choose  on<)  deputy.  Electors  nuist  be  Ottoman 
subjects  at  least  '.'5  years  of  age,  wliile  electoral  dele- 
gates must  be  30. 

Civil  L)r  military  nfficals  can  be  candidates,  but  must 
roi^^n  their  appointment  if  elected. 

This  is  the  Constitution  at  present  theoretically  in 
force. 

The  executi\e  pt>\ver  is  exercised  by  the  Sultan 
through  a  Cabinet  lesponsible  to  him.  This  Cabinet 
\  aries  in  size  and  at  present  consists  of  r<?  members. 

The  whole  of  the  Empire  is  divided  into  Vilayets  or 
governments,  at  the  head  of  the  administration  of 
which  is  a  \  ali,  or  governor  general,  rejjrescnting  the 
Sultan,  and  assisted  bv  a  provincial  council. 

The  \ilayet3  are  sub(li\  idcd  into  Sanjaks  or  minor 
provinces,  and  these  in  turn  into  Kazas  or  districts.  At 
the  bottom  of  the  list  is  the  Karie  or  village.  These 
minor  divisions  are  subjected  to  minor  authorities. 
Mutesarifs.  Kaimakams  and  Mnktars,  under  the  super- 
intendency  of  the  \'ali. 

All  subjects,  however  humble  their  (Origin,  are  eligi- 
ble to.  and  may  fill,  the  highest  offices  of  the  state. 

The  Turkish  Empire  is  made  of  (1)  Turkey  in  Eur- 
ope; (2)  Turkey  in  .Asia;  (3)  Provinces  of  the  Isle  of 
Samos  and  Cyprus,  but  the  tenure  of  the  latter  is 
merelv  nominal,  if  even  that. 

The  total  area  may  be  estimated  at  T10.',i2l  square 
miles  and  its  total  population  at  21.273.000.  Mahometan- 
ism  is  the  established  state  religion.  The  Sultan  as 
Calipliis  Supreme  Head.  The  chief  ecclesiastical  dig- 
nitary is  the  Sheik-al-Islam.  but  his  functions  are  judi- 
cial and  legal  rather  than  spiritual,  lie  is  a  member  of 
the  Cabinet. 

A  number  of  non-Mahometan  native  communities  or 
"millets"  are  recognized  by  the  Turkish  government. 

In  Turkey,  elementary  education  is  nominally  ohlig- 
atorv  for  all  children  of  both  sexes.  The  most  recent 
enactment  on  the  subject  is  a  Pro\isional  Law  of  Octo- 
ber 6.  1IM.3.  Under  tliis  law  all  children  from  7  to  16 
are  to  receive  primarv  instruction,  which  may.  how- 
ever, be  given  in  State  schools,  schools  maintained  by 
communities,  or  private  schools,  or  subject  to  certain 
tests  at  home.  The  schools  in  the  Empire  number 
about  3fi.23n  and  contain  approximately  1.331.000 
pupils. 

<')n   September    II,    II»1.<.   tin-  Turkish  debt   anv)unted 

262 


Statistics 

to  $675,654,000  at  various  rates  of  interest.  The  bulk  of 
the  debt  is  secured  by  administered  revenues. 

Adrianople  is  the  principal  fortress  in  European  'I\ir- 
key ;  technically  it  is  an  entrenched  camp.  On  the  land 
side,  Constantinople  is  defended  by  the  lines  of  Chatalja. 
The  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles,  the  approaches  by 
sea,  are  both  fairly  strongly  fortified. 

Smyrna  is  defended  to  some  extent  and  so  is  Krzerum 
in  Armenia. 

Military  service  in  Turkey,  according  to  the  decree  of 
August,  1909,  is  compulsory  and  universal. 

Liability  commences  at  the  age  of  20  and  lasts  for  20 
years.  Service  in  the  first  line  or  active  army,  called  the 
Nizam,  is  for  nine  years,  three  in  the  ranks  and  six  in 
the  reserve.  The  soldier  next  passes  to  the  i-ledif  or  sec- 
ond line  and  remains  therein  for  another  nine  years. 
Finally  he  completes  his  service  with  two  years  in  the 
Mustahfiz.  Reserves  are  liable  to  be  summoned  annually 
for  six  weeks'  training  and  the  Redif  for  one  month  in 
alternate  years. 

The  Redif  is  of  two  classes,  the  first,  of  the  men  who 
have  served  three  years  with  the  colors,  and  the  second 
of  men  who  for  various  reasons  were  exempted  for 
service  with  the  colors,  and  who,  after  a  short  training, 
pass  directly  into  the  Redif  category. 

The  approximate  peace  strength  of  the  Turkish  army 
is  about  230,000;  on  a  war  footing,  about  1,400,000 
would  be,  it  is  thought,  available. 

The  Turkish  infantry  is  armed  with  the  7.6.5mm.  Mau- 
ser magazine  rifle,  model  1890.  The  artillery  uses  the  7.5 
cm.  Q.  F.  Krupp  guns  and  in  1914  a  large  number  of 
Schneider  Q.  F.  and  Skoda  Q.  F.  howitzers  were  added. 
The  average  cost  of  the  army  in  late  years  in  peace  has 
been  about  $49,000,000,  including  the  expenditures  for 
the  42,000  members  of  the  gendarmerie,  which  is  really 
a  military  force. 

Crews  are  raised  for  the  Turkish  navy  by  both  con- 
scription and  voluntary  enlistment.  The  term  of  service 
is  twelve  years,  five  in  active  service,  three  in  the  re- 
serve and  four  in  the  Redif.  The  navy  has  a  nominal 
strength  of  about  31,000  in  all  ranks,  besides  9.000  ma- 
rines. 

The  names  of  the  principal  ships  are  shown  on  the  fol- 
lowing page. 

263 


Statistics 


PRINCIPAL  SHIPS  OF  TURKEY'S  NAVY. 


DREADNOUGHTS 

B«run         Nam*  DIaplaccment  Main  Armament         Hon*  Power  8p«*d 

1912  Osman*    27,500          14   12-in.,  20  6-in.  45,000  22 

1913  Reshadich    23.000         10  13.5-in.,  16  fi-in.  31,000  21 

1918     Fatiht  — 

OLD  BATTLESHIPS 

1874     Mcssoudiyeh    10,000           2  9.2-in..  12  6-in.  11.000  18 

1891     Torghout    RcissJ    10.000            2  9.2-in..  12  6-in.  11,000  16 

1891     Barbaroius  Hairredinct-.lO.oeo           6  ii-in..  8  4-in.  10,000  17 

CRUISERS 

1903     Medjidieh   3,300           2  6-in..  8  4.7-in.  12.500  32 

1913     Hnmidiveli   3.800           2  «-in.,  8  4.7-in.  12,000  22 


•Purchased    from    Brazil.     tOrdercd    in    .^p^iI.    1914,    being   built    in 
N'ewcastlc.      |Fv-r,/-rnirin    ).;ttfl.ship<;. 


?ri4 


Statistics 

'l"he  soil  in  Turkey  for  the  most  part  is  very  fertile,  but 
agncullure  is  most  primitive.   The  principal  products  are 
tobacco,  cereals  of  all  sorts,  cotton,  figs,  nuts,  olives,  etc. 
In   1911     164,979,000   bushels    of    wheat,    119,90;j,960 
bushels  of  barley,  200,000  bales  of  cotton  were  produced. 
Mining  is  of  some  importance.   Copper,  iron,  zinc,  coal 
(the  production  of  this  is  very  rapidly  increasing)   and 
the  precious  metals  are  produced  in  important  quantities. 
The  fisheries  are  also  important.  Besides  fish,  sponges, 
mother  of  pearl  and  pearls  figure  quite  largely  in  the  re- 
turns. 

Manufactures  are  mostly  quite  primitive. 
The  shipping  of  the  Turkish  Empire  in  1911  consisted 
of  120  steamers  of  66,678  tons,  963  sailing  vessels    of 
205,641  tons. 

The  length  of  railroads  in  Turkey  on  January  1,  1913, 
was  3,882  miles.  There  are  6,000  miles  projected  and 
under  construction. 

There  are  1,632  post-offices  in  the  Empire  and  1,017 
telegraph  offices. 


2  (I, 5 


SECRET  AGREEMENTS 


DOCUMENT  NO.  1. 

Report  of  General  Diicarne,  Chief  of  the  Belgian  Gen- 
eral Staff,  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  War. 

"Confidential 

"Letter  to  the  Minister 
"Concerning  the  Confidential  Conversations 

"Brussels,  April  10.  1906. 

"Mr.  Minister: 

"I  have  the  honor  to  report  to  you  briefly  about  the 
conversations  which  I  had  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barn- 
ardistun  and  which  have  already  been  the  subject  of  my 
oral  coniiiuinications. 

"The  first  visit  took  place  in  the  middle  of  January. 
Mr.  Bamardiston  referred  to  the  anxieties  of  the  General 
Staff  of  his  country  with  regard  to  the  general  political 
situation  and  because  of  the  possibility  that  war  may 
soon  break  out.  In  case  Belgium  shoidd  be  attacked,  the 
sending  of  alx)ut  100, (><K)  troops  was  provided  for. 

"The  Lieutenant-Colonel  asked  me  how  such  a  meas- 
ure would  be  regarded  by  us.  I  answered  him.  that 
from  a  militar>'  |X)int  of  view  it  could  not  Ije  but  favor- 
able, but  that  this  question  of  intervention  was  just  as 
much  a  matter  for  the  political  authorites,  and  that, 
therefore,  it  was  my  duty  to  inform  the  Minister  of  War 
about  it. 

"Mr.  Barnardiston  answered  that  his  Minister  in 
Brussels  would  speak  alxiut  it  with  our  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs. 

"He  proceeded  in  the  following  sense:  The  lantling 
of  the  English  troops  would  take  place  at  the  I'rcnch 
coast  in  the  vicinity  of  Dunkirk  and  Calais,  .so  as  to 
hasten  their  movements  as  much  as  possible.  The  entry 
of  the  English  into  Belgium  would  take  place  only  after 
the  violation  of  our  neutrality  by  Germany.  A  landing 
in  .Antwerp  would  take  much  more  time,  lK*cause  larger 
transports  would  be  needed,  and  because  on  tlie  other 
hand  the  safety  would  be  less  complete. 

266 


Secret  Agreements 

"This  admitted,  there  would  be  several  other  points 
to  consider,  such  as  railway  transportation,  the  question 
of  requisitions  which  the  English  army  could  make,  the 
question  concerning  the  chief  command  of  the  allied 
forces. 

"He  inquired  whether  our  preparations  were  sufficient 
to  secure  the  defense  of  the  country  during  the  crossing 
and  the  transportation  of  the  English  troops — which  he 
estimated  to  last  about  ten  days. 

"I  answered  him  tiiat  the  places  Namur  and  Liege 
were  protected  from  a  "coup  de  main"  and  that  our  field 
army  of  100,000  men  would  be  capable  of  intervention 
within  four  days. 

"After  having  expressed  his  full  satisfaction  with  my 
explanations,  my  \isitor  laid  emphasis  on  the  following 
facts:  (1)  that  our  conversation  was  entirely  confiden- 
tial; (2)  that  it  was  not  binding  on  his  government; 
(3)  that  his  Minister,  the  English  General  Staff,  he  and 
I  w^ere,  up  to  the  present,  the  only  ones  informed  about 
the  matter;  (i)  that  he  did  not  know  whether  the  opin- 
ion of  his  Sovereign  has  been  consulted. 

*     *     * 

"In  a  following  discussion  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bar- 
nardiston  assured  me  that  he  had  never  received  confi- 
dential reports  of  the  other  military  attaches  about  our 
army.  He  then  gave  the  exact  numerical  data  of  the 
English  forces;  we  could  depend  on  it,  that  in  12  or  13 
days  2  armv  corps.  4  cavalry  brigades  and  2  brigades 
of  horse  infantry  would  be  landed. 

"He  asked  me  to  study  the  question  of  the  transport 
of  these  forces  to  that  part  of  the  country  where  they 
would  he  useful,  and  he  promised  to  give  me  for  this 
purpose  details  about  the  composition  of  the  landing 
army. 

"He  reverted  to  the  question  concerning  the  effective 
strength  of  our  field  army,  and  he  emphasized  that  no 
detachments  should  be  sent  from  this  army  to  Namur 
and  Liege,  because  these  places  were  provided  with 
garrisons  of  sufficient  strength. 

"He  asked  me  to  direct  my  attention  to  the  necessity 
of  granting  the  English  army  the  advantages  which  the 
regulations  concerning  the  military  requisitions  pro- 
vided for.  FinalK  he  insisted  upon  the  question  of  the 
chief  command. 

"I  answered  him  that  I  could  say  nothing  with  refer- 

267 


Secret  Agreements 

enoe  to  this  la^^t  point  and  promised  him  that  I  would 

>tvid\    thf   other   que'sti<>">-   .-irefnlU 

•      »      * 

"Later  on  the  Engli>h  Military  Attaclie  confirmed 
his  former  calculations:  \2  days  would  at  least  be  nec- 
essary to  carry  out  the  landinp^  at  the  French  coast. 
It  would  take  a  considerably  lonpcr  time  (1  to  ^'^ 
months)  to  land  lOo.ooo  men  in  Antwerp. 

"Upon  my  objection  that  it  would  be  unnecessary  to 
await  the  end  of  the  landing  in  order  to  bepin  with  the 
railway  transportations,  and  that  it  would  be  better  to 
proceed  with  these,  as  when  the  troops  arrived  at  the 
qoast.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Rarnardiston  promised  to 
g^ve  mc  exact  data  is  to  the  numl^er  of  troops  that 
could  be  landed  daily. 

"As  regards  the  military  requisitions,  I  told  my  vis- 
itor that  this  question  could  be  easily  regulated. 


♦     ♦     ♦ 


"The  further  the  plans  of  the  English  General  Staff 
progressed,  the  clearer  became  the  details  of  the  prob- 
lem. The  Colonel  assured  mc  that  one-half  of  the  Eng- 
lish arnn  could  be  landed  within  8  days;  the  rest  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  I'-^th  or  13th  day.  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Horse  Infantry,  which  could  not  be  counted 
upon  until  later. 

"In  spite  of  this  1  thought  I  had  to  insist  again  upon 
the  necessitv  of  knowing  the  exact  number  of  the  daily 
shipments,  in  order  to  regulate  the  railway  transporta- 
tion for  every  day. 

"The  English  Military  Attache  conversed  with  me 
about  several  other  questions,  namely: 

"(1)  The  necessitv  of  keeping  the  operations  secret 
and  of  demanding  strict  secrecy  from  the  Press; 

"(2)  The  advantage*^  which  would  accrue  from  giv- 
ing one  r.elgian  officer  to  each,  English  General  Staff, 
one  interpreter  to  each  commanding  officer,  and  gen- 
darmes to  each  unit  of  troops,  in  order  to  assist  the 

British  prilicc  troops. 

*     *     « 

"In  the  course  i  another  interview  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  P..Trnardiston  and  I  studied  the  combined  oper- 
ations to  take  place  in  the  event  of  a  German  offensive 
with  Antwerp  as  it«i  object  and  under  the  hypothesi*; 
of  the  German  troops  marching  through  our  '"iinfrv 
in  order  to  reach  the  French  Ardennes. 

"In  this  qttcstinn.  the  Colonel  t;nid  he  quite  ncneed 


Secret  Agreements 

with  the  plan  which  1  had  submitted  to  him,  and  he  as- 
sured me  also  of  the  approval  of  General  (jrierson, 
Chief  of  the  English  General  Staff. 

"Other  secondary  questions  which  were  likewise  set- 
tled had  particular  reference  to  intermediary  officers, 
interpreters,  gendarmes,  mai)s,  photographs  of  the  uni- 
forms, special  copies,  translated  into  English,  of  some 
Belgian  regulations,  the  regulations  concerning  the  im- 
port duties  on  English  provisions,  to  the  accommodation 
of  the  wounded  of  the  allied  armies,  etc.  Nothing  was 
resolved  on  as  regards  the  activity  which  the  Govern- 
ment or  the  Military  authorities  might  exert  on  the  Press. 

*     *     * 

"During  the  final  meetings  which  1  had  with  the 
British  Attache,  he  informed  me  about  the  numbers  of 
troops  which  would  be  daily  disembarked  at  Boulogne, 
Calais  and  Cherbourg.  Tlvftj.di.stance  of  the  last  place, 
which  is  necessary  for  technical  considerations,  will  in- 
volve a  certain  delay.  The  first  Corps  would  be  disem- 
barked on  the  lUth  day,  and  the  second  on  the  loth  day. 
Our  railways  would  carry  out  the  transportation  so  that 
the  arrival  of  the  first  Corps,  either  in  the  direction  of 
Brussels-Louvain  or  of  Namur-Dinant,  would  be  as- 
sured on  the  11th  day,  and  that  of  the  second  on  the 
IGth  day. 

"I  again,  for  a  last  time,  and  as  emphatically  as  I 
could,  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  hastening  the  sea- 
transports  so  that  the  English  troops  could  be  with  us 
between  the  11th  and  12th  day.  The  happiest  and  most 
favorable  results  can  be  reached  by  a  convergent  and 
simultaneous  action  of  the  allied  forces.  But  if  that 
co-operation  should  not  take  place,  the  failure  would 
be  most  serious.  Colonel  Barnardiston  assured  me  that 
everything  serving  to  this  end  would  be  done, 

!  "In  the  course  of  our  conversations,  I  had  occasion 
to  .convince  the  British  Military  Attache  that  we  were 
willing,  so  far  as  possible,  to  thwart  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  and  not  to  take  refuge  in  Antwerp  from  the 
beginning. 

"Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  on  his  part  told  me 
that,  at  the  time,  he  had  little  hope  for  any  support  or 
intervention  on  the  part  of  Holland.  At  the  same  time 
he  informed  me  that  his  Government  intended  to  trans- 
fer  the    basis    of    the    British    commissariat    from    the 

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Secret  Agreements 

French  coa>i   to  Antwerp  .i>   suoii   as  all  German  ships 
were  swept  off  the  North  Sea. 
*     *     * 

"In  all  our  ct>nversations  the  Colonel  regularly  in- 
formed me  about  the  secret  news  which  he  had  con- 
cerning the  military  circumstances  and  the  situation  of 
our  Kastern  neighlK>rs.  etc.  At  the  same  time  he  em- 
phasizetl  that  Belgium  was  under  the  imperative  neces- 
sity to  keep  herself  constantly  informed  of  the  hap- 
penings in  the  adjoining  Rhinelands.  I  had  to  admit 
that  with  us  the  surveillance-service  abroad  was,  in  times 
of  peace,  not  directly  in  the  hands  of  the  General  Staff, 
as  our  Legations  had  no  Military  Attaches.  But  1  was 
careful  not  to  a<lmit  that  I  did  not  know  whether  the 
espionage  service  which  is  prescrilx-d  in  our  regidations 
was  in  working  order  or  not.  lUit  I  consider  it  my 
duty  to  {xiint  out  this  jxtsition  which  places  us  in  a  state 
of  evident  inferiority  to  oiW  neighbors,  our  presumable 
enemies.  ^-^i'" 

"Major-Gcnrral,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 
(  Initials  of  General  Ducarne.) 

"Note.  When  1  met  General  Gricrson  at  Compiegne, 
during  the  manoeuvres  of  1!M)6,  he  assured  me  the  result 
of  the  re-organization  of  the  English  army  would  be 
that  the  landing  of  loO.Ooo  would  be  assured  and  that, 
moreover,  they  would  stand  ready  for  action  in  a  shorter 
time  than  has  been  assvuned  alxne. 

"Concluded  September,  1906." 
(Initials  of  General  Ducame.) 


ANGLO-BELGIAN    AGREEMENTS. 

DOCUMENT  NO.  2. 

Minutes  of  a  Conference  Between  the  Belgian  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  General  Jungbluth,  and  the  British 
Military  Attache,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges. 

(Lieutenant-Colonel  Harnar<liston,  British  Military 
Attache  in  Brussels,  was  succeeded  in  his  office  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges.  Likewise,  General  Du- 
rarnc  was  succeeded,  as  Chief  of  the  Belgian  Staff,  by 
General  Jungbluth.  .\  conversation  between  Colonel 
Briflges    and     General     Jungbluth     was    committed     to 

270 


Secret  Agreements 

writing,  and  that  writing  was  also  found  at  the  Bel- 
gian Foreign  Office.  The  document,  which  is  dated 
April  23r(l  and  is  presumed  to  belong  to  the  year  1912, 
is  marked  "confidentielle"  in  the  handwriting  of  Graf, 
v.d.  Straaten,  the  Belgian  Foreign  Secretary.  This  is 
the  translation :) 

"Confidential 

"The  British  Military  Attache  asked  to  see  General 
Jungbluth.  The  two  gentlemen  met  on  April  23rd. 

"Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges  told  the  General  that 
England  had  at  her  disposal  an  army  which  could  be  sent 
to  the  Continent,  composed  of  six  tli visions  of  infantry 
and  eight  brigades  of  cavalry — together  100,000  troops. 
She  has  also  everything  which  is  necessary  for  her  to 
defend  her  insular  territory.     Everything  is  ready. 

"At  the  time  of  the  recent  events,  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  have  immediately  effected  a  disembark- 
ment  in  Belgium  (chez  nous),  even  if  we  had  not  asked 
for  assistance. 

"The  General  objected  that  for  that  our  consent  was 
necessary. 

"The  Military  Attache  answered  that  he  knew  this, 
but  that — since  we  were  not  able  to  prevent  the  Ger- 
mans from  passing  through  our  country — England  would 
have  landed  her  troops  in  Belgium  under  all  circum- 
stances (en  tout  etat  de  cause). 

"As  for  the  place  of  landing,  the  Military  Attache  did 
not  make  a  precise  statement ;  he  said  that  the  coast  was 
rather  long,  but  the  General  knows  that  Mr.  Bridges, 
during  Easter,  has  paid  daily  visits  to  Zeebrugge  from 
Ostende. 

"The  General  added  that  we  were,  besides,  per- 
fectly able  to  prevent  the  Germans  from  passing  through." 

DOCUMENT  NO.  3. 

Report  of  Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin, 
to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
(On  the  23rd  of  December,  1911,  Baron  Greindl, 
then  and  for  many  years  Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin, 
made  a  report  to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
There  was  found  in  Brussels  a  copy  of  this  report ; 
although  a  copy,  the  official  character  of  this  third  docu- 
ment found  in  Brussels    is    evident    from    the    official 

271 


Secret  Agreements 

imprint  on  the  puijcr  on  which  the  copy  stands.     Tlic 
first  page  reads: 

Section.  ...    N\> Enclosure.  .  .  . 

Reply  to  No.  General  Department  Of  lice  oi 

llrllU'i.m  l.ciration.  NO.  :U^\>2 — Hi'Hi. 

lierlin.  Deceniher  ^3,  TJll. 
Mii«.ii\   Conficieniial. 
What  IS  Itclgiun)  to  do  in  case  of  war  ; 

Mr.  Minister: 
I  Iwve  had  the  honor  to  receive  ihc  dispatch  of  the 
^<J7  Novenil)er  last.  1'  without  docket  numlier,  registra- 
tion number  1 108. 

Baron  Greindl's  report  is  an  extremely  long  one. 
The  writer  reveals  with  i^rent  astuteness  the  ulterior 
motives  underlying  tin  ICnj^lish  proposal  and  draws 
attention  to  the  danger  of  the  situation  in  which  Bel- 
gium had  become  inxolved  l)y  a  one-sided  partisanship 
in  favor  of  the  Powers  ni  the  Entente.  In  this  very 
detailed  report,  dated  Oec.  2'6.  1911.  I'.aron  Grcindl  ex- 
plains that  the  plan  of  the  General  .\rmy  Staff  for  the 
defense  of  Belgian  neutrality  in  a  Eranco-German 
war  as  communicated  to  him  only  concerned  the  (jues- 
tion  as  to  what  military  measures  should  be  adopted 
in  case  Germany  violated  l>elgian  neutrality.  The 
hypothesis  of  a  Erench  attack  on  Germany  through 
Belgium  had.  however,  just  as  nmch  probability  in  it- 
self. The  (lii)loniat  then  goes  on  in  the  following 
manner : 

'*From  the  Erench  side  danger  threatens  not  only  in 
the  south  of  Luxemburg,  it  threatens  us  ou  our  entire 
joint  frontier.  We  are  not  reduced  to  conjectures  for 
this  assertion.     We  have  positive  evidence  of  it. 

"Evidently  the  project  of  an  outflanking  movement 
from  the  north  forms  part  of  the  scheme  of  the  'En- 
tente Cordiale.'  If  that  were  not  the  case,  then  the 
plan  of  fortifvinj;  Elushinp  would  nf«t  hnvr  called  forth 
such  an  outburst  in  Paris  and  London.  The  reason 
why  they  wished  that  the  Scheldt  should  remain  for- 
tified,was  hardly  concealed  by  them.  Their  aim  was 
to  be  able  to  transport  an  English  garrison,  imhin- 
dcred,  to  Antwerp,  which  means  to  establish  in  our 
countrv  a  basis  of  operation  for  an  offensive  iti  the  di- 
rection of  the  Ivowcr  Rhine  and  Westphalia,  and  then 
to  make  us  throw  our  lot  in  with  them,  which  would 
not  be  difficult,  for.  after  the  surrender  of  our  national 
center  of  refui^c.  we  would,  through  our  nwn  fault, 
renounce  every  pos«;it)ility  of  opposing  the  demands  of 

27? 


Secret  Agreements 

our  doubtful  protectors  after  having  been  so  unwise 
as  to  permit  tbeir  entrance  into  our  country.  Colonel 
Barnardiston's  announcements  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
clusion of  the  'Entente  Cordiale,'  which  were  just  as 
perfidious  as  they  were  naive,  have  shown  us  plainly 
the  true  meaning  of  things.  When  it  became  evident' 
that  we  would  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  frightened  by 
the  pretended  danger  of  the  closing  of  the  Scheldt,  the 
plan  was  not  entirely  abandoned,  but  modified  in  so 
far  as  the  British  army  was  not  to  land  on  the  Belgian 
coast,  but  at  the  nearest  French  harbors. 

"The  revelations  of  Captain  Faber,  which  were  de- 
nied as  little  as  the  newspaper  reports  by  which  they 
were  confirmed  or  completed  in  several  respects,  also 
testify  to  this.  This  British  army,  at  Calais  and  Dun- 
kirk, would  by  no  means  march  along  our  frontier  tp 
Longwey  in  order  to  reach  Germany.  It  would  di- 
rectly invade  Belgium  from  the  northwest.  That  would 
give  it  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  begin  operations 
immediately,  to  encounter  the  Belgian  army  in  a  re- 
gion where  we  could  not  depend  on  any  fortress,  in 
case  we  wanted  to  risk  a  battle.  Moreover,  that  would 
make  it  possible  for  it  to  occupy  provinces  rich  in  all 
kinds  of  resources  and,  at  any  rate,  to  prevent  onr  mo- 
bilization or  only  to  permit  it  after  we  had  formally- 
pledged  ourselves  to  carry  on  our  mobilization  to  the 
exclusive  advantage  of  England  and  her  allies. 

"It  is  therefore  of  necessity  to  prepare  a  plan  of  bat- 
tle for  the  Belgian  army  also  for  that  possibilitv.  This 
is  necessary  in  the  interest  of  our  military  defense  as 
well  as  for  the  sake  of  the  direction  of  our  foreign 
policy,  in  case  of  war  between  Germany  and  France." 


273 


NAVAL  LOSSES 

TO  MARCH  1ST.  1916. 

Torpedo  boats,  destroyers,    submarines    and    other 
small  vessels  omitted. 


GREAT    BRITAIN. 

Aug.  7 — Amphion,  protected  cruiser  North  Sea 

Sept.  4 — Speedy,  torpedo  gunboat  North  Sea 

6 — Patlifinder,  protected  cruiser  Nortli  Sea 

7 — Warrior,  protected  cruiser  Bosphorus 

20 — Pegasus,  protected  cruiser  Zanzibar 

22 — Aboukir,  protected  crui.ser  North  Sea 

22 — Cressy,  protected  cruiser  North  Sea 

22 — Ilogue,  protected  cruiser  North  Sea 

Oct.  15 — Hawke,  protected  cruiser  North  Sea 

27 — Audacious,  dreadnought  Irisii  Coast 

31 — Hermes,  protected  cruiser  North  Sea 

Nov.  1 — Monmouth,  armored  cruiser  Chilean  Coast 

1 — Good  Hope,  armored  cruiser  Chilean  Coast 

11 — Niger,  torpedo  gunboat  Deal 

26 — Bulwark,  battleship  Sheerness 

Jan.    1 — Formidable,  battleship  Channel 

Number  vessels  lost,  16. 


GERMANY 

Aug.  5 — Panther,  gunboat 

20 — H.  \"on  Wissman,  gunboat 
27 — Magdeburg,  protected  cruiser 
28 — Mainz,  protected  cruiser 
28 — Koeln,  protected  cruiser 
28 — .Ariadne,  protected  cruiser 
Sept.  ir> — Hela,  small  cruiser 
Nov.  4 — Vorck,  armored  cruiser 
7 — Jaguar,  gunboat 
7 — Luchs,  gunboat 
7 — litis,  gunboat 
7 — C^rmoran,  gunboat 
7 — Ti|L,'er,  guni)oat 
7 — Emden.  protected  cruiser 
Dec.  8 — Scharnhorst.  armored  cruiser 
8 — Gneisenau,  armored  cruiser 
8 — Lcif)zig,  protected  cruiser 
8 — Nurnberg,  protected  cruiser 
Jan.  24  —  Rlucher,  armored  cruiser 
Number  vessels  lost,  19. 

274 


Mediterranean 

Gulf  of  Finland 

Helgoland 

Helgoland 

1  lel'^oland 

North  Sea 

Wilholinshaven 

Tsingtau 

Tsingtau 

Tsingtau 

Tsinj^tau 

Tsingtau 

Indian  C^cean 

South  .Atlantic 

South  .Atlantic 

South  .Atlantic 

South  Atlantic 

North  Sea 


Naval  Losses 

AUSTRIA 

Aug.  16— Zenta,  cruiser  Antivari 

Oct.  23 — Temes,  gunboat 

Nov.    6— Kaiserin-Klisaheth,  cruiser  Kia-Chow 

FRANCE 
Oct.  28 — Zelee,  gunboat 

28 — Mousquet,  destroyer 

RUSSIA 

Oct.  11 — Pallada,  armored  cruiser 
28 — Jemtchug,  cruiser 
29 — Donetz,  gunboat 

JAPAN 

Sept.    4 — Shiratage,  destroyer 
Oct.  17 — Takachicho,  cruiser 


TURKEY 

Oct.  31 — Burak  Reis,  gunboat 
Dec.  13 — Messudiyeh/battleship 


Dardanelles 


275 


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